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ABSTRACT
Historical ethnographic and early psychoanalytic epistemologies on 'fetishism' focus primarily on  
the fetish 'object', whereby the subject of 'fetish practices' was identified, pathologised and/or socio-
culturally invalidated primarily on the basis of affiliation with a taboo object. Such uncritical  
reliance on dualist, oppositional thinking and divisive, psychopathologising tendencies attenuates 
subjectivities and agency, and is inconsistent with contemporary postcolonial and queer scholarship.
Contemporary discourses around (gay male sexual) 'fetishism', lodged in the definitions and  
diagnostic criteria of sexual 'fetishism' in the World Health Organisation's International 
Classification of Diseases, efface the subjectivities of sexual subjects who incorporate material  
objects into their sexual scripts. I argue that these classifications should be completely revised, since 
more appropriate subject-oriented epistemologies on sexuality incorporating material objects should  
acknowledge the constitution of the subject as phenomenologically taking place through 
intersections between materiality and discourse. This implies that no separate psychopathology of 
'fetishism' can exist, since subjects, material objects and discourse cannot be effectively separated 
from each other.
In contradistinction, a subject-oriented approach should, I suggest, be adopted, oriented around the 
(non-essentialist) constitution and lived experiences of sexual subjects, rather than on human or 
inanimate objects of sexual attention. This approach focuses on the necessary role of the human 
(sexual) body, which is neither entirely discursively nor materially constructed, but rather is 
engaged in a complex interaction with subjectivities, discourse and the phenomenal world. The  
(non-unitary) 'self' is him/herself subject, object and part of a cultural environment, experientially  
delineated through 'embodiment', with the phenomenological paradigm allowing for validation of 
sexual expression from an inclusive perspective, to develop complex cartographies of subjectivities.
Based on this foundation, the thesis argues that the embodied sexual experience of the 'gay male  
fetishist' subject therefore serves to link him, objects and environments dialectically. Rather than 
being the 'object' of supervening drives, he is a valid agent, exploring his subjectivity and orienting  
himself in relation to his environment through his embodied experience. 'Sexual fetish' practices 
therefore function as connecting (rather than divisive) forces in human relations with the world. At 
the same time, consensual, non-harmful 'gay male fetish' sexualities are potentially self-
transformative and socially-transformative practices, called on as resources for recognising personal 
value.
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OPENING PARENTHESIS: POLITICAL CONTEXTS
“classificatory end-products to which the word 'fetish' has been applied cannot be understood simply as 
special kinds of objects, or defined in terms of their generic functional attributes. Neither do they reflect a 
particular mental condition. Rather, they reveal a variable combination of three universal underlying 
features of categorisation and representation: concretisation, animation or anthropomorphisation; 
conflation of signifier with signified; and an ambiguous relationship of control between person and object.  
All lie on a processual continuum which begins with identification of categories, relationships and 
p h e n o m e n a , a n d p r o c e e d s – v i a r e i f i c a t i o n a n d i c o n i f i c a t i o n – t o t h e i r 
personification.”1
We face a curious set of circumstances in the South African politics of sexual orientation. The 
country boasts one of the world's most progressive constitutions, which successfully protects 
marginal sexualities and underscores legislation affording lesbians and gay men equal rights in such 
areas as marriage, inheritance, insurance, medical aid and so on. Yet some sixteen years into  
democracy, the society remains disturbingly conservative, and popular discourses continue to 
marginalise gay men and lesbians, who face approbation, exclusion and the threat of violence on a  
daily basis2. At best, South African society is only becoming marginally more tolerant of unusual  
sexualities3. At worst, prevalent negative, heteropatriarchal discourses construct non-normative 
sexualities as ills to be exorcised or 'cured'4. 
It is politically desirable to develop a society which supports growth and the achievement of 
happiness and fulfilment. Yet such a society is not yet one in which we live. Clearly, simply shifting  
social and legal policies, principles and regulations from authoritarianism to human rights has not  
been sufficient to thwart the menace of conservatism and create a space in which non-normative 
sexualities can thrive. More fundamental change must surely be actioned in order to dismantle 
heteronormativity and move beyond the legal imperative imposed on the broader populace to 
merely 'tolerate' non-normative sexuality. To achieve an environment in which 
all sexual activity and identification (which includes both the normative and non-normative  
sexuality) can flourish, more effective political action should be identified. This research suggests  
more appropriate metatheoretical constructs on which to base such political action.
1 Ellen, R.F. (1988, 2006) Fetishism: A Cognitive Approach. In The Categorical Impulse: essays in the anthropology  
of classifying behaviour. Oxford & NY:Berghahn Books166-189 at 166
2 As well as bisexual, transgendered and intersexed people. See chapter 2
3 See chapter 2
4 See chapter 2 re homophobic discourses and violence aimed at gay, lesbian and transgendered people.
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Rationale
Legal protection of human rights and the mere tolerance of minority sexual variation is, I suggest, a 
problematic aspiration. Although necessary in the short term to prevent danger to life and limb, and  
to ensure fair disposition of resources, it appears to be insufficient as a basis on which to 
acknowledge that all people are both different and similar, and are both individuals and part of a 
wider world. It appears further to be an insufficient starting-point from which people can learn and 
gain positive value from each other.
The Political Question: Essentialism vs Discourse, or Something Else?
Essentialism
Part of the problem appears to lie in prevailing identity politics paradigms which essentialise human 
experience and personal growth. Such frameworks insist on characterising lesbians and gay men as  
d i s c r e t e e n t i t i e s , s o m e h o w f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o t h e h e t e r o s e x u a l 
population5. They largely and often unintentionally bind human experience to the prescribed sexual  
identities of 'straight' or 'gay' in order to qualify for rights and validation. This tends to tie people  
into essentialist, dualist roles and performances, marginalising those who live beyond singular 
'identities', and those who choose rather to attribute their individual value to diverse experiences or  
relations6. It tends to preclude fluid and multiple identifications: a 'homosexual' cannot be anything  
else, whether or not he/she wants to be.
The cancer of absolutist and essentialist thinking is, I suggest, further not only alive and well in the  
problematic diatribes of political and legal 'equality' in contemporary democratic 
discourse7. It permeates at a deeper level, in the interstices of metatheoretical constructs against  
which people measure physical and emotional health, and therefore adjudge the value of human 
experience. Such constructs tend to assume people primarily to be a variation of 'things' in the  
Cartesian mould: physical objects with separate minds. This often leads to the widespread belief  
that individuals are somehow fundamentally different to each other, and separate from the material  
world around them.
5 See chapter 2. Note that this thesis speaks specifically to sexual orientation, rather than gender identity, and 
therefore does not deal specifically with challenges to gender normativity, although similar principles apply.
6 See Butler, J. (1999) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity NY, Routledge
7 See chapter 2 re challenges to identity politics and the reliance on 'equality' as a basis for political change
2
 
 
 
 
This unfortunate perspective is, I suggest, often unwittingly perpetuated by many lesbians, gay men  
and gay r igh t s ac t iv i s t s , who c la im r igh t s based on such d i sc re te sexua l 
identities8. It perpetuates pre-existing heteronormativity and heteropatriarchy, and therefore 
persistently marginalises 'unusual' sexualities, notwithstanding well-meaning but arguably often 
misguided political and social pleas for some kind of equality based on difference. Contemporary 
forms of political action therefore seem to aggravate the problem, or at least maintain the negative  
status quo, by calling attention to the 'otherness' of gay men and lesbians rather than dissolving it.
Discourse vs Essentialism
Yet postmodernist, deconstructionist thinking has shifted political thinking. In the social sciences 
and humanities, both modernism and the historical reliance on essentialist presumptions is dead. Or  
at least ailing. The Foucaultian idea that discourse constructs 'reality' is now well-established, 
allowing increasing recognition that social structures are permeable. It acknowledges that 'identities'  
are fluid and mutable, and deconstructs essentialist ideas of 'otherness'.
But, I suggest, it is folly to rely on discursive accounts to fully explain social circumstances, and  
therefore to underpin political action. Discourse may account for the warp and weft of historical 
power relations, but it is often insufficiently detailed to predict or prescribe the future. Discursive 
accounts do not foretell the unfolding of events, which depend on a range of variables which 
include the choices people individually and collectively make based on their personal experience in  
a material world, however that materiality might be socially constructed.
Indeed, I suggest that both essentialist and discursive frameworks inadequately reflect the 
circumstances of the human condition in similar, foundationalist ways. Identity politics effectively 
assumes all people to have some kind of essential material identity, while discursive constructions 
often assume people to have no material identity and to be entirely constructed through discourse. 
Neither of these constructions recognises individual active enjoyment of personal value outside of  
overarching inherent constraints or power dynamics. Both tend to challenge notions of valid agency,  
through claims that choice is limited by the external controlling forces of bounded identity and 
discursive power relations respectively.
The possibility of political action is therefore in different ways attenuated or nullified, since 
individuals are effectively denied an active 'presence' in their lives, and therefore the agency to  
8 The constitution appropriately speaks of 'sexual orientation', not 'sexual identity', but most people conflate the two 
ideas. In the same way that 'gender' is read as relating primarily to women, 'sexual orientation' is seen to identify gay 
men and lesbians, while 'bisexuals', 'a-sexuals' and other categories seem to remain virtually invisible.
3
 
 
 
 
change them. Neither framework therefore seems to propose adequate solutions to homophobia and 
heteronormativity on either the personal or social front, since they assume that the power of the 
majority is either 'right' or unassailably dominant.
A Third Political Option?
To achieve more effective change, political action should, I suggest, be based on more complex 
understandings of how the variables of materiality and discourse interrelate, so as to avoid fictions  
of both the essentialist 'self' existing in an unproblematised Cartesian 'natural body', and woolly  
broad-stroke statements of a disembodied discursive constitution of social and personal experience. 
Political activity should, I suggest, also look beyond the power of numbers, which underpins both 
essentialist and discursive accounts of human experience (which translate into homophobic and gay 
rights discourses respectively). As I will discuss, both accounts tend to assume that problems and 
solutions lie in the numbers of adherents of a particular viewpoint. The solutions to 
heteronormativity and homophobia is therefore seen inherently to lie in changing the minds of, or  
protecting sexual minorities from, the large numbers of homophobes. By implication, the solution  
lies in mass action and oppositional political organisation.
This is perhaps valuable in the short term to deal with immediate concerns of violence and access to 
material resources, but I suggest that the long-term ramifications should also be taken into account.  
Identity-politics aims political activity at either defending discretely labelled 'homosexuals' from  
homophobia, or to change the minds of the majority to accommodate such people. Discursive  
constructions often only focus on large-scale discursive shifts, not concerted small-scale or 
individual activity, and thereby to merely deal with how the majority speaks about minorities.
Either way, political action remains reactionary. This is problematic, since to be reactionary is to  
perpetuate dominant, discriminatory discourses by recreating them in an oppositional way. Yet 
surely the cycle of discrimination should rather be broken and dissipated, not simply re-written 
through the same lenses? Surely all categorical distinctions between 'straight' and 'gay' (indeed all 
categorical distinctions at all), and not merely heteronormative value-judgements, should go the 
way of the dinosaurs? Surely the very idea of 'alterity' on an individual (as well as a discursive/
collective) level should be deconstructed to engender appreciation and celebration of embodied life 
itself, something from which all people benefit, while not being bound to fatuous assumptions that 
they are in some essentialist, foundationalist or determinist way the same?
4
 
 
 
 
Following from this, it makes sense that political challenges in the realm of sexualities should seek  
neither mainstreaming, nor mere 'accommodation' for unusual and non-normative sexual practices 
as some kind of rational political necessity based on minority toleration. It also makes sense that  
political activity should not be left to large-scale discursive shifts, poked at in piecemeal fashion,  
bu t s hou l d be l odge d w i t h t he i nd i v i dua l i n h i s / he r ow n s oc i o -po l i t i c a l 
context9. I therefore suggest that political activity should look beyond the power of systems, and 
towards how individuals within social systems contribute to shifting undesirable normativity 
through living their lives outside of purely reactionary actions and identifications. I suggest that  
political activity should therefore rely on well-conceived metatheory underlying relationships  
between people and things.
Metatheory for a New Wave of Political Action
'Gay men' and 'lesbians' clearly need protection in the face of opprobrium and violence. But I 
suggest that longer-term plans should also be laid to transcend 'protection' and encourage a world in  
which there is no necessary difference between people, and no value-laden basis on which to hang 
discriminatory discourses. For this, mechanisms should be identified to move beyond the 
categorical separation between entities and identities, and to recognise the positive value of unusual 
ways of living and the world-views associated with them.
This implies that political activists should unpack metatheories, and interrogate the philosophical 
assumptions to human experience. In this respect, twin Butlerian propositions are an appropriate 
tandem starting-point:
 recognising the 'dis-identification' of certain bodies, which are excluded on the basis of sex,  
ethnicity or age, whereby the idea of the material, which is made immutable, is used in  
discourses of power10; and
 critiquing the cultural construction of the material, whereby "a culture or an agency of the 
social. . . acts upon a nature, which is itself presupposed as a passive 
surface"11.
Ca l l ing on these not ions , e ssent i a l i s t f i c t iona l boundar ies be tween people 
inter se, between people and things, and between practices, can, I suggest, be reconceived. At the  
9 However that 'individual'  might be construed. Note: this thesis speaks of the power of the individual, but does not 
advocate an essentialist conception of the 'self' . See chapter 5 in this regard
10 Butler, J. (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. New York: Routledge, 1993 pp4
11 Butler, J. (1993) ibid
5
 
 
 
 
same time, discursive accounts can be factored in without relying on assumptions that people are 
exclusively constructed by discourse. Clearly, if better metatheory is to be identified than the 
foundationalist either-or propositions of essentialism or discourse, the human being should be 
interrogated as both a social and physical/emotional entity. This entails exploring the nexus between 
body, mind and society, which nexus this thesis addresses.
'Gay Male Fetish Sex': Both Question and Answer
In a delightfully perverse and amusing way, a convincing response to the conundrum of identity  
politics, discourse and the validation of non-normative sexualities emerges neither from normative 
heteropatriarchy, nor from the diatribes of more mainstream 'gay liberation' discourses. Such a 
location is, I suggest, revealed in the lives and practices of a group of people whose activities are 
not primarily political, and who remain largely marginalised by both hetero- and homosexuals, yet  
at the same time are understandably empowered, thanks to their socio-economic status: the men of  
the gay male 'leather' community whose sexual 'fetish' interests incorporate material 
objects12.
Their practices are so marginal that most of the broader population aren't even aware of their  
existence. When attention is paid to them, they are discounted as psychopathological, and derided 
or pitied, often even by their 'homosexual' compatriots13. They themselves in many ways perpetuate 
heteronormativity and discursive power relations through their practices. Yet in some ways at the  
same time they challenge social and institutional pressure both to conform to or reject  
heteronormative consensus morality. Albeit not without difficulty, and although they often reject the  
assertion, proudly claiming their singular 'gayness'. 
Even more than navigating a reprieve for themselves from restrictive heteropatriarchy, they also re-
frame alterity as a potentially good thing. Not simply because alterity is inherently a positive value, 
but because their unusual world views and experiences add functional value to their lives and the 
world around them.
12 Even though this thesis deals only with male fetishists, similar statements could be made about lesbian and 
heterosexual 'fetishists'. As will be discussed in chapter two, the choice of research participants is primarily 
pragmatic, rather than theoretical, since gay male 'fetishists' have been the easiest resource on which to call for the 
purposes of this research. However, that 'leathermen' in South Africa are arguably more publicly visible than lesbian 
or heterosexual 'fetishists' makes the former a group more representative of the metatheoretical argument around 
enabling public and personal transformation through relations with material objects (see chapter 6). The group's 
'maleness' also gives them a particularly multiple experience, being both empowered as (predominantly 'white') men, 
and yet also disempowered as a highly marginalised and frowned-upon sexual subculture.
13 Note that I use this term to denote how people identify themselves, not as a label imposed form the outside. See 
chapter 3 and 4 re psychopathology, and chapter 2 re the marginalisation of sexuality 
6
 
 
 
 
In so doing, they implicitly and often unconsciously challenge the normative and prescriptive 
separation between people inter se, and between people and things. In actively seeking out material 
sexual objects, they inadvertently and in surprising ways call attention to the mutability and fluidity 
of both human and material 'identity', and I suggest that their practices hold a key to dismantling 
essentialist assumptions around the 'thingness' of sexual orientation as a category itself, and 
therefore around the validation of heteropatriarchy14.
Ironically, their practices also reflect an alternative to the necessary primacy of discourse in the 
construction of reality and of the individual, and of notions of subjective human value, through their 
interesting materially-based exercise of agency and choice.
Supported by participant narratives, the thesis unpacks and rephrases the metatheories underlying  
'gay male fetish sex', which is thereby located as a powerful disruptive and contested site which 
reframes both essentialist-based heteronormativity and the failings of determinist discursive 
constructions15. In so doing, the thesis locates gay male fetish sex as a site at which more effective  
political activity can perhaps be organised16.
However, in advance of dealing with the specifics of the research question, and discussing the thesis 
argument, it is necessary to contextualise what is meant by 'fetish'.
A Brief Context for 'Gay Male Sexual Fetish' in South Africa
Terms of Reference & Descriptions: 'Fetish'- Variations on a Term
In polite (and impolite) conversation, people often have only a woolly sense of what 'fetish' entails. 
They discuss it in hushed tones with a glint in their eyes, nodding in a worldly fashion or looking 
embarrassed, as if it is something they should know nothing about, but feel as though they do.  
Perhaps, for many, it is a reminder of their fantasies, or of the inconsistencies between desires,  
experience and propriety. They often assume it is something to do with leather, rubber and sex toys,  
and/or in some undifferentiated way to do with carved idols, bones and feathers.
In scholarly contexts it is similarly Janus-like and multi-faceted. 
14 See chapter 5 re the constitution of the subject in relation to that of physical objects
15 See Butler, J. (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. New York: Routledge, 1993 pp4
16 See Butler, J. (1993) ibid
7
 
 
 
 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary describes the ‘fetish’ as:
Psychology: a thing abnormally stimulating or attracting sexual desire, and 
a) an inanimate object worshipped by primitive peoples for its supposed inherent magical powers or as 
being inhabited by a spirit
b) a thing evoking irrational devotion or respect17
Even at a cursory glance it is clear that the definition focuses on the 'thing', without which, by 
implication, there can be no 'fetish'. And not just any 'thing': a value-laden standard underlies this  
definition, imposing normative limits on the extent to which it is appropriate to appreciate sexual 
desire, worship or devotion. The term reels under the weight of associations with psychopathology,  
fictions of 'the primitive' in its Western superiority, and dualist assumptions about the power of 'the 
rational'18. Yet a dictionary definition is merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg, and belies profound 
discursive constructions on both 'fetish' and Western materialist frameworks.
'Fetish' as Object
'Fetish' in one sense means ‘charm’ or ‘sorcery’, coming from the Portuguese 
feitiço, meaning ‘charm’ or 'thing made by art'. It is etymologically related to ‘factitious’ and was 
used to describe the sculptures, figurines, trinkets, and religious objects of West Africans in the  
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.19 Through various moves and shifts in consciousness, 'fetish' 
slowly adopted different associations and meanings. In particular it branched out in two directions, 
describing the commodity, (specifically through Marx20); and sexuality, (especially through the 
17 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (1990) RE Allen (ed) Eighth edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford
18 See chapter 4 in respect of psychopathologies
19 Young, H (2005) The Black Body as Souvenir in American Lynching Theatre Journal 57, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press pp639–657
20 Marxist fetish is largely beyond the scope of the thesis, since it relates to commodification rather than sexuality. 
(Note the comments in the thesis Conclusion). Yet certain Marxian concepts are worth 
noting. Marx understood ‘capital’ as a kind of of fetish in its being the material form of a particular kind of social 
system. This idea linked the conception of the fetish with the capitalist social process. He explained fetish as 
“The commodity-form...[which] is nothing but the determined social relation between humans themselves which 
assumes here, for them, the phantasmagoric form of a relation between things.  In order, therefore, to find an 
analogy we must take a flight into the misty realm of religion.  Here the products of the human head appear as 
endowed with a life of their own, entering into relations both with each other and with humans”. (Marx Capital 
p. 165)
Marx first used the idea of fetish in terms other than the religious, relating mysticism and the meaning of fetish to 
economy, and proposing commodity fetishism as taking place when something which has use value is taken away 
from its original setting to enter the market place, where it gains exchange value. Importantly, this move from one 
state to another results in the human element in the thing’s production (i.e. the labour) disappearing while the 'object' 
appears, substantial and separate, or ‘real and final' (see Gemerchak, C.M (2004) Fetishism, desire and finitude: The 
artful dodge. In Gemerchak, C.M. (ed) (2004) Everyday Extraordinary: Encountering Fetishism with Marx, Freud 
and Lacan. Leuven: Leuven University Press pp 29)
Marx’s commodity fetish demonstrates the power of commercial goods to seem desirable in and of themselves (see 
Marx, K (1967) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (3 vols.) New York), thereby distracting awareness from 
the conditions of their production. (See Taussig, M (1980) The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America. 
8
 
 
 
 
nineteenth-century sexologists such as Krafft-Ebing and then Freud21). 
These shifts are complex, multi-faceted and at times contradictory, leaving the fetish
…an idea-thing which brings with it, from the beginning – when it ‘was god,’ so to speak – into the  
present, the trace residue of its etymology: What is left, active and powerful, is the word itself – 
enigmatically incomplete. Just the signifier, we could say, bereft of its erased significations gathered and 
dissipated through the mists of trade, religion, witchcraft, slavery, and what has come to be called science  
– and this is precisely the formal mechanism of fetishism (as we see it used by Marx and Freud), whereby  
the signifier depends upon yet erases its signification.22
Nonetheless, there is a certain fixity to it. Pietz views fetish as ‘always a meaningful fixation of a  
singular event; it is above all an “historical” object, the enduring material form and force of an 
unrepeatable event’23. 
He claims that 'the fetish' has four essential traits:
It has a basis in the material world, an “irreducible materiality”, its truth held by its status as 
‘material embodiment’. He claims that its truth is not that of the idol, which relates an ‘iconic  
resemblance to some immaterial model or entity.’24 Whereas the idol holds no power itself, 
the 'fetish' is magical thanks to its ability to resemble or reference something 
else25.
Chapel Hill, pp1–38) The Marxist commodity fetish sees fetish as a ‘sensuous supersensuous thing’, which 
approximates singularity and autonomy, but at the same time conceals itself in social construction and definition in 
an almost naturalistic way. (See Pels, D, Hetherington, K & Vandenberghe, F (2002) The Status of the Object: 
Performances, Mediations, and Techniques. In Theory, Culture & Society (2002) Vol. 19(5/6): 1–21, (SAGE, 
London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi) Pels et al argue that this has been analogous to the reversal involved in 
religious consciousness, which has made ‘the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings 
endowed with life’ which entered into relations both with one another and with their human producers.” (Marx, 
1977 [1867]: 77) They note that both the personification of things and the reification of persons were conceptually 
embedded in concepts of material production, “while the reification of cultural and political forms was seen as a 
secondary result of this primordial alienation.”(Pels et al ibid)
One important connecting point between Marxist and Freudian 'fetish' is related to desire, whereby capitalism 
revolves around the desire for what is missing in similar ways to that which Freudian and Lacanian fetishism does 
(see chapter 4).
21 See Krafft Ebing R. (1895) Psychopathia Sexualis. 8th edition. Paris: G. Carre; Freud S. (1905) Trois essais sur la 
theorie sexuelle. Paris: Gallimard; (French, 1987); Freud, S. (1977) On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality and Other Works. Trans. And ed. James Strachey. Comp. and ed. Angela Richards. The Penguin Freud 
Library Volume 7. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. 
For a re-evaluation of the emphasis on the ‘homo/hetero binary’ appearing in discussions of sexuality since the late 
19th century, in relation to European sexological texts and their classifications of sexual desire between men, see 
Brickell, C (2006) Sexology, the Homo/Hetero Binary, and the Complexities of Male Sexual History. In 
Sexualities, Vol. 9, No. 4, 423-447
22 See Alter, J.S. (2006) Yoga and Fetishism: Reflections on Marxist Social Theory. In 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 12, 763-783 pp769; Apter, E (1993) Fetishism and 
Materialism. In Apter, E & Pietz, W (eds) (1993) Fetishism as Cultural Discourse. Ithaca, Cornell University Press 
pp 225
23 Apter, E (1993) Fetishism and Materialism. In Apter, E & Pietz, W (eds) (1993) Fetishism as Cultural 
Discourse. Ithaca, Cornell University Press pp 3.
24 Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish I. In RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (1985), 5–17 pp7
25 Young, H (2005) The Black Body as Souvenir in American Lynching. In Theatre Journal 57, The Johns Hopkins 
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It connects multiple elements within a single body, with “an ordering power derived from its  
status as the fixation or inscription of a unique originating event that has brought together  
previously heterogeneous elements into a novel identity.”26
It has social value, not necessarily broadly accepted or universally comprehended, but  
holding meaning for those who own or want to own it27.
It must affect the physical body, requiring “the subjection of the human body (as the material 
locus of action and desire) to the influence of certain significant material objects that,  
although cut off from the body, function as its controlling organs at certain  
moments.”28 In extreme circumstances, the 'fetish' has a physical effect upon the corpus, able 
to heal the sick or help cure infertility.
'Fetish' as Practice
'Fetishism', qua practice, has similarly had a variety of incarnations, ranging from “assumed 
primitive beliefs, false consciousness, or the magic of consumer goods, to forms of perversion in a 
subject fixated at an infantile level of behavior”29. In this way, 'fetishism' betrays social relations 
and perspectives on people's orientations towards each other, and on both social and sexual 
locations and priorities.
'Sexual Fetish Practices' (relations with material objects) vs BDSM  (relations between people)
Consensual 'sexual fetish'30 is associated with BDSM (bondage, discipline and sado-masochism), 
but, as Martins and Ceccarelli note, neither is easily defined31. These terms can be differentiated 
University Press pp639–657. Young notes that “The fact that the word “fetish” was used to describe the religious 
objects of the West Africans rather than “idol” points to the ethnocentrism and, perhaps, racism of the Portuguese 
traders who refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of African spirituality. Their bias/prejudice prompted the creation 
of a new, separate word. I find it interesting that the black body was always already a fetish- the word was created 
with blackness in mind.” See Chapter 3 in this regard
26 Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish I. In RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (1985), 5–17 pp7
27 Pietz, W (1985) ibid
28 Pietz, W (1985) ibid
29 Brisson, U (2005) Fish and Fetish: Mary Kingsley’s Studies of Fetish in West Africa. In Journal of Narrative Theory 
35.3 (Fall 2005): 326–340
30 Gay male 'fetishists' have developed specific socially acceptable/desirable 'fetish' practices and the concomitant 
terms for these practices. It is important to have a basic understanding of these terms of reference in order to better 
comprehend both the experiences and perceptions of the research participants, and the discursive and political 
assumptions related to them. See Moser, C (2006) Demystifying Alternative Sexual Behaviors. In 
Sexuality, Reproduction and Menopause, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pp 86-90. Moser helpfully and simply summarises 
terminology and usages for the edification of both the lay person and medical professionals. He explains the 
nomenclature of sexual minorities, who often refer to themselves as queer, perv, pervert, kink, kinky, or fetish, and 
amongst which are counted 'fetishists'
31 Martins, MC & Ceccarelli, PR, The So-Called “Deviant” Sexualities: Perversion or Right to Difference? 
http://www.reviseF65.org/cuba1.html
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through the relative focus on the object of attention32. With 'sexual fetish', sexualised attention is 
focused on an inanimate material object. BDSM, on the other hand, prioritises the human sexual 
partner as the object of attention. In 'fetish', there is no real question of the presence or absence of 
consent, whereas in BDSM, there is very often a voluntarily unequal power relation between 
impliedly consenting and otherwise socially equal human partners.
Certain 'fetishists' enjoy both, while others do not take part in the sexual power play of BDSM, 
preferring the 'fetish' of object-relations. Yet the experiences are intertwined, and often the term 
'fetish' is used interchangeably with 'BDSM' relating to the subculture, rather than the  
practices33.
In this thesis I call on the term 'fetish' primarily to describe the object of interest. For ease of 
reference I use the term 'fetishist' to describe the person engaging in an interaction with the object,  
and terms such as 'fetishism' or 'fetish play' to describe the relationship between person and 
object34. I therefore specifically do not deal with what 'fetish' as sexual  bondage, discipline and 
sado-masochism (BDSM) power relations between people.
'Sexual Fetish': Personified Bodies, Classifications, Relationships and Phenomena
'Fetish' is however not simply about value-neutral categorical differentiations between object and 
practice, or between person and object-choice. These categories in themselves imply a process of  
personification of classifications, relationships and phenomena. As Ellen argues, the classifications 
of 'fetish' do not simply reflect the objects, generic functions of these objects, or mental 
32 Although this is not necessarily a widely-used distinction. See Chapter 4 re how 'fetishists' have reclaimed the term
33 See Chapter 4 BDSM has a range of associations which are connected, but not identical to 'fetish'. See Moser C 
(2006) Demystifying Alternative Sexual Behaviors. In Sexuality, Reproduction and Menopause, Volume 4, Issue 2, 
Pages 86-90):
BDSM is an acronym for Bondage and Discipline (B&D), Dominance and Submission (D/S), and Sadism and 
Masochism (SM or S&M); it describes people (players) who eroticize bondage, a power differential, physical, or 
psychological pain (sometimes called intensity). BDSM play is called a scene. Leather can be a fetish object and is 
also synonym for BDSM, especially Gay BDSM. Players who take the active role are called dominant, dom, 
domme, domina, top, master, mistress, and sadist. Players who take the passive role are called submissive, sub, 
subbie, bottom, masochist, boy or girl, and slave. (In some SM interactions, it may not be immediately obvious 
which partner identifies as the top and which as the bottom, although the practitioner may feel strongly about the 
label.) Switches can take either role. 
There is intense debate concerning the distinctions among these terms; for example, someone may say “I am a 
masochist; I will be submissive if my partner enjoys it, but I am no one’s slave.” Simplistically, a masochist 
primarily seeks physical sensations. The submissive primarily enjoys the psychological aspects, but maintains 
options to control the intensity and duration of the scene. The slave wishes to serve and/or give up as much control 
as possible. Other sexual minorities use the term bottom to describe the one penetrated or the receiver of the 
intensity or play, without implying a BDSM relationship. Similarly, a Top is the one who penetrates or applies the 
intensity. Mixed play implies a BDSM interaction between people who would not usually have sex together (a gay 
man with a lesbian, for example). BDSM partners engage in negotiation, the process of agreeing on what will 
constitute the specifics of their scene. They decide upon a safe word (a word or gesture that will stop the scene), and 
mutually define the limits (activities not to be included in the scene). Violating someone’s limits is a serious faux 
pas.
34 See chapter 4 which details how 'fetishists' have reclaimed the word 'fetish' in positive ways
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conditions35. Rather, they display three features of categorisation and representation, which proceed 
from categorical, relationship and phenomenal identification to personification, through reification  
and iconification:
“concretisation, animation or anthropomorphisation; conflation of signifier with signified; and an 
ambiguous relationship of control between person and object”36
As will emerge from the thesis argument, the resultant personification is particularly problematic in  
a sexual context, since it supports further heteronormative marginalisation: the 'fetish' is not only  
identified as an object, it is also often used to marginalise and/or demonise 'fetishists', who often 
themselves unconsciously perpetuate the discourses of otherness37.
To deal with this, I suggest that scholars of 'fetish' should unpack this object-focus by looking not to 
the 'fetish' object itself, but to the the socio-political relationships between object and person, and 
between people inter se, as mediated by the body doing the relating.
Research Question
The research question centres on the psychopathology of non-normative sexual proclivities. More 
particularly, it interrogates the basis for normative, heteropatriarchal approaches which bind and 
judge people on the basis of their unusual ('fetish') sexual identities/practices.
Central to this question is the ICD-10 International Classification of Diseases (ICD), which is the  
internationally accepted classification and diagnostic system of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and which is of influence in contemporary South African psychology and psychiatry 
practice38. The ICD-10 diagnoses 'fetishism' as a psychopathology, a paraphilia disorder requiring 
psychiatric intervention.
Much contemporary leftist sexualities theorising appropriately assumes that psychopathologising 
sexuality is inappropriate39. Yet it doesn't often explain the metatheory justifying such an 
35 Ellen, R.F. (1988, 2006) Fetishism: A Cognitive Approach. In The Categorical Impulse: essays in the anthropology  
of classifying behaviour. Oxford & NY:Berghahn Books166-189 at 166
36 Ellen, R.F. ibid
37 The thesis focuses on the marginality of fetish practices, rather than the ways in which unusual sexualities are 
demonised on the basis of moralising or religious opprobrium, which nevertheless feed into such marginalising.
38 World Health Organization. (2004). International Classification of Diseases 10 (2nd ed). Geneva: 
WHO. ICD-10, and American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
4-TR. Washington DC: APA.
39 In particular, see Chapter 4
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assumption, beyond stating that all people are equal, and that sexuality is diverse and variable. This  
is important, but beyond prioritising individualism and looking at its impact on others it doesn't  
expand on when sexual activity is helpful or when it is dysfunctional. Compare these two  
assertions:
'We think you're weird and what you do is sick and wrong, but we have no say over your life 
if you aren't hurting anybody else, so we'll leave you alone', and
'what you do is interesting and adds value to your life and to the world around you, so we'll 
leave you alone to enjoy your life experiences, and we may even learn something from them'.
There is a vast difference between them, although they both entail nominal 'acceptance'. In order to  
differentiate them, I suggest that it is therefore imperative to explore how psychopathologising is 
both socio-politically divisive and personally destructive. This entails identifying the problems 
which run through the underlying perceptions, assumptions and constructions of 'sexual fetish' 
inherited from anthropological and early psychoanalytic thinking. As will be discussed, these 
influence contemporary South African psychology/psychiatry practice and spill over into popular  
and political discourse. It further entails positing alternative frameworks based on more 
theoretically sound metatheoretical underpinnings.
Thesis Argument
The argument is not simply a linear comparison of present circumstances (i.e. what 'fetish' 'is', or 
what 'fetishists' 'do') to a stable, unproblematic pre-existing body of theory. 
Rather, the argument challenges dualist metatheories on the subject which both describe and 
construct sexualities, and thereby calls on 'fetish' as both constituted and exemplified by competing  
metatheoretical constructs. It critiques the metatheory underpinning contemporary psychological  
and psychiatric epistemologies on 'fetish', and advocates more functional epistemologies which  
avoid 'fetish-object-focused' divisiveness and suggest 'subject-oriented' cohesion. This approach 
points to the powerful roles of 'gay male fetish sexuality' (which is neither objectively identifiable 
nor delineable) as a resource subjectively viewed by the 'fetishist' as being available to re-orient the 
individual towards a sense of personal value. It is further, as I will argue, a resource which 
potentially has a function for both the 'fetishist' and the world in which he lives, both directly and 
symbolically. As I will argue, this conception does not prescribe political activity, nor how the 
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'fetishist' does or does not perpetuate heteronormativity, but is a relatively value-neutral safe space 
in which individuals can gain a sense of personal meaning in the face of normativities.
This argument is conducted through three broad thesis sections, comprising two chapters each, 
which address the following:
- Section 1: the research context
Chapter 1: my methodological relationship with the research
Chapter 2: a political epistemological framework for sexualities scholarship
- Section 2: problematic historical object-focused discourses around 'fetish'
Chapter 3: a critique of historical anthropological and Freudian psychological constructs of 
'fetishism'
Chapter 4: a critique of contemporary psychopathological assumptions on fetish sexuality
- Section 3: towards a more appropriate subject-oriented approach to 'fetish'
Interjection: contextualising a shift from a Foucaultian genealogical analysis to a forward-
looking metatheoretical reconfiguration
Chapter 5: re-configuring essentialist, foundationalist and determinist constructions of the 
'subject'
Chapter 6: revising conceptions of subjective agency and productive, transformative roles of 
'fetish' sexuality
I argue for a revision of historical 'object-focused' metatheories on which contemporary conceptions 
of fetish sexuality are based, which metatheories are patently unstable and theoretically inadequate  
as a platform for understanding the lived experiences of unusual sexual practices. I further argue  
that they are inappropriate as bases for challenges to heteronormativity and homophobia in  
contemporary South Africa.
In place of the 'object-focused' paradigms, I advocate a more appropriate 'subject-oriented' approach 
viewing 'fetish', which framework addresses concerns about both materialism and discourse as 
metatheories for sexualities scholarship.
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Beyond the Immediacy of 'Gay Male Fetish Sex'
I suggest that these revisions could be extrapolated beyond the immediate concerns of sexual  
'fetishists'. Calling on this kind of thinking, more functional re-constructions can be made of 
'homosexuals' and 'heterosexuals' (and a range of other essentialist, foundationalist and determinist  
categorical identities) as being complex and valid emotional and physical life forces, rather than as 
discrete (yet heteronormatively not quite equal) entities. At the same time, it perhaps opens doors to 
ways forward beyond unhelpful foundationalist, circular and backward-looking arguments on the 
discursive nature of power. This argument paves the way not only to ameliorating the  
marginalisation of 'fetishists' in a local context, nor of marginal sexualities more broadly, but to  
approaches to all sexuality. 
Moreover, it links in with global developments in sexualities scholarship which seek to find more 
functional and stable theoretical bases for a society in which flourishing is encouraged, rather than 
where difference is merely tolerated. Such a progressive society is not an unrealistic utopian ideal,  
based on fictive static social relations. Rather, it is potentially a space of flow and interconnection, 
where sexuality is not to be shunned, vilified or marginalised, but can be recognised as a valuable  
resource for complex individuals and their socio-cultural environment.
By focusing on bodies constituted through exclusion, and by exploring the potential benefits of non-
normative sexual practices, scholarship and activism can aim for political re-alignment beyond  
human-rights-based constitutional rights which simply serve to entrench 'difference'. Armed with 
revised notions of human-object relations, socio-political policies can be re-considered, and the 
choices and practices of government, health professions, and the media can be re-focused towards 
effective and non-reactionary political action aimed at shifting popular discourses.
I suggest that re-defining relations between people and things, and focusing on psycho-social 
support systems such as psychiatry and psychology is not about justifying 'gay fetish' to 
homophobes. Rather, it is about acknowledging and co-creating a self-validating space in which  
non-normative experiences can be celebrated as being actively and productively beneficial, even 
though (not despite) that subjects often substantially repeat damaging heteronormative scripts. Such  
an approach does not require majority support for the acknowledgement of 'alterity', but demands a  
recognition of the inherent value of living beyond the bounds of 'normality' while still recognising 
the complexity of the subject and the complexity and confusion involved in being human.
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CHAPTER 1
LOCATING AND CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH:
ADVENTURES IN REFLEXIVITY
“some colleagues I respect consider it risky to link a personal journey to an intellectual interest, because 
doing so reveals a personal ‘bias’. If by ‘bias’ we mean a ‘mental leaning or inclination’- which is one 
definition Webster’s New World Dictionary suggests- then yes, it does. The self is an instrument of 
inquiry. In the end we have no other. To understand the childhood origins of an intellectual passion is to  
understand the possibilities and limitations of that instrument, the better to see what other instruments one 
needs to know the world. But such subjectivity- what, it turns out, drives us- does more than just that. It 
shapes what we expect and wish, and so it shapes how the world surprises us. So, our subjectivity, with  
the wealth of comparisons it implants in us, transforms us into tourists of ourselves, visitors of the odd  
s i g h t s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . I t r e m o v e s t h e d u l l s e n s e t h a t a n y t h i n g a t a l l i s 
obvious.”40
It is somewhat unusual to situate methodologies as the first substantive chapter in a thesis. Yet in 
this instance it is the most appropriate place, since to deal with methodological issues first is to  
open the door to the thesis focus: the problems of simplistic classification and the fictions of the  
stability of metatheory. The thesis is primarily a metatheoretical and epistemological critique, not an 
exploration of participant experiences compared to a purportedly stable body of theory. It therefore  
seems inappropriate to separate the document into neatly compartmentalised units comprising an  
analysis of existing literature, followed by a description of methodologies, a 
study of participant contributions and a discussion of the findings41. Instead, it felt more appropriate 
to let the flow of the argument progress based on a firm grasp of how the problems posed both 
influence and are influenced by methodological concerns.
Like all research, my journey has not been linear, but rather a round-about journey of exploration of 
theory and practices which coil back onto themselves and feed into both the argument and the  
methodologies. The result: a thesis document which reflects an enticingly complex interplay  
between paradigms, perspectives and experiences, through both its argument and the methodologies 
employed to arrive there42.
40 Hochschild, A.R.(2003) The commercialization of intimate life- notes from home and work. University of California 
Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, p6
41 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002). Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for Reflexivity. In 
Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(3), Art. 18, http://nbn-resolving.de/
urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs020318.
42 See Willig, C (2001) Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in theory and  
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1.1 Unusual Beginnings: Developing a Research Question
Sexually and emotionally I am predominantly attracted to men, and I have first-hand experience of 
t h e l e e r i n g f a c e o f h e t e r o n o r m a t i v e a n d h o m o p h o b i c d e r i s i o n a n d 
opprobrium43. I was therefore determined to conduct doctoral research aimed at addressing the 
prejudices experienced by marginal sexualities. Yet the preliminary information-gathering and 
thinking for the research goes further back and is more personal than a desire to explore politics and 
epistemologies44.
In some ways the genesis of the research lies as far back as puberty, more than twenty-five years 
ago. During my teen years I was vaguely aware of my (homo)sexual desires, which I spent many 
years hiding so as to appear 'normal'. I was even less aware of how these desires involved physical 
objects, and I overtly acknowledged my 'fetishes' only in my mid twenties, when I lived in London 
and would join similarly-minded men in the 'leather scene'45. Yet it was not the pain and domination 
of BDSM which interested me46. To the contrary, violence vaporised any sexual rush, 
discombobulated me and unleashed a deep, visceral anger. Rather, I enjoyed the sexualised 
environment itself, surrounded by the promise of the mighty titans parading around me, and the 
fantastical prepossession of their exposed and adorned bodies. I came to put special stock in the 
material objects and accoutrements associated with 'fetish' sexuality, more than with the men 
wielding or wearing them.
When I returned to South Africa, I became involved in the local 'scene'. But my interest had waned. 
It no longer promised the prospect of a foray into the 'unknown', nor fulfilled my desires for  
transgression. Over the next decade I became a bystander, content to remain on the sidelines and 
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press. She notes that researching is a kind of adventure, rather 
than just as the application of recipes. Research is no longer a mechanistic process, but is now a creative way to find 
things out.
43 I am loathe to identify myself as 'gay', which is a rather restrictive category, since this does not describe me in any 
useful way. In this regard, see Chapter 2 re unpacking essentialist categories.
By heteronormativity I mean the ways in which the social discourses presume heterosexuality as a norm to which all 
people are meant to conform, failing which they must justify themselves.
See Marecek, J., Fine, M. & Kidder, L. (1997) Working between worlds: methods and social psychology. In 
Journal of Social Issues, 53, 631-644 at 634. They note that good research questions come from how we see the 
world and what interests us. 
44 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002). Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for Reflexivity. In 
Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(3), Art. 18, http://nbn-resolving.de/
urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs020318. They note that once the research question is decided on, we need to link it to the 'real' 
world and other people, and that in so doing our gathering of text, observations, interviews etc require a focus on 
dialogic interactions with the question.
45 Chaps are crotchless black leather trousers worn over jeans, inspired by the protective gear worn by cowboys to 
protect themselves from saddle sores
46 BDSM: Bondage, discipline and sado-masochism. See Introduction
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watch. Eventually I left the scene almost completely, and lost touch with most 'fetishists', save for a 
few stalwart friends who remained companions because of our similarly iconoclastic world views. 
Yet I wanted to know more about how this 'fetish' thing worked, the better to explain a sexual 
interest in material objects (my own as much as anything else). So I turned to academia.
1.1.1 The Research Question Unfolds
My research question initially emerged vaguely as revolving around the transgressive role of 'fetish 
sexuality'47. At first I wanted to explore how 'fetish' practices could be re-read through 
contemporary psychology as a 'healing' modality48. But this initial research motivation soon proved 
to conflict with the perspective that one can't 'know' anything, despite many pervasive positivist 
paradigms which prescribe 'appropriate' actions and lives, based on fictions of what is 'normal', 
'right', 'logical' or 'healthy'49. The more I explored the anthropology and psychology of 'fetish', the 
more I realised that they framed it inappropriately as something 'understandable' in comparison to 
fictive, arbitrary and discriminatory psychological norms50. These diatribes, which construct fetish 
in terms of a 'bad, mad or sad' paradigm51, were at odds with my own experiences of 'fetish', and 
t h o s e o f m y e r s t w h i l e f r i e n d s . A n d a t o d d s w i t h m y q u e e r p o l i t i c a l 
beliefs52. I realised that my unfolding research goals did not match my research objectives, nor what  
I thought I could discover on the research journey within those epistemological 
parameters53.
47 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002). Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for Reflexivity. In 
Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(3), Art. 18, http://nbn-resolving.de/
urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs020318. They argue that the first step in the research process is to formulate a research question. 
They see this as a dialogue since it is based on an understanding of the world as much as with academic theory.
48 See Cheek, J (1999) Influencing practice or simply esoteric? Researching health care using postmodern approaches.  
In Qualitative Health Research, 9(3), 383-392.
49 Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press
See Kirk, J. and Miller, M. (1986) Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. London: Sage. They say that 
positivism assumes that there is only one correct perspective of things available through inspection, and this 
perspective is independent of the processes involved in inspection. Yet comprehension of any given circumstances 
are necessarily partial and biased, and research undertaken is necessarily infused by the perspectives of the 
researcher. 
See Chalmers, A.F. (1999) What is this Thing Called Science?, 3rd ed. Buckingham: Open University Press on the 
constitution, limitations of scientiﬁc knowledge and on empiricism. Note that contemporary empiricists argue that 
acquiring knowledge depends on collecting and analysing data. See below re the interconnectedness of the research 
process and the metatheoretical argument of the thesis.
50 See Dowsett, G. (2007) The Health of Sexual Minorities: Public Health Perspectives on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender Populations. In Meyer, I.H. & Northridge, M.E. (2007) Researching Gay Men’s Health: The Promise of  
Qualitative Methodology. Springer. Pp419-441 re the move in public health research from the use of cross-sectional 
population surveys as dominant and default research methodology, towards qualitative methodology.
51 See the arguments below on psychopathologising and heteronormative assumptions
52 See chapter 2
53 See Kvale, S. (1995) The social construction of validity. In Qualitative Inquiry, 1(1): 19–40
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At the same time I became increasingly frustrated with expectations to be some kind of  
'independent researcher'. Partly because I already knew these people and some of the complexities 
of the 'scene', and could not view them as a simplistically-defined 'group' of research subjects, like  
so many protozoa in a petrie dish. Also in part because my academic interest in 'fetish' derived not  
from a voyeuristic desire to explain away the lives of 'others', but to explore my own emotional  
relationship to the material world as (nominally, or at least at one point in my life) one of them. As a  
result, the research developed organically, unaided and unforced, in its own time, and in tune with 
my emotional and intellectual readiness to face the questions that arose.
As I progressed, I realised that it was rather more fruitful to explore the scholarly presuppositions 
on which 'fetish' epistemologies are based. So, rather than focusing particularly on the 'fetishists'  
themselves or their practices, I determined to explore political relationships between the 
epistemologies of 'fetish' and the people these discourses describe as 'fetishists'. I decided to ask 
how discriminatory metatheory can be revised to enable more appropriate scholarship and policies  
on 'fetish'. This, in turn, required me to clarify my position on disciplines, epistemologies and 
methodologies, since I could clearly not rely on pre-existing clarity in any of these areas.
1.2 Tying Down Disciplines, Epistemologies and Methodologies
It has been challenging to find appropriate methodologies for philosophical and political research  
work drawing on various different disciplines and theoretical strains, and focusing primarily on 
unpacking and re-phrasing unstable metatheoretical underpinnings. It seemed important to clearly  
specify disciplinary, epistemological and methodological frameworks, yet during the initial research  
process it soon became clear that my organic research route and niche subject-area was antithetical  
to strict disciplinarity and 'scientific' methodologies and methods54.
54 Note the difference between ‘method’ and ‘methodology’. Whereas ‘methodology’ posits a general approach to 
research topics, ‘method’ is about speciﬁc research techniques. Methodology is more directly informed by 
epistemological positions than method. In the present instance, social constructionist methodology is incompatible 
with methods which measure variables, since social constructionism problematises such constructs as ‘psychological 
variables’, arguing against their validity. In this regard, the measurement of psychological variable is another way of 
constructing them.
See Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press
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1.2.1 Scholarly Reflexivity
It also became clear that the research hinged on one clear focus serving as the glue holding it all 
together: reflexivity qua researcher, which clearly applied to two primary areas: 
the need to apply the same kind of thinking to both the epistemological stance underpinning  
the research methodology and the unfolding substantive thesis argument (i.e. a 
'methodological recursiveness'55) ; and
the need to remain acutely aware of the relationship between me and the research 
participants both professionally as scholar and personally.
I had to be explicit about the operation of power in the process of researching and representing 
people, in order to remain honest about my power as researcher56. I had to acknowledge the multiple 
levels on which this power manifests: via hegemonic cultural viewpoints implicit in the language 
available, via subject positions, and via specific individual relationships with participants and the  
area of research57. This meant that I was under pressure to retain a self-critical introspection while  
undertaking both literature analyses and fieldwork, and that I had to review the research question as  
I went along58. Eventually I lodged the research in appropriate yet fluid and multiple disciplinary  
spaces, both theoretically/epistemologically and methodologically.
1.2.1a) Disciplinary Reflexivity and Flexibility: Working in the Interstices
Although commencing my exploration in psychology, I soon realised that psychoanalytic theory did  
not successfully lend a rounded and focused perspective on 'fetish' applicable to local conditions. 
Rather, it perpetuated grand explanatory frameworks which “…have been only partially successful 
i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e i n t r i c a t e r a n g e o f m e a n i n g s c a r r i e d b y t h e d a t a t h e y 
use.”59 Not only do these assume a common experience and 'reality' for all people over the  
centuries, but they buy into the “forces of globalization [which] seem to have won the global battle  
55 See below
56 Alldred, P (1998) Ethnography and Discourse Analysis: Dilemmas in Representing the Voices of Children. In 
Ribbens, J & Edwards, R.(eds)(1998) Feminist Dilemmas in Qualitative Research: Public Knowledge and Private  
Lives. London: Sage.
57 Alldred, P (1998) ibid
58 See England, K.V.L.  (1994) Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research. 
In The Professional Geographer 46 (1), 80-91. See also Barry, C.A., Britten, N., Barber, N., Bradley, C. & 
Stevenson, F. (1999) Using reflexivity to optimize teamwork in qualitative research. In 
Qualitative Health Research, 9(1), 26-44. For strategies to call on reflexivity, see Ahern, K. (1999) Ten tips for 
reflexive bracketing. In Health Research, 9(3), 407-411
59 Bernault, F (2006) Body, Power and Sacrifice in Equatorial Africa. In University of Wisconsin-Madison Journal of  
African History, 47, Cambridge University Press pp. 207–39.
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without being informed by the thick layers of the local histories they – or so scholars argue – cross,  
combine and connect.”60
In taking account of this, my research led away from exploring 'the mind' as a separate entity, to an 
awareness of the body/embodiment, which has historically resided in sociology and anthropology, 
but where there is no clear ‘last word’ on how best to approach knowledge 
production61. Yet simply relocating the focus from psychology to sociology seemed inappropriate, 
given the pul l of queer theory and pract ice within a social construct ionist 
framework62. In considering discipline-specific critiques of queer locations, in particular from 
sociology, and queer critiques of discipline-specific locations, I realised that no single discipline  
could provide all the answers63. Rather, I found the appropriate place for the research in an  
interstitial space between various discourses, traditions and disciplines, both covering and falling  
between psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political studies, all under the umbrella of  
sexuality studies64.
In considering what might otherwise have degenerated into an unrelated melange of discourses and  
disciplines, I realised that the core of queer theory is not simply a starting point, but the glue which  
holds the argument together65, through ‘Undisciplined Theory’, which is a reflexive location that 
“ u n d e r s t a n d s i t s p o s i t i o n i n t h e b e t w e e n a s a n o c c a s i o n t o t h e o r i s e 
ambivalence”66. 
60 Bernault, F (2006) ibid
61 Some useful insight on methodological issues in this regard is addressed by certain anthropological methodologies, 
especially an anthropology of the body, as developed through the work of Mary Douglas, Marcel Mauss and Robert 
Hertz. See Neumann, M (1996) Collecting Ourselves at the End of the Century. In Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) 
(1996) Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing. Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, London, 
New Delhi
62 See chapter 2 in this regard. 
See Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press
See also Burr, V. (1995) An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: Routledge. 
63 See Berg, M (2009) The “cyberqueer” option: a sociological take on queer qualitative methods. Proc. feminist 
research methods - an international conference (femmet'09), Stockholm, Sweden, Febr. 4-6, 2009, Halmstad 
University/School of Social and Health Sciences (HOS) Berg argues that there are questions pertaining to tensions 
between sociological and queer modes of inquiry. See Seidman, S (1995) Deconstructing Queer Theory or the 
Under-Theorization of the Social and the Ethical. In Nicholson, L & Seidman, S (eds.) (1995) Social 
Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 116-41.
64 Pryse, M (2000) Trans/feminist methodology: Bridges to interdisciplinary thinking. In 
NWSA Journal. Bloomington: Summer 2000. Vol. 12, Iss. 2; pg. 105. Pryse argues that strict disciplinarity, with its 
depth of detail, risks overspecialisation and insularity, while interdisciplinarity offers scope but risks superficiality 
and rootlessness. She argues that a hybrid methodology would create a balance between free-standing 
interdisciplinarity and Women's Studies (and I would argue Queer Studies) reliance on disciplinary methodologies. 
She suggests a 'rooting' and 'shifting' model of cross-disciplinary dialogue, both politically and academically, as a 
means of dealing with methodological socialisations and prejudices
65 See chapter 2
66 Genosko, G (1998) Undisciplined Theory. Sage: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi
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As Genosko notes, ‘ambivalence’ is a creative response to ‘being in the between’, and is not a 
resolution, but a way of occupying distress and making it live-able67:
“The task of theory in the between is to think through the problematic of ambivalence in relation to 
discipline and the challenge of becoming undisciplined, as well as the consequences of moving towards 
i n d i s c i p l i n a r y p u r s u i t s , t h e o r e t i c a l a n d o t h e r w i s e , p e r h a p s e v e n b e c o m i n g 
extravagant”68
Through the research process I found myself organically adopting the role of such an 'undisciplined  
theorist', of necessity being uninhibited and critical of the disciplinary bases on which I was calling, 
but at the same time not dismissing nor attempting to destroy them 69. I found myself most 
c o m f o r t a b l e f o c u s i n g o n s u b t l e t i e s , a n d o p e n t o u n e x p e c t e d 
eventualities70. In so doing, I was not trying to wage war, but happily to sow instability, discomfort, 
hope and mistrust71.
This multi/inter/undisciplined approach matches my social constructionist world-view, which 
acknowledges that human experience is historically, culturally and linguistically mediated. It has  
thereby enabled me better to argue against essentialist assumptions on fetish, which do not 
adequately reﬂect the complexity of human experience 72. It has further enabled me to argue in 
favour of more appropriate approaches to both 'fetish' and human (sexual) experience more 
broadly73. This approach is in concert with methodologies appropriate to both 'doing' the 
metatheoretical research and approaching the participants' contributions.
67 Genosko, G (1998) ibid
Discipline-specific theory is established as road-markings for mental activity, and “hangs in the axes of disciplinary 
differentiation which structure it, signifying, within a given discipline, a recognizable concept, practice, text, name 
or group, and in the between, it relies upon the disciplines that surround it and other few-and-far-betweens.”(ibid 
pp2) 
Yet theory is inherently unstable, which instability is celebrated within each discipline. There is no absolute truth in 
any discipline. The academy thrives on disagreement and differing viewpoints, and in recent years the concept of 
interdisciplinarity has gained ground, having become 
“…subject to a widespread institutional orthodoxization that transforms the between into a discipline in its own 
right., with its own codes, specialists, and graduates, who may have little or no interest in theory… In such cases, 
theory becomes relatively stable. In other cases, theory, with its new modifiers, becomes a specialisation 
admitted- on the basis of friendly gestures that may not entail a full welcome- into traditional disciplinary 
practices and bureaucracies.” (ibid)
68 Genosko, G (1998) ibid
69 Acknowledgements to Genosko, G (1998) ibid, pp10, recalling Roland Barthes.
70 Acknowledgements to Genosko, G (1998) ibid
71 Acknowledgements to Genosko, G (1998) ibid. To be honest, though, it is a kind of war, notwithstanding my pacifist 
position. However, rather than being combative, it is more like a peaceful sit-in demonstration.
72 See chapters 3 and 4 re the object-focused approaches historically located in anthropology and psychoanalysis
73 See chapters 5 and 6 re more appropriate subject-oriented influences inspired by phenomenology
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1.2.1b) Epistemological Reflexivity and Recursiveness: 'The Research is the Research'
The complexity of managing a disciplinary instability encouraged me to be especially aware of 
epistemological bases for both the metatheoretical argument and the participant contributions. At 
some point I realised that the work was 'epistemologically recursive'. By this I mean that the 
epistemologies for the methodological approach to the work were the same as those for the  
substance of the metatheoretical thesis argument. In other words, 'the research is the research': the 
subject of the research is actually the object of the research, and vice versa, where subject and 
o b j e c t a r e i n d i v i s i b l e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g , a n d b o t h o c c u p y t h e s u b j e c t 
position74. 
In a sense, this is a kind of Buddhist 'it is what it is' proposition, which applies to both the 
relationship between the research methodology and thesis argument, as well as between the 
researcher and the researched:
firstly, the thesis argues for a revised, inclusive, incorporative approach to viewing 
sexualities, to replace the old, 'scientific', divisive pathologising metatheory which pervades 
scholarship. The thesis is therefore a kind of exhortation to shift epistemologies in the  
psychology and scholarship of sexualities. By implication it is therefore a road-map for 
shifts in methodological approaches too; and
secondly, I, as the researcher, and the participants, as 'objects' of research, are in some 
ways the same: people interacting with material things by way of embodied experience,  
thereby deriving emotional meaning from the world75. Relational connectedness, (as 
opposed to positivist hierarchical superiority) in the research process therefore implies that 
researcher and participant are intimately connected, and that the relationship between the 
two is not that of subject-object, but of subject-subject76.
Put another way, this thesis argues that discourses and (embodied) practices at the same time both 
come from and perpetuate the substance of personal practices and the narratives which describe 
them. This non-linear thinking mirrors the methodological intersections between Ethnography and  
Discourse Analysis on which I call, in a hybrid position which effects the discourse of 
74 Again, though, not in any essentialist way
75 As I will discuss later, by 'object' I don't mean some kind of entity under a microscope, but rather the people around 
whose lives the research revolves. I also do not mean that people and objects are essentialistically separate entities, 
but that people and objects are interconnected. See chapter 5
76 See Bradley, L. (1995) Psychotherapeutic discourse analysis. In American Journal of Psychotherapy, 49(3), 371-382
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voice77. In this way, participants are not given authenticity outside of a dominant culture, but find  
their voice within the means and meanings available to them, whilst at the same time resisting and  
transgressing dominant meanings attributed to them78. This entails unpacking the ideas around the 
const i tut ion of the psychical subject and re-visioning not ions of voice and 
agency79.
The thesis argument reflects the methodological approach, since both are based on complementary  
ontologies. In this way, the research methodology and substantive argument of the thesis are 
attached to each other in a moëbius strip of confluence: each are part of a continuous feedback loop,  
linking into and substantiating each other. As such, the thesis becomes part of the critical theory  
school which, as Denzin frames it, calls on a merging of ethnographic and textual approaches,  
exploring how cultural interpretation is acted upon and given meaning in concrete 
circumstances80.
It was therefore imperative that I engage with the unfolding research in ways which supported the 
theory-orientation of the research, rather than reflecting a grounded problem-orientation as would 
be appropriate in grounded theory81. It also needed to reflect the resulting substantive ontological 
argument about the interconnectedness and 'oneness' of things, as opposed to the dualist thinking 
which so often predominates82.
1.2.1c) Methodological Appropriateness: Qualitative Research
This kind of recursive thinking matched my desire to explore how people make sense of their  
environment and experiences, and therefore the quality and texture of such experience. It therefore 
supported a focus on working with 'how and why' questions, which qualitative work 
engenders83.
77 Alldred, P (1998) Ethnography and Discourse Analysis: Dilemmas in Representing the Voices of Children. In 
Ribbens, J & Edwards, R.(eds)(1998) Feminist Dilemmas in Qualitative Research: Public Knowledge and Private  
Lives. London: Sage.
78 Alldred, P (1998) ibid
79 See chapter 5 and 6
80 Denzin, N. (1994) The Art and Politics of Interpretation. In Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research,pp. 500–15. London: Sage, pp509
81 In this regard, it was important for me to call on discourse analysis as theoretical framework for both the 
metatheoretical discourses (such as the psychological ICD and DSM classifications of fetish) as well as the 
participant perceptions. Given the epistemological framework for the thesis, and the tenor of the argument as social 
constructionist, from the beginning it was entirely inappropriate to call on empiricist approaches such as grounded 
theory. Yet note the Interjection on under what circumstances discursive approaches cease to be useful
82 See Harding, G. &  Gantley, M (1998) Qualitative Methods: Beyond the Cookbook. In 
Family Practice, 1998, 15: 76-79. The authors draw a distinction between problem-oriented and theory-oriented 
research, of which this is the latter.
83 I do not assume a single idea of qualitative methodology. See Kopala, M.A. & Suzuki, L (eds) (1999) 
Using Qualitative Methods in Psychology. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks. London. New Delhi. Rather, I 
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The 'how many' questions of quantitative work, which is primarily based on postulating something 
and then proving or disproving it, w e r e clearly inappropriate84. Incorporating quantitative 
approaches into the qualitative was just as inappropriate, given the main 'anti-positivist' thrust of the 
unfolding research85.
Qualitative research appealed to me on a range of visceral levels too, based on needing to 
acknowledge my role in the research process. I knew that claiming to be a 'separate' researcher, 
whether ontologically, epistemologically or methodologically, would be disingenuous and 
counterproductive, given my personal stake in the philosophical and political direction of the work, 
and given my personal involvement in the research process86.
recognise that there are ‘qualitative methodologies’. My concerns about quantitative research have bound me to 
other researchers who prefer ‘qualitative methodology’ in the singular. See Willig, C (2001) 
Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press.
See Jensen, C., Lauritsen, P (2005) Qualitative research as partial connection: bypassing the power-knowledge 
nexus. In Qualitative Research, Vol. 5, No. 1, 59-77 (2005). Appropriate to this research, they argue that qualitative 
research and methods are often conceived as pertaining to a problematic (the power-knowledge nexus). They 
suggest that the power-knowledge dichotomy, specifically as located in postmodernist thinking, is theoretically and 
empirically problematic. They explore theoretical and practical consequences of suspending this power-knowledge 
nexus, and suggest a need for looking anew at qualitative research, which they begin by calling on contemporary 
feminist theory and science and technology studies.
On the growth in qualitative research, see Bryman, A. & Burgess R. (1994) Analyzing Qualitative Data. London: 
Routledge.;  Denzin, N. (1994) The Art and Politics of Interpretation. In Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research,pp. 500–15. London: Sage; Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. (1999) 
Designing Qualitative Research, 3rd ed .London: Sage; Morse, J. (1994) Critical Issues in Qualitative Research 
Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
84 See Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press. Qualitative research can produce many results, 
including descriptions or explanations, voicing perspectives of the marginalized, and interpreting people's 
perceptions. It can link micro-processes, macro-structures, and can reflect a subjective ‘feel’ of an experience or  
condition. It can also identify recurring patterns of experience within groups. The kind of knowledge a methodology 
produces depends on its epistemological position, which in turn depends on the ontology relied upon.
See the early conversation around the issue in Bryman, A (1984) The Debate about Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research: A Question of Method or Epistemology? In The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 1. (Mar., 1984), 
pp. 75-92. Bryman discussed the main thrusts of the debate on quantitative vs qualitative methodology speaking of 
the philosophical issues underlying it. He distinguishes between epistemological and technical issues, highlighting 
three areas that show a tendency towards oscillation between epistemological and technical elements. He concludes 
that a neat correspondence between them can probably not be attained.
See supra re the difference between epistemology and methodology/method
See Jordan, S (2003) Who Stole my Methodology? Co-opting PAR. In Globalisation, Societies and 
Education, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 2003. Jordan argues that qualitative approaches are both technically and ideologically 
appropriate. Technically, they render a more rounded and holistic angle, with more fullness, and work better in 
small-scale, local research, where communities can participate and are less likely to be subject to outside 'expert'  
colonisation.
85 See Hanson, B (2008) Wither Qualitative/Quantitative?: Grounds for Methodological Convergence. In 
Quality and Quantity, Volume 42, Number 1 / February, 2008, Springer Netherlands, Pages97-111
Note that Hanson speaks of the qualitative/quantitative issue in sociological scholarship, and argues that the impetus 
for the issue is primarily political rather than intellectual, thanks to the exigencies of sociological practice: diverse 
intellectual heritages, that quantitative sociologists dominate in teaching methods and writing methods text books, 
that computer technology has recently proliferated, and that theory and method are separated. She argues that 
developing sociological methods will entail transcending the quantitative/qualitative issue and considering issues 
such as science, validity, causality and the multiverse.
86 See Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
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1.2.2 Quality Standards: Connecting 'Un-discipline', Epistemologies and Methodologies through  
Reflexivity
The demands of rigorous qualitative work demanded that I carefully reflect on my assumptions at 
all stages of the research87. This would ensure the reliability of answers to the 'how' and 'why' 
questions, which entailed focusing on a different set of standards to those applicable to statistical  
methods aimed to neatly prescribe the 'right'  or 'wrong' answers. 
In turn, I had to question what counts as 'quality' in qualitative research. This led to interrogating 
how the research question has deﬁned and delimited what can be ‘found’, how research design and 
analysis methods have ‘constructed’ the data and ﬁndings, how it could have been approached 
d i f f e r e n t l y , a n d w h e t h e r t h i s w o u l d h a v e r e s u l t e d i n d i f f e r e n t 
conclusions88.
Given the fluid nature of qualitative research, and given my starting-point in psychology, I focused  
on my research aim, which was to enable a more solid epistemological basis from which to better 
understand and reflect people's daily experiences and activities89. Throughout the process it 
therefore remained important to pay careful attention to certain useful qualitative research 
guidelines90:
1.Owning one's perspective;
2.Situating the sample and providing information such as gender, age and social status, while  
not assuming such information to define the participants in any essentialist way;
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press. Qualitative methodologies acknowledge the researcher 
as part of the research process, as opposed to an independent onlooker. The extent to which the researcher is seen as  
the author, rather than the witness, of the research differs between methodologies, some of which see the researcher  
as central since he/she constructs the ﬁndings. Others see the researcher as using their skills to unpack the evidence.
See Ellis, C., Bochner, A., Denzin, N., Lincoln, Y., Morse, J., Pelias, R., Richardson, L (2008) Talking and Thinking 
About Qualitative Research. In Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 14, No. 2, 254-284 (2008). The piece comes from an edited 
transcript of a session titled "Talking and Thinking About Qualitative Research," presented at the 2006 International 
Congress of Qualitative Inquiry at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on 4-6 May 2006. It featured 
scholars informally speaking about their personal history with qualitative methods, what attracted them to 
qualitative work or changed their viewpoints, ethical crises, etc.
87 Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press. Personal reﬂexivity is about reﬂecting on how the 
researcher's own values, experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider life aims and social identities 
arrange the research. It also entails considering how the research may affect and changed the researcher as a person  
and as a scholar. Some qualitative researchers focus on both personal and epistemological reﬂexivity for both the 
research process and the research report. Others recognise the necessity for reﬂexivity but do not provide in-depth 
consideration of it in the research report.
88 Willig, C (2001) ibid
89 Elliott, R., Fischer, C.T. & Rennie, D.L.(1999) Evolving guidelines for publication of qualitative research studies in 
psychology and related fields. In British Journal of Clinical Psychology (1999), 38, 215-229
90 Elliott, R., Fischer, C.T. & Rennie, D.L.(1999) ibid
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3.Grounding in examples: using data to illustrate analytic procedures and the resultant  
understanding;
4.Providing credibility checks: checking the themes, categories or accounts derived from  
analyses with participants, using an extra 'auditor' or multiple qualitative analysts, and 
verifying the research;
5.Coherence: representing the research in way which is integrated and coherent, while 
maintaining nuances to the data
6.Accomplishing general vs. specific research tasks: relying on a range of instances on which  
to base a general understanding of phenomena, and relying on systematic and comprehensive  
study and description to reflect specific understanding
7.Resonating with readers: constructing a document which will resonate with readers, while 
not adversely affecting the accuracy of the subject91.
1.2.3 Discourse and Narrative Analysis: Linking Metatheory and Participant Perception
Focusing on quality led to my basing the research in Foucaultian discourse 
analysis92, which has taken on a range of different guises93, thanks to its historically marginal 
position94. It is currently being called on increasingly in qualitative research, particularly in critical  
psychology in South Africa and elsewhere95, and I found it especially useful in three 
91 Elliott, R., Fischer, C.T. & Rennie, D.L.(1999) Evolving guidelines for publication of qualitative research studies in 
psychology and related fields. In British Journal of Clinical Psychology (1999), 38, 215-229
92 See Hook, D (2001) Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History/ Foucault and Discourse Analysis. In 
Theory & Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 4, 521-547 (2001). Hook notes that there is really no strictly Foucauldian method 
of analysing discourse. He argues that a close reading of Foucault's `The Order of Discourse' enables a correction of  
incorrect applications of Foucault's work, and enables issues of knowledge, materiality and history to be addressed. 
In developing a better comprehension of Foucaultian discursive analytic method, Hook explores a four-step 
discursive critique method.
93 See Potter, J., Wetherell, M., Gill, R. & Edwards, D (1990) Discourse: noun, verb or social practice? In 
Philosophical Psychology, vol 3, no2, 1990, pp205-217. The authors comment on different conceptions of the idea 
of 'discourse' and overview the basic elements of a coherent discourse analytic program in psychology.
See also Potter, J. (1996) Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Approaches: Theoretical Background. In 
Richardson, J.T.E. (Ed.)(1996). Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social  
sciences. Leicester; BPS Books. Potter resolves that discourse analysis focuses on talk and texts as social practices 
and on the resources called on to enable those practices. Foci of discourse analysis are often concerns of stake and 
accountability, and reject historical cognitive explanations of psychology.
94  See Cheek, J (2004) At the Margins? Discourse Analysis and Qualitative Research. In 
Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 14, No. 8, 1140-1150 (2004). Cheek questions the location of discourse analysis at 
the margins of qualitative research, and if so, if that matters and how it might shift the margins themselves
95 See Macleod, C (2002) Deconstructive discourse analysis: Extending the methodological conversation. In 
South African Journal of Psychology, 32, 17-25. She argues that it should not be viewed as bounded and 
uncontested, since it is intertwined with theoretical issues. Rather, it is dynamic and constantly being revised. She 
speaks of ways that CDA can be better worked with by calling on Derrida and Foucault
In regard South African critical psychology, the work of Ian Parker, Erica Burman, Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan  
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arenas96, which link together through the literature analysis97:
the professional discourses of psychiatry and psychology98,
popular heteronormative discourses of South African culture, often rendered in the 
media99, and 
participant narratives.
1.2.3a) Coming to Conclusions about Discourse and Social Processes/Structures
Calling on discourse/narrative analysis in these three arenas necessitated clarifying how much of the  
analysis is restricted to the conclusions about the discourse itself, and how much is aimed at 
drawing conclusions about social processes or structures100. The metatheoretical argument, which 
forms the core of the thesis, calls on the former, and is substantiated by the experiences and 
perceptions of the participants through the latter.
Discourse analysis enables me to unpack the metatheoretical inconsistencies and heteronormative  
political sub-texts to dominant discourses on 'fetish'101, while at the same time to explore a more 
Potter stand out.
See Painter, D & Terre Blanche, M (2004) Critical psychology in South Africa : looking back and looking ahead. In 
South African Journal of Psychology, Volume 34, Issue 4, p.520-543, looking at the development, current status and 
future prospects of critical psychology in South Africa. See also Hook, D, Kiguwa, P & Mkhize, N (2004) 
Critical psychology, Juta. Parker, I. (2004) Psychoanalysis and critical psychology, in D. Hook (ed.), with N. 
Mkhize, P. Kiguwa and A. Collins (section eds) and E. Burman and I. Parker (consulting eds) 
Critical Psychology, pp. 138-161. Cape Town: UCT Press. Parker, I (1998) Social constructionism, discourse, and 
realism. Inquiries in social construction, SAGE. Parker, I (1999) Critical psychology: critical links. In 
Annual Review of Critical Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 3-18. Goodley, D & Parker, I (2000) Critical psychology and 
action research. In Annual Review of Critical Psychology, Vol. 2, pp. 3-16. Burman, E (2006) Analytic Third or 
Law? Reflection vs. Regulation in Psychotherapy Case Notes. In Feminism & Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 4, 445-450 
(2006). Wetherell, M, Taylor, S, Yates, S.J. (eds) Discourse theory and practice: a reader Published in association 
with The Open University SAGE, 2001. Potter, J, Ashmore, M & Edwards, D (1999) Regulating criticism: some 
comments on an argumentative complex. In History of the Human Sciences, Vol. 12, No. 4, 79-88 (1999)
96 See van Dijk, T. A. (ed) (1997) Discourse Analysis as Social Interaction. London, Sage; Tonkiss, F. (1998) 
Analysing discourse. In Seale, C.(ed) (1997) Researching Society and Culture. London: Sage; Gee, J.P.(1999) 
An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: theory and method. London: Routledge; Wetherell, M., Taylor, S., & Yates, 
S. (eds) (2001) Discourse Theory as Practice. London: Sage.
See McGregor, S.L.T. (2003) Critical Discourse Analysis- A Primer. In Kappa Omicron Nu FORUM2003,(1), 2003. 
She notes that critical discourse analysis attempts to unite and express relationships between three levels of analysis: 
the text itself;  the discursive practices, which include the processes of creation, writing, speaking, reading, and 
hearing, and the larger social context.
97 See Denzin, N. (1994) The Art and Politics of Interpretation. In Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research,pp. 500–15. London: Sage pp509 re the role of textual analysis in critical theory.
98 See chapters 3 and 4
99 See chapter 2 in particular
100 See Hammersley, M. (2003) Discourse Analysis: a bibliographical guide. from http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/capacity/
Activities/Themes/In-depth/guide.pdf 
101 See McGregor, S.L.T. (2003) Critical Discourse Analysis- A Primer. In Kappa Omicron Nu FORUM2003,(1), 2003. 
She notes that critical discourse analysis is aimed at uncovering ideological assumptions hidden in discourse so as to 
become aware of and therefore resist power relations so that non-transparent relationships, power imbalances, social  
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functional basis for theorising human-object sexual relations102.
I cannot, however, assume a level political playing field from which to 'read' participants' social  
experiences, nor can I pretend to adopt a value-neutral approach103. Rather, critical discourse 
analysis104, aligned with positioning analysis105, enables me to acknowledge the avowedly political 
dimension of the argument relating to the psychiatric discourses on fetish and their heterosexist and 
damaging effects for non-normative sexualities106.
At the same time, calling on textual/discourse analysis enables my better understanding of the 'real-
life' world of the participants in ways which enable a multi-vocal, collaborative process, based in 
their lived experience, and organised by interpretive theory107. By connecting the participant 
narratives with the critical discourse analysis, I acknowledge the context in which discourses are  
inequities, non-democratic practices, and other injustices can be addressed and corrected
See also Fairclough, N. (1993) Language and power. New York: Longman.
102 My analysis argues in favour of moving beyond psychoanalytic pathologies and towards recognising that both 
discourse and phenomenology have a part to play in understanding how 'fetish' intersects with people's lives
In particular, see chapter 4 re psychopathologies and the role of discursive psychology in revealing the relations 
between people and objects. 
See Korobov, N. (2001). Reconciling Theory with Method: From Conversation Analysis and Critical Discourse 
Analysis to Positioning Analysis. In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social  
Research, 2(3), Art. 11, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0103119. Korobov looks at tensions between 
Critical Discourse analysis and Conversation Analysis, and posits Positioning Analysis as a middle-ground to 
reconcile them.
See also Potter, J (2003) Discursive Psychology: Between Method and Paradigm. In Discourse & Society, 2003; 14; 
783. Potter argues that discourse analytic work is connected to various theoretical ideas, specifically through its 
theorising of discourse itself as a medium related to action.
See also Potter, J (2003) Discourse analysis and discursive psychology. Qualitative research in psychology: 
Expanding perspectives in methodology and design. In Camic, P.M., Rhodes, J.E., Yardley, L. (Eds) (2003) 
Qualitative research in psychology: Expanding perspectives in methodology and  
design. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. (pp. 73-94). Potter notes that discourse analysis 
is about how talk and texts are used to perform actions, while discursive psychology is about how ideas from 
discourse analysis are applied to psychology. The latter is focused on analysing interaction in detail, while it aims to 
give a new perspective on a wide range of psychological phenomena. It is therefore not strictly a method, but a 
perspective which includes meta-theoretical, theoretical, and analytical approaches.
103 Such as is the case in conversation analysis. See Hammersley, M. (2003) Discourse Analysis: a bibliographical 
guide. from http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/capacity/Activities/Themes/In-depth/guide.pdf 
104 See Caldas-Coulthard, C.R. & Coulthard, M.(eds) (1996) Text and Practice: readings in critical discourse  
analysis. London: Routledge; Hammersley, M. (1997) On the foundations of critical discourse analysis. In 
Language and Communication, 17, 3, pp237-48; Chouliaraki, L. & Fairclough, N. (1999) Discourse in Late 
Modernity: rethinking critical discourse analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. 
(eds) (2002) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage.
See also Potter, J (1996) Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Approaches: Theoretical Background. In 
Richardson, J.T.E. (Ed.)(1996) Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social  
sciences. Leicester; BPS Books. Potter notes that discourse and conversation analysis are similar and yet different
105 See Korobov, N. (2001). Reconciling Theory with Method: From Conversation Analysis and Critical Discourse 
Analysis to Positioning Analysis. In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social  
Research, 2(3), Art. 11, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0103119. Korobov looks at tensions between 
Critical Discourse analysis and Conversation Analysis, and posits Positioning Analysis as a middle-ground to 
reconcile them.
106 See chapter 2
107 Denzin, N. (1994) The Art and Politics of Interpretation. In Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, pp. 500–15. London: Sage
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produced and perpetuated, and can recognise that the conversations of the participants are not  
something existing outside of the discourses constructed through psychiatric and psychological 
frameworks, but develop in relation to them, and indeed, as will be discussed in the Interjection, 
support and perpetuate them108.
1.3 Field-Work Methods and Reflexivity: Participant Contributions
1.3.1 Identifying the Participants
Finding appropriate research methods for participant contribution was a troublesome journey in 
itself, and finding the most appropriate participants became a roundabout process. At first I wanted 
to explore and map some kind of conceptual and scholarly location for people who specifically 
enjoy the sexual company of material objects. I wanted to research more broadly than those I had  
come to know in the 'gay leather scene'. I wanted to interview all kinds of people who identified  
with a 'male' sexual role, whether homo- or heterosexual, male, female, transgendered, and who 
may not be attracted to the strict dress-codes and BDSM overtones of the 'leather'  
environment109. Yet I realised that such people, even if identifiable, are often reticent about their 
desires, and are difficult to come by since they don't collect in well-organised or -advertised groups 
outside of the internet110. I knew that 'leathermen' are only one group amongst a plethora of people  
with varied and non-normative desires, and who explore what psychoanalysis would label as 'fetish' 
interests. Yet these people are conspicuous in their invisibility in South Africa, and appropriate 
research subjects eluded me.
I considered conducting research through internet chatrooms and websites, but soon rejected this 
option since I was not comfortable with the implicit voyeurism and positivism of this 
idea111. I wanted to find the people behind the façades, and explore personal perceptions and 
108 See chapters 4, 5 and 6, and in particular the Interjection
109 I soon realised that just defining what I meant by a 'male' role was too complex and convoluted for this work, and 
would require a whole new thesis, so I quickly revised this to refer to biological 'men'
110 Where, for example, does one come across men whose 'fetish' is to wear a suit and sit in a bath of baked beans while 
being urinated on. I know of just one such person in New York, and many more with similarly unusual interests 
scattered around the world. But I know few such people locally.
111 Information such as the number of internet users and where they go would only be tangentially important for the 
thrust of the research. In this regard, see, for example, Chaney, M.P. & Dew, B.J. (2003) Online Experiences of 
Sexually Compulsive Men Who Have Sex with Men . In  Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity, 10:259–274, 2003. The 
authors identify that internet growth and the increasing number of users indicates that more individuals will engage 
in sexual behaviours. They call on research indicating that 200 sexually explicit websites are daily added to the 
internet (Cooper, A., Delmonico, D. L., & Burg, R. (2000). Cybersex users, abusers, and compulsives: New ﬁndings 
and implications. In Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity, 7, 5–29.) they also report that sex is the most frequently 
searched term on the internet (Cooper, A., Mcloughlin, I. P., & Campbell, K. M. (2000). Sexuality in cyberspace: 
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perspectives, rather than to quote statistics or detail online fantasies. Further, online research may 
reflect 'virtual' sexuality in a fantasy world, but does not adequately reveal sexuality as it plays out  
in the material world112.
After a period of reading, I realised that the research question was not 'who are these people', nor 
'what do these people do', but 'what are the discursive alternatives to restrictive historical paradigms 
on 'fetish' applicable to any people exploring unusual sexual interests?' By rephrasing the research 
question, I was freed up to focus more on epistemologies and discourses than on the constitution of 
the people themselves, since I did not need a sample representative of all 'fetishists', which would  
be impossible anyway. Rather, I merely needed examples of people who sexually enjoy contact with  
material objects, i.e. 'fetishists'. I was therefore liberated to return to my original point-of-reference: 
the one group of people who were accessible, available, open and 'out', yet remain discursively 
marginal: certain men of the 'gay male BDSM/fetish' community.
In recruiting gay men, I could engage in a dynamic process, which is the best way of enabling 
research validity and reliability113. I could grapple with recruitment not as a static event, but as a 
dynamic process influencing the whole research program114. 
Update for the 21st century. In CyberPsychology & Behavior, 3, 521–536.) They note that 20% of internet users take 
part in some form of online sexual activity.
112 Which is, after all, the cornerstone of the idea of 'fetish': the intersection between desire  and materiality
113 See Filiault, S.M. & Drummond, M.J.N. (2009) Finding the Rainbow: Reflections upon Recruiting Openly Gay 
Men for Qualitative Research. In International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social  
Sciences, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp.183-192.
114 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002) Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for Reflexivity. In 
FQS: Forum: Qualitative Social Research/Sozialforschung, Volume 3, No. 3, Art. 18 – September 2002. They argue 
that the dialogic process encompasses all stages of the research, and the idea of collaboration starts before 
interviews. Questions and potential participants  are developed at the same time, along with anticipation of positive 
or negative circumstances potentially involved in the process. During the interaction with participants the rules of 
interaction are negotiated, albeit often not explicitly
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T h i s r e c r u i t m e n t p r o c e s s w a s c o n d u c t e d i n a ' s n o w b a l l s a m p l i n g ' 
fashion115, and resulted in the participation of the following (names are pseudonyms for anonymity):
Participant Estimated Age 
Range
City Primary 
Language
Citizenship
'Brian' 20's Jhb Afrikaans SA
'Donald' unknown Jhb Afrikaans SA
'Henry' 60's CT Afrikaans SA
'Jacques' 30's CT Afrikaans SA
'Joseph' 40's Jhb English USA (SA Permanent 
Resident)
'Jason' 30's Jhb English SA
'Jared' 40's Jhb English SA
'Karl' 50's Jhb Afrikaans SA
'Lawrence' 50's Jhb English SA
'Simon' unknown Jhb English SA
1.3.1a) Reflexivity: Researching Participant Interests, not Identities
But there remained the eternal injunction: to remain flexible, reflexive and conscious of my political  
position, which does not seek to represent a 'community' of participants as if there really is one, yet  
s t i l l cal ls on the percept ions of part ic ipants who organise themselves in a 
group116. I had to remember that identifying a single community is dangerous, even though the  
115 See Biernacki, P & Waldorf, D (1981) Snowball Sampling, Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling. In 
Sociological Methods and Research, Vol 10, No 2, November 1981, pp141-163; Heckathorn, D.D. (1997) 
Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations. In 
Social Problems, vol 44, no 2, May 1997, pp174-199; Muhib, F.B., Lin, L.S.,Stueve, A., Miller, R.L., Ford, W.L., 
Johnson, W.D. & Smith, P.J. (2001) A Venue-Based Method for Sampling Hard-to-Reach Populations. In 
Public Health Reports. 2001 Supplement 1 . Vol 116 pp216-222; Kemper, E.A, Stringfield, S & Teddlie, C (2003) 
Mixed Methods Sampling Strategies in Social Science Research. In Tashakkori, A & Teddli, C (2003) 
Handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral research, Sage
116 Note the arguments made in chapter 2 about my political position as a researcher, whereby I position the thesis with 
a political location, while at the same time engaging in discourse analysis around lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgendered and intersex (vs queer) politics.
See Koopmans, R & Statham, P (1999) Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and Political Discourse 
Approaches. In Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Volume 4, Number 2 / Fall 1999, 203 – 221. They critique 
protest event and political discourse newspaper analysis, and suggest a methodological approach with the 
quantitative coverage of event analysis and which also deals with qualitative discursive portions of claims. They 
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participants may call themselves 'gay fetishists'. As a researcher I could not perpetuate the 
essentialist labels of 'gay men' or 'fetishists', nor assume that the participants see themselves as a  
c o l l e c t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n a s a g r o u p o f i n d i v i d u a l s c o l l e c t i n g f o r v a r i o u s  
purposes117.
L i k e a l l p e o p l e , t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y f u l l y - i n t e g r a t e d 
selves118, nor do they necessarily adopt coherent identities, but range from having particular to 
authentic identities119, as well as multiple identities120. The variations are potentially very confusing. 
Even within the supposedly stable category of 'gay male fetishist', I had to remind myself that not 
all 'gay male fetishists', although they might self-identify as 'gay' (rather than 'transgendered'), 
'fetishise' objects in binary and gendered ways121. In corollary, not all 'same-sex male fetishists' 
identify as 'gay'122. Further, some biologically male 'fetishists' are gender-nonconformist in their 
public and/or sexual lives123. And some men are sexually attracted to animals, with no specific 
preference as to the sex-identity of the animal, making it difficult to identify their sexual  
o r i e n t a t i o n , w h i c h i t s e l f b e c o m e s c o n f u s i n g i n c r o s s - s p e c i e s 
sexuality124. In any case, 'fetish' revolves around sexual activity relating to material objects, 
which are generally gender-neutral, and identifying 'sexual identity' in relation to an inanimate 
locate protest and social movements methodologically in a broader framework of political claims-making, rather 
than merely theoretically. Using this approach, they thereby forge integrated approaches which locate protest in 
multi-organisational arenas and link it to political circumstances while being sensitive to the discursive message of 
protest.
117 See chapter 2
118 However one might define 'self'. In this regard, see chapter 5 re the constitution of the subject
119 Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor sees identity as relating the idea 
of self as an orientation in a moral space, and that the individual’s attempt to recognise their space in the matrix of 
life is what makes up identity. Here moral space is identified with physical space, which he locates in two aspects: 
knowledge of the physical space and placing the self in the known space, which requires spatial awareness and using 
navigation to obtain comprehension and meaning. This is more than getting information or knowledge, which are 
value neutral enterprises, but also figuring out where the individual is in relation to space, which is a value-oriented 
idea. This is, to Taylor, the foundation of human aspiration. For Taylor, the importance of identity is ‘. . . the need to 
be connected to, or in contact with, what they see as good, or of crucial importance, or of fundamental value. And 
how could it be otherwise, once we see that this orientation in relation to the good is essential to being a functional 
human agent? The fact that we have to place ourselves in a space which is defined by these qualitative distinctions 
cannot but mean that where we stand in relation to them must matter to us. (1989, p. 42)
120 See Miller, D. (2000). Citizenship and national identity. London: Polity Press.
See Golmohamad, M (2004) World Citizenship, Identity and the Notion of an Integrated Self. In 
Studies in Philosophy and Education 23: 131–148, 2004.
121 Some gay men enjoy cross-dressing, but don’t want to change their male gender identity. Other gay men are 
sexually attracted to breasts, or are interested in the 'male vaginas' of transgendered men. Note: female-to-male 
transgendered people are referred to as FTM's. Many elect to have 'top surgery', i.e. mastectomies, in order to appear  
more masculine, and often undergo hysterectomies but prefer not to surgically alter their vaginas, which often 
remain sexually functional.
122 Some are bisexual, while other men-who-have-sex-with-men (MSM) identify publicly as heterosexual, but may 
enjoy anal sex or dildo-play with a man. Other heterosexual men enjoy anal penetration by a woman using a dildo or 
a strap-on penis extension, or are attracted to pre-operative transgendered women (so-called ‘she-males’)
123 'gender benders'/'cross-dressers'
124 Note: this thesis very consciously does not deal with bestiality, and does not seek to address questions of the 'object-
status' of animals or the ethical/moral  considerations of cross-species sexual preferences
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object defies logic125.
There can therefore be no essentially unifying front to the participants, whether politically,  
psychologically or socially, and I could not approach the research as if exploring a necessary or 
essentialist identity-based grouping126. The narratives of the participants of necessity do not reflect 
the fullness of participants' desires, interests, political and social positions beyond their sexual  
practices127.
By recognising this diversity and complexity of participant constitution, even within the putatively 
coherent group of middle-class, (predominantly 'white') 'gay male fetishists', I could partially  
liberate myself from fears of a priori partiality, since I was calling on the participants as 
representative not of their 'identities' (of 'gay', 'male', 'fetishist' etc.), but of their self-identifications  
and interests128. I was therefore free to interview individuals who self-identify as gay men for some  
purposes, while still recognising that their 'identities' inform and are informed by their experiences  
in a social constructionist way. I could therefore recognise and work productively with the notion 
that no research participants are wholly defined by their sexual orientation, or by any of the other 
scripts they adopt in the panoply of social or sexual self-identifications. Rather than being 
delineated by a 'unity of identity', I could see the research participants as connected through their  
'unity in diversity'129, and I could remain both personally and epistemologically 
reflexive130.
1.3.1b) Heterocentric and Normative Biases
In response to the impossibility of definitively 'identifying' research participants, and the need to 
focus on their interests and practices, rather than their 'identities', I therefore opted for a 
125 Despite that certain languages such as German and French allocate gendered pronouns to inanimate objects. See 
Introduction re defining the boundaries of 'fetish'
126 See chapter 2
See Koopmans, R & Statham, P (1999) Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and Political Discourse 
Approaches. In Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Volume 4, Number 2 / Fall 1999, 203 – 221. 
127 See chapter 2. For example, certain participants are demonstrably transgressive in their sexual interests, but are at 
the same time rather conventional and conservative in their wider political views and social identifications
128 See chapter 2
129 Golmohamad, M (2004) World Citizenship, Identity and the Notion of an Integrated Self. In 
Studies in Philosophy and Education 23: 131–148, 2004. at 131. Golmohamad notes that, even though science has 
been able to move beyond the limitations of previous frameworks of knowledge, there remains amongst many 
ordinary people a kind of need to identify a ‘bounded’ kind of identity linked to national pride and patriotism, and 
therefore to classify who does and doesn’t belong where
130 See Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press. Willig notes the two types of reﬂexivity: personal and 
epistemological reﬂexivity. The former entails reﬂecting on the researcher's own values, experiences, interests, 
beliefs, political commitments, wider life aims and social identities and how they intersect with the research. The 
latter deals with the assumptions placed on the research by the researcher
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methodological approach which takes account of heterocentric and normative biases in the research  
itself, rather than focusing on the participants' group constitution131.
In order to do this, I called on queer theory, which aims to negate stability, and to focus on 
possibility and the subversion of categorical thinking132. Queer theory unpacks identity, rather than 
perpetuating it, and works productively with the absence of an essential 'natural' sex, gender or  
sexuality. I could therefore avoid heteronormative, androcentric or ethnocentric perspectives, and 
was free not to essentialise 'gay fetishism' as a 'thing' specifically restricted to 'gay men' and 
different from any other kind of 'fetishism'. Rather, I could see it is one part of the gamut of 
sexuality, where the participants explore an element of their wider desires, rather than necessarily 
defining themselves in terms of an identity.
This was appropriate for the broad strokes, since Queer Theory clearly indicates which research 
methodologies are inappropriate. But it doesn't necessarily prescribe methods for obtaining 
participant contributions133. To move in a productive direction I looked to non-normative creative 
methodologies134. Feminist theories promised some assistance, since they critique normative 
assumptions about research and the norms against which it is measured 135. Further, proactive 
research methods, linking feminist and queer methodologies136 have been helpful in working 
131 See Wittig, M (1981) One is not born a woman. In The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, New York: Routledge: 
pp103–109 re heterosexist assumptions. See also Seidman, S (1997) Difference Troubles: Queering social theory  
and sexual politics. New York: Cambridge University Press re the effects in sociology.
132 See Norton R. (1999) A Critique of Social Constructionism and Postmodern Queer Theory, updated 24 October 
2002. Available at http://www.infopt.demon.co.uk/extracts/htm 
133 Queer theory also means not relying on numbers arguments in the way that identity-politics-based theories, such as 
gay and lesbian theories, do, which in turn obviates reliance on positivist methodologies: See chapter 2
134 See Emke, I. (1996) Methodology and Methodolatry: Creativity and the Impoverishment of the Imagination in 
Sociology. In The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 1996), 
pp. 77-90. Emke argues that there is a tension in sociology between a reification of conventional research strategies, 
which allow little creativity, and a deification of creative and interpretive sociologists. He discusses structural and 
individual impediments to creativity, and suggests how limitations might be overcome through the alteration of 
research goals and researcher's roles.
135 Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press
Some critiques are that the male is the norm against which research is compared, since most studies were carried out 
with male subjects; and that male science claimed to be 'objective', whereby researchers were meant to be impartial  
and detached
See also re methodologies and issues pertaining to researching sexualities: Crimp, D. (1992) Portraits of people with 
AIDS. In Grossherg, L., Nelson, C. & Treichler, P. (eds.) Cultural Studies. London and New York: Routledge, 
117-33.; de Lauretis, T. (1991). Queer theory: Lesbian and gay sexualities. In Differences: A Journal of Feminist  
Cultural Studies 3, iii-xviii. ; D'Emilio, J. (1992). Making Trouble: Essays on Gay History, Politics and the  
University. London and New York: Routledge.; Grosz, E. A. (1989). Sexual Subversions: Three French  
Feminists. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
See Diamond, L.M (2006) Careful What You Ask For: Reconsidering Feminist Epistemology and Autobiographical 
Narrative in Research on Sexual Identity Development. In Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society  
2006, vol. 31, no. 2
136 See Hammers, C & Brown, A.D. (2004) Towards a feminist–queer alliance: a paradigmatic shift in the research 
process. In Social Epistemology, Vol. 18, No. 1, January–March 2004, pp. 85–101. They argue that there is fertile 
ground to build on feminist advances in methods, methodology and epistemology, and that feminist and queer theory 
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towards a feminist-queer alliance in methodology, where perhaps none as yet 
exists137.
1.3.2 The Impact of Personal Experience: Insider Trading
Linking queer and feminist methodologies provided insight into interactions with participants 
approached from an 'insider' perspective, informed by my own experience of and intersections with 
'fetishists'138. I called on feminist methodologies which generally approve of reciprocal relationships 
calling on empathy and mutual respect, rather than a hierarchical priority of the researcher's  
purportedly superior knowledge139. I thereby acknowledged my reliance on the participants to help  
me to understand the multiple meanings of their perceptions, narratives and daily  
experiences140. 
I focused on sharing meanings and developing the research process as equals in partnerships based 
on intersubjectivity, flexibility and reflexivity141. I could thereby call on the strengths of being an 
' i n s i d e r ' , b y c a l l i n g o n f r i e n d s h i p a n d p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t s a s a m e t h o d . 
My intimate knowledge of the environment stood me in good stead with 'getting in' to interview 
participants, and with not getting the wrong end of the stick while speaking to 
them142.
should meet to talk, in order to challenging 'scientific' approaches to researching minority sexual orientations and 
adopting reflexivity in relation to subjectivity and sexuality. This approach does not privilege essentialist, 
categorical and reductionist binary conceptions and moves into thinking sexualities in terms of inclusivity and 
multiple identities.
137 See Hammers, C & Brown, A.D. (2004) ibid. The authors call for an alliance between feminist social science and 
queer theory, through the challenge to traditional scientific approaches to research on sexual minority groups. The 
‘queer’ approach advocated suggests a reflexive position on subjectivity and sexuality celebrating inclusivity and 
multiple identities, rather than reductionistic categorical thought. This is as opposed to essentialist conceptions 
which privilege gay/lesbian, man/woman, and object/subject
138 In regard to positioning as a researcher, see Acker, S (2000) In/out/side: positioning the researcher in feminist 
qualitative research. In Resources for Feminist Research. Toronto: 2000. Vol. 28, Iss. 1/2; pg. 189. Acker looks at 
concerns of "insiderness" and "outsiderness", and at certain problems around figuring out who is an insider and who 
an outsider, and which of those positions affords greater insights in different situations. She argues that this question 
cannot be definitively answered, but that creative work can be done between the tensions. Questions need to be 
asked about the problems created by relative 'insiderness', which changes and shifts as the researcher becomes more 
knowledgeable about the area of research and the research participants.
139 See the points on feminist and queer epistemological positions later
140 'supplication': See England, K.V.L.  (1994) Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research. In 
The Professional Geographer 46 (1), 80-91.
141 See England, K.V.L.  (1994) ibid
142 See Tillmann-Healy. L.M. (2003) Friendship as Method. In Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 9, No. 5, 729-749 (2003). 
Tillmann-Healy discusses friendship as a method of qualitative research, defining friendship as a kind of fieldwork. 
She posits that friendship as method entails researching with the practices, at the pace, in the ordinary contexts, and 
through adopting an ethic of friendship.
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Yet it also forced me to manage other considerations for both researcher and 
participants143. My location (at least partially) inside the research resulted in a need to focus clearly  
on ethics144. In particular, I was forced methodologically to distinguish my own political aims from 
those of the participants, thereby interrogating my own location and relationship to the research 
work145. Was I sufficiently distant from the participants and the research content to be adding 
intelligent and intelligible value to the scholarship on the topic? Or was I too similar to the 
participants, thereby merely performing an advocacy role masquerading as theoretical research? 
Was I really 'researching', or was I rather simply regurgitating my own pre-concretised 
perspectives? And was I simply (ab)using participants to further my own personal and political 
manifesto of liberation with limited critical thinking applied to it?
The answer I arrived at: the research was indeed validly conducted because of, not despite, the 
personal element to the research process. In the social sciences, a personal narrative element or  
interest is somewhat unusual, and at times frowned upon, since it is assumed that the researcher  
must remain objective, disconnected, and unemotional146. 
This research, however, was undertaken with an auto-ethnographic element which explains the 
research participants' world in ways that cannot be captured by the externalised, authorial voice of a 
distant ethnographer/researcher, who cannot hope impartially and independently to capture the  
subject's ‘truth’147. There is always an element of the ethnographer’s subjectivity implicit in the  
descriptions of the subject148. As Mark Neumann remarks of ethnography:
“As a form of institutional and scientific investigation, ethnographic reports privileged the “neutral” voice  
of the writer over the authority of subjective and personal experience. Yet, elements of fascination,  
adventure, romance, and desire leak through, suggesting how ethnographic discourse functions as location 
for addressing issues of identity, place, and uncertainty in modern life”149.
143  See Tillmann-Healy. L.M. (2003) ibid
144 England, K.V.L.  (1994) Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research. In 
The Professional Geographer 46 (1), 80-91.
145 See Pain, R (2004) Social geography: participatory research. In Progress in Human Geography 28,5 (2004) pp. 
652-663. See also chapter 2 where I engage in news analysis to gauge popular perceptions of homosexuality in 
South Africa
146 See Probyn, E (1993) Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies. Routledge: London & New York
147 Neumann, M (1996) Collecting Ourselves at the End of the Century. In Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) 
Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing. Altamira Press: Walnut Creek, London, New 
Delhi. p172 et seq
148 See Russell, Glenda M. & Kelly, Nancy H. (2002). Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for 
Reflexivity [47 paragraphs]. In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social  
Research, 3(3), Art. 18, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs020318
See Strathern, M (1991) Partial connections. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
149 Neumann, M (1996) Collecting Ourselves at the End of the Century. In Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) 
Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing. Altamira Press: Walnut Creek, London, New 
Delhi. p172 et seq, pp 176
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I focused on productively incorporating these considerations into the research process, by ensuring 
that the 'interview' process remained consciously conducted and balanced.
1.3.3 Preparing for the 'Interview' Process: A Focus on Ethics
As a visible part of the research process and setting, I had to factor myself into the research 
itself150. I found Participatory Research to be compelling, since it resonated with my attempts to  
incorporate new voices into the academy, thereby acknowledging a variety of different perspectives  
rather than assuming a singular voice of ‘alterity’151.
I found this thinking particularly useful for exploring relations with accounts of space, place and 
environment, as well as for ties between cultural identities and place, as is the case with the current 
research into materialist relations between people and objects152. This allowed me to pull together 
multiple connections between concerns and practices, focusing on local conditions and knowledge, 
and reflecting complex narratives in a context-specific way. In particular, the focus on context 
enabled me to make methodological connections between social geography and the present research 
focus on participants' experiences of their material environment153.
1.3.3a) Dialogic Conversations
As a result I chose to call on dialogic participation, whereby both researcher and researched are 
acknowledged as taking part in the process154.
150 Methodologically I have been influenced by geography and spatial theory, since both this arena and the current 
research deals with phenomenological experience, which is implicitly connected to materiality, physicality and 
physical  location of participants. See Smith, S. J. 1988. Constructing local knowledge: The analysis of self in 
everyday life. In Eyles, J. & Smith, D.  (eds.), Qualitative Methods in Human Geography. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
17-38. 
151 See Cahill, C. (2004): Defying gravity? Raising consciousness through collective research. In Children’s 
Geographies 2. See also Pain, R (2004) Social geography: participatory research. In 
Progress in Human Geography 28,5 (2004) pp.652–663, See also Cieri, M. (2003): Between being and looking: 
queer tourism promotion and lesbian social space in Greater Philadelphia. In ACME 2, 147 – 66. 
152 See McIntyre, A. (2003) Through the eyes of women: photovoice and participatory research as tools for reimagining 
place. In Gender Place and Culture 10, 47 – 66.; Kindon, S.L. (2003) Participatory video in geographic research: a 
feminist practice of looking? In Area 35, l42 – 53; Offen, K. 2003: Narrating place and identity, or mapping Miskitu 
land claims in Northeastern Nicaragua. In Human Organization 62, 382 – 92.
153 See Pain, R (2004) Social geography: participatory research. In Progress in Human Geography 28,5 (2004) pp.652–
663. See chapters 5 & 6 for more elucidation on the interaction between materiality and discourse in the lives of 
(research) subjects
154 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002) Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for Reflexivity. In 
FQS: Forum: Qualitative Social Research/Sozialforschung, Volume 3, No. 3, Art. 18 – September 2002. They argue 
that subjectivity of researchers and participants, as well as inter-subjectivity between researchers and between 
researchers & participants, can better place research. They call on a framework involving understanding qualitative 
research as interconnected and mutually influential dialogic processes. This enables each major part of a research 
program to be seen as enabling synergistic communication between or among participants. This necessitates 
reflexivity on the part of both researchers and participants.
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The research took place through conversations between the participants on the one hand, and me as 
researcher, (in some cases) friend, and 'co-conspirator' on the other. We were similarly located as 
equals by our gender, ethnicity, primary sexual orientations, often by our age, and so on. And more 
importantly, by the confluence of our interests. In this way I located myself as a compatriot, thereby  
enabling honest and open discussion while acknowledging that I was part of the process and setting.
This meant that my personal characteristics enabled, rather than hindered, insights not attainable by 
a putatively 'independent' or 'impartial' researcher. I understood that the subjectivity in research  
information would come from both me and the participants, and that we would both bring our  
personal experiences and perspectives into the research. Our perspectives would “inform and 
mediate each element of the research project, influencing not only the process and intended goals 
b u t a l s o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a n d a t t r i b u t i o n s f o u n d w i t h i n t h e e v e n t 
itself.”155
Given that qualitative research is an embodied experience for both the researcher and the  
participants, I had further to acknowledge that we would both have emotional experiences, and that  
the phenomenological insight I was importing into the research (and the argument) was applicable 
both to me qua researcher, and the participants156.
1.3.3b) Research Impacting the Researcher
I wanted to learn something new, which is why I undertook an arduous PhD study. And it has 
indeed delivered what it promised: a kind of personal transformation through 
knowledge157. Participatory research enabled a process of learning about both me and others, and I  
confronted new feelings about myself158. Consciousness of this process enabled me to carry out 
effective, solid research while constantly remaining reflexive, since I was not merely recording but 
actively processing information by comparing how it related to my own experiences.
155 See Russell, Glenda M. & Kelly, Nancy H. (2002). ibid
156 Dickson-Swift, V, James, E.L., Kippen, E, Pranee Liamputtong, P (2009) Researching sensitive topics: qualitative 
research as emotion work. In Qualitative Research, Vol. 9, No. 1, 61-79 (2009). The authors provide a grounded 
theory analysis of researchers working on qualitative research, and explore theoretical and empirical evidence of  
emotional involvement in research projects. They highlight certain consequences of emotion work and provide 
suggestions for researcher self-care. See also Barnacle, R (ed) (2001) Phenomenology: Qualitative Research 
Methods. Melbourne: RMIT University Press
157 See Brydon-Miller, M & Tolman, D.L. (1997). Engaging the process of transformation. In 
Journal of Social Issues, 53, 803-810.
158 Freire, P (1993) Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum.
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1.3.3c) Research Impacting the Participants
Concerns of power and empowerment are central to participatory research and there is a strong need 
to minimise separation between researcher and participants159. Participant experiences are impacted 
o n b y t h e r e s e a r c h e r ' s p r e s e n c e a n d t h e i r r e s p o n s e t o t h e r e s e a r c h e r ' s 
presence160. I called on this thinking to avoid a paternalistic relationship between me and the 
participants, and to focus on the idea of self-empowerment in the face of the marginality of their  
sexual practices161, whilst researching the participants as a marginal group162.
The participants in this research, however, occupy multiple social locations and, as predominantly 
'white', middle-class men, are not substantially disempowered163. They are therefore more able to 
push their own political agendas and empower themselves wherever necessary in ways not readily 
accessible by others164. Their dual role of 'empowered' and 'disempowered' (and their concomitant 
ability to push their own political empowerment agendas) linked into my intention not to 'transfer'  
p o w e r i n s o m e m a g n a n i m o u s w a y t o t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , a s i f I h a d i t t o 
give165. Rather, I wanted to enable a space in which self-empowerment could take place wherever 
possible, through giving the participants a non-judgmental platform to express themselves 
unfettered in ways they otherwise would not.
1.3.3d) Ethics: Practical Implementation
This self-expression at the same time placed a burden on me to maintain the highest standards of  
research ethics. I had to enable the participants to drive both the process and content of their 
contributions, and to remain comfortable throughout the participation process.
159 Pain, R. (2004) Social geography: participatory research. In Progress in Human Geography 28,5 (2004) pp. 652 – 
663. See also Karnieli-Miller, O, Strier, R & Pessach, L (2009) Power Relations in Qualitative Research. In 
Qualitative Health Research  2009; 19; 279 re tensions between commitments to power redistribution inherent in 
qualitative research and the ethical and methodological complexity of clinical research. Qualitative inquiry seeks to 
reduce power differences and to encourage researcher-participant disclosure and authenticity. This raises ethical  
dilemmas and methodological challenges, which the authors propose to deal with by a developmental analysis of 
power relations across the different stages of the research process.
160 See Pain, R (2004) Social geography: participatory research. In Progress in Human Geography 28,5 (2004) pp. 652–
663. This is subject to the caveats above about the identities of the research participants
161 See for example in respect of empowering disadvantaged communities. See eg Leyshon, M. (2002) On being ‘in the 
field’: practice, progress and problems in research with young people in rural areas. In 
Journal of Rural Studies 18, 179–91.
162 See Pain, R (2004) Social geography: participatory research. In Progress in Human Geography 28,5 (2004) pp. 652–
663. This is subject to the caveats above about the identities of the research participants
163 See supra
164 See chapter 2
165 See Wilton, R. (2004) Keeping your distance? Balancing political engagement and scientific autonomy with a 
psychiatric consumer/survivor group. In Fuller, D. and Kitchin, R. (eds) (2004) Radical theory, critical praxis: 
making a difference beyond the academy?, ACME e- book series, 116 – 31
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To facilitate this I gave each participant a written copy of an ethics statement, as well as a written  
summary of the nature of the study, together with contact details for me, my supervisor and the  
university. I made copies of the proposal available, and preceded all participation by obtaining  
informed written and oral consent. I gave each participant the opportunity to ask questions on the  
issues, and each was free to discontinue their participation at any time.
I offered participants transcripts of all conversations in which they took part, and they could ask to 
modify or delete any element of the conversation. I discussed with them how I was intending to call 
on the conversations in the study, from which they could withdraw at any time.
I assured participants as to the complete confidentiality and anonymity of all contents of 
discussions, which took place at safe, confidential and convenient spaces agreed between all parties.  
All interview recordings were done by me, and will remain under my control and in my  
safekeeping. I altered the participants’ names and other pertinent details in transcriptions, which 
were done by me. No subsequent translations or concomitant transcriptions were necessary from 
other languages to English, which obviated the need to call on others who would become privy to 
the participants narratives before pseudonyms were allocated.
None of the participants expressed marked psychological or social problems around their 'fetish 
sexuality', and I was honest about my role as researcher rather than psychologist or counsellor. Even 
though no professional (psychological) assistance has been necessary as a result of the participation, 
if any subsequently becomes necessary, even after the conclusion of the research, I will put 
participants in touch with professional individuals or organisations able to assist them.
1.3.4 Developing Interview Schedules and Conducting Dialogic Conversations
1.3.4a Focusing on Language awareness
With these imperatives in mind I prepared a set of questions which I forwarded to the research 
participants for their perusal. This enabled them to mull over what they considered important about  
their own experiences in advance. Some participants simply provided written answers, while others 
responded in a one-on-one dialogic interview/conversation process, discussing feelings and 
perceptions. 
I consciously constructed questions ('guidelines for interviews') to reflect the themes I wished to 
explore. Through open-ended questions, they covered issues around 'fetish practices', the body, 
power relations, emotional space and social space. The framing of these questions necessitated a 
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reflexivity and a critical awareness of language as a part of the meaning we give  
experiences166.
Language constructs, rather than simply mirroring reality, which means that categories and labels  
shape research findings. This necessitated my asking a range of questions relating to social,  
psychological and political space, and not presuming that I had the answer to those questions.
The research was conducted through what Kidder and Fine distinguish as open-ended, inductive 
methodologies relating to the generation of theory and meaning exploration ('big Q'), rather than 
n o n - n u m e r i c a l d a t a i n c o r p o r a t e d h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e r e s e a r c h ( ' l i t t l e 
q')167. The interviewing was undertaken with a view to obtaining a sense of the participant narratives 
and perspectives, which the interview questions in general sought to elicit rather than ensuring that 
each participant answered the same question in exactly the same way. In interviews I was thereby  
free to ask slightly different versions of the questions than appeared on the questionnaires, 
depending on the overarching tenor and sensibility of the conversation in the moment. This resulted  
in a range of different responses which reflected a better sense of narrative continuity, rather than a 
sense of absolute answers to carefully linguistically constructed questions which could be compared 
in a hypothetico-deductive way168. 
166 This relates both to the words used during the interview process, and the participant responses, the latter to be 
discussed below
See Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and  
method. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press
167 See Kidder, L.H.  & Fine, M. (1987) Qualitative and quantitative methods: When stories converge. In 
New Directions for Program Evaluation, Volume 1987 Issue 35, Pages 57-75, Special Issue: Multiple Methods in 
Program Evaluation. The authors argue that qualitative measures used in a quantitative framework can reasonably 
result in triangulation, but that independent qualitative and quantitative evaluations are more problematic for 
triangulation, while enabling greater discovery.
See Kidder, L.H.  & Fine, M. (1997) Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology: a radical tradition. In Fox, D & 
Prilleltensky,  I. (eds) (1997) Critical Psychology, an Introduction. London: Sage
168 See the critique of inductivism by Karl Popper, and his formulation of hypothetico-deductivism, which is now 
considered the basis of mainstream experimental psychology. Popper, K.R. (1959) The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery. Hutchinson: London. Popper, K.R. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London; Popper, K.R. (1972) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon, Oxford. Observation of 
similar circumstances cannot ensure the same outcome without exception. Popper suggested that induction and 
veriﬁcation should be replaced with deduction and falsiﬁcation, whereby theories are tested through hypotheses 
which can subsequently be tested by experiment or observation, thereby looking for dis-conﬁrmation or falsiﬁcation 
which eliminates claims. Hypothetico-deductivism was challenged in the '60s and '70s for its non-acknowledgement 
of the role of historical, social and cultural factors in the formation of knowledge. The bases upon which the critique 
can be voiced is that it does not provide enough space for the development of theory, it is elitist , and is a myth. In 
this regard, see Willig, C (2001) Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and method. 
Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press
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1.3.4b) The 'Interview' Process
Some questionnaires were answered in the privacy of participants' homes at their leisure. The 
dialogic conversations, however, took place in a 'safe' space: one at my home, one at a participant's  
place of work where he felt comfortable talking, and the remainder at a pool-party event in 
Johannesburg, hosted by SALeathermen169. These interview spaces were very different from each 
other, and I was aware of the potential for participants to be influenced by the environment, and 
therefore to provide context-dependent answers170.
During the conversation process I focused on balancing my role as researcher with my role as 
confidant, thereby minimising appropriation. In so doing, I avoided leading questions as far as  
possible, while still being present in the moment of the interview. I tried my best to  
follow the conversation direction, rather than steer it, thereby not angling the research towards what 
I hoped the answer would be. The dialogic conversations therefore took place by way of a natural 
interaction171. I was not aware of much self-consciousness or reticence in any of the interview 
environments, and participants successfully represented themselves as much as 
possible172. Indeed, this turned out to be powerful, in that I learned new things from the interactions,  
and certain participants experienced the process of discussing their sexualities with me as cathartic. 
This more comfortable dialogic process resulted in rich and meaningful interactions from which 
came a range of themes and perspectives which largely matched the kinds of information I was 
trying to obtain173. I was comfortable that it nevertheless did not reflect my preconceptions, but  
provided me with a valuable body of perceptions coming out of the dynamic of the conversations, 
and out of personalised responses to the standardised themes174.
169 The not-for-profit organisation which serves as a point of contact for the 'leather' community in SA. See 
www.saleathermen.org.za
170  See Talja, S (1999) Analyzing Qualitative Interview Data: The Discourse Analytic Method. In 
Library & Information Science Research, Volume 21, Issue 4, November 1999, Pages 459-477. Talja notes that 
participant interpretations are more context-dependent and variable than ordinarily acknowledged, and calls on 
discourse analysis to enable interview data to lay bare irregular interpretative practices whereby participants 
construct versions of actions, cognitive processes, and other phenomena in the context of the interview. This allows 
for the recognition of cultural regularities in participants’ accounts so as to deal with the macrosociological level.
171 See Potter, J. (1996) Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Approaches: Theoretical Background. In Richardson, 
J.T.E. (Ed.)(1996). Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social  
sciences. Leicester; BPS Books. This is not to rely on simplistic behaviourism, ignoring the interaction or reducing it 
to mere movements
172 Pain, R. (2004) Social geography: participatory research. In Progress in Human Geography 28,5 (2004) pp. 652 – 
663
173 See Ryan, M.M., Ogilvie, M & Pettigrew, S (2002) Self-introspection as a Research Method in Exploring 
Consumption Behaviour at a Special Event. In Qualitative Research Journal, vol 2, no 2, 2002 pp47-57. The authors 
speak of introspection as a data collection method for obtaining experiential data, and revealing rich insights.
174 See Potter, J. (1996) Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Approaches: Theoretical Background. In Richardson, 
J.T.E. (Ed.)(1996). Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social  
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1.4 Transcribing, Analysing and Writing: Reflexivity in Interpretation
As Denzin notes: when it comes to the social sciences, there is only interpretation175. Transcribing 
analysing and incorporating participant contributions required my paying particular attention to the 
role of theory and how I was to position myself as writer176. Rather than being an 'outside' recorder 
of 'fact', I had to recognise that I am productive of the 'reality' with which I come into contact in the  
research177. I remained cognisant of issues involved in the transition from the field to the text: sense-
making, representation, legitimation and desire178. I therefore remained reflexive in the process of 
choosing what to include and what to exclude, how to represent it, and so on. In avoiding 
foundationalist epistemological positions, I opted to lodge the writing in local, personal and 
political representations, allowing the participants as much of their own voice as possible. At the  
same time I reflected on my own position in the research, unapologetically yet consciously, honestly 
and ethically inserting it into the body of work while keeping a keen eye on the worth of the content 
and the 'vitality' of the text179.
1.4.1 Calling on Language
As is the case with all qualitative research, it was important to recognise that anything I obtained 
from the participant narratives was mediated by both the language the participants used, and my 
own interpretation/construction thereof, in a way Denzin refers to as 'interpretive interactionism'  
whereby the interpretation begins and ends with the life story of the researcher 
him/herself180. 
I t has therefore been imperative to avoid the pitfalls inherent in discourse 
analysis, a n d it has been necessary to make allowances for both miscommunication and 
sciences. Leicester; BPS Books. Potter notes that interviews are complex and expressive. In discourse research, 
interviews allow a standardised range of themes to be addressed with various participants, and they enable a lot of 
control over sampling. Interviews are seen as a way to identify and explore participants' interpretative practices, not 
as a way of finding the 'true' reflection of events, attitudes and beliefs
175 Denzin, N. (1994) The Art and Politics of Interpretation. In Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research,pp. 500–15. London: Sage pp500
176 Re transcription, see Edwards, J.A (2003) The Transcription of Discourse. In Schiffrin, D, Tannen, D & Hamilton, 
H.E. (eds) (2003) The Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Blackwell. See also Potter, J. (1996) Discourse Analysis 
and Constructionist Approaches: Theoretical Background. In Richardson, J.T.E. (Ed.)(1996). 
Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social sciences. Leicester; BPS Books.  Potter 
notes the need to take into account both the content and the interaction in transcriptions. In this regard, I have 
transcribed the interviews and conversations myself, and have tried as far as possible to include the nuances and 
inflections, pauses, laughter etc in conversations.
177 Denzin, N. (1994) The Art and Politics of Interpretation. In Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, pp. 500–15. London: Sage
178 Denzin, N. (1994) ibid
179 Denzin, N. (1994) ibid
180 See Denzin, N. (1994) ibid
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misrecognition of meaning181.  I could not simply assume that what participants said was a blanket 
representation of 'truth', but rather that it reflected layers of political, personal and social meaning 
both in the responses and in my perception of them.
For example, certain participants felt that the local 'leather' scene reflects a wide cultural diversity, 
representative of the broader South African society. In contradistinction, however, racist sentiments 
have been expressed to me outside of the formal research itself, and I know that the environment is 
often not very welcoming to 'people of colour'. There are very few, if any 'black' fetishists in the 
'scene', and a smattering of 'coloured' and 'Indian' men182. The latter seem to aspire to western 
cultural and social norms to a greater extent than most 'black African' gay men in South Africa, who  
to a greater or lesser extent align themselves with more African traditionalist world-views which do 
not approve of homosexuality or unusual sexual practices183. In this regard, my perception is that 
there is very little cultural diversity in the local BDSM/fetish arena. Perhaps participants' statements  
to the contrary indicate that they are unaware of the (Western) cultural hegemony of the 'scene'.  
Perhaps, in wishing for more cultural diversity, they represent the situation as they would like it to 
be, so as not to appear 'racist'. Perhaps the participants' intrapsychic scripting (perceptions by 
individuals of how people see them) has influenced the kinds of sexuality they enjoy, skewing their 
perceptions and what they say184. Perhaps the participants simply did not understand the question. 
Or indeed, perhaps it is more complex than all of these.
Whatever the reasons for the difference in perceptions, I had to remaining reflexive throughout the 
181 Antaki, C., Billig, M., Edwards, D & Potter, J (2003) Discourse Analysis; Means of Doing Analysis. In 
Discourse Analysis Online, 2003 – hiscc.dk. The authors identify a number of ways of looking at talk and textual 
data which do not count as discourse analysis. Namely: under-analysis through summary, through taking sides, 
through over-quotation or isolated quotation, circular identification of discourses and mental constructs, false 
survey, and analysis made up of merely noting features. They argue that none of these effectively analyse the data.
182 I use these appellations very uncomfortably, with an eye on how they perpetuate the colonialist and apartheid 
labeling of 'white', 'black', 'coloured' and 'Indian'. Yet it was clear in the dialogic conversations that the participants 
identify themselves using these categories.
183 Note, this is merely a perception, and not borne out by any detailed research. But see Chapter 2 on popular 
discourses on sexual orientation in Southern Africa
See Zea, M.C., Reisen, C.A & Diaz, R.M. (2003) Methodological Issues in Research on Sexual Behavior with 
Latino Gay and Bisexual Men. In American Journal of Community Psychology,Volume 31, Numbers 3-4 / June, 
Pages281-291. The authors focus on the importance of culture and socio-economic forces in psychological theory 
looking at sexual behaviour. They argue that social context and internalised sociocultural experiences can have an 
effect on sexual scripts and definitions and fluidity of sexuality identities, and that gay men's sexuality may be 
influenced by experiences of oppression, discrimination, racism and homophobia. They further address questions of 
levels of acculturation.
184 See Whittier, D.K. & Melendez, R.M. (2004) Intersubjectivity in the Intrapsychic Sexual Scripting of Gay Men. In 
Culture, Health & Sexuality, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 131-143 . The authors call on sexual scripting 
theory as a framework for sexual history. The analysis substantiated claims that intersubjectivity (what people 
thought others thought of them) commonly affects participants' intrapsychic sexual scripting. Social structures like 
gender, race, class and age are called on by participants to make sense of their sexual lives. Pertinently, they imply 
that gay men do not call on such categories as strict 'scripts' prescribed to them, but rather, actively engage with the 
creation and use of such structures in their sexual lives.
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process, including in the transcription and analysis process, and I had to unpick my own 
preconceptions and contributions to the construction of meanings. I constantly reminded myself to 
allow participants, wherever possible and wherever there may be a discrepancy in the text, to self-
represent, rather than being represented by someone in authority such as the convenor of the fetish 
organisation185, or by me. In this regard, I did not stick to the questionnaire scripts too closely 
during the 'interview' process. This allowed for the transcripts and analysis to reflect the participant 
practices in a participatory and self-reflectory way, rather than assuming participants were 
answering what I expected.
Notwithstanding concerns about the efficacy or veracity of such an approach, it was incumbent on 
me to acknowledge that some of what I used in the research might not fully reflect the participant  
perceptions in their fullest, and could be used out of context 186. I have tried to minimise yet 
acknowledge this risk, and have therefore tried to cut the participant narratives as little as possible 
during the transcription process and to mediate them as little as possible during writing up.
1.4.2 Models of Analysis
The analysis of information clearly entailed recognising a range of different metaphorical voices,  
including those which are absent187. It was therefore important to restrain myself from coming to 
conclusions based on participant narratives alone, but rather to listen with my ears cocked to what 
they were saying, what they were not saying, and what I was saying. The analytic method has 
therefore been at least as dialogic as the conversations with the participants.
The analytic process for participant narratives straddled a range of models appropriate to narrative 
a n a l y s i s o f t h e s t o r i e s f o r e g r o u n d e d i n t h e i n t e r v i e w s a n d d i a l o g i c 
conversations188. I took account of the various models available, in particular calling on thematic  
analysis: how the story is told, rather than what is said. I avoided structural analysis of participant  
narratives, which is better suited to descriptions of life stories or detailed experiences than to  
perceptions of specific areas of interest such as the research elicited. I paid more attention to  
185 The organisation SALeathermen, see above
186 See Mohan, G. (1999) Not so distant, not so strange: the personal and the political in participatory research. In 
Ethics Place and Environment 2, pp41–54; Cooke, B. & Kothari, U., (eds) (2001) Participation: the new tyranny? 
London: Zed Books.
187 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002). Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for Reflexivity. In 
Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(3), Art. 18, http://nbn-resolving.de/
urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs020318
188 See Riessman, C.K. (2005) Narrative Analysis. In Narrative, Memory Everyday Life. University of Huddersﬁeld, 
Huddersﬁeld, pp. 1-7. from http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/4920. Reissman notes that the importance in narrative analysis is 
that “narrative” is about sequence and consequence in that events are selected, organised, connected, and evaluated  
as meaningful for a specific audience.
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interactional analysis, with an emphasis on the dialogic processes between me as 'interviewer', and 
the participants as 'narrators'.
Since I was present at the 'interviews' myself, I was also able to extend the analysis into a certain  
element of performative analysis, whereby I called on my personal perceptions of participant 
feelings demonstrated through their body language, ease of communication, tone of voice, etc.
A particular model on which I called was Attride-Sterling's conception of thematic networks, which 
is a compelling way of approaching the qualitative analytic process by seeing the main themes as  
networks189. The approach seeks not to manage conflicting definitions of a problem, but rather to  
explore the comprehension of an issue or the signification of an idea. I approached participant  
narratives analytically through systematising lowest-order premises coming from transcribed texts 
('Basic Themes'), followed by categorising basic themes grouped to reflect more abstract concepts 
('Organizing Themes'), and 'big-picture' themes covering the main textual metaphors ('Global 
Themes')190. Although not necessarily explicit in the thesis argument, I conceived of these themes as  
web-like maps covering the three levels and focused on the relationships between them. These 
themes assisted me in organising the substantive argument, and in deciding which contributions to 
include, and which to exclude.
When looking at the texts substantiating my argument191, and the content of the participant 
narratives sprinkled throughout the thesis, I also called on more minute levels of textual analysis 
available in Crit ical Discourse Analysis, by looking particularly at language 
use192. Since the thesis focuses on discourse in a 'big-picture' sense, I have avoided conversation  
analysis in its strict formulation, which focuses on the linguistic detail of participant 
narratives193.
189 Attride-Stirling, J (2001) Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research. In Qualitative Research, Vol. 
1, No. 3, 385-405 (2001)
190 Attride-Stirling, J (2001) ibid
191  for example in chapter 2 when looking at newspaper reports
192 See McGregor, S.L.T. (2003) Critical Discourse Analysis- A Primer. In Kappa Omicron Nu FORUM2003,(1), 2003.
McGregor calls attention to various issues pertinent to the minutiae of sentence, paragraph and chapter construction:
1. texts can be framed, whereby the topic creates a perspective influencing the reader's perception
2. sentences convey information about power relations, about who is seen as having power over whom (agency)
3. omission of information, passive verbs, nominalization etc have an impact in terms of the agency of power
4. presupposition about normalisation and normality can have an effect on the reader
5. Insinuations carrying double meanings are powerful, and can be called on to deny any intention to mislead
6. connotations carry powerful meanings
7. tone of the text is created by means of specific words implying certainty and authority (modality)
8. single words can reflect register, and can imply mistrust, skepticism etc through choice of first/second/third 
person
193 See Korobov, N. (2001). Reconciling Theory with Method: From Conversation Analysis and Critical Discourse 
Analysis to Positioning Analysis. In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social  
Research, 2(3), Art. 11, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0103119. Korobov looks at tensions between 
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1.4.3 Writing Up
A singular challenge in writing up this research has been to avoid making it tedious to read, while  
still rendering a solid piece of academic writing. On the other hand, I have also avoided writing up  
the argument in too 'creative' a way, in order to avoid charges of flippancy in the face of the serious  
political issues at play194. Whilst acknowledging my subjective role and influence as researcher, I  
wanted to avoid too colloquial a framework for writing up the argument. I have therefore 
c o n s c i o u s l y n o t a t t e m p t e d t o c r e a t e a f u l l - b l o w n ' c r e a t i v e n o n -
fiction'195, despite that this would perhaps better reflect the light-hearted and energised ways in 
which 'fetishists' undertake their play196.
1.4.3a) Balancing Accountability and Joie-de-Vivre
In the writing process as much as in the research process, I have rather paid attention to reflexivity,  
and to the need to remain accountable in reflecting a positioned stance. This is why I lodge the 
political framework for the research from the very beginning, and consciously focus both the tone  
and content of the argument on the more serious elements of the sexual play undertaken by the 
participants, in order to give them as much of a voice as possible, while still recognising the ways in  
which they perpetuate heteronormativities197. This joins postmodernist demands to maintain an 
a s t u t e a w a r e n e s s o f t h e p o l i t i c a l e l e m e n t s o f a l l a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g 
research198. 
I have therefore paid close attention to who benefits from the research, and my concomitant 
accountability both to the research participants and to me199. My responsibility and accountability 
lies in honouring the life stories of the participants who, like everyone else, each faces their own 
Critical Discourse analysis and Conversation Analysis, and posits Positioning Analysis as a middle-ground to 
reconcile them.
194 See chapter 2 re the problems of heteronormativity in South Africa, dominant homophobic discourses and threats of 
violence.
195 Caulley, D.N. (2008) Making Qualitative Research Reports Less Boring- The Techniques of Writing Creative 
Nonfiction. In Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 14, No. 3, 424-449 (2008). Caulley calls on creative nonfiction as a means to 
write qualitative research reports by using fiction techniques. He argues that use of the word 'creative' does not 
indicate a diversion from the facts, but rather that creative nonfiction is about telling the truth creatively, which can 
be applied to writing qualitative research reports.
196 See Gardner, F & Lehmann, J (2002) But Wait! There's Still More In Qualitative Research Journal, vol 2, no 2, 
2002 pp16-27. The authors speak of the information garnered from interviews and focus groups over an extended 
period of time, substantial batches of information which is often substantially excluded from the final research 
product. They call on researchers to contemplate what can be garnered from what is excluded from the final product
197 See Chapter 2
198 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002). Research as Interacting Dialogic Processes: Implications for Reflexivity. In 
Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(3), Art. 18, http://nbn-resolving.de/
urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs020318. See also Brydon-Miller, M. & Tolman, D.L.(1997) Engaging the process of  
transformation. In Journal of Social Issues, 53, 803-810.
199 See Russell, G.M. & Kelly, N.H. (2002) ibid
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emotional darkness200. Some participant narratives indicate that sexual desires may be linked to 
ea r l i e r l i f e expe r i ences o f emot iona l , phys i ca l and /o r sexua l v io l ence o r 
abuse201. However, it is foolish to make direct causational links between childhood experiences and  
adult propensities, or to assume that adult desires are inherently dysfunctional. Clearly, as I will 
argue, some of the participants' sexual 'fetish' play exacerbates their demons. At times their play 
soothes the beast. And at times it is irrelevant to these monsters at all. I have therefore avoided 
publication of details of a very personal and painful nature gathered through the course of the  
research. I have honoured the participants' privacy as far as possible, assigning them with 
pseudonyms and avoiding clearly demarcating their identities. I have provided them with ethically 
sound recourse such as referrals to psychological professionals should this be needed.
Yet the extent to which the participants are generally self-aware, and balance their actions with a  
broader sense of well-being is remarkable. Largely they do not define themselves by their 
sexualities, they do not engage in sexual experiences which render them dysfunctional, and they are 
aware of their own boundaries. In rendering the thesis and writing up the participants' responses, I  
have tried to remain true to the spirit of individuals' desires and frame of reference, and therein to 
acknowledge that their frailties, both individually and as a group, are neither more nor less 
traumatic than anybody else's202.
I have been immersed in this world for the past few years of this research, and involved with 
unusual sexualities on a personal level for far longer. It is clear to me that the men who take part in 
'fetish' sex take themselves and their sexual practices seriously, yet do so in a lighthearted, free and  
j o y o u s w a y , w i t h a n e y e t o a c h i e v i n g a n d l i v i n g o u t p e r s o n a l 
happiness203. Clearly the participants call on 'fetish' sexual practices not as the demon, but rather as 
a way to re-align individual life experiences in a positive light. I have therefore aligned my explicit  
desires with those of the participants to be allowed a political space in which to explore the world 
unfettered, rather than being labelled a priori 'bad, mad or sad'204.
200 See Theobald, S & Duckett, P (2002) Flexible Roles and Reflexive Souls in Qualitative Action Research. In 
Qualitative Research Journal, vol 2, no 2, 2002, pp58-79
201 Which I acknowledge in the Interjection, but do not dwell on in any substantive way, since it does not form part of 
the argument.
202 despite what psychopathologies might say. See chapter 4
203 See Ahmed, S (2007) The Happiness Turn. In New Formations, Winter 2007/2008; 63; pp 7 et seq. On various 
philosophical traditions on happiness see also McGill, V.J. (1967) The Idea of Happiness. New York, Frederick A. 
Praeger; Sumner, L.W., (1996) Welfare, Happiness and Ethics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
204 See chapter 6
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In writing up the research and constructing the thesis argument I have focused on balancing the  
sobriety of the theory with at least some of the life-spark of the participants' narratives. In this way I 
have written up the research very consciously advocating the attainment of both theoretical/
scholarly and emotional balance, rather than the hysteria so often associated with both marginal  
sexualities and 'fetish'. This reflects the participants' positive sentiments, and focuses on positive 
living.
1.5 Conclusion
The thesis is not founded on a purportedly stable theoretical base. The argument is not a positivist 
work of simple hypothetico-deductivism demonstrating straightforward relationships between 
things and their representations. Nor is it an empiricist unfolding of 'knowledge', pre-existing truths 
or incontrovertible 'reality', borne of experientially or experimentally derived 'facts'.  
Rather, the underlying epistemologies for both the methodology and the thesis argument reflect an 
exploration of questions of process and relationality. The research has been conducted through an 
exploration of relational (rather than confrontational) epistemologies around being human, with a  
focus on plurality and a multiplicity of voices and views. I have therefore been at pains to reflect on 
the purportedly 'external' observation of circumstances and narratives, acknowledging the subjective 
nature of the information and perspectives gathered through this process.
The research methodologies anticipate the thesis call to revise the epistemological bases of  
sexualities research. Divisive and 'scientific' approaches to 'doing' scholarship are inappropriate, 
specifically in the arena of health and psychological well-being. Rather, cohesive and encompassing 
approaches do the researcher, the metatheory and the research subjects more justice, since all are 
implicated in the adventure which is research. The methodology has therefore had to be fluid and  
internally coherent, reflecting the underlying epistemological approach to the developing thesis  
argument in a recursive way.
The most appropriate methodology for the research process has therefore been discourse analytic  
qualitative research which reflects a feminist/queer epistemology and participatory methodologies.  
The key to this research has, for me, been a focus on epistemological coherence and scholarly 
ethics, through remaining reflexive on my role at all points of the research adventure.
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CHAPTER 2
LOCATING 'GAY MALE FETISH SEXUALITIES': DIVISIVE 
IDENTITY POLITICS, COHESIVE QUEERNESS AND 
RECOGNISING SUBJECTIVE VALUE
“As I acquired more experience in the S/M community, I realised this, too, was a sexuality that allowed  
people to step outside the usual rigid boundaries of sexual orientation. I met lesbians who topped  
straight men for money .... I met straight men who would go down on other men or be fucked by them if  
their mistresses ordered them to do it. Since the acts took place under the authority of women, they 
thought of them as heterosexual behaviour. (I also met a lot of bisexuals who didn't need any excuses.)  
These combined experiences have resulted in a lifestyle that doesn't fit the homosexual stereotype. I lie  
with my woman lover of five years. I have lots of casual sex with women. Once in a while I have casual  
sex with gay men. I have a three-year relationship with a homosexual man who doesn't use the term gay. 
And I call myself a lesbian.”205
Few of the research participants feel fully accepted or fulfilled in the heteronormative world or in 
normative 'mainstream' gay subculture206. For fear of judgement and censure, they are often reticent 
to express their desires publicly in either environment, neither of which entirely endorses their 
'fetish' practices. Rather, they prefer to be broadly seen as 'normal' gay men with no 'dark' side:
“I never, never, never spoke to anyone about my fetishes. Because you're the first person I'm actually  
talking to about fetishes.” ('Henry')207
Politically, they want the same rights and options as other citizens, and they therefore rely on a 
certain level of visibility as 'homosexuals', an identity which links to prevailing gay rights  
discourses, qualifying them for continued legal and constitutional validation. Yet on other levels  
they want invisibility: to be left alone to explore their lives and their sexualities 
unjudged208. They escape the prevailing approbrium against the vibrant recesses of their 
imaginations on the 'fetish scene', where, in the safety of 'fetish' collectives such as  
SALeathermen209, they find a sense of camaraderie and liberation from normative social 
proscriptions.
205 Califia, P. Gay Men, Lesbians and Sex: Doing it Together. In Morland, I and Willox, A, (2005) 
Queer Theory, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire and New York, pp22-27 at 23
206 See arguments below
207 During the course of the thesis I will call on participant narratives to support my arguments, which are 
predominantly focused on the metatheories underpinning sexualities. See chapter 2 and the Interjection in this regard
208 See argument and participant narratives below
209 the local organisation representing the 'scene'. See www.saleathermen.org.za
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Although most of the participants identify as 'gay', their fetish practices undermine simplistic  
c a t e g o r i e s o f ' g a y ' v s ' s t r a i g h t ' i n w a y s p a r a l l e l e d t o P a t C a l i f i a ' s 
perceptions210. Such complexity is reflected in contemporary sexualities studies and anti-
homophobic analyses which no longer take simplistic constructions of sexual orientation as primary 
departure points211. 
I suggest that the basis for an exploration of 'gay male fetish sexuality', and for the validation of and 
visibility for 'alterity', must therefore be unpacked beyond simplistic identity politics protecting  
homosexuals. This is important in order to delineate a clear political, and thereafter metatheoretical,  
basis for the public acknowledgement of the perverse imagination as a valid space for exploration. 
This basis should, I suggest, be unfettered by norms, expectations and judgment, and should 
celebrate the complexity of human experience (rather than merely 'putting up' with what many 
perceive as undesirable people), where the perverse itself is deconstructed.
As I argue in this chapter, Butlerian ideas of queerness and performativity enable a fluidity of  
identification over time and space, where people are not expected to conform to fatuous dualist  
gendered or sexualised performances212. Queer theories fit more closely with the contradictory 
desires of 'fetishists' to be both visible and invisible, and with calls to increase access to political 
rights while encouraging cultural paradigmatic shifts213. Further, I suggest, Queer theories tend to be 
more theoretically sound and socially cohesive.
However, given the identity-bound political and social world in which we live, aspirational utopian 
queer ideals on their own are often not workable political solutions, and, I suggest, should be 
mediated by pragmatism. 'Gay male fetish sexuality' should therefore be seen through lenses which 
acknowledge the personal in the political, by viewing sexuality as a resource on which individuals  
call for recognising subjective value214.
210 See opening quote, supra: Califia, P. Gay Men, Lesbians and Sex: Doing it Together. In Morland, I and Willox, A, 
(2005) Queer Theory, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire and New York, pp22-27 at 23
211 See Sedgwick, E.K. (2005) Axiomatic. In Morland, I and Willox, A (2005) Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan, 
Hampshire and New York, pp81-95 at 81: As Sedgwick notes, there are basic axioms that don't assume fixity of 
identity:
1. Axiom 1: People are different from each other
2. Axiom 2: the study of sexuality is not co-extensive with the study of gender; correspondingly, antihomophobic 
inquiry is not co-extensive with feminist inquiry. But we can’t know in advance how they will be different;
3. Axiom 3: there can’t be an a priori decision about how far it will make sense to conceptualise lesbian and gay 
male identities together. Or separately;
4. Axiom 4: the immemorial, seemingly ritualised debates on nature versus nurture take place against a very 
unstable background of tacit assumptions and fantasies about both nurture and nature
5. Axiom 5: the historical search for a great paradigm shift may obscure the present condition of sexual identity
212 Butler, J. (1999) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity NY, Routledge
213 See below for a clearer explanation of these terms
214 This is based on the idea that there is no essentialist and necessarily coherent 'self', but rather that both discursive 
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These principles form the foundation for this chapter, which, although not introducing anything 
startlingly new to sexualities discourses, politically locates the thesis, and forms both a context and 
the beginning of the argument itself by calling on synergistic ontologies. The chapter sets the scene 
for the detailed exploration of how divisive and object-focused lenses for gay male fetish sexuality 
should, I argue, be replaced by the subject-oriented metatheory which recognises the importance of 
bodily experience in sexual fetish practices215.
2.1 Problematising Gay Rights Identity as Divisive
[A]n understanding of virtually any aspect of modern Western culture must be, not merely incomplete, 
but damaged in its central substance to the degree that it does not incorporate a critical analysis of  
modern homo/heterosexual definition216.
As I will argue in more detail in the Interjection and Chapter 5, (gay) 'identity' is problematic, since 
it cannot be pinned down in any useful way, as can't the exact constitution of either the subject, or 
the 'gay male fetishist' subject. Instead, I suggest, queer fluidity is a more appropriate starting-point 
from which to view both unusual sexual proclivities (such as 'gay male fetish sexuality') and the 
relationships between people and objects which these reflect.
2.1.1 The Complexity of Sexual Identities
Historically, gay rights discourses and sexualities epistemologies have problematically been based  
on fictions of relatively simple binary identities of 'heterosexual' and 'homosexual', which, like 
i d e n t i t i e s s u c h a s m a l e a n d f e m a l e , a r e a s s u m e d t o b e m u t u a l l y  
exclusive217. Sexual identity is often conceived of as being unitary and coherent, where the sexual  
'other' (gay or lesbian) is singular in its otherness. Sexual identity is, however, far from coherent,  
and indeed never has been218. It cannot be externally identified in some essentialist way, but is a  
constructs and materially-oriented experience impact on the meanings and value individuals ascribe to their lives. In 
regard the constitution of the individual, see chapter 5
215 This links in to a larger pursuit within sexuality studies of acknowledging the bodily experience.
216 Sedgwick, EK (2005) Axiomatic. In Morland, I and Willox, A, (2005) Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan, 
Hampshire and New York, pp81-95 at 81. Such critical analysis, Sedgwick suggests, should look at other binaries 
like knowledge/ignorance and domestic/foreign in ways that queer theory attempts to deconstruct apparently non-
sexual binarisms as normative concepts. Sexuality binaries are just as contradictory and determinative as those of 
sex, class and race, and have “primary importance for all modern Western identity and social organization (and not 
merely for homosexual identity and culture)” and is “so situated as to enable most inextricably and at the same time 
most differentially the filaments of other important definitional nexuses”. Note that I include the gay male fetish 
sexuality under discussion in 'Western culture', since most participants affiliate with western gay norms. 
217 See especially Butler, JP (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity New York, Routledge
218 The genesis of sexual identity lies in nineteenth-century sexual psychology models (See chapter 3, in particular 
relating to Krafft-Ebing and Freud). Sedgwick argues that the late nineteenth-century crystallization of a homo/
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c o m p l e x i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n p s y c h o s o c i a l , s o c i o c u l t u r a l a n d s y m b o l i c 
dimensions219. Today there is an endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition in modern western 
culture220. Garlinger, notes that “although it appears to be a seemingly coherent category of sexual  
orientation, homosexuality is, in fact, riddled with internal contradictions about the relationship 
between erotic desire, sexual acts, and personal identity. The name given to gay and lesbian 
relationships will invariably reference, directly or indirectly, the ideological substance of the terms  
already in circulation for same-sex desire”221.
Butlerian arguments on the performativity of such supposedly static and immutable identities are 
now entrenched in the scholarly landscape, and counter any arguments that identity is unitary or 
singular222. As Lance and Tanesini point out, often the rejection of the existence of identities derives 
from essentialist assumptions of 'identity' as a concept, through a desire to undermine the  
dichotomy between homo and heterosexuality, or through a radical libertarian view that constraints  
are oppressive and limit freedom223.
Yet people nevertheless rely on sexuality as an important part of how they self-identify. People  
locate their political claims in a sense of authentic experience as members of specific identity  
categories/communities224. It is therefore not enough to simply critique anthropological and/or  
sociolinguistic constructions of identity-politics without acknowledging that people use 'identity' to 
lodge their real-world experience and political claims. Sexual identity can therefore not simply be  
heterosexual binary created an ontological “world-mapping” of sexual identity where “every given person, just as he 
or she was necessarily assignable to a male or a female gender, was now considered necessarily assignable as well to  
a homo- or a heterosexuality, a binarized identity that was full of implications, however confusing, for even the 
ostensibly least sexual aspects of personal existence. It was this new development that left no space in the culture 
exempt from the potent incoherences [sic] of homo/heterosexual definition.” (Sedgwick, EK. (1990) Epistemology 
of the Closet Berkeley: University of California Press pp2). As Garlinger notes, these fictionally coherent models 
added to, rather than overruling the previous religiously-based model of sex acts, which remain in our understanding 
of identity. See Goldberg, J. (1992) Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities Stanford: Stanford 
University Press
219 Foucault argues that sexuality was a recent invention, as a mechanism of organizing bodies and pleasures into 
comprehensible subjects. See Foucault, M (1978) The History of Sexuality. Trans. Robert Hurley. Vol. 1. New York: 
Pantheon; Garlinger, PP ‘‘In All But Name’’: Marriage and the Meaning of Homosexuality. In Discourse 26.3 (Fall 
2004), pp. 41–72. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan. Also note David Halperin’s contestation of this 
reading: Foucault set two types of discourses for same-sex sexual relations in opposition but did not maintain that 
there was no-one not making wider connections between same-sex relations and individual subjectivity beyond the 
legal system. Halperin views Foucault’s argument as being that a connection between erotic acts and individual 
subjectivity was absent as social, legal, and political discourse until the nineteenth century (27–29). See Halperin, D. 
(2002) How To Do the History of Homosexuality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
See Foucault, M (1978)  The History of Sexuality. Trans. Robert Hurley. Vol. 1. New York: Pantheon. By saying 
‘‘The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species’’, he is understood to have 
indicated a new transformation of desire into sexuality as an expression of individual personhood
220 Sedgwick, EK (1990) Epistemology of the Closet. Berkeley: University of California Press pp2
221 Garlinger, PP ‘‘In All But Name’’: Marriage and the Meaning of Homosexuality. In  Discourse 26.3 (Fall 2004), pp. 
41–72. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan
222 Butler, JP, ibid
223 Lance, MN and Tanesini, A. Identity Judgments, Queer Politics. In Morland, I and Willox, A (eds) (2005) 
Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan Hampshire and New York pp171 – 186 at 171
224 Cameron, D & Kulick, D (2005) Identity crisis? In Language & Communication 25 (2005) 107–125
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denied as if it did not exist, nor discounted225. Yet a ‘claim-staking’ idea of identity is not enough on 
its own to ground the study of sexuality, or, therefore epistemologies on sexual desires which 
incorporate material objects226.
The implications are complex. To say that certain kinds of people experiencing varied sexuality are  
‘‘in denial’’ of their ‘‘true’’ sexuality is to render real-world complexity simplistic, and to fail to  
acknowledge variety and possibility227. It also assumes that human experience and identities are 
static and unproblematic. 
Cameron and Kulick acknowledge that people have a strong mental and emotional involvement 
with their sexual acts, yet nevertheless often view these acts as as alien or threatening to their 'self-
perceived identity'228.
Further, individuals often have difficulty articulating their own identities in light of their (at times 
contradictory) combinations of experiences and multiplicities, which render identities insufficient to  
encompass human experience. Some married men identify as heterosexual, but have anonymous 
sex with other men. Some self-identified lesbians have sexual feelings for men. Indeed, the research 
participants, supposedly singularly 'gay' men, are at times uneasy about identity:
Qu: Would you describe yourself as 'heterosexual', 'bisexual', 'gay', 'queer' or something else? Why?
“Gay in general, queer in disposition, gay with bisexual leanings to myself.” ('Joseph')
“Gay. Um, ja, a lot of the above as well, having been married for 18 years... The thing is, do you want to 
know what I am now or what I have been?” ('Lawrence')
As evidenced by the research participants, people manage multiple (religious, sexual, cultural,  
social) identities at the same time, some of which seem inconsistent229:
“...with my religion, a good catholic boy, I would automatically feel bad about my sexual orientation, but 
I've come to grips, not... come to an understanding with that. Um, I accept myself as I am.” ('Henry')
225 Lance, MN and Tanesini, A. Identity Judgments, Queer Politics. In Morland, I and Willox, A (eds) (2005) 
Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan Hampshire and New York pp171 – 186 at 171
226 Cameron, D & Kulick, D (2005) Identity crisis? In Language & Communication 25 (2005) 107–125 pp112. This is 
discussed in the context of sociolinguistics and sexuality. They claims that it is not sufficient to posit 
the relationships between sexuality and language either.
227 Such claims are often made in homophobic claims that homosexuals are merely 'mistaken' or 'ill', and in gay rights 
discourses claiming that 'bisexuals' are merely closeted homosexuals
228 Cameron, D & Kulick, D (2005) Identity crisis? In Language & Communication 25 (2005) 107–125. In this respect, 
“sexuality is a social and psychological phenomenon that often exceeds, and sometimes contradicts, the sexual 
identities people consciously claim or disclaim. What people desire often clashes with, undermines or disrupts who 
they consider they are or ought to be.”
229 Lance, MN and Tanesini, A. Identity Judgments, Queer Politics. In Morland, I and Willox, A (eds) (2005) 
Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan Hampshire and New York pp171 – 186 at 171
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Qu: and how did you change... how did that acceptance happen?
“I think it was a case of I realised I would never ever be different to what I am. Right?  As a good  
Catholic boy I would say you're gonna have to go to confession every week. But every week you're going  
to confession, you're saying the same things. You've done the same things. And you're gonna be doing 
that til the end of your life. Um, when you come down to it, Christ came to die for sinners, not for  
saints.” ('Henry')
The inconsistencies inherent in real-life experience require commitments on the part of the 
individual, commitments which indicate that identities are subject to normative constraints and  
project normatively, rather than causally, into the future230. Biology clearly is not descriptive enough 
of sexual identities, which are instead of social significance231. Whereas most ('heterosexual') people 
attempt to repeat normative performances in order to try to embody the 'proper' in accordance with  
norms232, some refuse to comply with normative heterosexuality 233. In other words, the repetition of 
the performances of identity open the door to contestation234.
To look a little deeper: 'identities' are made up of an 'ought' proposition: “I ought to take a particular  
identity as part of my script, and I ought to allow associated scripts in order to claim coherence with 
other scripts”235. Further, one 'ought' to “take this identity to project normatively into the future, and  
that others ought to assign social priority to facilitating one's living according to the resulting 
narrative unity of the various scripts”236. Claiming 'who one is' is not to describe a hidden nature, 
since it does not describe it at all, nor is it simply an empty description of how one is treated, since  
it is a political endorsement. In this respect, to claim a 'queer' (rather than 
'gay'237) identity is to endorse an exclusion from what is 'proper' and claim that exclusion as an  
identity238.
As Sedgwick notes, the idea of 'difference' incorporates varied forms of sexuality, which are 
n e v e r t h e l e s s c a r e l e s s l y l u m p e d t o g e t h e r u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g ‘ s e x u a l 
orientation’239. Sexuality is a pragmatic and simplistic way of differentiating between people, 
230 See chapter 6 re the role of agency in sexuality
231 See Cameron, D & Kulick, D (2005) Identity crisis? In Language & Communication 25 (2005) 107–125, and Butler, 
JP (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity New York, Routledge
232 Cameron, D & Kulick, D (2005) ibid
233 Butler, JP (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity New York, Routledge
234 Butler, ibid
235 Lance, MN and Tanesini, A. Identity Judgments, Queer Politics. In Morland, I and Willox, A (eds) (2005) 
Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan Hampshire and New York pp171 – 186 at 179
236 Lance and Tanesini, ibid, pp179
237 See below
238 Lance and Tanesini, ibid, pp179
239 See Sedgwick, E.K. (2005) Axiomatic. In Morland, I. and Willox, A. (2005) Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan, 
Hampshire and New York, pp81-95 at 82 for a very compelling explanation as to how sexuality is not useful as a 
category denoting 'difference'. She notes how experiences, bodies, sexual acts, sexual objects mean different things 
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whereas more logically conceived and true-to-life differences transcend sexuality and gender 
categories240.
Cameron and Kulick note that “consciously claimed or denied identity is not simply or 
transparently congruent with sexuality”241. They differentiate between identity, which they see as “a 
subject’s more or less conscious allegiance to a particular social position”, and identification, which  
they see as allowing for “recognition and investigation of conflicting affiliations that may both  
structure and disrupt a person’s claim to a particular identity”242. These ideas can be used to 
understand the richness and complexity of personal narratives in constructing complex 
cartographies of social relations and sexualities theorising. In this way, sexuality goes beyond 
simplistic constructions of identity, and more particularly how identity is denied exclusively or 
primarily in a ‘claim-staking’ sense.
2.1.2 'Queer Locations' not 'Gay Identity'
In contradistinction to 'gay identity', I suggest that queerness is a more compelling political location  
for 'gay male fetish' sexuality243. Penn and Irvine note that much recent work in gay and lesbian 
studies can be categorised in two distinct but related camps: 
identifying and accounting for homosexual identity formation in a variety of contexts,  
which often results in case studies of specific homosexualities or homosexuals in relation to  
race and ethnicity, gender, region, class, historical period, etc.; 
a comprehensive rethinking of the theoretical foundations upon which work is based,  
resulting in provocative studies exploring reconfiguration of theoretical formulations in the  
light of evidence provided by emerging case studies244.
They point out that an effect of postmodern emphases on “fractured identities, multiple  
subjectivities, performance, and representations as markers for ever-shifting cultural formations and 
social practices is to reframe the focus of study from "gay and lesbian" to 
to different people, even within the same sexual identity 'category' and implies that the subjective experience is a 
more useful way of looking at sexuality, rather than 'objective' identification. In this regard, see the arguments in 
chapters 3 to 6.
240 See chapters 3 to 6 for an argument around how these should be seen, calling on lived experiences and discourses 
241 Cameron, D & Kulick, D (2005) Identity crisis? In Language & Communication 25 (2005) 107–125 at 112
242 Cameron, D & Kulick (2005) ibid pp112
243 See Quinn, V & Sinfield, A (2006) Queer Theory. In The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory 
2006 14(1):143-151. Quinn and Sinfield argue that Queer theory can be read as coming from Russian formalism, 
since it relies on the idea that to disrupt language and representation in the way that Joyce and surrealism did is 
similar to disrupting dominant ideologies, and therefore economic and political relations which it secures
244 Penn, D & Irvine, J. ibid
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“queer.””245 This move locates re-mapping of boundaries of inclusion in terms of ‘queerness’, which 
can be described as "the fractious, the disruptive, the irritable, the impatient, the unapologetic, the  
bitchy, the camp...."246. Queer analyses intentionally disrupt the apparently rigid separation between 
"normal" and "outcast" and focus on the fluidity of boundaries. They further note that “as an 
analysis that focuses on shifting boundaries, queer similarly destabilizes the integrity of gay and 
lesbian as a distinct category, however expansively constituted. Here, queer is intended to remedy  
what some believe to be the intellectual and political limitations of the identity-based categories 
"gay" and "lesbian."247”
One of the hinges of this construction of queerness is the question of visibility, an idea paralleled in 
transgender theory and a useful point of intersection for this thesis since it specifically recalls the 
concerns of the participants to be both visible and invisible, and both normative and non-
normative248. More normative strands of trans-theories locate the demands of the transgendered  
person in the right to fade back into normative society by claiming the gender of their choice. These  
goals are, I suggest, inappropriate to claims for unitary gay identity, which entail publicly 
acknowledging and answering for one’s sexuality. The transgendered person, like the 'queer', claims 
his/her 'identity' in relation to what they cannot ‘be’, i.e. the gender of their choice, and they  
emphasise the ‘trans’-ness of their gender.
In particular, queer theory interrogates whether practices are fundamentally transgressive or 
complicit. Quinn and Sinfield argue that the answer lies with the beholder, in their historical 
situation249. They note that unfixing gender took on the task of undermining heterosexuality’s 
precedence since all sexualities are constructions that are anxious, iterative and 
performative250. 
This thesis locates 'fetish sexuality' itself as inherently transgressive and unfixed, even though 
' f e t i s h p r a c t i c e s ' c a n l e g i t i m a t e l y b e r e a d a s r e p e a t i n g h e t e r o n o r m a t i v e 
scripts251. As I will argue, this is since, although the participants' 'fetish practices' may largely reflect 
245 Penn, D & Irvine, J. ibid
246 See Dinshaw, C. 
(2006) The History of GLQ, Volume 1: LGBTQ Studies, Censorship, and Other Transnational Problems In 
GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies - Volume 12, Number 1, 2006, pp. 5-26
247 Penn, D & Irvine, J. ibid
248 See Hausman, B.L. (2001) Recent Transgender Theory. In Feminist Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 
465-490; Halberstam, J (2005) In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural  
Lives. New York University Press, New York. See also the Interjection in relation to normativity
249 See Quinn, V & Sinfield, A (2006) Queer Theory. In The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory 
2006 14(1):143-151
250 Quinn, V & Sinfield, A, Ibid
251 See the Interjection
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problematic normativity (which I suggest is linked to the participants' own assumptions that they  
are in some essentialist way 'gay'), the relationships between people and objects which underlie 
such practices indicate a fluidity and an undermining of (normative) assumptions around the fixity  
of human-object distinctions and thereby the role of sexuality as sense of emotional (re-)location 
and (re-)orientation252. In so doing, I call on functions of queerness as both subversive and 
pedagogical253.
2.1.2a) Queerness as Subversive
Whereas 'gay identity' replicates the discourses of difference between heterosexual and homosexual, 
and therefore re-inscribes the idea of 'difference', queerness is a ‘‘parodic replication and 
r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f h e t e r o s e x u a l c o n s t r u c t s w i t h i n n o n - h e t e r o s e x u a l 
frames.’’254 This parodying subverts the idea of the normative by shifting the frame of reference  
from the forward-looking 'ought' proposition of homo- or heterosexuality to an 'ought not' 
proposition255. In other words, queerness parodies heteronormativity by denying the identity-based 
assumptions that people 'ought' to be 'heterosexual', failing which they 'ought' to be 'homosexual'. 
Rather, queerness says that people aren't inescapably bound to being anything in 
particular256. In this way, Freeman notes the possibility of re-imagining queer as “a set of 
possibilities produced out of temporal and historical difference”, where we can see the manipulation 
of time as a way of producing both “bodies and relationalities (or even non-relationality), and 
thereby develop “a more productively porous queer studies”257. This means that if we manipulate 
the linear and causational thinking of the 'ought' propositions of heteronormativity and identity, we 
can rephrase the assumptions around time and space implicit in both heteronormativity and identity 
politics. Both these assumptions propose that people are in some ways bound to reproduce 
identities/identifications because of both their histories and the physical forms they inhabit.  
Queerness, however, implies that by acknowledging that there is no necessary causational link from 
now into the future between historic socio-cultural influences and people's (sexual) performances, 
we can acknowledge that people choose social performances moving forward in time based both on 
the dominant discourses and their material experience258.
252 See the Interjection and Chapters 5 and 6
253 See particularly Chapter 6
254 Butler, J. (2006) Imitation and Gender Insubordination. In Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader 
Pearson Prentice Hall
255 See supra: ref Lance, MN and Tanesini, A. Identity Judgments, Queer Politics. In Morland, I and Willox, A (eds) 
(2005) Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan Hampshire and New York pp171 – 186 at 179
256 This means in a forward-looking sense, i.e that people can move away from the historical/backward-looking bounds 
which have constructed their consciousness through discursive constructs. See chapters 5 and 6 in this regard
257 Freeman, E (2007) Introduction, in GLQ Vol. 1, 13:2 – 3 pp159-176
258 For a more in-depth explanation, see chapters 5 and 6 about the roles of discourse and embodied experience in the 
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2.1.2b) Queerness as Pedagogy
Queerness is also more than merely a reactionary political position in response to heteronormativity.  
It is also a way of opening the world by challenging essentialist ideas about the subject of unusual 
and non-normative experiences259. In some ways it is about teaching the normative-focused world, 
which includes both 'heterosexuals' and 'homosexuals' such as some of the present participants who 
cling to notions of separate sexual identities. As Britzman sees it, queer pedagogy entails risking the  
self by engaging with multiple, rather than plural, identifications, rather than 
identities260. In other words, “[n]ot that anyone might be queer, but that something queer might 
happen to anyone”261.
2.1.2c) Identity and Queerness: Complex Relations
Queerness doesn't necessarily seek to erase identity, but rather to use it in more complex and 
effective ways. Butler and Patton both argue the need recognise the problematic nature of identity  
politics in the ways they exclude and reproduce oppressive politics262. But they argue that identity 
categories can be strategically used263. 
Both Butler and Patton base certain of their reservations on the concerns of identity politics as bases 
for claims for minority rights. Butler argues that Foucault "in his later interviews, …suggests that  
identities are formed within contemporary political arrangements in relation to certain requirements  
of the liberal state, ones which presume that the assertion of rights and claims to entitlement can 
only be made on the basis of a singular and injured identity." She further argues that "[i]n this sense, 
development of subjectivity and identification.
259 In other words queerness isn't merely a reactionary proposition about what 'identity' isn't. It's also a means of 
shifting dominant paradigms moving forward, using the idea of time and space in innovative ways to potentially 
empower individuals and their communities to view their worlds differently and therefore to shift discourses. In this 
regard, see chapters 5 & 6 about how the subject re-orients him/herself
260 See Britzman, D. (1998). Lost subjects, contested objects: Toward a psychoanalytic inquiry of learning  
Albany: State University of New York Press
261 Haver, W (1997) Queer Research in Golding, S. (ed) (1997) The Eight Technologies of Otherness Routledge: New 
York, London, p288-291. Haver, calling on Britsman, suggests what we could read as a liberation, depending on our 
perspective, “a technique or a peisis which does not make the world familiar or comfortable … but which 
defamiliarises, or makes strange, queer or even cruel what we had thought to be a world.” 
262 For Patton's arguments about postmodern governmentality see Patton, C. Tremble, Hetero Swine. In Warner, M (ed.)
(1993) Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory Minneapolis: University of Minn Press, pp 162.
263 Butler, J.(1995) Discussion. In Rajchman, J. ed. (1995) The Identity in Question, New York: Routledge, at 129; 
Butler, J (1993) Bodies that Matter New York: Routledge pp-226-230.
Butler notes that “particular identities are being produced as contested zones within political discourse all the time, 
and this is being done in part by right-wing political forces. ... [I]t would be perilous ... to claim or call for the 
surpassing of particular identities on the Left, since that would be to give over such identities to a reactionary 
constitution. In the face of the prospective silencing or erasure of gender, race or sexual minority identities by 
reactionary political forces, it is important to be able to articulate them, and to insist on these identities as sites of 
valuable cultural contest. ... [I]t is imperative to assert identities, at the same time that it is crucial to interrogate the 
exclusionary operations by which they are constituted.”
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what we call identity politics is produced by a state which can only allocate recognition and rights  
t o o b j e c t s t o t a l i z e d b y t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r p l a i n t i f f  
status."264
Likewise, Patton notes that "the person who takes up a post-Stonewall gay identity feels compelled  
to act in a way that will constitute her or himself as a subject appropriate to civil rights discourse,  
and thus, deserving of the status accruing to successful claims to minority 
status."265 She posits that "postmodern mini-narratives of individual and collective moral legitimacy 
are replacing the rational metanarratives... that characterized state legitimation in 
modernity"266.
This is compelling. To add to this, Weeks urges us to read Foucault's contribution more broadly 
through focusing on the question of identity or subjectivity, the historic present (i.e. “after 
F o u c a u l t , ” w h e r e w e a r e a c t o r s ) , a n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f e t h i c s a n d 
values267. Weeks claims that queering theory led to social constructionism becoming unfashionable  
while queer theorists attempted to transcend dichotomies and categorisations. However he 
maintains that it remained important to understand sexualities in terms of historicity, particularity 
and universality, without trying to deny the validity of gay experiences, but rather to affirm them 
without falling back on false or impossible histories or anthropologies. He notes the attempts to 
understand heterosexuality in the search for unmasking homosexuality, when three questions 
became important:
“First, how is sexuality shaped, how is it articulated with economic, social, and political structures, and 
how, in a phrase, has it been invented? Second, how has the domain of sexuality achieved such a critical  
organizing and symbolic significance in Western culture, and why do we think it is so important? Third, 
what role should we assign class divisions and patterns of male domination and racism, how is sex 
gendered and made hierarchical , and what i s the relat ionship between sex and 
power?”268
264 Butler, J (1995) Subjection, Resistance, Resignification.... In Rajchman, J. ed. (1995) The Identity in Question, New 
York: Routledge, at 242.
265
 Patton, C. Tremble, Hetero Swine. In Warner, M ed.(1993) Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social 
Theory Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p.174.
266
 Patton (1993) ibid
267 Weeks, J (2005) Remembering Foucault. In Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 14, Nos. 1/2, January/April 
2005 186-201 at pp187: Like Weeks, my argument seeks
“…neither to engage in a polemical dismissal of Foucault and his legacy nor to find an original Foucault buried 
beneath a tonnage of overreverence, ancestor worship, and system building. I don’t want to find the halo around his 
head, but neither do I wish to forget Foucault. I want to remember him, to remember why I found his work so 
important. At the same time I want to query/queery his legacy, not as an act of lèse-majesté or intellectual betrayal 
nor as a rejection of my earlier self, which grabbed at every bit of Foucauldiana that was published, but as a tribute 
to the stimulus he provided.”
268 Weeks, J (2005) ibid at 188
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As Weeks argues, Foucault’s History of Sexuality seemed to address these questions. If not directly, 
then through the underlying question that works its way through the three questions. In other words, 
if sexuality is constructed by human agency, then how can it be changed? Weeks notes that Foucault 
seems to offer a framework through the chronology he proposes, and through explanations of the 
rise of power and bio-power, which Foucault does largely through linking the mechanics of power 
in relation to hystericising women’s bodies, pedagogising child sexuality, socialising procreation 
and psychiatrising perverse pleasures. In so doing, Weeks argues that Foucault suggests ways of 
thinking about gender, race, sexuality and subjectivities that challenge easy linearity and  
progressivism, and challenge a call on sexuality to function merely as a force to counter power. 
Instead, Foucault recognises the significance of the social whereby sexuality is not subversive, 
where sexuality becomes more about the practices of friendship and relationships, the body and 
pleasure269.
This more complex conception of Foucault acknowledges both discourse and embodiment, which, 
as I argue in Chapters 5 and 6, is a precondition to strong LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgendered and Intersex) social advance and a progressive agenda, which includes removing 
antigay legislation, equality in age of consent, anti discrimination measures, adoption, same-sex 
partnership and marriage legislation, community-based HIV action and provision of gay 
services270. I inc lude ca l l s fo r depa tho log i s ing fe t i sh sexua l i ty wi th in these 
parameters271.
However, as Weeks acknowledges, this growth in provision for LGB people is unfinished, in light 
of conservative politics and fundamentalisms, which refuse dialogue and perpetuate homophobia,  
heterosexism and heteronormativity272. It is therefore imperative that political and theoretical work 
be done both with and against naturalized gay identities273, and I suggest, through also engaging in 
queer revolts against tyrannical identities274.
Weeks claims that all sexual identities are provisional, showing contingency and problematics of 
269 Weeks, ibid, speaks approvingly, in this regard, of David Halperin and Mark Blasius: Halperin, D (1995) Saint 
Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press; Blasius, M (1994) 
Gay and Lesbian Politics: Sexuality and the Emergence of a New Ethic Philadelphia
270 Weeks, ibid, pp193. He notes four paradoxes, that sexual identity adopts fixity and uniformity and at the same time 
confirms the reality of unfixity, diversity, and difference; that identities are personal but inform multiple social 
belongings, that sexual identities are at the same time historical and contingent; and that they are are fictions—albeit 
necessary fictions
271 See chapter 4
272 Weeks, J (2005) Remembering Foucault. In Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 14, Nos. 1/2, January/April 
2005 186-201 at 193
273 for example the desire to obtain a rationale for gay existence in genes or brains
274 See Weeks, ibid. Ironically, this revolt is often engaged with by creating new identities such as post-gay, post-AIDS, 
postfeminist identities.
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identifications275. He points out that sexual identities are troubling, entailing paradoxes, and acting 
as relay points in networks of differences interconnected and intersected in amongst race,  
nationality, gender, age and sexuality276.
“Perverse sexual identities, in particular, breach boundaries, subvert good order, reveal the worm of 
transgression at the heart of the normal, and thereby warn us that even the strongest identities are  
f igments of our imagination—which, of course, can make them more, not less, 
potent.”277
He notes four paradoxes:
Sexual identity adopts fixity and uniformity and at the same time confirming the reality of 
unfixity, diversity, and difference.
Identities are personal but are informed by multiple social belongings.
Sexual identities are at the same time historical and contingent.
Sexual identities are fictions—albeit necessary fictions278.
However, his labeling of sexual identities as fictions is not to undermine their value. He recognizes  
the power of narratives, and acknowledges that histories are inescapable as a means of holding onto 
and locating the present. His conception of identities gives a sense of agency and at the same time 
shows their arbitrariness279. As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 6, they are about ‘becoming’ or 
'moving towards', which is a more cohesive concept than the two-dimensional divisive version of 
‘being’, which inherently equates to 'separation from'280.
This more cohesive approach based on a positional and contextualised frame of reference for  
'identity' (rather than static oppositional location) is more in line with 'queer' thinking, which is  
something different to the presumed static 'gayness'. Halperin calls on Foucault and notes that we 
can move away from substantive, and towards 'oppositional' constitutions for (homosexual) 
identity281. In other words: “not by what it is but by where it is and how it operates. Those who 
knowingly occupy such a marginal location, who assume to de-essentialise identity that is purely  
275 Weeks, ibid 
276 Weeks, ibid
277 Weeks, ibid, at 188
278 Weeks, ibid, at 193
279 In this regard, see chapter 6
280 In this regard, see chapter 6
281 Halperin, D (1995) Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp61-2
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positional in character, are properly speaking not gay but queer”282. 
As I will argue in the Interjection, most of the participants seem to see themselves as 'gay' in this  
regard, since they are largely not aware of the ways in which they repeat heteronormativity and 
often don't consciously de-essentialise identity. However, as I will argue in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
relationships which they have with the material world through their 'fetish practices' reflects a sense 
of 'queerness' through how they work as a (re-)orientation in the face of heteronormative pro/
prescriptions. As I will suggest, therefore, rather than using the notion of 'oppositional', we should 
think of such a location as 'orientational', not constructed by its function as 'in conflict with' 
heterosexuality, but 'in relation to' it283.
Such a more complex mapping of sexualities reveals that identity is problematic but at the same  
time useful in the context of sexualities, “whether we see it as the effect of reverse discourses, the 
eruption of subjugated knowledges, or, as Plummer has suggested, the proliferation of new sexual 
stories”284. Identities both call attention to what we have in common as well as our 
differences285. 
It also, as I will argue in the Interjection, directs scholarship towards methods of inquiry which 
reflect both the ways in which subjects repeat normativities and ways in which they undermine 
them. In this respect, essentialist views of externally defined 'gay identity' are inappropriate for 
complex cartographies in theorising sexualities. Such essentialist views are based on acts of  
affirmatively staking claims to 'being homosexual'. These claims are divisively opposed to those of 
'being heterosexual'. In contradistinction, 'queerness' is not necessarily a positive proposition, but is 
about being located (orientationally) 'in relation to' others286.
282 Halperin, D (1995) ibid. He goes on to say: “Unlike gay identity, which, though deliberately proclaimed in an act of 
affirmation, is nonetheless rooted in the positive fact of homosexual object-choice, queer identity need not be 
grounded in any positive truth or in any stable reality. As the very word implies, “queer” does not name some natural 
kind or refer to some determinate object; it acquires its meaning from its oppositional relation to the norm. Queer is 
by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to 
which it necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence.”
283 See chapter 6
284 Plummer, K (1995) Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds. London. He notes that identity is 
often the beginning-point of ethnic cleansings and murder.
285 A view from which Foucault distanced himself, even though identity was not his main concern: ““The purpose of 
history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation”, in 
other words to refuse categories imposed as though they are truth”: Bouchard, D. F.  ed (1971) 
Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews  
New York at 162.
286 Hall, D.E. (2003) Queer Theories Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, at 67. At face value 'queerness' 
might look like it is 'oppositional', i.e.that 'queer' is located as 'not being gay'. Hall, however, prefers to see it as 
'abrasive', calling on Foucault who has been instrumental in the creation of queerness and in relation to the 
deconstruction and challenge to identities and identity politics. In this way, queerness is more about defining the self 
'in relation to' others, rather than 'in opposition to' others. Queer 'identity' thereby serves to challenge the status quo 
positionally. 
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Such is the case with the present participants who are largely reactionary and claim to 'be'  
homosexual, but nevertheless often engage in practices which undermine the essentialism and 
determinism of such assertions, while at the same time repeating dominant heteronormativity.
2.2 Sexual Politics and Locating 'Gay Male Fetish 
Sexuality'
I firmly believe in the principle of equality and the need for LGBTI people to be liberated from 
legal and social discrimination. I count this thesis as a tool for furthering such goals by means of 
shifting paradigms of gay male fetish sexuality from psychoanalytic disease and health models to 
queer perspectives on sexuality as social product with specific historical practices and 
meanings287. Yet one cannot assume that all members of LGBTI communities have the same  
concerns, perspectives or life experiences. It is therefore problematic to assume that gay rights  
discourses are appropriate bases for this liberation. 
Simplistic assumptions around the singularity of 'identity' are clearly inappropriate. Gay rights  
political discourses are similarly problematic since they are premised on unstable Lockean  
Liberalism, and often mobilise oppositionally-defined sexual identities. They tend to assume 
essentialist sexualities and experiences, thereby perpetuating oppositional and divisive political  
strategies.
Queer political approaches, however, do not require consensus morality to justify either the 
constitution of the (appropriate) sexual subject (qua 'identity'), nor the likeness of all subjects. They 
therefore tend to challenge (hetero)normativities in more relational ways.
Before unpacking this idea in more detail, it is useful to differentiate two main political aims:  
 'political' goals, which I rephrase as 'rights-seeking goals', and which Bernstein refers to as 
those which entail changing laws and policies to obtain new rights, benefits, and protections 
against harm288. Examples of such goals are obtaining marriage rights and, as I will suggest in  
Chapters 3 and 4, depathologising 'fetish sexuality'.
287 Penn, D. & Irvine, J. (1995) Gay/lesbian/queer studies. In Contemporary Sociology. May 1995. Vol. 24, Iss. 3 
Washington: at 328
288 Bernstein, M (2002) Identities and Politics Toward a Historical Understanding of the Lesbian and Gay Movement in 
Social Science History 26:3 (fall 2002) pp531-581. Note that I feel it necessary to rephrase the terms  'political goals' 
and 'cultural goals', since both aiming for acquisition of rights and changes to normativities are inherently political, 
and further since social change is both political and ideological. These ideas should therefore be better delineated.
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'cultural' goals, which I rephrase as 'social-change goals', and which for lesbians and gays 
are made up of, inter alia, challenging pervasive constructions of masculinity and femininity,  
homophobia, and the focus on gendered heterosexual nuclear families, i.e. 
heteronormativity289. Liberation from consensus morality and the validation of 'fetish'  
practices in ways which I argue in Chapters 5 and 6 is such a social-change 
goal290.
Rights-based arguments are appropriate for achieving 'political (rights-seeking) goals', but are 
inappropriate for achieving 'cultural (social-change) goals'. As Bernstein notes, “some indict 
identity movements for mistaking symbolic or cultural concessions for programmatic change,  
whereas others charge that the focus on narrow minority-based political rights will result only in 
‘‘virtual equality’’ rather than in transformative cultural change (i.e., that identity movements  
reinforce rather than challenge dominant cultural norms)291. This kind of critique derives mostly 
from postmodern or ‘‘queer’’ theorists, who view categories such as ‘‘gay’’ and ‘‘lesbian’’ as 
restrictive, and who view the adoption rather than deconstruction of the categories as reinforcing, 
not challenging the heteronormative system that labels 'non-heterosexuals ' as  
inferior292.
At face value, acknowledging sexualities as 'queer identifications' by abrasive dis-identification  
rather than 'gay identity' by positive allegiance might seem to contradict arguments that queerness is 
more cohesive than divisive. Yet, as I will argue, the political frame of reference for queerness is 
one that is complex and relational, rather than simplistic, dualistic, oppositional, and exclusionary.
2.2.1 The Political Playing Field
According to Weeks, in reviewing the ‘contemporary sexual battlefield’, sexual and intimate life is  
undergoing a t ransformation via a dual process of de-tradi t ional isat ion and 
individualization293. He notes that modernity has slowly done away with traditional institutions such 
a s f o r m s o f c i v i l i t y a n d c l a s s t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y s u s t a i n e d s e x u a l 
289 Bernstein, M ibid. See the Interjection in terms of how heteronormativity works
290 See below for more indepth discussion on the political relationships between these two goals
291 Bernstein, ibid referencing Vaid, U. (1995) Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian 
Liberation. New York: Anchor. 
292 See Britzman, D, (1998) Queer Pedagogy and Its Strange Techniques. In Ristock, J.L. & Taylor, CG, eds.(1998) 
Inside the Academy and Out: Lesbian/Gay/Queer Studies in Action Toronto: University of Toronto Press at 85: For 
example, certain queer theorists claim that the search for 'rights' (political change) such as same-sex marriage results 
in ‘‘exorbitant normality,’’ which locates gays and lesbians who seek assimilation in the mainstream so they can 
become legitimate and respectable subjects
293 Weeks, J (2005) Remembering Foucault. In Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 14, Nos. 1/2, January/April 
2005 186-201 at 194 
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morality294. This is added to by the media impact on sexuality, as increased secularization has  
weakened links between faith and morality295.
Notwithstanding these shifts, however, political activity in sexualities tend to rely on rights-based 
identity politics, which, as Bernstein notes, revolves around the view that 
“homosexuality is seen as fixed, whether it is conceived of as a result of nature (genes, hormones, etc.) or 
of nurture—etched indelibly in early childhood socialization resulting in a unitary identity that cannot be 
altered. Defenders view identity politics as a strategy necessary to obtain liberal political goals of 
freedom and equal opportunity in order to gain entry into the political mainstream on the same level as  
other groups, without altering the structures of society .... Critics of identity politics, by contrast, see the 
result of embracing an essentialist identity as a limited and flawed politics because it relies on claims to a 
racial- or ethnic-like minority status.”296
She notes that neither view explains why activists both use and fail to use these politics. 
Leftists charge reliance on fixed identities as the reason for an absence of statements of a universal  
vision for social change. Since identities splinter and fragment, the social movements cannot hold 
onto anything other than opposition to the enemy, which is seen as omnipotent white heterosexual  
males. “By targeting white heterosexual men, identity politics leaves no space for them to  
participate politically, resulting in an unproductive defensiveness”297. This results in inability to 
form coalitions that could result in progressive or revolutionary change. She notes that when gays 
and lesbians left fixed identities behind, other groups still refused to work with  
them298.
294 Weeks, ibid pp 194 referencing Anthony Giddens and Dennis Altman in relation to global sexuality: 
Giddens, A(1991) Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age  
Cambridge; Altman, D (2001) Global Sex Chicago.
295 See later re the media
296 Bernstein, M (2002) Identities and Politics Toward a Historical Understanding of the Lesbian and Gay Movement in 
Social Science History 26:3 (fall 2002) pp531-581 at 532. In this regard she references Altman, D. (1982) The gay 
movement ten years later. In Nation, 13 November: 494–96; Paul, W. (1982) Minority status for gay people: 
Majority reaction and social context. In Paul, W. Weinrich, J. D. Gonsiorek J. C., and Hotvedt, M. E. (eds.) (1982) 
Homosexuality: Social, Psychological, and Biological Issues. Beverly Hills: Sage: 351–70; Escoffier, J. (1985) 
Sexual revolution and the politics of gay identity. In Socialist Review 81/82: 119–54. Epstein, S. (1987) Gay 
Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism. In Socialist Review 93/94: 9–56; Epstein, S. (1999) 
Gay and Lesbian Movements in the United States: Dilemmas of Identity,  Diversity, and Political Strategy. In Adam, 
B. D., Duyvendak, J.W., and Krouwel, A. (eds.) (1999) The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics:  
National Imprints of a Worldwide Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press: 30–90; Seidman, S. (1993) 
Identity and politics in a ‘postmodern’ gay culture: Some historical and conceptual notes. In Warner, M (ed.) (1993) 
Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 105–
42; Gamson, J. (1995) Must identity movements self-destruct? A queer dilemma. In Social Problems 42 (3): 390–
408.; Vaid, U. (1995) Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian Liberation. New York: Anchor. See 
also the argument re multiculturalism, supra
297 Bernstein, M ibid referencing Kauffman, L. A. (1990) The anti-politics of identity. In Socialist Review 90 (1): 67–
80.
298 Bernstein, ibid
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I de n t i t y po l i t i c s i s a l s o c r i t i c i s e d a s no t r e s u l t i ng i n m e a n i ng fu l s oc i a l 
change299. These arguments conceive identity movements seeking rights (i.e. requests for inclusion  
into existing frameworks) as being in opposition to those seeking cultural and social transformation, 
(i.e. wanting to remain outside of existing frameworks). Therefore, movements seeking rights-based 
change are seen as being outside of politics, since they mistake new laws and policies for persistent 
cultural change. However, those looking for cultural transformation are often accused of misreading  
symbolic concessions as being change300. In this way, identity politics becomes a-political since it 
becomes consumption politics, whereby protest is commodified, and lifestyle or consumerism 
becomes the goal.301
2.2.2 The Limits of Liberalism and Human Rights
The problematic divisiveness implicit in gay rights politics tracks through from their genesis as a 
product of Liberal belief systems and their foundation for the modern trend towards identity-politics 
and human rights discourses. Rights claims, which are based on fictively static and divisively-
conceived identities, can easily be denied on the basis of consensus morality. They are therefore, I  
suggest, insufficient and cannot securely lodge validation for both sexual minorities 
q u a subject ('political'/rights-based goals) a n d free spaces for unusual and contentious sexual 
practices ('cultural'/social change goals).
Liberalism has now become ‘the defining doctrine of self and society for modernity’, where the idea 
of rights is central in moral, political, and legal vocabulary 302. All people are seen as having an 
inalienable right to individual choice, as well as the right to conduct their lives without negatively  
affecting others: ‘‘Respect for individual subjects may be considered simply as respect for their 
rights, as recognizing their capacity to assert claims’’303.
Liberalism is founded on a universality uniting people on a moral basis, ideas which inappropriately 
posit an essential human nature that transcends specific local historical and social 
differences304. This universality problematically assumes a singular ‘truth’ to oppression and a  
299 Here the idea of ‘meaningful’ depends on the context and who is being asked. Bernstein, ibid referencing 
Vaid, U. (1995) Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian Liberation. New York: Anchor. See notes 
supra
300 see Bronner, S. E. (1992) Moments of Decision. New York: Routledge.
301 See Evans, D. T. (1993) Sexual Citizenship: The Material Construction of Sexualities. New
York: Routledge.; Kauffman, L. A. (1990) The anti-politics of identity. In Socialist Review 90 (1): 67–80.; 
Hennessey, R. (1993) Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse. NewYork: Routledge.
302
 Goldberg, D (1993) Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Press at 
19.
303 Goldberg, ibid
304 Goldberg, ibid at 5 note 22
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homogeneity that is unbounded and uncomplicated by social forces and power. As Lenon notes, it 
“requires the production of a subject transcending social differences and its social 
location(s).”305
Goldberg notes that liberalism is a core set of ideas which include commitment to individual claims 
over those of the collective, together with commitment to equality motivated by rational reform and  
progress306. The deep underlying approval of individualism indicates that individual desires must 
take precedence over collective will and the right to privacy is more important than public  
morality307. 
As a product of liberalism, human rights are
“a set of internationally agreed upon moral principles that have been set down in various United Nations 
human rights instruments. In the aftermath of the documented atrocities of World War II, these  
instruments were designed to ensure that crimes against humanity, such as policies of genocide, would 
not happen again”.308
As Kallen argues, international human rights principles are prior to law, as moral guidelines, and 
represent global standards to which laws and public policies of all countries should 
adhere309. Yet there is no prior identity-based protection on a global scale for non-normative 
sexualities, which is significant since identity-based rights premise that, in order to qualify for  
p r o t e c t i o n , t h e o b j e c t r e q u i r i n g p r o t e c t i o n n e e d s t o b e i d e n t i f i a b l e a n d  
identified310. LGBTI people must therefore problematically rely on negotiations between activists 
and the proponents of localised consensus moralities.
In Southern Africa such moralities unfortunately remain conservative, reactionary and  
homophobic311, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e l o n g h i s t o r y o f g a y l i b e r a t i o n 
305 Lenon, S.J. (2005) Marrying Citizens! Raced Subjects? Re-thinking the Terrain of Equal Marriage Discourse. In 
CJWL/RFD Vol. 17 2005 at 409
306 Goldberg, D (1993) Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Press at 19.
307 Howard-Hassmann, RE (2001) Gay Rights and the Right to a Family: Conflicts Between Liberal and Illiberal Belief 
Systems. In Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 73–95 The Johns Hopkins University Press
308 Kallen, E, (1996) Gay and Lesbian Rights Issues: A Comparative Analysis of Sydney, Australia and Toronto, Canada 
In Human Rights Quarterly 18.1 (1996) 206-223 at 206, referring to United Nations, International Bill of Human 
Rights (1978).
309 Kallen, E, ibid
310 This should not be broadcast too loudly, for fear that the 'moral right' gets wind of it and uses it to the detriment of 
LGBTIQ people
311 See Howard-Hassmann, RE (2001) Gay Rights and the Right to a Family: Conflicts Between Liberal and Illiberal 
Belief Systems. In Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 73–95 The Johns Hopkins University Press. See also Sanders, 
D Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights Agenda, in 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 67 (1996) for 
reference to the international campaign for gay and lesbian rights.
For perspectives on sexual orientation in an African context, see Hoad, N.W. (2007) 
African Intimacies: Race, Homosexuality, and Globalization. University of Minnesota Press. Hoad calls on the 
historical and social narratives on homosexuality as cultural signifier while exploring the relationships between 
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movements312. As can be seen all over sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Zimbabwe and 
Uganda313, political and economic circumstances can lead politicians, the right-wing press and other  
leaders to call on widespread public homophobic fears at will. Consequent to its historical apartheid 
history, South Africa has constitutional protection on the basis of sexual orientation and a slew of  
laws granting gay rights314. Yet we remain subject to conservative views and periodic vitriolic 
denunciation of LGBTI people in the press. One such recent example is that of Jon Qwelane, who 
states: “There could be a few things I could take issue with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, 
but his unflinching and unapologetic stance over homosexuals is definitely not among 
those”315. He damns the move amongst churches to accept homosexuals and ordain women, and he  
likens homosexuality to bestiality, hoping that “some day a bunch of politicians with their heads 
affixed firmly to their necks will muster the balls to re-write the constitution of this country, to 
excise those sections which give license to men “marrying” other men, and ditto to  
women.”316 
This is a disconcerting constitutional possibility if a prevailing party with an overwhelming 
parliamentary majority so chooses, a state of affairs from which we are not so 
distant317. This is especially given such recent responses to homosexuality as the Minister of Arts  
and Culture's refusal to provide the opening speech at an art exhibition portraying female same-sex 
homosexuality and the material and discursive production of Africa. This is not a linear history of homosexuality in 
Africa, but rather a look at how certain moments of crisis relate to ideologies and signifying practices in terms of, 
amongst others, imperialism and nationalism.
See particularly Roberts, B. & Reddy, V. (2008) Pride and prejudice: public attitudes toward homosexuality. 
HSRC Review. 6(4):9-11. (from http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Research_Publication-20926.phtml) The authors analyse the 
the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) and discuss contemporary attitudes to homosexual behaviour. 
They argue that, even though South Africa has progressive legislation upholding lesbian and gay rights, 
discrimination and violent hate crimes against them are rife, and that there remains a negative attitude about and 
reluctance to accept homosexuality.
See also Epprecht, M (2004) Hungochani: A History of a Dissident Sexuality in Southern 
Africa. Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press; Epprecht, M (2008) Heterosexual Africa. Ohio: Ohio University 
Press, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.
See also Mthethwa, B (2008) “It's still not ok to be gay in SA: Survey shows 80% of population is prejudiced 
against same-sex relationships”. In Sunday Times, 23 November 2008, Page 24 (Addendum 4a)
312 See Hoad, N.W., Martin, K & Reid, G (eds) (2005) Sex and Politics in South Africa. Juta and Company Ltd
313 Recently, the Ugandan government has been considering passing laws to further criminalise homosexuality, and 
Robert Mugabe is well-known for his homophobia
314 See Hoad, N.W., Martin, K & Reid, G (eds) (2005) Sex and Politics in South Africa. Juta and Company Ltd
315 Qwelane, J (2008) Call me names, but gay is NOT OK, The Sunday Sun, Sunday 20 July. (See addendum 4b)
316 Qwelane, ibid
317 Fundamental human rights are entrenched in Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution in sections 7 to 39. The Bill of 
Rights cannot be changed by a simple parliamentary majority, but needs a Bill passed by the National Assembly on 
the vote of at least two-thirds of the members of Parliament, plus the vote of at least six provinces from the National 
Council of Provinces. On the face of it changing the equality clause is virtually impossible, given the onerous 
requirements entrenched in the constitution. However, in the recent national election, the African National Congress 
took 65.9 percent of the vote. As a result it obtained 264 seats, which are three seats short of the 66% consensus 
required for amending the South African constitution. The ANC is currently in control of 8 of the 9 South African 
provinces. This means that the potential for constitutional change is real. Further, reading these clauses restrictively 
or loosely, thereby impacting on the practical implementation of equality, is possible, subject to legal fiat and 
consensus morality.
70
 
 
 
 
intimacy, which the Minister denounced as 'pornographic'318.
The liberal equality paradigm is the main resource called on to oppose such conservatism, adding to  
the conception of ‘‘lesbians and gay men as a discrete minority community, whose ‘difference’  
should not result in prejudice and discrimination.’’319 As Howard-Hassmann argues, in this 
paradigm, diversity is more highly prized than conformity to public morals, and private lives are 
protected from public interference320. This results in opposition to gay-rights calls for public 
acceptance of homosexuality from both western conservatives and non-western 
traditionalists321. As Howard-Hassmann argues, these conservatives find hard to swallow the 
implicit public rejection of sex roles, the heterosexual family, and society’s normative 
u n d e r p i n n i n g s , a s w e l l a s a r e j e c t i o n o f f u n d a m e n t a l r e l i g i o u s 
beliefs322. Whereas traditionalists expect all people to restrain their activities and stick to the social 
rules, liberals encourage self-fulfillment, choice (even in sex role behaviour) and public 
exhibitionism. Gay rights movements therefore attack traditional social morality more  
fundamentally than any other human rights movement, thanks to its defiance of orderly oppositions 
be tween ma le and f ema le wh ich i s a rguab ly cen t r a l t o a l l con t empora ry 
cultures323.
2.2.3 Toleration and Difference: the Lock(e) on Sexual Liberation
However, gay rights discourses are, arguably, problematically based on mere toleration (not 
necessarily acceptance) of LGBTI people and their non-normative practices by the (conservative) 
majority, toleration which Katznelson explains as the institutional guarantee that we not be required 
to give reasons for our differences324.
318 Evans, S (2010) Minister Slams 'Porn' Exhibition, The Times, Monday 1 March, see http://www.timeslive.co.za/
local/article332784.ece. See also Times, 2 March 2010. The Minister responded by claiming that her actions came 
from her desire to protect children from 'pornography', rather than a distaste of images representing same-sex 
behaviour. See http://www.dac.gov.za/media_releases/2010/04-03-10.html. Given that the images do not appear to 
represent sexual activity at all, but rather to show women in emotionally intimate poses, the implication is that this 
official statement is merely a political response to cover up negative publicity and homophobia. (Addendum 4c)
319 Lenon, S.J. (2005) Marrying Citizens! Raced Subjects? Re-thinking the Terrain of Equal Marriage Discourse. In 
CJWL/RFD Vol. 17 2005 at 408. referencing Herman, D (1994) Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay 
Legal Equality Toronto: University of Toronto Press at 5.
320 Howard-Hassmann, RE (2001) Gay Rights and the Right to a Family: Conflicts Between Liberal and Illiberal Belief 
Systems. In Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 73–95 The Johns Hopkins University Press
321 In regard human rights in Southern Africa, see Hoad, N.W. (1999) Between the White Man's Burden and the White 
Man's Disease: Tracking Lesbian and Gay Human Rights in Southern Africa. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and 
Gay Studies 1999 5(4):559-584
322 Howard-Hassmann, ibid
323 Howard-Hassmann, ibid
324 Katznelson, I (1996) Liberalism's Crooked Circle: Letters to Adam Michnik Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Note that 'toleration' is broadly equatable to 'tolerance', although 'toleration' indicates the allowance or sufferance of 
something with which one disagrees, whereas 'tolerance' implies a liberal approach to the views and actions of 
others.
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Toleration is a defining issue in the relationship between liberalism and cultural  
pluralism325. It is a central tenet of multicultural life and key to the future of liberal democracy in 
that liberal democracy prioritises the toleration of diverse people326.
2.2.3a) Difference and The Threat of Violence
Holland argues that toleration must be reconsidered, acknowledging that conflict in a political space 
is inevitable327. Lockean liberalism has tried to define "a secure place for the recognition of 
difference inside liberalism's doctrinal edifice," but ultimately 
"[its] portrayal of difference tends to be rather too orderly and sanitized, downplaying the remarkable  
interlacings and amalgamations of human life, the rich varieties of cultural traditions, positions, and 
relationships, and [the] ever-present possibilities for ugliness and unspeakable brutality exercised in the  
name of difference."328
Holland argues that Lockean thinking assumes the acceptance of "facts" of difference with no 
further inquiry into processes where difference produces and is produced as 
politics329. Toleration is premised on a doctrinal potential for violence as a ‘structural condition’ and 
an (albeit unintended) effect330. This inherently divisive potential further calls in question the ability  
o f to le ra t ion to encourage the shared mora l f r amework which Katzne l son 
encourages331.
325 Holland, CA (2000) Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, 
Johns Hopkins Press. Note, however, that Holland's argument relates to multiculturalism, rather than to sexual 
alterity.
326 Importantly, multiculturalism is sometimes used by LGBTI theorists as a way out of the morass of self-defeating, 
circular essentialist identities. However, see Binnie, J (2004) The Globalisation of Sexuality Sage Publications: 
London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, pp69. He notes that this is problematic in the context of sexualities. Looking at 
'queer people' as a quasi-ethnic group, although on the surface appealing, tends to perpetuate the assumptions of a 
universal gay identity, thereby further marginalising LGBTI people from marginal communities. Binnie notes that 
reading LGBTI people as an ethnic group implies reading 'racial'/'ethnic' identity on the opposite side to LGBTI 
identities. He calls attention to the inherent problems of referring to gay culture as hybrid, in the mould of 
postcolonial thinking. This implies that gay culture is becoming more homogeneous. In this respect, Binnie, ibid, 
pp69, refers to Sinfield, A (1996) Diaspora and Hybridity: queer identities and the ethnicity model. In 
Textual Practice, 10(2): 271-93. Notwithstanding cogent arguments against comparing sexuality and 
multiculturalism, I suggest that arguments on the limits of toleration are nonetheless apposite to arguments against 
calling on identity politics to support social change.
327 Holland, CA (2000) Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, 
Johns Hopkins Press
328 Katznelson, I (1996) Liberalism's Crooked Circle: Letters to Adam Michnik Princeton: Princeton University Press at 
149, 155; see also Rawls, J(1993) Political Liberalism New York: Columbia University Press; Kymlicka, W. (1995) 
Multicultural Citizenship Oxford: Clarendon
329 Holland, CA (2000) Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, 
Johns Hopkins Press at 26. In setting up toleration in relation to the right not to give reasons for differences, Locke 
at the same time “displaces what is most political about the social "fact" of conflict in multicultural society”. Locke 
calls attention to the ways in which social and historical processes enable group differentiation, while downplaying 
the extent to which they make up a "common ground". This is the case even where such common ground is only 
recognizable by shifting perspective from established "facts" to processes that establish them.
330 See Holland, ibid
331 Katznelson, I (1996) Liberalism's Crooked Circle: Letters to Adam Michnik Princeton: Princeton University Press 
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2.2.3b) On Universal Moral Standards: Political Claims
Locke further implicitly defers to universal moral standards to deal with inevitable moral  
conflict332. Further, Locke sees some form of belief in a god is a pre-requisite both for social 
cohesion and for toleration333. In a modern, Western secular society which premises the complete 
s epa r a t i on o f r e l i g i on and s t a t e , t h i s , and t he concom i t an t exc l u s i on o f 
atheists334 poses problems for the acceptance and tolerance of sexual orientations and practices such  
as 'gay male fetish sexuality', which are inimical to many, if not most formal religions, and are often 
viewed as 'evil'335.
In this way, toleration is fundamental to Locke in that comprehension thereof takes for granted a 
common (religious) moral framework not inherent in contemporary liberal formulations. Toleration 
is further fundamentally divisive in that expectation and encouragement of failures thereof are  
incorporated into the founding principles of liberalism. This is particularly pertinent in the context  
of marginal sexualities which are almost by definition consistently excluded from religiously-
lodged conservative (hetero)normative frameworks.
2.2.3c) On Religious Concerns: 'Cultural' Claims
Lockean liberalism is premised on a rigid distinction between state and civil society, and on state  
neutrality, whereby 'difference' is allowed into public discourses while downplaying its less 
benef ic ia l e ffec ts , notwi ths tanding the exis tence of inequal i ty and cul tura l 
conflict336.
Debate, which is central to Lockeanism, cannot relate to non-religious concerns about public 
life337. Such debates are “to Locke's logic governed by an empiricist and objectivist denial of the  
332 Holland, CA (2000) Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, 
Johns Hopkins Press.
333 Holland, CA (2000) ibid at 30. As Holland notes: “In this way, the political mechanism of toleration assures that 
religion, and religious tension, are maintained and even institutionalized by virtue of the secularization of the 
political sphere, yet by the same token Locke's doctrine of toleration offers no clear means by which that tension can 
be engaged as politics. Failures of toleration are thus an essential component of Locke's formulation.”
334 Locke, J (1990) A Letter Concerning Toleration Buffalo: Prometheus Books at 64., referenced in Holland, CA 
(2000) Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, Johns Hopkins 
Press at 29: Locke refuses atheists access to debates on toleration, since they are purportedly too great a threat to the 
survival of a civil authority, noting "Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society can have 
no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all."
335 Fundamentalist Christian opposition to homosexuality is well documented in sexualities research. See also Chapter 
3, pertaining to the religious underpinnings of constructions and demonising of 'fetish' practices.
336 See John Locke, Two Tracts on Government, ed. Philip Abrams (1967) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; and (1990) A Letter Concerning Toleration Buffalo: Prometheus Books 
337 Holland, CA (2000) Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, 
Johns Hopkins Press at 25. Locke viewed teaching, admonishing and debate as excellent means of activating 
intellectual discussion and political debate. He advocated giving reasons and relating publicly in terms of 
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very existence of normative perspectives on civil matters.”338 This implies that coercive power from 
the state cannot be countered by Lockean liberalism in areas of ethnicity, race, sexuality or gender  
where these discussions are not politically significant, “not because they reflect subjective 
convictions, but instead serve as registers of civil injury, "accounts of the political weight and 
meaning of social 'facts.'"339 Technically, Locke does not accommodate intellectual and political  
disagreements on issues other than religious doctrine, nor does his doctrine of toleration protect 
political dissent from the coercive power of the state since he locates religious toleration in the set-
up of political dispute as epistemologically impossible.
In this regard, Lockean Liberalism is (perhaps) an appropriate frame of reference for political  
claims premised on difference/social division, but not for 'cultural'/social change claims premised  
on similarity/coherence.
2.2.4 Claiming Queer Cultural/Social Transformation
This thesis is a progressive/radical acknowledgement of 'homo-fetish' desire, and is a call for both 
'political' (rights-based) and 'cultural' (social) transformation. Through locating the research in a 
complex reading of queer theory, it argues for freedom from policing and pathologising (political 
goals), and at the same time for validation (cultural goals). Motivating for depathologising gay male  
fetish sexuality (Chapters 3 and 4) locates the research as a call for equality of opportunities and 
rights, where “[t]he burden of becoming equal thus rests on whom and what is outside and wants to 
be ‘‘in.’’”340. Calls for re-visioning the premises for 'fetish sexuality' as validation (Chapters 5 and 
6), however, are to reconceive 'fetish' as by definition validated and justified in being left “out”.
Calls to depathologise 'fetish' sexuality function as a political claim inasmuch as they insist on 
institutional shifts, i.e. for both government and psychiatric institutions to deal with (gay male) 
sexual 'fetish' in the same ways they deal with (heterosexual, non-fetish) psychiatric dysfunction: by  
differences. He also called for obtaining social peace by “delegating these necessary tasks to private individuals who 
command not the power of the state or the church but the art of reason.” 
338 Holland, ibid at 25
339 Holland, ibid, at 25 referencing Kirstie McClure: McClure, K.M. (1990) Difference, Diversity, and the Limits of 
Toleration. In Political Theory 18 (August 1990), 361-391 at 385. Holland further notes that “Careful readers of 
Locke may contest this formulation, and there are certainly grounds for doing so. After all, in his Second Treatise, 
Locke guarantees the people the right to rebel against unjust rulers (even though he assures us repeatedly that 
rebellion is almost never undertaken for light or trivial reasons). Surely, then, it is overstating the case to suggest that 
Locke characterizes disputes about civil matters as epistemologically impossible. But I would remind readers of 
Locke's notoriety for altering his own positions, particularly in the case of toleration, and suggest that his 1689 
Letter promotes religious toleration at the expense of the political disputes his Two Treatises, written approximately 
a decade earlier, allows.”
340 Lenon, S.J. (2005) Marrying Citizens! Raced Subjects? Re-thinking the Terrain of Equal Marriage Discourse. In 
CJWL/RFD Vol. 17 2005 at 411, referring to same-sex marriage rights 
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dealing with the psychical discomfort of a person based on the underlying psychical issues, rather 
than by psychopathologising non-normative practices341. At the same time, such calls function as 
cultural claims in that they call for validation of sexual practices, which I argue should be based on 
t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e r o l e o f t h e b o d y / e m b o d i m e n t i n s e x u a l 
practices342.
On the face of it these two approaches conflict in terms of locating the sexual subject in a stable  
way. Political (rights) arguments, such as those advocating gay marriage, tend to assume a 
‘desexualised’ legal subject aligned with (heteronormative) monogamy and conjugal love. However, 
validating sexual fetish as cultural (social) phenomenon seems to posit something quite different: a  
s u b j e c t d e f i n e d b y s e x u a l c h o i c e s , r a t h e r t h a n l o v e , r o m a n c e a n d 
respectability343. As I will explain in Chapter 5 and 6, there is a third option, which supports social  
change through refusing to define the subject in any objective sense at all.
Rights arguments attempt to 'include' a sexual minority into a pre-existing set of rules and socially  
approved practices which are primarily created and perpetuated through heteronormativity. In so 
doing, rights-debates try to 'iron out' and minimise the extent to which the marginal sexual practices 
do not conform to heteronormative values. Through this, such debates try to lodge the (homo)sexual  
subject as stable, identifiable and controllable, falling strictly within the bounds of 
heteronormatively approved or approvable behaviour. Since the corollary to 'rights' is 
'responsibilities', rights-based calls for equality implicitly promise to the heteronormative 
population that the included group ('homosexuals') is inherently identifiable and therefore  
controllable by (i.e. responsible to) the ordinary legal and social systems of the courts, medicine, 
psychiatry and so on. Rights-based claims thereby seek to expand the bounds of existing 
heteronormativity to include marginal groups, and thereby merely to increase the scope of 
341 See the argument in chapters 3 and 4 on moving away from historically demonised and psychopathologised 
conceptions of fetish sexuality.
342 See the arguments in chapters 5 and 6 on the importance of the lived body in validating subjectivities and practices 
in fetish sexuality 
343 Lenon, S.J. (2005) Marrying Citizens! Raced Subjects? Re-thinking the Terrain of Equal Marriage Discourse. In 
CJWL/RFD Vol. 17 2005, notes that “This bid for respectability via the positioning of a ‘‘de-sexed’’ subject in 
lesbian and gay equality rights discourse is critically discussed by a number of authors” In particular see Boyd, S & 
Young, C.F.L. (2003) From Same-Sex to No Sex? Trends towards Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in 
Canada. In Seattle Journal for Social Justice at 757; Butler, J (2002) Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual? In 
Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 14; Cossman, B (2000) ‘Canadian Same-Sex Relationship 
Recognition Struggles and the Contradictory Nature of Legal Victories. In Cleveland State Law Review 49; Eaton, 
M (1994) Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle for Equality Rights: Reversing the Progressive Hypothesis. In Dalhousie 
Law Journal; Phelan, S (2001) Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians, and Dilemmas of Citizenship 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Richardson, D (2004) Locating Sexualities: From Here to Normality. In 
Sexualities 391; Valverde, M (2003) Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
and Vaid, U (1995) Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian Liberation New York: Doubleday
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acceptable sexual practices, with the majority controlling the decisions. On the surface, this does  
not challenge the bases of heteropatriarchy, such as assumptions around monogamy, sexual 
propriety, respectability etc., nor do they do not explode heteronormativity in total.
On the other hand, seeking appropriate 'cultural/social' change is to acknowledge that 
no people, whatever their identities/identifications, can be adequately described through labelling  
processes which seek to identify them as essential, unitary selves. 'Cultural change' seeks to bypass 
the surface changes to legal and regulatory systems. It thereby enables the possibility of multiple  
ways of practising sex not restricted only to the marginal group in question, but potentially open to 
a l l people, including the (heteronormative) majority. This entails suggesting that, rather than 
defining the sexual subject by sex (or the by the promise of the control of that sex by a 
heteropatriarchal majority), the subject can validly be explained in an impartial/value-neutral way 
which does not rely on heteronormative aspirations to monogamy, procreation and conformity,  
rather than justified through their choice of sexual practices.
Yet in this instance, I suggest, pragmatism determines that the tools of rights-based politics be  
mobilised to effect cultural/social change, without relying on (and, as I will explain, by  
transcending) the assumed stability and essentialism of static 'identity'.
2.2.4a) Rights Claims and Equality: Problematising 'Empowered' vs 'Disempowered'
In order to deal with these conflicts, and track how this 'both-and' approach should work, we 
should, I suggest, first unpack the power dynamics of 'in' and 'out'. In this respect, as Johnson 
argues, identity politics is about the construction of powerful, majority and "mainstream" identities  
as much as it is about disempowered, marginalized identities344.
Rights claims are made on the premise of a demand from a presumed disempowered group to an 
assumed empowered subject majority. However, contrary to assumptions about the 'top-down' 
nature of the claims made, the relationship between the 'empowered' (those 'granting' rights) and the 
disempowered (those 'claiming' rights) is really dialectical, and expresses a more complex desire for 
self-expression and agency, both collectively and individually. Lenon argues that maintaining a 
commitment to an image of equality for lesbians and gay men in a heterosexual culture is possible,  
344 Johnson, C (1997) Visiting the Margins: Revenge, Transgression or Incorporation -- An Australian engagement with 
theories of identity. In Theory and Event, 1:3. Johnson notes that more attention should be paid to the construction of 
"mainstream" identities and the roles taken on by forms of incorporation and/or assimilation which deny group 
identities. The "mainstream" can be constructed as much by inclusion or assimilation as by exclusion, while the 
"revenge of the mainstream" can be seen as a response to identity fragmentation involving a retrospective challenge 
to attempted incorporation of marginalized groups into "mainstream" identity.
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while at the same time critiquing the emancipatory narratives and discursive strategies put forward  
in the name of equality345.
What is required, I suggest, is to revise the discourses that require that such equality and legitimacy 
should be obtained. Unlike the demand for equality via depathologising 'fetish sexuality' (i.e. 
political claims to equality in ‘presence’), the demand for the right to practice fetish sexuality  
unfettered, (if you’ll excuse the pun), is a demand to be excluded from majority morality. Not 
merely to be excluded, but to be allowed a voice/location which conflicts with the moral majority.  
In other words, as well as arguing for equal access to heterosexual, 'non-fetish' privilege, (i.e. the 
right to equality in the law and psychiatric definitions), 'fetishists' should, I suggest, argue for 
exclusion from heteronormative (specular) control and restriction, and thereby argue for the right to  
b e personally present, rather than politically monitored. As Garlinger argues, rights are but one 
element of equality346.
On the one hand, gay men and lesbians are coded in many human-rights based discourses as 
‘lacking’ full equality and social legitimacy, while their claims for equality are framed in terms of  
‘desire’, which in conventional psychoanalytic narratives is defined as an absence or a  
lack347. A more appropriate approach is to rephrase such 'desire' and 'lack', as 'voice'. This turn-
around rephrases a divisive, objectified substrata for calls for equality into a proactive one based on 
the assumption of equal agency amongst different yet equally valuable social agents. 
2.2.5 'Gay Male Sexual Fetish' as Pragmatic Queer Activism
As I will argue in Chapter 6, 'Gay male sexual fetish' challenges or distorts conceptions of what  
many perceive as ‘legitimate sexual relations’, by reconstituting or revisioning the meanings of 
corporeal and shared sexual expression348. Yet it is problematic to find appropriate political 
locations for sexual 'fetishists' (as opposed to scholarly/political locations for the thesis itself, 
345 Lenon, SJ (2005) Marrying Citizens! Raced Subjects? Re-thinking the Terrain of Equal Marriage Discourse. In 
CJWL/RFD Vol. 17 2005  at pp408
346 Garlinger, PP (2004) “In All But Name”: Marriage and the Meaning of Homosexuality. In Discourse 26.3 (Fall 
2004), pp. 41–72. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan. At 65
“the gay and lesbian struggle for legal recognition is not only a struggle to obtain specific benefits but also to 
exercise some control over the power to name oneself. Discourses of sexuality often reflect a profound conflict 
between majoritarian labels and subcultural denominations that emerge from within specific communities. The 
reconfiguration of the term ‘‘queer,’’ for example, was a deliberate strategy of appropriating a pejorative term for 
political ends to blunt its negativity and reinvest it with more affirmative connotations. The capacity to name oneself 
is a powerful privilege, in part because the choice of names indelibly shapes a person’s identity. …In this respect, 
the linguistic debate is not simply a semantic ‘‘name game’’ but rather a profoundly significant debate on the 
meaning of homosexuality. One of the fundamental dimensions of a pro-gay movement is articulating a positive 
meaning for homosexuality and same-sex practices.”
347 Grosz, E (1995) Space, Time, and Perversion New York: Routledge at 177.
348 See chapters 3 to 6
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discussed in Chapter 1). A political claim for equality is imperative, as is a cultural claim for  
'fetishists' to be left in peace to explore their sexualities unhindered. Yet, as discussed above, these 
aims are at face value contradictory.
Yet arguments such as this thesis, which motivates for both political and cultural change, contribute 
to a 'new sexual movement', which Weeks argues is characterized by two moments; transgression 
and citizenship349. The transgressive moment occurs by challenging traditions and institutions that 
attempt to exclude the sexual ‘other’, challenges that derive from creation of “new sexual  
s u b j e c t i v i t i e s , w h i c h t r a n s g r e s s t h e n o r m s o f h e g e m o n i c 
heterosexuality”350. The challenge is an attack and a demand for recognition, respect and rights, 
which challenge therefore becomes the second moment: of citizenship and belonging. At the same 
time it is the fl ip-side: responsibil i ty to and respect for other cit izens and 
community351. Langdridge et al point out that “if the first of these two moments is seen as a utopian 
mechanism for challenging and extending the (frequently conservative) ideological responsibilities 
that result from rights claims politics, through the act of transgression, then we have the potential  
for a radical queer politics of citizenship”.352
Like the Netherlands, South Africa has extremely progressive legislation protecting same-sex action 
and sexual identities. Public life and sexual location for middle class (predominantly white) gay 
men such as the participants in this research is no longer fraught with claims for legal and social 
equality in the way they were during apartheid353. So the kind of subversive activism engaged in by 
SALeathermen354, in some ways reflect what Hekma notes about queerness in the Netherlands:
349 Weeks, J. (1995) Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press.
350 Langdridge, D & Butt, T (2004) A Hermeneutic Phenomenological Investigation of the Construction of 
Sadomasochistic Identities. In Sexualities, Vol. 7, No. 1, 31-53 (2004) at 34
351 Bell, D. and Binnie, J. (2000) The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond. Cambridge: Polity Press. & Gamson, 
J. (1995) ‘Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma’ Social Problems 42(3): 390–407. as 
discussed in Langdridge et al, ibid
Weeks’ points are criticised by Bell and Binnie who claim that arguments about moving from transgression to 
citizenship are conservative or assimilationist. However the points are nevertheless valid if we take account of 
Gamson’s conclusions that the lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender (as opposed to queer) communities need to engage 
with both identity movements and queer politics to achieve political success
Real political accusations of conservatism can be voiced if Weeks’ viewpoint is related as a movement from 
awareness-raising, to transgression, to rights, responsibilities and citizenship. However, if the argument is rephrased 
as a relationship of dialectics, we can recall the relationship between ideology and utopia put forward by Ricoeur, 
where ideology is about identity preservation while utopia is about rupture, novelty and difference (Ricoeur, P. 
(1986) Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. Edited by G. H. Taylor. New York: Columbia University Press)
352 Langdridge, D & Butt, T (2004) A Hermeneutic Phenomenological Investigation of the Construction of 
Sadomasochistic Identities. In Sexualities, Vol. 7, No. 1, 31-53 (2004) at 34
353 This is patently not the case for working class and black gay men and lesbians in South Africa who face 
discrimination and prejudice, and even violence, 'corrective rape' and death daily. Merely one example is the 
untimely death of twenty-five year old Desmond Dube, a drag queen fondly known as Daisy, who died in a shooting 
in Yeoville in June 2008.
354 the social organisation which brings the research participants together around sexual pleasure
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“Gays and lesbians may have come out of their closets, but most people find that sexual orientation has  
little relevance in public life. The Dutch may be beyond the closet, but they have created a new  
one.”355
An important strategy in the creation of queer space has been the process of developing gay and  
lesbian visibility. Now, since there are clear rights in place, Hekma argues that sexual orientation  
only matters in the bedroom, and not in public. “In the past”, he says, “silencing was directed at  
public homosexuality and private homosexuals; now it is directed at anything queer beyond 
personal identities”, and that normalization, naturalization and privatization of sexuality was a  
priority for most gays and lesbians, which they now have.356 However, now people are not judged 
for their private actions, but are assumed to be non-sexual and non-gendered in public. He notes 
that transgendered and queer people do therefore not have a public home in daily life. South Africa  
is in some ways similarities to the Dutch case, at least in the context of middle class gay men and 
their social and political world. Hekma notes that, thanks to high-profile media coverage of child 
abuse (and paedophilia) scandals, there is an increase in Puritanism, which results in the acceptance  
of homosexuality in private, but a rejection of the ““filthification” of society by such public  
expressions of sexuality as gay parades and prostitution”357. And, I would add, public 
acknowledgement of 'fetish sexuality'.
Various forms of gay and lesbian, gender, transgender, and queer studies have criticized the 
normalization of homosexuality; the naturalization of gender performances, sexual preferences, and  
gender and sexual dichotomies; and the privatization of desires. On the positive side, these 
academic fields have demonstrated the queerness of straight culture; on the negative side, they have 
not fundamentally changed traditional, not-so-queer ideas and practices.
As Hekma asks, how do we obtain more widespread appreciation of multisexual, polymorphous and 
transgender pleasures, and how do we move beyond the idea of there being only two genders and 
that marriage, love and sex ‘belong’ together? He notes that “Queer studies may have provoked 
much brainwork in academe, but its results in the everyday lives of queer people are too 
invisible.”358 As he says, the marginal work of queers and women’s studies advocates have a hard 
time finding common ground, and complacency has slowed much political action. 
355 Hekma, G (2004) Queer: The Dutch Case. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies Volume 10, Number 2, 
2004, pp. 276-280 at 277
356 Hekma, G, ibid
357 Hekma, G,  ibid at 278. I would suggest that the same be said for the public representations of same-sex intimacy. 
See the arguments on Qwelane and the Minister of Arts and Culture, supra
358 Hekma, G, ibid at 278
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2.2.6 Pragmatic Activism: Unities of Process and Identity
As discussed above, social theorists often criticise gay and lesbian social movements as narrowly 
and naively engaging with identity politics in essentialist ways, based on perceived difference to the  
majority and without interrogating the limitations and functioning of toleration. The critics often  
accuse such essentialism of preventing coalition building and reinforcing hegemonic and restrictive 
social categories. Bernstein argues that the proponents of such arguments see ‘‘identity 
movements’’ as 'cultural'(social) more than 'political'(rights-based) movements, where goals, 
strategies, and mobilisation forms are better explained by static ideas of identity than by other  
factors359.
In so doing, she integrates political process and identity theories to construct a ‘political identity’ 
approach to social movements, thereby demonstrating that LGBTI movements alternately and at the  
same time emphasise both political and cultural goals. In this way, she argues that structural and 
contextual factors, rather than essentialist conceptions of identity, demonstrate a movement’s focus 
on political change.
Part of the problem around identifying what makes up ‘real change’ lies in the difference between 
‘cultural’ and ‘political’ found in debates between new social movement and identity theorists on 
the one hand360, and resource mobilization361, political opportunity362 and political process 
theorists363. Identity movements are seen as new social movements, in contradistinction to labour 
359 Bernstein, M (2002) Identities and Politics Toward a Historical Understanding of the Lesbian and Gay Movement. 
In Social Science History 26:3 (fall 2002) 531-581
360 She differentiates new social movement and identity theorists, on the one hand, from political process (PP/PO) 
theorists on the other. The former include Touraine, A. (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social  
Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R, Duyvendak, J.W. and Giugni, M. 
G. (eds.) (1995) New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.; Cohen, J. (1985) Strategy or identity: New theoretical paradigms and contemporary social 
movements. In Social Research 52: 663–716.; Melucci, A. (1985) The symbolic challenge of contemporary 
movements. In Social Research 52: 789–816, and Melucci, A. (1989) Nomads of the Present. London: Hutchinson 
Radius. The latter include McAdam, D. (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,  
1930-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
361 She notes sources for resource mobilization (RM) theory: McCarthy, J. D., and Zald M. N. (1977) Resource 
mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. In American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212–39.
362 She refers to sources for political opportunity (PO) theorists: Gamson, W. A., and Meyer D. S. (1996) The framing 
of political opportunity. in McCarthy, J., McAdam, D., and Zald, M.N. (eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Social  
Movements: Political Opportunities,Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 275–90.; Kitschelt, H. (1986) Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear 
movements in four democracies. In British Journal of Political Science 16: 57–85.; Tarrow, S. (1988) National 
politics and collective action: Recent theory and research in Western Europe and the United States. In 
Annual Review of Sociology 14: 421–40.; (1993) Cycles of collective action: Between moments of madness and the 
repertoire of content. In Social Science History 17 (2): 281–307. (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and  
Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
363 McAdam, D. (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-  
1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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movements, Marxism and socialism, since for identity movements class is not central to politics.
Bernstein notes that cultural movements and strategies are also best seen as political, while others  
focus on the relationship between collective identity and political circumstances. Activists look to 
obtain both cultural and political goals. Theorists should therefore, I suggest, move away from 
assuming a dichotomy between political and cultural movements. 
This approach is informative and compelling, given that in 
“so-called identity movements (action) is not the result of internal or essentialist features of movements  
but of social networks, resources, and political conditions. Thus what I call ‘‘identity strategies’’ should  
be c ons ide r e d one a spe c t o f a move me n t ’s s t r a t e g i c r e pe r to i r e bu t on ly one 
aspect.”364
Bernstein further argues that identity can be called upon as a strategy for change. Activists can call  
on their 'identities' (i.e. what I call 'identifications': the categories, values and practices assigned to  
and chosen by them, not any essentialist conceptions of 'identity') to ensure that they become the 
subject of debates, and to criticize dominant essentialist identities or to forward views of minorities  
that challenge dominant perceptions. Such 'identifications' can be used to educate or to focus on 
differences to the majority in order to exercise cultural critique.365 Breaking 'identity' into ‘bite-sized 
chunks’ of 'identification' allows for debates on the effectiveness or advisability of these politics to  
become more or less polemical or analytical. In this way, identity politics can be rephrased as 
complex, fluid and multidimensional.
Further, enacting toleration as a political practice among citizens rather than as a state doctrine  
provides opportunities to 'give reasons' by way of mechanisms to transform identity from “a 
privileged domain that is immunized against politics into a site of critical contest 
itself.”366 In this way, providing reasons becomes a pragmatic and proactive way of shifting  
dominant (heteropatriarchal) discourses, rather than a self-justificatory and placatory way of asking  
permission for entrance to heteropatriarchal systems.
364 Bernstein, M (2002) Identities and Politics Toward a Historical Understanding of the Lesbian and Gay Movement. 
In Social Science History 26:3 (fall 2002) 531-581 at 536, referencing Tilly, C. (1978) From Mobilization to 
Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley; (1993) Contentious repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834. In 
Social Science History 17 (2): 253–80; Tarrow, S. (1993) Cycles of collective action: Between moments of madness 
and the repertoire of content. In Social Science History 17 (2): 281–307.
365 Bernstein, ibid  at 539
366 Holland, CA (2000) Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, 
Johns Hopkins Press. She discusses the possibility and ways of developing a postfoundationalist liberalism 
abstracted from foundationalist distinctions (such as between darkness and light, reason and unreason, rule of law 
and resort to violence). She also notes that “neither administrative procedure nor universal moral standards can 
supply us with a single measure by which differences might be appraised or domesticated”
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In this way, difference and dispute stop being a threat to democracy, but rather its substance, in that 
dispute makes political meaning unstable, and shifts focus from identity as a finished product to the 
process of political identification, which are indeed at least partially cohesive rather than divisive  
principles367. As I will suggest, politics does not need to be bound by identity as 'closure', but can be  
seen as a locus of 'disclosure' and 'engagement'368.
A more pragmatic approach at least partially deals with concerns about identity politics and 
foundational inconsistencies in Lockean logic369. It further, I suggest, benefits the location of 'gay 
male fetish sexuality' as a public, but not necessarily institutional concern, and paves the way to 
arguments around the validation of social/cultural space in which 'fetish' can flourish. 
It does not, however, necessarily and conclusively shift paradigms from political divisiveness to 
social cohesiveness370.
2.2.7 Rephrasing 'Gay Male Fetish Sexuality' as a Resource for Recognising Subjective Value
The thesis seeks to rephrase 'gay male fetish sexuality' as a resource for positively recognising the 
subjective value of the individual as he/she lives in his/her community, rather than as a set of sexual 
practices needing to be vilified/justified in a reactionary way. This should, I suggest, take place 
through re-constituting the assumptions of pathology for 'fetish sexuality'. 
Instead of being a marginalised form of sexual expression as rights-based identity politics might 
suggest, I argue for a view of 'gay male fetish' as a body-based/embodied sexual exploration of the 
material world. These explorations are central to all human experience, and are available as means 
of accessing and expressing the value of a lived life. I argue that this is a variation of a queer 
367 Holland refers to further development of this line of thinking in Euben, JP,(1997) 
Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political Theory Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. esp. Chapter Six.
368 In a sense, this latter Katznelson (Katznelson, I (1996) Liberalism's Crooked Circle: Letters to Adam Michnik  
Princeton: Princeton University Press) recalls Hannah Arendt's address accepting the Lessing Prize conferred by the 
city of Hamburg. For her acceptance speech, see Arendt, H (1968) "On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about 
Lessing." In Men in Dark Times, New York: Harcourt Brace, pp.3–31. For an excellent and nuanced reading of 
Arendt, see Disch, L.J. (1995) On Friendship in 'Dark Times,' In Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt  
ed. Bonnie Honig University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, 285-311.
369 Holland argues in favour of  “redefin[ing] toleration as the expectation that we must give reasons and thereby 
engage others in a public conversation about the differences that form the basis of our common life. To do so is not 
to rely on personal goodness nor is it to assume the inherent goodness of human nature. Nor is it to discard the 
concept of a common public order and the commensurate, if mobile, distinctions between public and private that it 
entails. (See Galeotti, A.E., (1993) Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration. In Political Theory, vol.21, 
no. 4, at 601.) On the contrary, it is to show how the very concept of toleration relies on a common public life that, 
in its conventional Lockean form, it cannot allow. Without that public life where we must give reasons for our 
differences and engage those of others, toleration is a politically unintelligible demand.” (Holland, CA (2000) 
Giving Reasons: Rethinking Toleration for a Plural World. In Theory and Event, 4:4 2000, Johns Hopkins Press.)
370 either on the level of multiculturalism or in relation to sexualities
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framework seeking both to achieve political goals of equality and to challenge heteronormativity by 
way of 'cultural'/'social' change. However I do not suggest that 'gay male sexual fetish' should 
merely be located within queer (non)identification, rather than within gay rights identity politics.  
Rather, I suggest that paradigms be widened substantially, incorporating the principles of queer 
identification, to incorporate influences not often called on in sexualities scholarship: the idea of 
subjective value which challenges normative assumptions and is lodged in the phenomenological.
Skeggs notes Jon Dovey’s identification of ‘extraordinary subjectivity’, which entails a shift from 
grand narratives as the ground for truth statements to claims that the world has no meaning unless  
grounded in the personal, subjective and particular371.
In contradistinction to identity politics, Skeggs argues against seeing gender and sexuality as an 
object or property of identity. Instead, she favours approaching them as resources to which one is 
granted or refused access, and therefore as means of accessing value in the 
'self'372. Notably, and as I will explain in Chapters 5 and 6, this is not a wholesale embracing of  
commercial/capitalist doctrine, since it is not based on the idea of 'sale' for profit, but on 'exchange' 
of value which reflects subjectivities and what individuals are aiming for reflected through 
pragmatic language which acknowledges that people make sense of their lives through the material.
Seeing 'resource' as a subjective rather than capitalist notion enables a view of using the resources 
of gender and sexuality as persistently reproducing both. Rather than being an essentialist unit, the 
371 Skeggs, B (2004) Uneasy Alignments, Resourcing Respectable Subjectivity. In  GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay 
Studies, 10(2): 291–8 referencing Dovey, J (2000) Freakshow: First Person Media and Factual Television.  
London: Pluto
Whereas Lauren Berlant refers to this as ‘intimate citizenship’, Nick Rose refers to ‘governing the soul. See Berlant, 
L (2000) The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, Politics. In Transformations: Thinking through 
Feminism, ed. Sara Ahmed et al. London: Routledge, 33–48; Rose, N, (1989) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of  
the Private Self. London: Routledge
According to Skeggs, the move to personalising political expression and experience is linked to the rise in the ‘psy’ 
sciences, the phenomena of taking ‘expertise’ into practices of work, and vocabularies in popular culture, together 
with capitalist search for profit from new practices of consumption which results in new kinds of marketing such as 
‘emotional branding’. These are linked to neoliberal governance that encompasses contradictions relating to a 
collective-minded citizenry which contradictorily is at the same time made up of individualist consumers. Skeggs 
argues that these elements shape how gender and sexuality are evaluated, and how the individual is deemed worthy 
and valuable.
372 Skeggs' language implies an uncomfortable affiliation with enlightenment and humanist thinking, and therefore in 
some ways belies assumptions around some kind of essentialist 'self'. Her argument also imports unpleasant 
associations with commercialisation and commodification discourses. Yet, her thinking  is compelling if we look 
past these implications, and use her argument as a starting-point to reconnect the sexual 'identification' (as the 
affiliations people have with certain sexual practices, rather than a static 'identity') with materiality and experience. 
In other words, we should acknowledge that there is no essential 'self, but that people choose to identify themselves 
multiply by associating themselves with various categories (such as those of gender, class and sexual orientation). At 
the same time we should acknowledge the role of discourse in the construction of the human being. However, we 
should factor in the role of the material in how people ascribe value to their lives: people value themselves in 
relation to their environment and dominant discourses. This results in sexuality being a symbolic/metaphoric system, 
yet lodged in the material/physical.
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'self' becomes a metaphoric space where resources can be stored and displayed, and where a 
symbolic system of exchange grants value to specific practices and positions, and allows people to  
know how to use gender and sexuality. Or not. This symbolic system, Skeggs argues, is ‘ubiqitous 
across sites of inscription and representation, but is also contested”, for example through queer  
resignification373. Skeggs notes that “the embodiment of gender or sexuality can be a forced visible 
display or an inevitable essentialising”374. 
Skeggs calls on Bourdieu’s views of class as a starting-point, wherein he uses economic metaphors 
to assert that the kinds of capital (i.e. cultural, social, economic and symbolic) settle in the body,  
creating the dispositions he calls ‘habitus’. The ability to collect different kinds of capital allows 
bodies to move in social space with ease and a sense of value, or to be “fixed in positions and 
ascribed symptoms of pathology”375. Although Bourdieu’s construction is based on class, Skeggs 
argues that adding sexuality, gender, race and nationality to how it is made up calls attention to the  
disruptions rather than repetitions and habits376. She notes that there isn’t a clean sequence process 
between positions into which we are born and that we re-fabricate through experience. Instead, they 
remain uneasily aligned.
Access, use and display appear as personal dispositions rather than necessarily resulting from 
differentiation, classification and inscription, and become central in construction of public  
subjectivity377. Further, the resources in themselves do not reflect social value, but rather the uses to  
which they are put. 
She further notes that even though identity politics might be discredited, they are often the means 
by which people coalesce for the purposes of attaining public credibility, a process that relates to the  
373 Skeggs, B (2004) Uneasy Alignments, Resourcing Respectable Subjectivity. In  GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay 
Studies, 10(2): 291–8  at 292
374 Skeggs, ibid. She notes how heterosexual men call on their gendered positioning to gain advantage in the sexual 
division of labour, and to call on aspects of their femininity in order to resource themselves as ‘new managers’, 
seeming more friendly and caring. The use of femininity by women does not grant them the same benefits, since for 
women femininity is normative: they can’t be ‘enterprised up’ in the purported remaking of gender.
In similar ways people perform blackness while white, for example certain contemporary 'white' hip-hop artists. At 
the same time, essentialist constructions of blackness remain as markers in films such as Pulp Fiction, where Samuel 
L Jackson plays and ‘is’ black, and is therefore denied the use of the classification of blackness since he is 
positioned as black and is fixed thereby. 
375 Skeggs ibid pp292
376 Bourdieu, P (1987) What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups. In 
Berkeley Journal of Sociology (1987): 1–17. On habitus see Mauss, M (1979) Body Techniques. In 
Sociology and Psychology: Essays, trans. Ben Brewster, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 54–67; Merleau-
Ponty, J (1965) The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher. London: Methuen. See also feminist work on 
Bourdieu by Lovell, T(2000) Thinking Feminism with and against Bourdieu. In Feminist Theory 1 (2000): 11–32; 
Moi, T (1991) Appropriating Bourdieu: Feminist Thought and Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociology of Culture. In 
New Literary History 22 (1991): 1017–49.
377 Skeggs, B (2004) Uneasy Alignments, Resourcing Respectable Subjectivity. In  GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay 
Studies, 10(2): 291–8 at 292
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potential for public visibility. People want to be seen to have an identity that is valuable and 
respectable in public forum. For example, the current research participants self-identify as 'gay men'  
and collect on that basis to explore their individual 'fetish' interests. Calling on the classification of 
'men', they obtain privileged access to public forums. With this access, they state their claims as 
'gay' to address the marginalisation of sexual orientation378. Under certain circumstances, they also 
call on the classification of 'gay men' to stake their claims for equality in the face of both 
heteronormativity and the normative subcultures of mainstream gay life. They thereby navigate 
t h e i r m u l t i p l e l o c a t i o n s p r i v i l e g e ( m a l e , g a y ) , w h i l e s t i l l b e i n g  
marginalised379.
This kind of thinking appeals to queer politics inasmuch as queerness becomes more ‘respectably 
marginal’ (rather than mainstream) and therefore acceptable. Only those who can gain access to and 
use the appropriate resources can increase their visibility in public380.
378  See Skeggs, B (2004) Uneasy Alignments, Resourcing Respectable Subjectivity. In 
GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, 10(2): 291–8 at 295: “The responsibility of resourcing one’s gender, 
sexuality, class, and race “in the right way” is a responsibility of the neoliberal individual. This responsibility relies 
on access to the “right” cultural resources and is read on the body as a sign of value and/or pathology. It is how 
gender and sexuality are made and seen in the present.”
379 Whether and to what extent they are marginalised depends on the direction in which their activities and 
identifications are oriented. See arguments in chapter 6 re orientation
380 Using this kind of thinking allows for a re-evaluation of the positioning of ‘gayness’ as cultural marker and as a new 
class relation where alternative forms of exploitation are introduced. The branding of gayness as user-friendly in 
effect creates a new construct which lodges a kind of 'homonormativity', by which I mean the compulsory scripts of 
'gayness' acceptable in Western commercial gay subculture. These differ from place to place, and are more or less  
prescriptive depending on their broader social frameworks, but they broadly reference aspirational images of 
homosexuality made in advertising aimed at and about gay men (and to a lesser extent lesbians) pertaining to 
holidays, products, lifestyle products etc, as well as the assumptions relating to a 'gay bourgeoisie'. These scripts 
marginalise performances and people that are deemed unacceptable. As one participant notes:  
L: Do you feel excluded from the LGBT community as a result of your fetish interests? If so, how and why?
Donald: Yes.  The LGBT community in SA is very prejudiced amongst themselves.  I am myself – I cannot and 
will not stand any effeminate guy – they embarrass me.  There are certain groupings such as the “metro-men” 
who grooms and so on, then of course the “queens”, etc.  Groupings, including certain fetish groups, group 
together and it sometimes difficult for an outsider to get in and be accepted.... Yes we are forced to be in groups. 
“Others” in the gay community sometimes frown upon it.  I think some are afraid of burly leather men, haha.  I 
am athletically built, although I look a bit aggressive in my demeanour.  I am not aggressive though, yet I feel 
outside the mainstream LBGT community.
Joseph: Yes.  The first time SAleathermen participated in Pride, they wanted to put us #36 out of 37 (37 failed to 
show up for the orientation) and only back down when I questioned their decision, placing us at 28.  On the other  
hand, media partners have expressed support, partly perhaps because they hope for something of a freak show.  Is  
that fair?  On a personal level, it has affected some of my partner’s previous friendships because I was no longer  
“acceptable” in their circles.  It may not have just been my “outness” about leather/BDSM, but it certainly played  
a part.  And the worse part is the hypocrisy amongst those who call me up stoned for “pig sex” then ignore me 
publicly, or make up stories about outrageous encounters that they most likely are secretly aroused by.
In this respect what is a resource empowering one can fix, essentialise and pathologise another. Sexual fetish can be 
seen as the latter, and 'homonormative' gay male scripts as the former.
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2.3 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the social and political locations of 'gay male fetish sexuality', arguing 
that simplistically conceived gay rights discourses are inappropriate lenses through which to view  
political and social claims for validation. Such paradigms, which are often simplistically premised  
on essentialist views of identity as unitary and coherent, are perhaps (partially) useful when applied 
to political claims for access to rights denied to sexual minorities. They are, however, I suggest,  
inappropriate for cultural claims for recognition of value and for exclusion from policing.
I suggest that a more coherent framework for understanding complex arguments for social change,  
in this instance for recognition of unusual sexual practices, is that of queer theories, which conceive 
of identity as multiple and complex. In general, queer theories need to be mobilised pragmatically 
in concert with gay rights discourses, based on a re-assessment of potentially fatal flaws in the 
latter's liberalist foundations. I therefore suggest that 'gay male fetish sexuality' should, in particular, 
be approached by calling on complex, resource-based theories in concert with queer conceptions of 
'identification-based' location as a resource for recognising individual value.
Moving away from the fictions of static identities through to framing sexuality as a resource for 
recognising individual value acknowledges the queer complexity of political location for South 
African 'gay male fetish sexuality'. It is both an expression of the empowered, as an experience 
accessible to the privileged elite, and of the disempowered, as a pathologised practice of a disdained 
sexual minority who, as I will discuss in the Interjection, both support and challenge heteronorms.
As such the thesis approaches 'gay male fetish sexuality' neither exclusively in the mould of 
individualist, identity-bound, divisive 'gay rights' in search of equal political access to resources,  
nor exclusively as collectively-oriented 'queer identification' in search of cultural change. Rather,  
the thesis combines the two in a dialectical way, by positing a political citizen who is  
both an individual and part of a collective made up of mind, body and environment, all of which are  
in relation with each other and connected through embodied experience. Key to this conception of 
'relatedness' is the agency and responsibility of the individual to mobilise resources for the benefit  
of both him/herself and the world in which he/she lives. In this way it is not some essentialist  
'identity' which labels him/her as marginalised, nor his 'outsider' status which labels him/her as 
challenging and therefore valuable, but rather his/her choice to live consciously and in harmony 
with both his political and social world which marks him as beneficial citizen.
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By way of riding the fine line between the subversive radicalism of queer theory and the  
ameliorative reform necessarily involved in achieving change within contemporary identity-based 
political paradigms, this framework allows the thesis, as political tool, to enjoy a dialectical 
relationship with the lived reality of the research participants, whose political perspectives and aims 
it neither wholeheartedly represents nor denies. Politically the thesis doesn't claim to speak entirely 
on their behalf, but rather to acknowledge their varied and at times contradictory personal and  
political aims, while still following its own political agenda, which is to assist in theorising  
liberation and empowerment for unusual sexualities.
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CHAPTER 3
THE (FETISH) OBJECT OF MY AFFECTION: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND 
PSYCHIATRIC DISCOURSES ON 'FETISHISM'
“All human beings are fetishists to some degree. In Brazilian culture, buttocks are the object of national 
adoration, while in American culture, breasts are extremely valued. In China, small female feet are 
e x t r e m e l y s e x y. T h i s d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s e l e c t t h e i r o w n 
fetishes381.”
The idea of 'the fetish' and 'fetishism' come to us through an historical trajectory of colonialist,  
followed by Freudian psychoanalytic epistemologies which, I argue, prioritised the 'fetish' object as  
the definitional nexus for categorising 'fetishists'. That these frameworks are 'object-focused' might 
seem obvious and of no concern, since 'fetishism' is, after all, about objects and people's relations 
with them. It is obvious, yet problematic, since a single-minded object-focus tends discursively to 
obscure subjectivities and therefore to attenuate subjective agency382. 
In a value-laden way, I argue, such discursive frameworks inappropriately skew priorities in favour 
of foundationalisms, which attenuate the agency of people undergoing complex emotionally-driven 
lived experience383. Such frameworks hide the personal under the political, and the importance of 
embodiment under impermeable rules of psychology. They thereby fail to acknowledge a fluidity 
between consciousness and environment, mis-recognising the complexity of human emotional  
processes driven by a vast range of influences, both internal and external, personal and political,  
rational and emotional. In other words, they obscure the importance of bodily experience and  
subjectivities, thereby reducing the potential for valid agency. This is antithetical to more useful  
queer-based frameworks for theorising sexualities384.
This chapter looks more closely at the foundationalist discourses underlying 'fetish', discourses  
which developed through colonialist assumptions around culture and were brought into the modern 
era through Freudian psychoanalytic theory. I suggest that unpacking them reveals the seeds of the 
reconfigurations of metatheory for 'sexual fetish', which I explore in chapters 5 and 6.
381 Brame G, Brame W & Jacobs (1993). Different Loving. The World of Sexual Dominance & 
Submission. Villard Books: NY at 358.
382 The problems with psychopathology will be discussed more fully in chapter 4
383 See chapter 5 re non-foundationalist conceptions of the human subject, and chapter 6 re agency
384 See chapter 2
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3.1 Anthropological Discourses on the ‘Feitiço’: Encounters with 
(Perceived) Difference
“the genealogy of the fetish reflects a deep encounter with difference. People need to make links between 
themselves and others – economic and political, for the most part, and of course personal, while 
maintaining distinctions.”385
The 'fetish' can be seen as “the personification and ‘agent-ification’ of material objects, … thought  
to be possessed by spiritual, even supernatural forces, and command[ing] a unique reverence as a 
result of this magical attribution”386, which view I argue has informed both the historical and 
contemporary metatheoretical bases for the (sexual) relations between people and objects.
Early definitions of 'fetish' emerged from colonialist domination of West African people, based on 
the colonial desire for resources not available in Europe387, matched with stereotyped racialised and 
racist perceptions388. These early definitions reflect colonialist discourses which prioritised Western 
Christian paradigms and perpetuated contemporary dysfunctional discourses on power and the  
body, thereby ignoring indigenous paradigms389.
A closer reading of colonial discourses reveals that this simple object-focused idea of fetish was 
more complex. It came out of cross-cultural encounters imbricated with mutual misunderstanding,  
and through intersections between colonial religion and capitalism which sought to control 
individuals and their bodies. These linked in with complex and competing juxtapositions of colonial  
fetishism and reification discourses, which demonstrate the underlying colonial discomfort with its  
own discursive premises and its parallels with the colonised.
385  Alter, JS (2006) Yoga and fetishism: reflections on Marxist social theory. In Journal of the Royal Anthropological  
Institute (N.S.) 12, 763-783 Pp770-771
386 Pels, D, Hetherington, K & Vandenberghe, F (2002) The Status of the Object: Performances, Mediations, and 
Techniques. In Theory, Culture & Society, SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 19(5/6): 1–21, 
referencing Pietz, 1985, 1987, 1988
387 The colonial 'scramble for Africa' is about the commercial relations around natural resources such as land, 
agriculture, mining etc. It also about human resources obtained through racial segregation and slavery. In this regard, 
see Klein, M.A. (1998) Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa. New York and England: Cambridge 
University Press. See also Müller, Max. "Is Fetishism a Primitive Form of Religion?" 1878. Reprinted in 
The Essential Max Müller: On Language, Mythology, and Religion, edited by Jon R. Stone. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002;  Müller, Wilhelm Johann. Die Afrikanische auf der guineischen Gold Cust gelegene Landschafft  
Fetu. 1673. Translated and reprinted as "Müller's Description of the Fetu Country, 1662–9." In 
German Sources for West African History, 1599-1669, edited by Adam Jones, 134–259. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 1983.
388 See Bhabha, H. (1994) The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism. In 
The Location of Culture New York:  Routledge. 66-84, where Bhabha critiques colonial authorial integrity by calling 
attention to the anxiety underlying postures of mastery and certainty that underpin stereotype assertions.
389 For a background on categorisation, see Ellen, R.F. (1988, 2006) Fetishism: A Cognitive Approach. In 
The Categorical Impulse: essays in the anthropology of classifying behaviour. Oxford & NY:Berghahn 
Books166-189 at 166
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Through better understanding the complexity of colonialist conceptions of 'fetishism' we can 
understand the ways in which the 'object-focus' of early epistemologies on 'the fetish' manifested, 
and were transposed into later psychoanalytic conceptions of the notions. Through revealing the 
dialectical relations between coloniser and colonised through Foucaultian discursive readings of  
power and 'fetish', we can track back to the colonial failure to acknowledge the religio-cultural and 
personal frames of reference of both the colonisers and the colonised, which obscured the 
subjectivities of both, thereby denying real agency to both390.
These failures remained unexplored during the colonial era. Unfortunately, early psychoanalytic 
theory did not problematise the object-focus it inherited. Psychoanalytic theory therefore inscribed 
psychological frameworks for 'fetishism' with fictions of difference, which, like its colonial 
counterpart, it at the same time acknowledged and disavowed, perpetuating assumptions that people 
are essentially different to other people and to the objects around them. This fed into later 
psychological discourses on 'fetishism', and through to contemporary metatheory on the subject 
which, as I will argue, remains object-focused and problematic391.
Yet at the same time, I suggest, these failures grant insight into more functional metatheories for  
notions of  fetish as (sexual) relations between people and objects392.
3.1.1 The Genesis of the Term 'Fetish' as Cross-Cultural Encounter
The term 'fetish' finds its genesis in encounters between sixteenth-century Portuguese trader-sailors 
and West Africans393. This implies that the term is linked to colonialist labelling  
and expropriation discourses inappropriately demonising indigenous cultural practices. 
Pietz , who has exhaust ively interrogated anthropological ' fe t ish ' , notes that 
390 For a more in-depth look at late-colonial post-World War 1 approaches in colonial ethnography, See Wilder, G 
(2003) Colonial ethnology and political rationality in french west Africa. In History and Anthropology, 1477-2612, 
Volume 14, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 219 – 252. Wilder looks at the circular and mutually reinforcing relationship 
between professional anthropology and new technologies of administration. He reviews how the contradictory 
characterizations of African social relations by ethnologists and contradictory native policies were inherently related 
to one another, rather than merely influencing each another
391 See later in this chapter re Freudian fetish, and chapter 4 re psychopathologies
392 See chapters 5 and 6
393 Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish, I. In Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (Spring, 1985): 5-17; The Problem 
of the Fetish, II. In  Anthropology and Aesthetics 13 (Spring, 1987): 23-45. For a broad overview of the history of 
fetish as linked to the anthropology of religion, see Ellen, R.F. (1988, 2006) Fetishism: A Cognitive Approach. In 
The Categorical Impulse: essays in the anthropology of classifying behaviour. Oxford & NY:Berghahn 
Books166-189 at 167 et seq., where he argues that scholars like Charles De Brosses in the 18th century argued that 
religion, as a more highly evolved immaterial concept, came out of 'fetishism', which reflected a 'primitive' need for 
a tangible object to focus on, and only with further development could the 'savage' mind move to concepts of 
abstraction and animation. This was widely accepted until the mid-nineteenth century. Comte viewed 'fetish' as 
being the first in the evolution of religion from 'fetishism' to polytheism to monotheism. In this regard, see Comte, A 
(1856) Système de logique positive, ou traité de philosophie mathématique. In Oeuvres D'Auguste Comte. Vol.  
12. Paris
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'feitiço' is a corruption of a medieval term for witchcraft and/or a derivation of some un-enunciated 
African term394. It therefore refers to both a repudiated medieval past, and a spiritual investment in  
the material in ways the European explorers could not explain395.
As Pietz further notes, however, the word 'fetish' is not of African origin but is an import of the 
Portuguese traders396. Even though the word comes particularly from European discourses which 
therefore claim a sense of 'ownership' over that which they label, its referent is located elsewhere,  
a n d i t t h e r e f o r e t a k e s o n a p o s i t i o n i n - b e t w e e n c u l t u r e s a n d 
discourses397. Contrary to expectations and assumptions, he argues, the idea of 'fetish' therefore does 
not belong specifically to either African or European societies, but is based on “a cross-cultural 
situation formed by the ongoing encounter of the value codes of radically different social 
orders”398. As such, the history of 'the fetish' (and the notions underpinning it) is largely the history 
of the first encounters between the old world and the new, i.e. Europe and Africa/the Americas, and  
is related to the idea of cross-cultural encounters399. It is therefore deeply implicated with 
assumptions around inferiority, difference and 'otherness', and belies complex dialectical relations 
rather than mere domination by one group.
3.1.1a 'Fetishism' as Intersection between Colonial Religion and Capitalism
The 'feitiҫo' was laden with associations with the mysterious and the unknown, the exotic and the  
dangerous. In its original incarnation, it was as much about fictions of cultural superiority as about 
the colonial enterprise imposing its socio-economic value-systems onto the colonised, and the  
'fetish' could only come into being along with the birth of “commodity forms in relation to social  
values and religious ideologies of two different types of societies. Both differed strongly when they 
encountered each other in the contact zone”400 'Fetish' was about how the material world represented 
394 See Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish, I. In Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (Spring, 1985): 5-17; (1987) 
The Problem of the Fetish, II. In  Anthropology and Aesthetics 13 (Spring, 1987): 23-45. (1988) The Problem of the 
Fetish IIIa: Bosman's Guinea and the Enlightenment Theory of Fetishism. In Res 16 (autumn 1988): 105–123.
That we can locate the idea's etymological roots more or less specifically from the European perspective, yet not 
from its African origins itself indicates the historical priority of European thinking over the indigenous
395 Pietz, ibid
396 Pietz, ibid
397 Brisson, U (2005) Fish and Fetish: Mary Kingsley’s Studies of Fetish in West Africa. In 
Journal of Narrative Theory 35.3 (Fall 2005): 326–340. The 'in-between' position is one which references neither 
the Portuguese cultural norms, nor the African cosmological conceptions to which it purportedly refers. As such, it is 
a word without a clear referent, since the Portuguese appear to have judgmentally meant it to refer to what their 
cultural norms weren't, while the Africans implicitly wouldn't have used the idea at all, since it formed an integral 
part of their practices, not needing a definition and justification from the outside
398 Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish, I. In Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (Spring, 1985): 5-17; (1987) The 
Problem of the Fetish, II. In  Anthropology and Aesthetics 13 (Spring, 1987): 23-45. (1988) The Problem of the 
Fetish IIIa: Bosman's Guinea and the Enlightenment Theory of Fetishism. In Res 16 (autumn 1988): 105–123.
399 Pietz, ibid
400 Pietz, W (1985) ibid, quoted in Brisson, U (2005) Fish and Fetish: Mary Kingsley’s Studies of Fetish in West Africa 
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immaterial 'facts' to the colonisers, such as the supposedly 'God-given' right to colonial domination, 
and the rape in and theft of human and material wealth from the New World.
The colonisers labelled 'the fetish' as mysterious and dangerous because they couldn't understand 
the relationships to the material world which 'fetishes' represented to the colonised. The colonisers 
couldn't understand, for example, why Africans happily traded gold, which they respected highly, 
for jewellery and cheap beads. African senses of the value of commodities did not conform to the  
European capitalist frames of reference401, and the colonisers associated fetish with cultural 
arbitrariness, the primitive, irrationality and mystery concerning African relationships to materiality  
and economics402. To proscribe 'fetishism' was therefore to support the colonialist enslavement of  
Africa, both because its people were black and, more importantly, because Africa was not Christian 
or capitalist403. Indeed, "[a]s an irrational relation to objects, fetishism was not just an abomination  
i n t h e e y e s o f t h e L o r d ; i t w a s a l s o a d a m n e d n u i s a n c e t o m a r k e t 
activity"404. Pietz describes 'fetish' as a barrier to trade, and as "a perversion of natural processes of  
economic negotiation and legal contact. Desiring a clean economic transaction, seventeenth century 
merchants unhappily found themselves entering into social relations and quasi-religious ceremonies  
that should have been irrelevant to the conduct of trade"405. Fetishism was therefore a symbol that 
both related between and obscured socio-economic relationships in a display of both orientalism 
and méconnaissance406.
3.1.2 Colonialist Tropes of People and Things: Dialectics of Power
However, colonial 'fetish' discourses run deeper than simple colonial domination for material gain,  
or the head-scratching incomprehension of Europeans in the face of perceived difference. Böhme’s 
(2005)  Journal of Narrative Theory 35.3 (Fall 2005): 326–340
401 Pietz, ibid
402 See Pietz ibid and Winokur, M (2004) Technologies of Race: Special Effects, Fetish, Film, and the Fifteenth 
Century, in Genders Online Journal, Issue 40 . One such example is the ways in which the early European traders in 
Africa could not understand how Africans could so easily part with their gold in return for cheap beads and 
jewellery, even though the Africans held gold in high esteem. These traders expected the Africans to automatically 
have the same proto-capitalist views on the gold as being valuable in itself, whereas it appears that Africans looked 
beyond the commercial value of gold to what it could and did represent from a religious and social perspective  in 
the objects they made from it. As a result of the misunderstanding about what gold (and other artifacts) represented 
in indigenous cultures, the traders and colonisers outlawed the use of material objects in indigenous cultural 
ceremonies, since the colonisers viewed these as representations of non-christian deities, and forbad idol-worship.
403 Acknowledgements to Winokur, M, ibid
404 Foster, H (1992) "The Art of Fetishism", in Fetish, Princeton Architecture Journal, p8
405 Apter, E (1993) ‘Fetishism and Materialism’, in Emily Apter and William Pietz, (eds), Fetishism as Cultural 
Discourse, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp 22-23
406 See Said, EW (1978) Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient Pantheon; Lacan, J (1951) Some Reflections 
on the Ego. In Int. J. Psycho-Anal., vol. 34, 1953 p. 12; Lacan, J. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 
1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p.167; Lacan, J. 
(1966) Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p.165
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unsure stance on whether 'fetishism' signifies “the spoken utterance or the speaker; the described 
object or the describing subject” demonstrates that 'fetish' serves at the same time to exclude it from  
consciousness, or at least force it to remain peripheral to discourse in any real 
sense.407 Such exclusion or relegation to the periphery implies discursive parallels between the  
world-views of the colonised 'fetishists' and of the colonisers as to the nature and function of the 
'fetish object' and the power dynamics of colonial relationships inter se.
3.1.2a) Discourses of 'Fetishism' and 'Reification'
From a contemporary vantage-point, discourses of 'fetishism' did not necessarily imply either a top-
down colonial domination of the colonised by the coloniser408. Nor do they imply simple 
constructions of people and objects. As Brisson notes, a closer look at 'fetish' tells us more about the  
(dialectical) nature of cultural encounters409, through a “three-sided interplay between materiality, 
i m m a t e r i a l i t y , a n d s o c i a l i t y ” i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e l i f e o f t h e 
object.410
Colonisers worshipped an immaterial God and defined their lives in terms of material wealth which 
they felt justified in taking from the material world (and from the colonised). They relied on two 
assumptions: that spiritual wealth could not be attained in the material world (Christian heaven was  
only attainable after death); and that they were entitled to claim the resources in the colonies 
(through fictions of 'racial' superiority), which resources, they claimed, could not encompass 
spiritual wealth. They thereby prioritised the immaterial over the material and called on discourses  
of 'fetishism' to target “the illegitimate confusion between things and non-things” through colonial  
suppression of witchcraft and the proscriptions against idol-worship411.
However, these discourses nonetheless reflected their own reification discourses which both 
a c k n o w l e d g e d a n d d i s a v o w e d a s a m e n e s s o f t h e c o l o n i s e r a n d t h e 
colonised412. Notwithstanding the colonial proscriptions against 'fetishism', European religion, 
desires for wealth and reverence for the material were themselves reified, in that 
their social interactions, ways of going about things, performances and ideas were inappropriately  
407 Böhme, H. (2001) Das Fetischismus-Konzept von Marx und sein Kontext. In Gerhardt, V (ed)(2001) 
Marxismus: Versuch einer Bilanz. Magdeburg: Scriptum-Verlag. 289–319. 30 August 2004 <http://
www.culture.huberlin.de/HB/volltexte/texte/fetisch.html>. Quoted in Brisson, U (2005) Fish and Fetish: Mary 
Kingsley’s Studies of Fetish in West Africa. In Journal of Narrative Theory 35.3 (Fall 2005): 326–340
408 Brisson, ibid
409 Brisson, ibid
410 Pels, D, Hetherington, K & Vandenberghe, F (2002) The Status of the Object: Performances, Mediations, and 
Techniques. In Theory, Culture & Society, SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 19(5/6): 1–21
411 Pels et al ibid
412 See later re Freudian conceptions of disavowal fropm which these notions evolved
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imposed onto impersonal, non-human objects413. Pels et al argue that this reification is analogous to 
the necessary reversal involved in religious consciousness, which has made ‘the productions of the 
human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life “which entered into relations both 
with one another and with their human producers.”'414
Through this blind spot in correlations between reification and fetishism, the colonisers failed, or  
refused, to see the parallels between their own world views and those of the colonised, whereby 
b o t h v i e w e d s p i r i t u a l c o n n e c t i o n a s m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h t h e m a t e r i a l 
world415. Through antagonistically focusing on the 'fetishes' of the colonised as 'inappropriately' 
revered objects, colonisers avoided acknowledging their own discursive practices, and the 
ontological connections between coloniser and colonised. The protestations of colonial discourses 
against the similarities between coloniser and colonised in some ways  therefore recognised that the  
two supposedly separate groups were similar. By protesting against similarity, the colonialist 
discourses supported that similarity through discursively perpetuating dualism.
They failed to recognise that both the colonisers and the colonised inscribed discourses on 'fetish', 
religion, economics and colonial power with new meanings, through negotiation and borrowing 
f r o m e a c h o t h e r , i n p o l i t i c a l l y a n d s o c i a l l y p a r a d o x i c a l a n d c o m p l e x 
ways416. Indeed, political relations were complex and dialectical, rather than being a simple  
enforcement of colonial belief systems onto an unwilling populace417. For example, colonised 
subjects incorporated Christian ideals into traditional practices for their own 
purposes418, i n w ays comparab l e , I s ugges t , t o Lee concep t ions o f t a c t i c a l 
413 Pels et al ibid
414 referring to Marx, K (1977 [1867]) Capital. Vol.1. Moscow: Progress Publishers. At 77, and speaking of modern 
conceptions of the commodity fetish, described as a ‘sensuous supersensuous thing’, which approximates singularity 
and autonomy, but at the same time concealing itself in social construction and definition in an almost naturalistic 
way.
415 Pels, D, Hetherington, K & Vandenberghe, F (2002) The Status of the Object: Performances, Mediations, and 
Techniques. In Theory, Culture & Society, SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 19(5/6): 1–21. Pels 
et al note that both the personification of things and the reification of persons were conceptually embedded in 
concepts of material production, “while the reification of cultural and political forms was seen as a secondary result 
of this primordial alienation.”
416 See Cinnamon, JM (2002) ”Ambivalent Power: Anti-Sorcery and Occult Subjugation in Late Colonial Gabon” in 
Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 3:3 at 2. This negotiation, patently skewed in favour of the colonisers, 
enabled, “an anti-sorcery movement intimately concerned with culturally embedded understandings of power 
[which] paradoxically served to reinforce colonial power.”
417 Cinnamon, ibid. One such example is the complexity of traditional witchcraft, sorcery and power practices in the 
face of Christian conversion of indigenous communities, as Cinnamon discusses referring to ‘anti-sorcery and occult 
subjugation’ in late colonial Gabon
418 Cinnamon, JM (2002) ”Ambivalent Power: Anti-Sorcery and Occult Subjugation in Late Colonial Gabon” in 
Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 3:3 at 18. Records detail how Emane Boncoeur rephrased cultural 
understandings of fetish in his time by removing ‘evil fetishes’ from villages in his area, causing fetishists to 
“recognize their fault and mend their ways.” In this way he furthered his own personal/political/social needs and 
desires, which may or may not have been linked with trying to impress the colonial powers, or trying to garner 
political and/or social support
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citizenship419. In this way, instead of 'fetish' merely appearing to be 'bad' to the colonisers and 'good' 
to the colonised, both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 'fetishes' were clearly part of the cultural landscape on both  
sides of the colonial divide, and a variety of complex and often incongruent views on the value and  
meaning of fetish co-existed and competed420.
These amalgamated and dialectical discursive formulations deny any fictions of homogeneity in the  
colonialist Western dualist framework of humanity, personification, the supernatural and magic,  
which may s imply have been inc red ib le in t r ad i t iona l non-Weste rn soc ia l 
structures421. They also deny any fictions of singularity or coherency in the construction of the term 
'fetish' in its colonial context, and therefore attenuate such meanings subsequently adopted in later 
psychical contexts422.
3.1.2b) (Assumed) Material Differences between Colonial Bodies
Colonial discourses assumed that colonial and indigenous societies were essentially different, and 
they demonised 'fetishism' in an attempt to call attention to those differences. In so doing, they  
See also Stoller, P (1995) Embodying Colonial Memories: Spirit Possession, Power, and the Hauka in West Africa.  
New York: Routledge. Stoller looks at the West African Hauka, which are spirits in the body of (human) mediums 
that mimic and mock colonial Europeans, combining narrative description, historical analysis, and reflections on the 
importance of embodiment and mimesis to social theory. He considers the cultural sentience of the body, the 
dynamics of colonial resistance movements, and the political discourses of West African postcolonies, arguing that 
mimicry is about the diversion of European power.
419 Lee, C.T (2006) Tactical Citizenship: Domestic Workers, the Remainders of Home, and Undocumented Citizen 
Participation in the Third Space of Mimicry. In Theory and Event (2006) 9:3 
Albeit speaking of contemporary undocumented workers rather than of historical colonised peoples or sexual 
fetishists,  Lee identifies four conventional theoretical citizenship constructions as "proper ways of participating as 
citizens", which render difficult conceptions of alternative means and forms of citizen participation: 1. the in-or-out 
dichotomy of citizenship; 2. civility and law-abidingness; 3. politics as the supreme activity of citizenship (and its 
simultaneously "public" and "collective" character); and 4. system-subject correspondence.
He calls on Homi Bhabha, Michel de Certeau, James Scott, and Robin Kelley to frame an imaginary of alternative 
citizenship in which these four features are shifted to become ‘tactical citizenship’ by each of them corresponding, 
being translated and re-narrated by undocumented subjects into four "other ways of participating as citizens": 
1. the "neither/nor" and "both/and also" of the third space of mimicry; 2. calculated conformity; 3. hidden 
transcripts, and 4. the Greek notion of metis (i.e.tricks and cunning intelligence)- alternatively understood as Levi-
Strauss’ idea of bricolage. 
420 Incidentally, such beliefs in witchcraft still subsist in contemporary Central Africa and are prosecuted through the 
penal code of the Central African Republic. See Special Assignment, Tuesday 21 July  2009, broadcast on SABC 3. 
The program indicated that such accusations are often motivated by petty squabbles and personal priorities by 
members of the community. See also Miguel, E (2005) Poverty and Witch Killing. In 
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 1153-1172.  Miguel argues that poverty is a key 
underlying cause of the murders of elderly women as “witches” in rural Tanzania. He also makes correlations 
between the decrease in the number of accusations of witchcraft in Limpopo province in South Africa and the 
institution of a social grant for the elderly.
421 Pels, D, Hetherington, K & Vandenberghe, F (2002) The Status of the Object: Performances, Mediations, and 
Techniques. In Theory, Culture & Society, SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 19(5/6): 1–21, 
referencing Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish, I. In Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (Spring, 1985): 5-17; 
(1987) The Problem of the Fetish, II. In  Anthropology and Aesthetics 13 (Spring, 1987): 23-45. (1988) The Problem 
of the Fetish IIIa: Bosman's Guinea and the Enlightenment Theory of Fetishism. In 
Res 16 (autumn 1988): 105–123.
422 See argument later in this chapter re psychodynamics
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called on 'fetishism' to distinguish the colonisers from the colonised in both form and substance. 
The colonial enterprise was at pains to separate people, justifying institutionalised colonial  
domination through fictions of essentialist, racial superiority, and through assumptions that the 
bodies and minds of the colonised were fundamentally and essentially different to those of the 
colonisers. This resulted in the objectification and negation of specific ('colonised, othered') bodies 
by the colonising imagination, and fed fictions of distinct and discrete 'types' of bodies and cultures.  
These categories were largely defined in terms of the 'racial otherness', which partly relied on 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n ( A f r i c a n ) ' f e t i s h i s m ' a n d ( E u r o p e a n ) ' n o n -
fetishism'423. This essentialist view in turn perpetuated the colonisers' wilful ignorance and divisive  
obscuring of the world-views and subjectivities of the colonised in other areas.
Yet colonia l soc ia l interac t ions were dynamic , and the colonis ing cul tures 
were  influenced by the colonised, (and vice versa). Bernault agrees with analyses that tend to  
explain the interest in the body in terms of the destructive integration of Africa in the global 
economy, together with the commodification of the body424. However she argues that Western 
secular views on materiality, power, and the human body have not been consistent. From the 
eighteenth century, secular views had changed the body from the subject of religious discourses to  
an object of medical attention; an organic, technical machine. At the same time as these discourses  
disallowed the physical body from exerting power, they continued to use them as key political 
ammunition425.
The colonial enterprise concealed gaps between the assumptions of Western conceptions of the 
body’s materiality and the immateriality of public power, perhaps in contradistinction to indigenous  
conceptions of materiality426.  Dominant colonising tropes of the body insisted that the body was 
only a 'sign', i.e. that although material, the body merely signals but does not hold 
power427. This power was itself colonially conceived as an immaterial fact only to be held by the 
423 See argument supra on reification discourses
424 Bernault, F (2006) Body, Power and Sacrifice in Equatorial Africa. In Journal of African History, 47, Cambridge 
University Press pp. 207–239
425 Bernault, ibid at p228-229 referencing Bourdieu, (1979) La Distinction, critique sociale du jugement.  
Paris: Minuit. This translated, she argues, into modern bureaucratic states’ strategies of regulating citizens, and 
targeting individuals’ bodies as resources for producing and inscribing public power. Referencing Bourdieu, she 
notes that constructing people’s bodies as social identity markers, and masking this process in naturalised or inherent 
physical traits, indicates how modern Western visions have not make clear distinctions between the materiality of 
the body and the social meanings it symbolised or displayed.
426 Although it is now difficult to identify what those conceptions may have been, since the colonised voice was 
effectively silenced, and since colonialist discourses obscured the differences in world-view between locals from 
different places, incorrectly assuming that 'all Africans are alike'.
427 Bernault, ibid at p228-229 referencing Bourdieu, (1979) La Distinction, critique sociale du jugement.  
Paris: Minuit.
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colonisers, divinely ordained and/or supported by ideas of superiority fed by (mis-)readings of 
evolutionary theory. The colonised, in contradistinction, reflected a materiality in and through their 
bodies while at the same time holding the body to be ‘sacred’428.
The colonisers assumed both that body and spirit were separate, and that 'white' and 'black' bodies 
were essentially different429. The colonisers assumed that the colonised were ineluctably ‘primitive’, 
and justified 'white' colonial presence through fictions of its educative and 'civilising' role. They 
therefore assumed that they had an automatic ‘right of domination’, and that the 'white' body was  
t h e s i g n o f s o c i a l f o r c e s s u c h a s m i l i t a r y , t e c h n i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c 
superiority430. The 'white' body was seen as larger than itself, rather than as merely the embodiment 
of the colonizers’ material rule.431 
By implying a direct engagement with the material nature of power, however, equatorial 'fetishism'  
threatened to disclose internal contradictions between claims of the colonisers’ superiority and 
indigenous inferiority, and threatened to allow uncomfortable parallels between the philosophies of 
the colonised and the coloniser. In other words, through 'fetishism', whereby sacred power was held 
in material bodies and objects, the colonised appeared to turn to material objects to gain and  
manipulate power in similar ways to the colonisers432.
In order to support the fictive 'right' to domination, the colonisers also turned to the fictions of  
'difference' between their own 'white' bodies and the 'black' bodies of the colonised, and to the 
material objects of military, technical and economic technology which they claimed the colonised 
were unable to develop themselves. Through this dual layer of thinking the colonisers constructed  
fictions of African bodies as being 'fetish objects' in themselves, while purportedly 'non-fetishised' 
European bodies were used as tools of domination433.
Clearly, therefore, 'fetishism' was used to mask relations between the body and meaning which both 
Europeans and Africans shared. By the 1880’s, both Europeans and Africans were calling on the  
body as a kind of 'fetish', whereby power could be established and maintained by manipulating 
sacred power held in material bodies434. Both fought to establish coherent ideas about the location, 
mobilization and representation of power, and about how to enforce authority by means of physical 
428 Bernault, F ibid
429 Bernault, F ibid
430 Bernault, F ibid
431 Bernault, F ibid
432 Bernault, F ibid
433 Bernault, F ibid
434 Bernault, F ibid
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violence. It was primarily the colonisers' refusal to recognize this similarity which prevented any 
conscious or acknowledged points of commonality435.
3.1.3 Dialectics, not Domination
As I have suggested, colonialist discourses assumed that the immaterial took priority over the  
material. This favoured antagonistic and oppositional views of relationships between people, and 
obscured the substantive and political similarities between colonisers and colonised, thereby 
ignoring the dialectical nature of relationships. The denial of colonial subjectivities through reliance 
on discourses on 'fetishism' obscured points of connection and similarities between the colonisers 
and the colonised. Essentialist constructions both of 'fetishism' and of the difference between 
colonial and indigenous bodies allowed colonisers to avoid recognising their own subjection and 
subservience to fictions of the immaterial over the material, thereby obscuring the subjectivities of  
both the colonised and the colonisers, and mis-recognising the dialectical role of agency in social 
interaction.
Simply put, from its genesis 'fetishism' has been an unstable concept, subject to shifts and changes 
depending on the prevailing exigencies of political power and on consensus ontologies of the 
constitution of people. This is notable, and runs contrary to contemporary classifications which 
lodge it as some kind of determinist 'truth', capable of being classified, for example through the ICD 
classifications436.
More complex readings of colonial relations reveal that the colonialist discursive proscriptions of  
'fetishism' (which were defined by reference to the material objects of interest) were underpinned by 
assumptions that the use of material 'fetish' objects inherently challenged the immateriality of both  
colonial power and the colonial God, and in turn that the objects were epistemologically more  
important than the subjectivities of those who incorporated them into their lives. 
435 Bernault, F ibid. Yet both Africans and Europeans engaged in a progressive “re-enchanting of the human body” 
during the colonial era (Bernault, F ibid at p228). Conceptions of the body in Central Africa were key to crafting and 
reproducing power. These conceptions were disrupted by colonialism, which based assumptions of colonisers' 
superiority on fictions that power and the body are disconnected. The colonial enterprise nevertheless laid bare 
important contradictions in Western assumptions around materiality and the body. Both political and moral 
transgressions were set in motion by colonisation, on the part of both colonisers and colonised. The Europeans 
themselves saw political survival as a ‘positive exchange’ intimately connected to the ‘body-fetish’. Questioning the 
historical colonial tendencies to mark boundaries between Western and African imaginaries, Bernault argues that  
both coloniser and colonised bodies became ‘re-sacralised’ as political resources. 'Resacralised' implies that that the 
body had in some ways lost its function as a sacred space through the colonial imposition of Cartesian thinking 
around corporeality. However, Bernault argues that the similarities in world-view between the colonisers and 
colonised resulted in the body to regain a sense of the sacred.
436 See chapter 4
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However, contrary to suppositions and on closer inspection, colonialism was not about a 
mere top-down domination of colonial subjects by colonisers, or the priority of humans over 
material objects. Rather, it was made up through dialectical relations between coloniser and  
colonised whereby both called on mind and body (as well as the material world) as political 
resources. This implies that both colonisers and colonised used both the body and the material 
world in dialectical, rather than hierarchical ways, and that people, the material world and 
discursive power were not ontologically separate437.
This more complex understanding of the mutable relations between the material, immateriality and 
power gives some insight into how we can view contemporary 'fetish sexuality', by recognising the  
relationships between discourse, materiality and the body in contemporary metatheories on 
'fetishism', rather than by simply re-applying determinist assumptions that some people (for  
example the 'mentally well') are inherently more 'viable' than those who are constructed in 
foundationalist ways ('fetishists')438.
This complexity, in turn, implies that individual agency was being employed by both the colonisers 
and the colonised in order to navigate their relationships inter se. This further lends some insight 
into how we can see contemporary fetish sexuality as entailing, rather than denying 
agency439. In turn, this implies that (sexual) relations with material objects do not inherently mean 
an ontological primacy of humans, qua putatively immaterial beings, over each other or the material  
world. Nor does it imply that subjects are normatively pathologisable through an epistemological 
focus on the material objects they use to give meaning to their lives440.
Through colonial force and domination, the colonial enterprise nevertheless refused the role of 
materiality in human life, and to acknowledge this agency. Despite the clearer conception we now  
have of how the 'feitiço' interacted with discourses in colonial times through reification of power 
and the body, object-focused and essentialist/determinist assumptions around both 'fetishism' and 
the constitution of humans flowed unquestioned into late colonial constructions. The human subject 
continued to be seen as separate from other human subjects, and from the world and its constituent 
objects, foundationalist frameworks which were perpetuated into the modern era, in particular into  
the psychoanalytic discourses around fetish sexuality.
437 See Chapter 5
438 See Chapter 5 re the constitution of the subject
439 See chapter 6 re agency and the functions and workings of fetish sexuality
440 See below and chapter 4 re normative concerns.
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3.2 Psychoanalytic 'Fetish': the Conflation of Presence and Absence
Fetishism used to be a question of gods. … Now fetishism seems to be a question of the gods’ 
disappearance, in more than one sense a crisis of faith. The fetishism commemorates the crisis,  
marking the space of this disappearance. Fetishism is no longer seen as the immediate presence of an  
embodied force, but is rather fetishism de la chose perdu [of the lost thing], a nostalgia for lost 
essence and significant relations, and a displacement of this fetishized essence onto an object-
screen.441
Like their colonialist counterparts, late nineteenth-century sexologists, in particular Binet and  
Krafft-Ebing, adopted inherently object-focused discursive constructions of the 
'feitiço'442. Freud followed suit in theorising psychodynamic frameworks443, which form the basis for 
contemporary psychoanalytic discourses around 'fetishism'444. 
This fundamental 'object-focus' is clearly visible, I suggest, in two areas:
Freudian psychoanalytic constructions of the psyche are framed in patriarchal, 
heteronormative terms, which perpetuate the assumption of the male as dominant subject, and 
the human sexual partner as passive (female) 'object'445. This in turn frames the sexual subject 
441 Gemerchak, CM (2004) Preface, in Christopher Gemerchak (ed), Everyday Extraordinary: Encountering  
Fetishism with Marx, Freud and Lacan, p. 7.
442 See Nye, RA (1991) The History of Sexuality in Context: National Sexological Traditions. In 
Science in Context (1991), 4:387-406 Cambridge University Press. He argues that sexology developed historically 
differently in France than elsewhere in Europe, and that even though the modern idea of “sexuality” came about in 
the last half of the nineteenth century, the older idea of ”sex” persisted in French science and medicine for longer 
through fear of the threat of non-reproductive sexual behaviour deepening the local population crisis. He argues that 
scientific and medical concepts of the sexual 'perversions', especially homosexuality, were seen by French 
sexologists as abnormal deviations from heterosexuality. On the other hand, certain English, German, and Austrian 
sexologists, including Freud, were more tolerant of the 'perversions' as natural variations of the norm. He approaches 
the inadequacies of historical developmental accounts favouring Foucaultian discursive ruptures, rather stressing 
social and causal historical explanations. See also Money, J. (2003) History, causality, and sexology. In 
The Journal of Sex Research. Vol. 40, 2003; Béjin, A and Giami, A (2007) Une histoire de la sexologie française / A 
history of French sexology. In Sexologies Volume 16, Issue 3, July-September 2007, pp 170; 
443 See Armstrong, R.H (2005) A Compulsion for Antiquity: Freud and the Ancient World. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. Armstrong argues that we should not forget Freud's construction of human psychology in relation to antiquity, 
so as to remember the cultural continuity between antiquity and modernity. 
See Hoad, N.W. (1998) Wild(e) Men and Savages: the Homosexual and the Primitive in Darwin, Wilde and  
Freud. PhD Thesis. Columbia University. Hoad argues compellingly that late nineteenth century notions of male 
'homosexuality' should be located in the context of racial difference and white European imperial expansion. More 
particularly, he argues that Freud relies on Darwin's arguments around ontogenetic development as linking into 
phylogenetic primitiveness to locate theories of psycho-sexual development, allowing Freud to conceive of 
homosexuality as arrested development.
444 See note supra: Nye, RA (1991) The History of Sexuality in Context: National Sexological Traditions. In 
Science in Context (1991), 4:387-406 Cambridge University Press; Money, J. (2003) History, causality, and 
sexology. In The Journal of Sex Research. Vol. 40, 2003; Béjin, A and Giami, A (2007) Une histoire de la sexologie 
française / A history of French sexology. In Sexologies Volume 16, Issue 3, July-September 2007, pp 170; 
445 In stating this I nevertheless acknowledge that some feminist responses to this kind of critique argue that, even 
though Freud’s theories reflect patriarchy and his own sexism, they serve to provide understanding for the psychical 
reproduction of patriarchy. However, As I argue in chapters 3 and 4, these arguments have largely not been taken  
into account in contemporary thinking about and metatheoretical underpinnings for fetish sexuality
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hierarchically in implicitly power- and object-focused terms, whether to human or 'fetish'  
object; and
Freudian fetishism is constructed as the (inappropriate) adult response to castration anxiety,  
which serves to narrow/eliminate the gap between 'pathological' and 'non-pathological' 
categories of 'fetishism', through relying on normative standards.
As I will argue, these concerns can superficially be addressed by re-reading Freud's reliance on 
unequal gender-role power relations, and by referencing 'fetishism' through poststructuralist theories 
which explain society in terms of discursive construction and power. However, such scholarly 
sleights-of-hand do not address the fundamental concern that both Freudian and poststructuralist 
psychoanalytic theory are inherently based on 'lack', whether conceived through the absence of an 
essentialist and material object (Freudianism) or through the absence of a foundationalist 
discursively-described symbol (post-structuralist psychoanalytic theory such as Lacan). 
These concerns cannot, I suggest, be adequately addressed through existing psychodynamic 
theories, which attenuate the role of the subject (and his/her constitution as an embodied being), and  
therefore the role of agency. Psychodynamic assumptions therefore remain unstable and 
inappropriate as metatheoretical bases for contemporary thinking on 'fetish' sexuality, which, as will 
be more fully discussed in chapter 4, serves to obscure subjectivities, and reduce the scope for 
validated agency. This is of particular concern for non-normative (or partially-
normative446) individuals exploring unusual sexual practices, such as 'gay male sexual fetishists'.
3.2a) The 'Perversions'
Nineteenth-century sexologists such as Binet found the concept of 'fetishism' in Rousseau, Darwin 
a n d t h e e t h n o g r a p h y o f t h e t i m e , a n d t r a n s l a t e d i t i n t o t h e s e x u a l  
sphere447. Von Krafft-Ebing in particular engaged in the debate through classifying perversions in 
446 See the Interjection
447 For a compelling insight into the connecting points between colonial and psychoanalytic fetish, see Cheng, A.A. 
(2006). Josephine Baker: Psychoanalysis and the Colonial Fetish. In Psychoanalytic Quarterly., 75:95-129, where 
a path is tracked connecting racial fantasy, aesthetic judgement and the cultural concern of 
intersubjective recognition. Cheng looks at sexual and racial fetishism in an historical colonial context, thereby 
unpacking disturbances around the racial fetish. As Cheng notes, “there are both structural and functional 
justifications for thinking about racial stereotypes as specifically a form of fetishism. [T]here are nonetheless several 
unresolved remainders left by this equation”
See also Bauer, H (2003) “Not a translation but a mutilation”: The Limits of Translation and the Discipline of 
Sexology. In The Yale Journal of Criticism, vol 16, no2 (2003): 381-405. Bauer notes that translations from the 
original German into English of Krafft-Ebing's work served to obscure the original meaning, and bought into 
dominant homophobic British Imperialist norms, subtly losing the belief that homosexuality was a 'normal' variation 
of human sexuality like variations in eye colour. Bauer also explores similar concerns relating to the work of 
Magnus Hirschfeld and Karl Heinrich Ulrichs.
101
 
 
 
 
Psychopathia Sexualis448.
Freud's classification, picked up from Krafft-Ebing in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,  
h a s b e c o m e d i s c u r s i v e l y c e n t r a l , b e i n g w i d e l y u s e d a n d f o u n d i n m a n y 
dictionaries449. For Freud, 'perversions' are improper sexual activities that either 
extend, in an anatomical sense beyond the regions of the body that are designed for sexual 
union, or 
linger over the intermediate relations to the sexual object which should normally be 
traversed rapidly on the path towards the final sexual aim.450
The classification relates to two distinct categories:
perversions relating to objects, where the subject finds pleasure in partners not conforming 
to (hetero)norms, including homosexual partners, animals, children, non-consenting persons,  
dead bodies and substituted objects; 
perversions of aim, in which pleasure is gained exclusively through activities that are 
ordinarily secondary or less important in sexual relations, such as looking, touching and  
stimulating451.
448 Krafft Ebing R. (1895) Psychopathia Sexualis. 8” edition. Paris: G. Carre. See Ellen, R.F. (1988, 2006) Fetishism: A 
Cognitive Approach. In The Categorical Impulse: essays in the anthropology of classifying behaviour.  
Oxford & NY:Berghahn Books166-189; Nye, RA (1991) The History of Sexuality in Context: National Sexological 
Traditions. In Science in Context (1991), 4:387-406 Cambridge University Press. He argues that sexology developed 
historically differently in France than elsewhere in Europe, and that even though the modern idea of “sexuality” 
came about in the last half of the nineteenth century, the older idea of ”sex” persisted in French science and 
medicine for longer through fear of the threat of non reproductive sexual behaviour deepening the local population 
crisis. He argues that scientific and medical concepts of the sexual perversions, especially homosexuality, were seen 
by French sexologists as abnormal deviations from heterosexuality. On the other hand, certain English, German, and 
Austrian sexologists, including Freud, were more tolerant of the perversions as natural variations of the norm. He 
approaches the inadequacies of historical developmental accounts favouring Foucaultian discursive ruptures, rather 
stressing social and causal historical explanations. See also Money, J. (2003) History, causality, and sexology. In The 
Journal of Sex Research. Vol. 40, 2003; Béjin, A and Giami, A (2007) Une histoire de la sexologie française / A 
history of French sexology. In Sexologies Volume 16, Issue 3, July-September 2007, pp 170; See also Bonnet, G 
(2002) Pour une nouvelle classification des perversions sexuelles, Evol Psychiatr 2002 ; 67 : 496-505, 
in the exploration of the insufficiencies of traditional classifications of sexual perversion.
449 Freud, S. [1905](1977) On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other  
Works. Trans. And ed. James Strachey. Comp. and ed. Angela Richards. The Penguin Freud Library Volume 7. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. See Bonnet, G (2002) Pour une nouvelle classification des perversions sexuelles. In 
Evolutionary Psychiatry 2002 ; 67 : 496-505. See also Apter, E (1991) Feminizing the Fetish: Psychoanalysis and 
Narrative Obsession in Turn-of-the-Century France. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press; Apter, E and Pietz, W, 
(eds) (1993) Fetishism as Cultural Discourse. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press esp: Nye, RA. (1993) The 
Medical Origins of Sexual Fetishism. In Fetishism as Cultural Discourse, edited by Emily Apter and William Pietz. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press
450 Freud, S. [1905](1977) On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works. Trans. And ed. 
James Strachey. Comp. and ed. Angela Richards. The Penguin Freud Library Volume 7. Harmondsworth: Penguin
451 Bonnet, G (2002) Pour une nouvelle classification des perversions sexuelles. In Evolutionary Psychiatry 2002 ; 67 : 
496-505 pp497. Bonnet notes that these kinds of distinctions are used increasingly infrequently 
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3.2.1 Object-Focused Freud
I can only repeat over and over again – for I never find it otherwise – that sexuality is the key to the  
problem of the psychoneuroses and of the neuroses in general. No one who disdains the key will ever 
be able to unlock the door.452
I suggest that Freud adopted a singular object-focus for his construction of 'fetish', which implies 
“subjection of the human body . . . to the influence of certain significant material objects that,  
although cut off from the body, function as its controlling organs at certain 
moments”453. Early views of the idea of 'the fetish' often constructed it as a fabricated item worn on  
the body, which, although not part of the body, effectively becomes part of it and takes control of it.  
Pietz' argues that this understanding has continued to relate in subsequent formulations of 'the 
fetish', noting that psychoanalysis “develop[s] most fully this theme of the effective symbolization 
o f t h e s e x u a l h u m a n b o d y a s ‘ f i x a t e d ’ i n r e l a t i o n t o c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l  
things”454.
Whereas the colonial 'fetish' is focused on the proscribed the devotional 'fetish object', Freudian  
psychoanalytic 'fetishism' is based on notions of disavowal455, the absence of a 
penis/phallus456, and the Oedipal Complex457. Yet, I suggest, both are based on an antagonistic 
lately. When used, however, the classification usually refers to genital sexuality, where perversion is seen as an 
inversion or an aberration related to pleasure-seeking norms, whether through object or aim 
However, whether this means statistical or moral norms is not generally clarified.
452 Freud (1905) Dora
453 Davidson, G (2007) Ornamental Identity: Commodity Fetishism, Masculinity, and Sexuality in The Golden Bowl 
The Henry James Review 28: The Johns Hopkins University Press 26–42
454 Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish, I. In Res 9 (1985): 5–17.
455 Freud's Ego-Splitting and Disavowal relate fetishism as an inappropriate adult response to castration anxiety.  For a 
brief description, see Addendum 1
456 For a brief explanation of Defence and Repression, see  Addendum 1
457 For a brief explanation of the Oedipal Complex, see Freud, S. (1924). The Passing of the Oedipus Complex. In the 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 5:419-424. Freud, S (1925) Some Psychological Consequences of the 
Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes. In Adams, R & Savran, D (2002) The masculinity studies  
reader. Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted from (1925) Sexuality and the Psychology of Love, trans. Strachey, J. New 
York: Collier Books, pp183-193
See also Laufer, M.E. (1993) The Female Oedipus Complex and the Relationship to the Body. In 
Breen, D (1993) The Gender conundrum: contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives on femininity and  
masculinity, Volume 18 of New library of psychoanalysis. Routledge; Loewald, H.W. (2000) The Waning of the 
Oedipus Complex. In Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, vol. 27, 1979, pp. 751–775; Swan, J 
(1974) Mater and Nannie: Freud's two mothers and the discovery of the Oedipus complex. In 
American Imago. Vol 31(1), Spr 1974, 1-64. Simon, B (1991) Is the Oedipus Complex Still the Cornerstone of 
Psychoanalysis? Three Obstacles to Answering the Question. In Journal of the American Psychoanalytic  
Association, Vol. 39, No. 3, 641-668 (1991). Simon addresses questions of the political controversies, the definitions 
and boundaries and criteria for evidence to prove or disprove it.
Note that this chapter does not deal with the Oedipus Complex in detail, since the arguments critiquing it are largely 
addressed by points made in this chapter on the object-focus of metatheories on fetish as pertaining to disavowal. 
The primary argument of this chapter is not around how patriarchy is perpetuated (which is often well argued in 
relation to the Oedipal Complex), but rather how (hetero)patriarchy has often refused a (nonessentialist) sense of 
'self' and agency to individuals through the discursive constructs such as Freudian psychoanalysis.
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oppositional definitional nexus between person-and-object, whereby the idea of 'fetishism' and 
'fetishist' are defined through a focus on the 'fetish' object, in divergent or conflictual terms.
In both colonial and Freudian psychoanalytic constructions, 'fetishism' implies both presence and 
absence, which in turn defines both the 'fetish' object and the 'fetishist' in terms of neurosis. In both 
instances, the relative focus has historically been on the object rather than the relationship between 
the two. This, I suggest, results in epistemological constructs of psychoanalytic 'fetishism' which 
both over-prioritise the object and under-prioritise embodied, experiential, processual notions of 
living458. This in turn leads to the marginalising of subjectivities and the attenuation of the power of 
subjective agency. 
In this regard, theories of psychoanalytic agency distinguish between 'non-pathology' as the 
practices which engage a sense of agency on the one hand, and 'pathology' on the other, which is  
mediated through the desire to achieve agency by means of the psychoanalytic therapeutic 
process459. However, I suggest, discursive constructions of 'fetishism' blur this distinction through 
normative sexual assumptions. In particular, I argue that:
Freudian psychoanalytic constructions of the psyche are framed in patriarchal, 
heteronormative terms, which perpetuate the assumption that the sexual subject is inevitably 
male, and the sexual object female, in ways paralleled to a disapproved-of inanimate object.  
This in turn frames the sexual subject hierarchically in implicitly power- and object-focused 
terms, whether to human or 'fetish' object.
Pathological adult 'fetishism' is seen as a childish psychological attachment to the presence/
absence of the penis. This is problematic since such an assumption does not ground the  
distinction between pathology and non-pathology sufficiently firmly, since both rely on  
normative and therefore variable distinctions. This implicates so-called 'non-pathological 
fetishism' with the same pathologising associations as its 'pathological' counterpart.
At first glance, this could perhaps be remedied by re-working Freudian premises, and/or by 
458 See chapter 4
459 In this regard, see Pollock, L., Slavin, J.H. (1998). The Struggle for Recognition: Disruption and Reintegration in 
the Experience of Agency. In Psychoanalytic Dialogues., 8:857-873. They note that classical psychoanalytic models 
see treatment as enabling subjects to reclaim their own agency and to take responsibility for themselves as agents in 
respect of their own motives and impulses, but that agency is less clearly understood developmentally and as part of 
the treatment process. They suggest that obtaining the ability to experience the self as an agent comes out of 
complex interpersonal and intrapsychic processes in infancy and early childhood. It represents a binding force which 
founds a feeling of personal coherence. They also argue that the development of a sense of agency is based on the 
childhood negotiation of recognition and mutual impact with parents, and that when these negotiations go wrong, 
the child's capacity for agency can be disturbed.
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rephrasing the object-focus by call ing on l inguistic/discursive constructions.  
However, doing so does not address the abiding concern that psychoanalysis is premised on 'lack', a 
premise which is itself, I suggest, inherently object-focused and foundationalist through the 
description of the human psyche as irretrievably defined in relation to the absence of an object,  
whether physically, psychically or discursively described. This 'not having' implies an attenuation of  
agency, in contradistinction to 'having' which implies that the subject-agent has psychical choice.
Such antagonistically object-focused constructions are, I suggest, problematic both for women and 
'gay male fetishists', whose subjectivities are obscured by psychoanalytic constructions which 
negate the complexity of psycho-social agency460, and ignore the central role of sexual embodied 
experience in sexuality461.
As will be discussed later, a more functional psychical approach is to conceive of 'fetishism' in 
subject-oriented ways. In other words, it is more appropriate to conceive of 'fetish' sexuality as 
taking place within a context dialectically defined in relation to the sexual subject who is in turns  
conceived as being oriented in-relation-to-object (and environment) in convergent or cohering 
terms462.
3.2.2 The 'Fetish': Dominating (Male) Subject, Passive (Female) Object
Freud's assumptions around the primacy of the male, heterosexual psyche, and his views of the 
sexual ‘other’ are, I suggest, both theoretically and politically problematic in that Freudian 
'fetishism' assumes a heteropatriarchal social framework whereby the 'fetishist' is by definition male 
and heterosexual. Further, they assume both a passive female human sexual object, and the 
hierarchical subjection of the material world to the desires of the (dominating) subject through  
subjection of material ('fetish') objects to the agency of male sexuality in ways paralleled to the 
heteropatriarchal treatment of the female socio-sexual object.
This has troubling implications when viewed through feminist and queer lenses, since it perpetuates 
the problematic invisibility, and at the same time specularising of people other than heterosexual  
460 The concept of agency in sexuality is associated with the concept of the agency of the psychoanalytic subject in the 
process of psychoanalysis. For an overview and intersection with this idea see Moran, F.M. (1993) Subject and 
agency in psychoanalysis—Which is to be Master? New York and London: NYU Press. See also Ogden, T.H. 
(1992). The Dialectically Constituted/Decentred Subject of Psychoanalysis.I. the Freudian  
Subject. In Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 73:517-526. He looks at the theme of the 'splitting of consciousness' and the 
question of the location of the subject within this 'dual consciousness'.
See also Borch-Jacobsen, M. Porter, C. Trans Porter, C (1989) The Freudian Subject. Stanford University Press; see 
also Domenici, T; Lesser, R.C; Harris, A (1995) Disorienting Sexuality: Psychoanalytic Reappraisals of Sexual  
Identities, Routledge
461 See chapters 5 and 6
462 See chapters 5 and 6
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males. In particular, Butlerian conceptions of performativity undermine assumptions of the static 
and immutable nature of both gender and sexuality463, which de-centres the idea of essentialist 
sexual locations: in this instance the notion of men always being dominant in essentialist ways.  
Such assumptions are problematic in view of the inherent patriarchal power-dynamic assumed/
created by Freudian psychoanalysis which defines the 'fetishist' antagonistically in opposition to the 
o b j e c t , w h e t h e r h u m a n o r i n a n i m a t e , r a t h e r t h a n d i a l e c t i c a l l y c o n n e c t e d 
in relation to him/her/it. This serves to obscure both the 'fetishist's' subjectivity and his  
psychodynamic orientation as taking place 'in relation to' complex socio-political and emotional 
circumstances, rather than 'in opposition to' an assumed static, foundational psychodynamic 
location. The former, I argue, grants a psycho-sexual agency, which the latter attenuates.
Feminist critics have dismissed Freud’s work as sexist because of his premise that women are 
mutilated and must accept the deformity from which they suffer in their lack of a 
penis464. Other scholars have addressed concerns about the primacy of the penis. 
Bass, for example, goes further than Freud in suggesting that 'fetishism' is the problem of 
substitution for a disturbing reality465. Bass sees it as allowing consolation in the material while 
retaining unconscious what has been registered but nevertheless is disavowed or "defended 
against"466. He suggests that any material things that serve as transitional substitutes for "magical,  
relieving objects" can serve as a basis for "fetishistic formations"467. In this way, the mother's breast 
can be 'fetishized' as much as the maternal phallus.
Other feminist critics have robustly criticized Freud, but argue that psychoanalysis is imperative to  
the feminist project and must, as with other theoretical traditions, be adapted by women so as to be 
freed from its sexist premises468. Firestone, for example, talks of how Freudianism is substantially 
accu ra t e bu t t ha t t he word ‘pen i s ’ i n h i s work shou ld be r ep l aced wi th 
‘power’469. Further, many feminists, such as Mitchell and Rose, have approached Freudian analysis 
in general, and the Oedipal Complex in particular, as the process by which patriarchal power is  
reproduced at a subjective psychodynamic level470.
463 In particular see Butler, J. (1999) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity NY, Routledge.
464 See Schor, N. (1992) Fetishism. In Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary, edited by Elizabeth 
Wright. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell; Grosz, E. (1991) Lesbian Fetishism? In Differences 3, no. 2 (1991): 39–54; 
Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex." New York: Routledge
465 Bass, A. (2000) Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press at 
48
466 Bass, ibid, at 51
467 Bass, ibid at 207–208
468 for example Juliet Mitchell, Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin, Jane Gallop, Bracha Ettinger, Shoshana Felman, 
Griselda Pollock and Jane Flax
469 "Freudianism: The Misguided Feminism"
470 See Mitchell, J & Rose, J (1982) Feminine Sexuality, Macmillan; Lacan, J, Mitchell, J & Rose, J (1985) 
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These kinds of arguments, although compelling in terms of explaining how patriarchy is 
perpetuated as a discursive practice, do not adequately address the constitution and role of the 
individual subject as he/she relates to the material world, and as he/she manipulates the discourses  
to which he/she is subject, since such constructions are, as I will argue, based on foundationalist 
assumptions471.
Similarly, there is no single feminist analysis of 'fetishism'472. Perhaps the closest connecting idea is 
that feminist scholars tend to understand the function of the phallus as a signifier being conflated  
with material reality, to which it inherently refers473. Certain feminist critiques argue that sexual 
'perversions', which include 'fetishism', are symptoms of a strained effort to subscribe to gender 
stereotypes. Others note the theoretical impossibility of female 'fetishism', and yet call on it to  
understand women's and lesbian desire. De Lauretis, for example, posits the fetish, rather than the 
substitution for a "real" lack, as a fetish of a fetish and the material marker of a fantasy that marks  
both an "object" and its absence, through the fetishising of the female body or something related to 
it in lesbian desire474. This allows feminist theorists to conceive non-heteronormative and 
phallocentric theories of sexuality, specifically for women475.
Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought. WW Norton & Co; Mitchell, J (1991) 
Commentary on “Deconstructing Difference: Gender, Splitting, and Transitional Space”. In 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 1:353-357; Mitchell, J (2000) Psychoanalysis and Feminism. Basic Books; Mitchell, J 
(2004) The Difference Between Gender and Sexual Difference. In Matthis, I (2004) Dialogues on sexuality, gender,  
and psychoanalysis. Karnac Books; Rose, J (2005) Femininity and its Discontents. In Feminist Review, No. 80, 
Reflections on 25 Years (2005), pp. 24-43; Rose, J (2005) Sexuality in the field of vision, Volume 9 of 
Radical thinkers. Verso, 2005
See also Nasser, A.G (1998) Psychoanalysis, Paradigm Shift, and Theoretical Reflexivity: the Case of the Oedipus 
Complex. In Psychoanalytic Review, 85:225-251; Jones, G.Y. (1999) 'Beyond the oedipal complex': Freud and 
Lacan revisited. In Psychodynamic Practice, Volume 5, Issue 4 November 1999 , pages 453 – 463; Smith, J.C. 
(1990) The Neurotic Foundations of Social Order: Psychoanalytic Roots of Patriarchy. New York: New York 
University Press; Freeman, T (2008). Psychoanalytic Concepts of Fatherhood: Patriarchal Paradoxes and the 
Presence of an Absent Authority. In Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 9:113-139; Rohde-Dachser, C (1992). Do We 
Need a Feminist Psychoanalysis? In Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 15:241-259
Izzard S.(2002) Deconstructing Oedipus. In European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling & 
Health, Volume 5,Number 1, 1 March 2002 , pp. 1-12(12) Izzard notes that historically the Oedipus complex has 
been central to psychoanalysis relating to human growth and development, and understanding relationships. The 
paper argues that it remains powerful since it is a lens through which gender relationships, sexuality and social 
structure are seen. The paper proposes reasons for questioning it, followed by ways in which it has been responded 
to.
471 This is comparable to how anthropological notions of 'fetishism' obscured colonial subjectivities
See arguments such as those of Butler: Butler, J (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of  
Identity. New York:Routledge; Butler, J (1993) Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex"  
New York: Routledge.
In this regard, see later in this chapter re charges of psychoanalytic lack, and further see chapters 5 and 6
472 Morris, R Fetishism - Overview - Feminist Criticism And Poststructuralist Readings, from http://science.jrank.org/
pages/9366/Fetishism-Overview-Feminist-Criticism-Poststructuralist-Readings.html
473 Morris, R ibid
474 See De Lauretis, T (1994). The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press
475 Morris, R Fetishism - Overview - Feminist Criticism And Poststructuralist Readings, from http://science.jrank.org/
pages/9366/Fetishism-Overview-Feminist-Criticism-Poststructuralist-Readings.html
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These approaches do not, however, successfully address how 'fetish' applies specifically in male 
same-sex sexual contexts, although allegiances can be made for where 'fetishism' is employed in a 
passive sense, i.e. when the 'fetish object' is used to dominate a male object. However, such re-
organising still tends to assume that the role of sexual subject is active (and therefore 'masculine'), 
albeit not necessarily dominating476.
3.2.2a) Heteropatriarchal Assumptions
Freud's views, although perhaps in some senses compelling, create an implicit hierarchical 
construction of the relation between sexual subject and object, whereby subject and object are 
separate and the one prioritised over the other. This links to feminist concerns about both Freud and  
his constructions of 'fetishism'.
According to Miyasaki, there are two central problems relating to the Freudian model of sexual  
relation. Gender roles and relations generally associated with (compulsory) heterosexuality are 
already built into Freud’s conceptions of sexual instinct and aim477. Variations from the 'normal' 
sexual object and aim therefore demonstrate hierarchically opposed masculinity and femininity, and  
Freud’s theory of sexuality thus implies that erotic bonds are inescapably those of domination: that  
human relations can only take place as relations of subject and object, activity and passivity, whole 
and part, or owner and property478.
The first problem he identifies is that the other is overvalued, “(found pleasurable as both active  
stimulus and passive satiation) only given its continued utility as passive recipient in the sexual 
aim”, which he calls the 'problem of domination'479. The other is seen as not-valuable and a source 
of pain, and the subject therefore must continue to possess and subordinate the other to his pleasure.
The second problem is that the overvaluation fails to motivate the subject to recognise the other’s 
subjectivity, and the subject sees the overvalued other only in terms of the other’s pleasure and  
utility to the subject. Miyasaki calls this the 'problem of property' whereby the other’s very 
existence is seen in terms of a function of being dominated.480
476  as will be discussed below, domination is a central problem pertaining to agency
477 Even though Freud rejects biologically defined connections between instinct and object, which assists him in 
avoiding labeling all variations from heterosexuality as “degenerate” or “pathological”. See Miyasaki, D (2003) 
The Evasion of Gender in Freudian Fetishism. In JPCS: Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society, 
Volume 8, Number 2, Fall 2003, pp 289-298 Ohio State University Press, calling on Three Essays on the Theory of  
Sexuality.
478 This addresses arguments that Freudian concepts are useful in describing how patriarchy is reproduced
479 Miyasaki, D (2003) The Evasion of Gender in Freudian Fetishism. In JPCS: Journal for the Psychoanalysis of 
Culture & Society, Volume 8, Number 2, Fall 2003, pp 289-298 Ohio State University Press, pp291
480 Miyasaki, ibid
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Further, the perceived inability of the subject to acknowledge the subjectivity of the sexual other not  
only locates the other in terms of domination and property, but disallows the 'fetishist' from taking a  
passive, dominated or owned position, which many gay men desire in their role-
play481. This in turn renders his own subjectivity irrelevant, thereby negating his agency in 
negotiating his world psychodynamically482. I call this third concern the problem of agency.
Miyasaki argues cogently that another reading of Freud and 'fetishism' is possible, enabling a 
revision of preconceptions of gender-bias, and oppositional, hierarchical gender roles 
in Freudian thinking483. Even though Freud views 'sexual fetishism' as a particularly masculine 
enterprise, his text also supports a reading of the 'non-pathological fetishist' as escaping gender and 
sexual roles. This implies that 'fetishism' can be seen as a critique of the Freudian masculine model  
of sexual instinct and relation.
In order to avoid the problems set out above, an alternative view to sexual relation must be found.  
Firstly, “the subject’s overvaluation of the other as pleasurable stimulus must be independent of the 
other’s continued utility for satisfaction”, which means that the subject must be able to enjoy desire  
in itself. The other must be appreciated for its capacity to provide both desire and “satiated  
desire”484. Secondly, I suggest, the subject should have the understanding to acknowledge the other  
as subject. In other words, the (human) object must be granted agency, thereby enabling full  
unfettered and equal agency to be exercised by the subject, described in terms of connectedness to 
the sexual object, rather than antagonism.
Miyasaki sees Freud’s theory of 'non-pathological fetishism' as containing the seeds of this 
perspective, which avoids the gender role construction divided by castration, unlike Freud’s 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f o t h e r f o r m s o f ' p e r v e r s i t y ' , i n c l u d i n g b o t h h e t e r o - a n d 
homosexuality485. He argues that disavowal really means the disavowal of the ‘fact’ of the female 
body. In this way, Freud does not consider that the fetishist’s disavowal of a perceived reality is that  
of a misperceived reality, since the 'fetishist' does not actually disavow 'reality' at all. Rather, he 
t r a n s p o s e s a t t e n t i o n a n d d i s p l a c e s v a l u e f r o m t h e p e n i s t o a n o t h e r 
object486. The 'fetishist' doesn’t disavow the woman’s real lack of penis, since female genital  
481 See chapter 4 and the Interjection in particular
482 In this regard, see Butler, J (1999) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, NY, Routledge
483 Miyasaki, D (2003) The Evasion of Gender in Freudian Fetishism. In JPCS: Journal for the Psychoanalysis of 
Culture & Society, Volume 8, Number 2, Fall 2003, pp 289-298 Ohio State University Press
484 Miyasaki, ibid pp292
485 Miyasaki, ibid pp292
486Miyasaki, ibid pp292 referring to Freud, S “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense.” The Standard Edition, Vol. 23. at 
277
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construction is acknowledged. Rather, the 'fetishist’s' interest is changed. He acknowledges the 
other’s subjectivity in a desire to protect his own penis, whereas 'non-fetishists' do not need to, since 
the belief in castration leads to a deprecation of femininity487.
Miyasaki argues in favour of the fetishist's “sexual wholeness and subjectivity to the sexual other 
generally and women specifically. In the fetishist’s view, women must, like himself, actively and 
passively experience sexual desire, pleasure, and satisfaction”488. Further, 'fetishism' prevents 
assigning the roles to biological gender. The ‘normal’ subject relinquishes the parent as sex-object, 
but retains the identification with the parent’s sex-role. But the 'fetishist' does not have a distinct 
gender-role-identity. The castration issue implies lack of sexual subjectivity, of which lack the 
female body is a sign. But the Oedipus complex also means being dominated and having autonomy 
removed by the father. Therefore the male body represents domination over something lacking 
subjectivity, and male sexuality implies inherent domination. The 'fetishist' however avoids gender 
differentiation, therefore women are not fundamentally passive or able to be owned. As Miyasaki 
notes, this solves both the ‘property problem’ as well as the association of sexual role with 
biological gender.
However, the issue of the masculine role of domination subsists, since the 'fetishist’s' subjectivity  
still results in displeasure. In this respect, Miyasaki suggests that even though overvaluation of the 
object conditional on its utility are implicit in perverse tendencies, 'fetishism' involves 'object over-
valuation' with the ability to obtain pleasure from an object even when the utility is not  
there489. The 'fetishist' is pleasured by desire itself, which means that he does not need to dominate.
In this way, the sexual role of the 'fetish object' then becomes akin to that of the female in ordinary  
heterosexuality- a relation to an appropriated thing490. 'Pathological fetishism' may be seen as a 
variant of normal heterosexuality by means of the (male) 'fetishist’s' refusal of acknowledgement of 
the other’s subjectivity. The 'pathological fetishist' abandons the other in favour of an object or 
body-part by taking the feminine phallus as sexual object491. This, however, does not deal with the 
‘property’ or the ‘domination’ problems, only allowing an interpretation of the masculine role of  
domination as being auto-erotic and therefore narcissistic492. In so doing, the 'fetishist' abandons the 
487 Note the assumption that the fetishist is a male with a penis, and that he wants one. Many fetishists are female, while 
other (male) fetishists desire to have their penis removed, or for it to be unusable.
488 Miyasaki, D (2003) The Evasion of Gender in Freudian Fetishism. In JPCS: Journal for the Psychoanalysis of 
Culture & Society, Volume 8, Number 2, Fall 2003, pp 289-298 Ohio State University Press pp293
489 Miyasaki, ibid
490 Miyasaki, ibid at 295-6
491 Miyasaki, ibid at 295-6
492 In relation to narcissistic personality disorder, see Vaknin, S (2003) The World of the Narcissist. Narcissus 
Publishing
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masculine role, which is about overvaluation of the object on the condition of its utility for the  
sexual aim493. The 'pathological fetishist' allows the 'fetish object' to take the place of the normal  
aim, and therefore his appreciation of the other qua 'other' is not conditional on utility, and he must 
appreciate the other as such, not as dominated possession. Miyasaki notes that in 'pathological 
fetishism' the aim is replaced by the object. He notes further that the appearance of auto-eroticism in  
'fetishism' leads Freud and others to presume its masculine nature, but that really it is a non-
masculine variation of narcissism. The subject doesn’t view the 'fetish object' as the same as the  
other. In fact, the other is absent, which is admittedly a heavy-handed solution to the issue of 
dominating relations494.
These arguments are compelling in that they rephrase the problems of 'property' and 'domination' 
and therefore partly deal with gender-bias.495 In so doing, they however refer to either pathological 
o r non-pathological fetishism to address gender-bias, rather than dealing with how 'pathological' 
and 'non-pathological fetishism' are related to each other, and therefore whether they can exist as 
separate notions. They further do not deal with the assumption that the fetishist inherently adopts a  
masculine role which precludes the possibility of a 'feminine' fetishist (meaning a receptive, if not 
passive sexual partner). They do not thereby resolve the problem of agency, which is integrally 
linked to concerns over the distinction between 'pathological' and 'non-pathological fetishism', and 
which idealises the 'non-pathological fetishist' as being focused only on desire rather than on the 
attainment of the object of desire, thereby remaining outside of the relations of domination.
3.2.3 The Substitution of the Object for 'Reality': Normative Concerns on Over-Valuation  
For Freud, adult 'fetishism' is a childish psychological attachment to the absence of the female  
phallus (qua object). This problematic assumption does not ground the distinction between 
'pathological' and 'non-pathological fetishism' sufficiently firmly without reference to normative 
factors which, as many commentators have noted, underpin distinctions between proper and 
improper erogenous zones496. This is despite Freud’s opinion that all sexuality is a 'perversion' of 
493 Miyasaki, D (2003) The Evasion of Gender in Freudian Fetishism. In JPCS: Journal for the Psychoanalysis of 
Culture & Society, Volume 8, Number 2, Fall 2003, pp 289-298 Ohio State University Press at 295-6
494 Miyasaki, ibid pp 295-6
495 See feminist arguments above re the female fetishist, which can be aligned with passive sexual roles of certain gay 
men in instances where the fetish object is used as a tool of domination. This, however, does not deal with issues of 
agency, which is seen as an active/male process, unless revised in light of Lacanian power relations. Yet see below 
re agency
496 See Laplanche, J (1976) Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. Trans. and introd. Jeffrey Mehlman. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins. He says that Freud saw the exception, in other words the perversion as taking the rule along with it in that 
the exception should presuppose the existence of a preexisting sexual function, but results in an undermining and 
destruction of the idea of biological norms. See also Dollimore, J (1991) Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde,  
Freud to Foucault. Oxford: Oxford University Press, at 169–204, who extends this into homosexuality. 
See Davidson, G(2007) Ornamental Identity: Commodity Fetishism, Masculinity, and Sexuality in The Golden 
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human biological function497. 'Fetishism' which is 'non-pathological' in certain times and places is 
therefore 'pathological ' in others, depending on prevail ing social norms and 
circumstances498. 'Non-pathological fetishism' is therefore inappropriately liable to be pathologised 
in much the same way as its pathological counterpart.
Freud admits that 'fetish' interests are part of ‘normal’ sexual love in that over-valuation of the  
object of love or of their body parts viewed separately can open sexual interest in the other partner.  
These body parts are ordinarily seen as part of a broader relationship wherein the relationship is the 
primary focus, rather than the body part499.
Yet Freud still distinguishes between 'pathological' and 'non-pathological fetishism'. He does not 
make this distinction firmly, saying no more than that 'fetishism' becomes pathological when the  
desire for the 'fetish object' moves beyond a necessary condition connected to the object and takes 
the place of the normal aim and becomes the sole sexual object500.
3.2.3a) Pathological vs Non-Pathological 'Fetishism'
The problem is that the difference between 'pathological' and 'non-pathological fetishism' is not, 
d e sp i t e appea rances , va r i a t i ons o f t he same i s sue seen on some k ind o f 
continuum501. In 'pathological fetishism' the original aim of undermining the threat of castration is  
done away with completely through the erasure of the relation to the object. This means that the 
relation to an ‘other’ is erased, and the auto-erotic relation of a child to its body-parts is mirrored. In 
'non-pathological fetishism', however, the threat of castration remains.
The problem lies in the ideas of 'necessary condition' and 'normal aim' as grounds for distinction 
between 'pathological' and 'non-pathological fetishism', which terms indicate socially-mediated  
normative specifications for what counts as pathology502.
Freud ceased equating stimulus with displeasure, even before writing on 'fetishism'. However, this  
Bowl. In The Henry James Review 28: The Johns Hopkins University Press 26–42
497 See Davidson, G, ibid
498 See chapter 2 on queer theory and the exigencies of identity politics
499 Steep, I (2007) ‘GWM ISO GAM’: Mediated identities and ethnicity fetish, In Queer Space” Centres and 
Peripheries, UTS 2007 referencing Moyaert, P & Gemerchak, C.M (2004). ‘Fetishism and the vicissitudes of the 
object in sublimation according to Freud and Lacan’, in Gemerchak, CM (2004) Everyday Extraordinary: 
Encountering Fetishism Marx, Freud and Lacan, Leuven: Leuven University Press, at 53.
500 Miyasaki, D (2002) The Confusion of Marxian and Freudian Fetishism in Adorno and Benjamin. In 
Philosophy Today, Winter 2002 pp429 et seq at pp294 referring to Three Essays at 154
501 Miyasaki, D (2003) The Evasion of Gender in Freudian Fetishism. In JPCS: Journal for the Psychoanalysis of 
Culture & Society, Volume 8, Number 2, Fall 2003, pp 289-298 Ohio State University Press
502 As I will argue in Chapter 4, this assumption which contemporary constructions of 'fetishism' have adopted results 
in the prescription of heteronormativity.
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did not lead to revisions of conceptions of over-valuation and object-libido in relation to 'fetishism'. 
Notwithstanding his abandonment of the idea of pleasure, Freud retained his explanation of 
'fetishism' as a ‘displacement’ of value to a pleasure aimed at preserving the sexual aim and 
requiring the disavowal of reality503. 
This lacuna in logic suggests that over-valuation be re-assessed in its entirety, in order to clarify the 
distinction between pathology and non-pathology and to clarify the question of subjective agency. 
In this regard, four concerns must be laid out, all of which compound each other.
3.2.3b) Four Concerns
Firstly, Freudian over-evaluation contradicts itself. Freud links over-valuation to the transferral of  
narcissistic libido to an object, required by excess libidinal energy which derives from a continuous  
instinctual source of stimulation504. The subject is thereby motivated to relate to a world which is 
external to him and can only be experienced in an antagonistic way as a source of increased 
stimulation. However this explains neither 'pathological' and 'non-pathological fetishism', nor the 
distinction between the two. In 'pathological fetishism', the subject renounces the sexual aim,  
thereby removing excess stimuli, yet he does not renounce the other. This creates additional stimuli, 
thereby increasing dissatisfaction. To the contrary, however, the Freudian theory of instinct 
indicates that the subject should completely repress the instinct, regress to auto-eroticism or give up 
the object while preserving the sexual aim. As Miyasaki argues, this implies that the subject does 
not necessarily experience external world stimulus and the other as displeasure, which in turn 
implies that we should reject Freud’s early position on pleasure and instinct. Since increased 
stimulus can be seen as pleasure, over-valuation is not a ‘displacement’ or ‘extension’ of instinctual 
pleasure, and should be reviewed in relation to non-pathological fetishism and other 
‘perversions'505.
Secondly, the idea of 'over-valuation' relies on the idea of 'normal aim' which distinguishes 
'pathological' from 'non-pathological fetishism', and, as mentioned above, indicates a normative 
relationship between 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' valuation of the object. The point at which the  
o n e s h i f t s t o t h e o t h e r i s f l u i d , a n d d e p e n d s o n p r e v a i l i n g s o c i a l 
503 Miyasaki, ibid pp296, where he notes “For example, despite his suggestion in the 1924 essay “The Economic 
Problem of Masochism” that pleasure and unpleasure “depend, not on this quantitative factor, but on some 
characteristic of it which we can only describe as a qualitative one”, he nevertheless insists upon explaining 
“femininity” in terms of a “feminine masochism…based on the primary, erotogenic masochism, on pleasure in 
pain”—in other words, a connection of femininity to the “death instinct”. This connection is quite peculiar, since it 
is precisely the narrow, “masculine” sense of pleasure that makes the erotic bond so difficult to comprehend.”
504 Miyasaki, ibid pp 295, referencing Freud, S “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.” The Standard Edition, 
Vol. 14. at 120
505 Miyasaki, ibid pp 295, referencing “Instincts” ibid at 120
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exigencies506. This indicates that the definitions both of when adult 'fetishism' exists, and the 
appropriate point at which 'normal' 'fetish' interests are declared pathological, is inherently socially, 
rather than psychodynamically dependent. In a predominantly heteropatriarchal social structure, the  
dominant paradigm of 'normal' sexual practices is that these take place between a single male sexual 
subject and a single female sexual object. 'Gay male fetish sex' therefore implies a challenge to 
heteronormative assumptions about the primacy of (heterosexual) monogamous 
relationships507. It further implies a challenge to the hetero-patriarchal prioritising of procreation, 
contrary to assumptions that normative sexuality must be goal-oriented towards procreation, failing  
which it becomes non-functional and thereby potentially pathologised. 
In the face of the challenges of normativity, the only linking factor between the definitions of  
'pathological' and 'non-pathological fetishism' can, I suggest, be that of a focus on the object made  
by automatically excluding the value of it's attraction. In other words, the focus is on normative 
assumptions around 'necessary' conditions and 'normal' aims, since human sexuality is ordinarily 
defined in terms of normative frameworks of goal-directed human-human relations aimed at 
productive, presumably procreative, success508. The (physical) object is therefore a priori excluded 
from the ambit of sexuality, except where it aids the normative processes of copulation, whereupon  
an exception is made to include the 'fetish' object within the bounds of norm under 'non-
pathological fetishism'. In this respect, normativity is theoretically imposed on a subject in a  
hierarchical way: 'fetishist' practices are to be assumed to be pathological unless the subject can  
demonstrate that his practices conform to normative ideas around propriety in terms of the sexual 
aim. The implicit theoretical problem that impacts on questions of agency in this construction is that 
the onus of demonstrating 'non-pathology' lies on the subject. The result is that 'non-pathological 
fetishism' is squeezed out of a valid place by normative assumptions (whether statistically or 
morally defined) that most people are not fetishists, on the one hand, and that fetishists are by  
definition pathological, on the other. This concern is increased by the role of the psychological  
professional in the diagnosing process509.
Thirdly, and following on from point two above, the distinction between pathology and non-
506 See more on this in chapter 4
507 See the Interjection and Chapters 5 and 6. See also Riggs, D.W. (2008) The blighted germs of heterosexual 
tendencies: reading Freud in (be)hindsight. In Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology  
Volume 18 Issue 2, Pages 131-139 Special Issue: Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology: Historical Connections and 
Contemporary Applications. He argues in favour of Freud's queer contributions to social psychology, and speaks in 
favour of the ongoing utility of psychoanalysis for developing social psychological approaches to same-sex 
identities and heteronormativity, thanks to Freud's implicit critiques of heteronormativity and explicit support for the 
rights of non-heterosexuals.
508 See below for more on this
509 For more on this point, see chapter 4
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pathology is made without accounting for the subjective understanding, processes and perspectives 
of the psychological subject, i.e. it is seen to be an automatic or essential aspect to the subject's  
psychology, de f ined in t e rms of the cas t ra t ion complex , ego-spl i t t ing and 
disavowal510. As Miyasaki notes, “the Freudian theory of fetishism emphasizes, not alienation, but 
the illusion of a relation.”511 The 'fetishist' substitutes the object for the ‘maternal phallus’, thereby 
seemingly preventing a loss of social relation through preventing alienation from the opposite 
gender512. Authentic relations are substituted for false relations, which are false due to their loss of 
authentic satisfaction in social relationships. The 'fetish' is ‘degraded’, since it is a thing with no  
direct relation to the desire of a human subject. However, the subject is unaware of alienation or  
loss since he is reassured that the relation he desires is being achieved through the 'fetish object'. 
Freudian 'fetishism' is therefore a substituted satisfaction (or false reconciliation) rather than 
resignation to a substitute that is not satisfying. This unawareness on the part of the subject 
indicates that an external ('professional psychoanalytic') identification/'diagnosis' of 'fetishism' must 
take place for the label 'fetish' to be applied to any given set of circumstances. This in turn indicates 
that the process of diagnosis ignores the internal (subjective) exigencies of the 'fetishist', which 
become secondary to the focus on the 'fetish object' and on the ability of the psychoanalytic  
professional to 'correct' the 'fetishist's' misperception through diagnosis and psychotherapy.
Fourthly, the idea of the 'sole sexual object' implies that 'fetishism' cannot be both pathological  and 
non-pathological at the same time. Yet, as will be discussed in chapter 4, individuals are at certain  
times focused on the sexual 'fetish object' to the exclusion of human sexual relations in what 
Freudianism constructs as pathological, but at others are more centrally focused on the human 
sexual partner, in a 'non-pathological' way.
These four concerns on how pathological and non-pathological fetishism are distinguished serve 
theoretically to illustrate internal contradictions in the construction of 'fetishism', and obscure 
subjectivities of the 'sexual fetishist' (thereby rendering him/her discursively invisible and denying 
him/her a valid space) through normatively prescribing the nature of the relationship between the 
subject and the object, while at the same time inherently alienating the subject from the object. The  
question arises as to whether the dynamic between sexual subject and inanimate sexual object must 
be (heteropatriarchally) hierarchically-defined, and as to how much agency the sexual fetishist  
subject qua active and passive participant can enjoy513.
510 See explanation of these processes supra
511 Miyasaki, D, ibid, at pp 429
512 See criticisms of sexism below
513 See chapter 5 and 6
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3.2.4 Shoring up Freud with Discourse
These concerns are all linked through assumptions that 'fetishism' is primarily about the fetish 
object and biological imperatives. More recently, however, arguments following the 'linguistic turn' 
have claimed that the psychical point of reference is discursive, not physical, through the phallus  
rather than the physical penis. They hold that normative masculinity works in much the same way 
as Freud postulated, but via substituting the phallic symbol for the penis, which gives the male the 
fictive permission to use his penis as though by right, thereby perpetuating heteropatriarchy. In this  
regard, Lacan has often been called on to re-conceive the psychodynamic bases for 'fetishism', and  
to deal with questions of agency514.
According to discursive accounts, the male moves from having a present (as opposed to the 
Freudian absent) penis to having power through language, from which the Real (i.e. the penis) is  
excluded. In this way 'fetishism', which is also seen as a way of gaining access to power, is seen as a 
function of language, taking place when language is literalised and its fully symbolic elements are 
refused515. This is said to happen through the sexual expression of the displacement which is made  
possible by making language into image516. The displacement is one in which the subject 
purportedly tries to make an image real517. The resulting interstitial situation results from the anxiety  
514 See Lacan, J & Granoff, W. (1956) "Fetishism: The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real." In 
Perversions, Psychodynamics, and Therapy, edited by Sándor Lorand, 265–276. New York: Random House, 1956.
515 Lacan's theory of sexuation arranges masculinity and femininity in terms of different unconscious structures, 
whereby both male and female subjects take part in "phallic" organization, where the feminine side of sexuation is 
"supplementary" rather than opposite or complementary. Lacan insisted that the maternal figure is phallic for the boy 
through the power she has over him, which is only possible because she has no penis
Notably, Freud's Satisfaction and Lacan's jouissance, together with the Lacanian conception of the Mirror Phase, 
link Freud and Lacan in relation to 'sexual fetishism'. Both Freud and Lacan approach 'fetishism' as the investment 
of meaning in a specific object which is substituted for another. Whereas Freud views psychical activity as taking 
place in relation to the idea of 'Satisfaction', Lacan sees it in terms of the process of 
jouissance. (see Diatkine, G (2007) Lacan. In International Journal of Psychoanalysis 2007;88:643–60 pp650). 
When adults look at themselves in the mirror they do not see the 'marvellous child' they should have been in their 
parents eyes, since the mother sees that the child cannot gratify her absolutely, and is more excited by the father’s 
phallus than by the child. Lacan sees the Phallus as that which only appears in the form of what the Other lacks, 
through castration. The Lacanian Phallus is not less literal than the Freudian Penis. The mother lacks the phallus and 
the subject can therefore identify himself with it in fantasy so as to make himself the cause of the mother’s desire. In 
this castration fantasy, the subject loses an important section of his ‘specular image’. At the same time he identifies 
with fecalised objects which will encourage the other’s jouissance. Jouissance is distinguished from orgasm. The 
former is more satisfying than the latter, and relates couples and parent-child relationships in terms of the fecalised 
object rather than in terms of a mutual relationship. In Lacan’s view, the subject renders himself desirable by making 
himself the cause of jouissance. This happens by the subject identifying with what appears to be a degraded part-
object (fecalised matter).
516 See Lacan, J, and Granoff, W. (1956) "Fetishism: The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real." In 
Perversions, Psychodynamics, and Therapy, edited by Sándor Lorand, 265–276 at pp272. New York: Random 
House
517 See Kaplan, L.J. (1991). Female Perversions. New York: Doubleday. At 11-13. Discussed  in Dervin, ibid, 370. 
Dervin quotes Grossman, L. (1996) 'Psychic Reality' and Reality Testing in the Analysis of Perverse Defences. In 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. 77: 509-17. As Dervin notes, Lacan's concepts are not equatable with 
Freudian drive theory, thanks to his disconnecting biological location for the drives. The Lacanian subject does not 
achieve integration, but the self-images are split into idealised illusions and imperfect body images, then locked into 
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t h a t comes f rom lo s s , l i nked t o t he gu i l t a s s oc i a t ed w i th t he (pa t e rna l ) 
‘law’518. This is said  to result in an incapacity to fully take part in social relationships mediated by 
the presence of a sexual partner.
Lacan's redirection of Freud's focus on the penis (the material object) to the language constructing 
the penis as a phallus appears to divert attention away from the Freud's (hetero)patriarchal 
assumptions519. Further, Lacan makes the sexual act more public through his focus on the shared 
meaning involved in discourse, rather than the individual meaning based in the inward-looking  
absence-presence dichotomy of the Freudian fetish-object focus. 
This is a powerful antidote to certain criticisms of Freud, as detailed above, particularly his  
essentialist assumptions and his reliance on biology. Yet it is not powerful enough to avoid 
accusations from theorists such as Elizabeth Grosz who accuse Lacan of supporting 
psychoanalysis’s sexist tradition520.
the Imaginary. Dervin further argues that  “For the fetishist, it is not so much splitting of the ego or disavowal of 
castration that distinguishes him as seeing how much he can get away with by evading reality testing when he "blurs 
the distinction between the fetish and the penis" (Grossman 1996, 511). In fact, Lacan's now-you-see-them-now-
you-don't phallic signifiers underwrite the sexual masquerade by sliding from man to woman; so doing, they also 
fulfill the "perverse strategy" of deception that "obliterates sexual differences" as well as those between the child 
and adult generations (Kaplan 1991, 41). Ideally the strategy requires a script or scenario, occurs in a public display 
or performance that includes risks plus moral defiance, and parades a phallic masculine facade while shielding 
forbidden feminine strivings; while everyone is "concentrating on a presumably erotic performance, what is being 
sneaked in is hatred and vengeance" 
518 The mother's desire for a phallus/penis substitute pre-dates the child's desire for the mother and the incest drive 
disappears among other signifiers. As Dervin notes, “to avoid castration he accepts its symbolic form and becomes 
human by being constituted through language”, indicating that the Lacanian subject could be passive, which could 
be seen to cover up perverse defensive systems set in place against paranoid fears
Dervin, D (1997) Where Freud Was, There Lacan Shall Be: Lacan and the Fate of Transference American Imago 
54.4 (1997) 347-376 at 370, referencing  Smith, J. (1991). Arguing with Lacan: Ego Psychology and 
Language. New Haven: Yale University Press at 43; Mitchell, J & Rose, J. (Eds). (1983). Feminine Sexuality: 
Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne. New York: Norton. At 5
519 Note, Critics like Judith Butler and Jane Gallop have referred to Lacan to develop gender theory. Gallop, J (1985) 
Reading Lacan, Ithaca, Cornell Univ Press, and (1982) The Daughter’s Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis; 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, and Butler, J (1999) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, NY, 
Routledge
520 See for example Grosz, EA (1990) Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction, Routledge. Also, in relation to 
masculinities, see Frosh, S, (1994) Sexual Difference: Masculinity and Psychoanalysis, Routledge See also 
Grosz, E, (1993) "Lesbian Fetishism?" In Fetishism As Cultural Discourse, edited by Emily Apter and William 
Pietz, 101–115. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Ettinger, from the viewpoint of late Lacanian theory, exposes blindspots in both Freud and Lacan related to the 
feminine, the maternal and femaleness in the Real related to the body. See for example Ettinger, B (1992) Matrix 
and Metamorphosis. In Differences, Vol. 4, 1992,  (2004) Weaving a Woman Artist with-in the Matrixial Encounter. 
In Event Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 21, No. 1, 69-94 (2004); (1997). The Feminine/Prenatal Weaving in 
Matrixial Subjectivity-as-Encounter, Psychoanalysis Dial., 7:367-405.
She helps develop conceptions of subjectivity and transforming the Symbolic, laying out sexual difference on a 
‘matrix’-basis of the feminine, pre-maternal and maternal. Locating a border-space unconscious, she conceives of a  
space, starting from the child’s primordial contact with the female body, fantasy and trauma, of ‘subjectivity as 
encounter’, where the ‘I’ and the ‘non-I’ come out connected without rejection or symbiosis. This is a feminine 
difference where subjectivity is structured with a ‘trans-subjective’ flavour through jointness-in-differentiation. 
Here, primary access to the maternal takes place via aesthetic proto-ethical ‘fascinance’. The idea is that ‘primary  
compassion’ takes place before and beside ‘abjection’
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Indeed, replacing a biology-focus with a discursive focus merely opens another cans of worms, 
s i nce u s ing language as the psychodynamic reference point is problematic on a 
number of fronts521:
neither language nor the unconscious can be understood as 'structured'
words have a signifying and signified side, but Lacan's idea of an autonomous signifier  
without a signified is ridiculous
in structural linguistics, the signifiers are not what is meant by 'structure', but the important 
characteristics of the phonemes looked at as a whole
unconscious representations can't be seen to be like signifiers, but rather to be 'in' the 
unconscious, and as only able to be brought out by means of interpretation. This leads to  
questions around the very existence of the 'internal world', since psychic events happen  
between the subject and the Other, and thereby challenge the idea of inside/outside. In this 
respect, Lacan substitutes models without such an inside or outside for Freud's ego, id and 
superego, such as Klein's bottle or the Möbius strip522.
3.2.4a) Psychoanalytic Lack
T he s e c onc e rns f e e d i n t o w ha t i s pos s i b l y t he c e n t r a l i s s ue a t t e nua t i ng 
psychoanalytic theory: the foundationalist assumption of lack, which underpin both Freud and 
Lacan. These concerns are central to re-visioning frameworks for 'fetishism', since they feed 
directly into assumptions around the psychical functions of 'fetishist' desires, and therefore into the 
value of those desires as pathological or not.
Psychoanalytic theory assumes a foundationalist basis for psychical activity: 
'lack', which I suggest is the node at which contemporary psychopathology meets the problems of 
object-focus. Psychoanalytic theory assumes that the psychical drive to use material objects 
sexually is an attempt to replace what is psychically missing523. In other words, something 
521 Diatkine, G (2007) Lacan. In International Journal of Psychoanalysis 2007;88:643–60. Diatkine reveals the 
following concerns relating to Lacanian theory
522 In this regard, see object-relations and spatial theory, which followed from Freudian and Kleinian models of 
psychotherapy. In particular Vygotsky, Winnicott and Bakhtin for object-relations theory. For a partial overview, see 
Guntrip, H. (1996). My Experience Of Analysis With Fairbairn And Winnicott: (How Complete A Result Does 
Psychoanalytic Therapy Achieve?) In International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 77:739-754.
523 See Lacan, J. Seminar X, Anxiety, June 5, 1963, unpublished seminar. Cited in Renata Salecl, "Love Anxieties," in 
Reading Seminar XX: Lacan's Major Work on Love, Knowledge, and Feminine Sexuality, ed. Suzanne Barnard and 
Bruce Fink (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 93-97. Lacan, in Seminar X  explains: “The fact 
that the phallus is not found where we expect it to be, where we require it to be. . .is what explains that anxiety is the 
truth of sexuality. . .The phallus, where it is expected as sexual, never appears except as lack, and this is the link 
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psychically fundamental must be missing in order for fetish to exist. However, this missing  
'something' which defines 'fetish sexuality' misdirects the discourses on 'fetishism' away from the 
agency of the subject, and towards the inevitability of never achieving the object or its symbolic 
representation524.
Freudian lack comes about when the child notices the absence of his mother's penis, and fears the 
loss of his own penis, or alternatively fears that that he will not get a penis from the  
mother525. Lacanian notions reframe psychical activity as relating to the phallus 
qua discursive and power-related symbolic construct. The child undergoes psychic transformation,  
from needing the mother/caregiver to understanding that he is dependent on her. This implies a lack  
in the child which the caregiver cannot fulfil. The mother’s lack is the subject’s original lack, which 
feeds the ongoing lack of satisfaction, which in turn is the lack of a substitution object (such as a  
'fetish')526.
Robinson notes that Badiou, Butler, Mouffe, Stavrakakis and Zizek all take approaches traceable to 
Lacanian conceptions of existence as being constructed around the repression of a fundamental, un-
presentable and impossible negativity527. Lacan's Real makes any sort of social fullness impossible, 
since it haunts the symbolic order. The social order, or Symbolic, makes an illusion of  
completeness, but only by the symbolic exclusion and psychical repression of the Real, which 
exclusion is enabled by the master signifier which covers the field of discourse and reality by 
situating a specific element in discourse as universal. The exclusion of this element allows the 
possibility of a stable symbolic apparatus528.
The Real must be repressed for all symbolic structures, but because the Real is impossible and 
unreachable, the symbolic order cannot be established. The Lacanian conception is based on the  
assumption of an inevitably recurring structure of discourse which is reactive, exclusionary, and  
with anxiety.”
524 A fuller exploration of psychoanalytic subjectivity through Lacanian theory can be seen in Fink, B (1996) 
The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. Princeton University Press, dealing with the 
development of psychoanalytic subject and psychosis. 
525This feeds into the Oedipus Complex. As noted above, Freudian theory is based on the study of the male child, who 
inevitably is the subject in question
526 Kripps, H (1999) Fetish: An Erotics of Culture Cornell University Press.
527 Robinson, A (2004) The Politics of Lack. In BJPIR: 2004 VOL 6, 259–269, reviewing Badiou, A (2001) Ethics: An 
Essay on the Understanding of Evil. London: Verso; Butler, J, Laclau, E and Z, Slavoj (2000) 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London: Verso; Mouffe, C (2000) The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso; 
Stavrakakis, Y (1999) Lacan and the Political. London: Routledge; Zizek, S & Lenin, V. I. (2002) 
Revolution at the Gates: Selected Writings of Lenin from 1917. London: Verso; Zizek, S. (1997) The Plague of  
Fantasies. London: Verso
528 See Robinson, ibid
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founded on negativity529.
Badiou's view of the symbolic order is of 'opinion', polite discourse and normal science, where 
every symbolic system is underlain by a void which is its Real530. Laclau and Mouffe's view is that 
political stability needs a political order to be constructed, but the construction thereof is based on 
political antagonism and created through exclusion and violence531.
The Lacanian return of the Real is always disruptive and revolutionary, and destroys the social  
created around its exclusion, which destruction is premised on a single nodal point which must  
remain, failing which, collapse532. Lacanians are in favour of becoming reconciled with the 
exclusion of the Real and the inevitability of lack, rather than resolving or removing violence and  
antagonism533. Mouffe takes issue with deconstructive and dialogic approaches to ethics that do not  
deal with political confrontation534. In this way, Robinson argues, Lacanian thinking becomes 
almost immune to analytical critique in its own terms, and has tendencies to make detailed  
restatements of ontological positions, rather than supplying substantive frameworks for political 
theorising535. These issues demonstrate the problematic essentialising function of lack which is 
treated on an ontological level, abstracted from specific points of conflict and scarcity as it arises,  
indica t ing tha t lack i s a metaphysica l en t i ty wi th a posi t ive force in the 
world536. Lacanian theorists “therefore take a contradictory position, offering precisely the kind of  
complete theory-without-remainder they declare to be impossible by reinscribing the remainder as a 
positive element given the name of negativity”537
Ahumada agrees that Lacan's thinking centres around the void538. He argues that, according to 
Lacan and Laplanche, sexuality arises from traumatic lack, and disallows continuities but merely 
allows for momentary filling of the void539. This follows Heidegger's view of the Grund as being a 
bottomlessness. The violence released is connected to the individual's identity and solitariness 
which allows for the possibility of full, limitless, continuous being, abstracted from the particularity 
of the love object. He recalls Bataille's view of the object or sexual partner as being about 
529 Robinson, ibid
530 See Badiou, A (2001) Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. London: Verso
531 See Butler, J, Laclau, E and Zizek, S (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London: Verso and Mouffe, C 
(2000) The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso
532 Robinson, A(2004) The Politics of Lack. In BJPIR: 2004 VOL 6, 259–269
533 Robinson, ibid
534 See Mouffe, C (2000) The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso
535 Robinson, A(2004) The Politics of Lack. In BJPIR: 2004 VOL 6, 259–269
536 Robinson, ibid
537 Robinson, ibid pp261
538 Ahumada, JL. (2001) The Rebirth of the Idols: the Freudian Unconscious and the Nietzschean Unconscious. In 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis (2001) 82, 219
539 Ahumada, ibid
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discontinuity and interruption, and that sexuality is no different from the perversions, and is to be 
seen in terms of perversion540. He further recalls Lacan's assertion that there is no sexual 
relationship, which I would translate into meaning that the sexual relationship is merely one with 
the 'self', rather than any other person541.
3.2.5 'Lack' and Agency
Premising psychoanalysis on an ineluctable 'lack' is not merely a question of an intellectual 
instability in the metatheory of psychoanalysis. It has a very real impact on the extent of agency 
accreditable to individuals. If an individual is psychically dependent on an object which he/she can 
never obtain, he/she cannot make fully independent choices542.
In the context of the psychodynamics of 'gay male fetishism', the 'fetishist' can therefore never be 
said to really choose his 'fetishes' (whether 'pathological' or 'non-pathological)', or indeed his 
sexuality in toto. He can further never be said to enjoy his 'fetishes' fully without being in some 
ways psychically dependent on them, since psychoanalysis premises his desires on some kind of 
inherent compulsion543.
The central metatheoretical problem of lack must therefore, I suggest, be resolved in order to 
approach 'gay male fetish sexuality' in more epistemologically sound ways. Alternatives should, I 
suggest be found, beyond the assumptions that sexuality is merely defined in a negative way in 
response to the pre-existing foundationalist lack, such as in Freudian constructions of the penis or 
the Lacanian absence of the phallus. We need to explore the possibility that sexuality is instead 
working 'towards' something, based on what subjects have, not what they don't have.
One key to finding this alternative appears to lie in Foucaultian notions of discourse, which can be 
mobilised in anti-foundationalist ways to enable a kind of dialectical relationship between the  
subject and the world around him through the acknowledgement that discourse is collectively 
constructed and at the same time constructs 'reality'544.
540 Ahumada, ibid
541 Ahumada, ibid
542 See Kripps, H (1999) Fetish: An Erotics of Culture Cornell University Press. Kripps brings an unusual perspective 
to theorising about fetishism, which he sees as a paradoxical refusal to follow up on one’s desire, rather than as 
being about what is socially unacceptable or about unusual desires. This implies that 'the fetish object' is not simply 
a substitute for the desired object but rather is an obsession with an object that prevents the subject from obtaining 
his/her/its desired object, whereby 'fetishism' is a substitute for an unobtainable object
543 See chapter 4
544 In other words, 'reality' is not outside of the purview of human influence, and therefore people can impact and 
change it. This is a kind of agency, although bounded by the collective choices. See chapter 5 and 6. Yet see above re 
the concerns about discursive accounts and the notion of psychical reality
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As one such approach, Discourse Psychology resists the notion of a clear division between the 
social and the psychic, through claims that to study public discourse is itself to study the mind 
rather than being a substitute for it. This idea is supported by Billig who demonstrates that thought  
i s a k ind o f i nne r speech t ha t suppo r t s t he d i a log i c cha r ac t e r o f soc i a l 
discourse545. This implies that the complexity, dynamism and inconsistent nature of subjectivity is 
some kind of Bakhtinian 'polyvocality' or 'heteroglossia', not the product of the unconscious. These 
voices interrelate rhetorically, which in turn indicates that processes like 'repression' are discursive 
rather than psychodynamic in that they are what is unspoken rather than what is removed from 
consciousness546.
In this way, discursive accounts encompass Western notions that humans have their own mind and 
biography, and should be held accountable for deviations from patterns. This implies that there is no  
'inner' psychodynamic organisation, and in Western thought it is central to discourse practice that  
people produce themselves (in other words, that they have agency). Further, the contradictory 
nature of culture gives the impetus and resources for all social and subjective interactions, whereby 
there is no need for a separate space such as the unconscious to take account of people's actions and 
opinions, since enough creative tension exists in culture itself547.
However, as will be addressed in more detail in the Interjection and Chapter 5, discourse-based 
approaches on their own are inadequate, largely because they lack an appropriate 'ontology of the  
self'548. Indeed, many discourse theorists agnostically refuse to identify the 'self', instead analysing 
debates on the 'nature' of people as played out in daily discourse549.
545 Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and Thinking. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.; Billig, M., Condor, S., 
Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D., & Radley, A. (1988). Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of 
Everyday Thinking. London, UK: Sage.
546 In this respect, see Derrida, J. (1973). Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of 
Signs. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. See also Billig, M. (1997) The dialogic unconscious : 
Psychoanalysis, discursive psychology and the nature of repression. In British Journal of Social Psychology 
1997,vol.36(2), pp.139-159, which discusses possible links between discursive psychology and psychoanalytic 
theory. Billig argues that Discursive psychology follows its Wittgensteinian and conversation analytic underpinnings 
and focuses on the social and discursive make-up of psychological phenomena, rather than on supposed inner 
motivations. However, the idea of the 'dialogic unconscious' suggests how processes of repression can be 
approached discursively. This argument suggests that conversation can be repressive and expressive, which 
discursive psychology has overlooked, concentrating on presence rather than absence in discourse. 
547 Edley, ibid
548 In the same vein, identity is 'sticky' and subjectivity is 'bounded', which claims are antithetical to discursive 
constructions. See Edley, N (2006) Never the Twain Shall Meet: A Critical Appraisal of the Combination of 
Discourse and Psychoanalytic Theory in Studies of Men and Masculinity Sex Roles (2006) 55: 601–608. In this 
respect, see chapter 2 on gay rights vs queer political frameworks
549 See Edley, N (2006) Never the Twain Shall Meet: A Critical Appraisal of the Combination of Discourse and 
Psychoanalytic Theory in Studies of Men and Masculinity Sex Roles (2006) 55: 601–608. In this way, the 'reality' of 
men and masculinity is dealt with in Discourse Psychology as both a topic and an outcome of discursive practices.
As Edley notes, the value of certain criticisms of Discourse Psychology, in particular that things like attitudes, 
memories and emotions should not be dealt with as facets of social action, and that certain poststructuralist theorists 
have de-centred the Cartesian subject too much. These arguments point out that the self is studied only as terms of 
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While useful in challenging foundationalisms, discourse psychology appears inappropriately to 
allow subjects to make completely strategic or executive decisions about the identities they take on, 
and agency is exaggerated550. Alternatively, as will be discussed in the Interjection, discursive 
accounts assume that the subject is constituted entirely through discourse and has no agency.
One attempt at an alternative has been to merge Discourse Psychology with Psychoanalytic 
theory551, on the premise that the latter are often thought to fill the gaps in the former, which are 
broader in scope552. However, discourse and psychoanalytic theories have incompatible 
metatheoretical bases, and most attempts to combine them result in a running of the theories side by  
side rather than a synthesis553. These incompatible metatheoretical bases demand that 
alternatives to psychoanalytic theory be found, rather than trying to shore up psychoanalytic 
notions in one or other way by calling on discourse to supplement it, or vice versa, or trying to 
replace psychoanalysis with discourse theories.
individual discursive acts undertaking social activities like presenting the self, excusing, blaming and so on, 
resulting in conceptions of self where subjective experience is flexible to the extent that there seems to be little to 
personal psychology beyond moment-to-moment located experience. The self is encompassed within language, and 
the self is too far removed from phenomenological or experiential reality (See chapters 5 and 6 in relation to 
embodied, experiential approaches, especially phenomenology ). 
550 Edley, ibid.  On the other hand, psychoanalysis grants detailed models of structures and processes of the psyche that 
allow exploration of how and why identities are discursively created. Yet, see above for criticisms in this regard. At 
face value, combining discourse and psychoanalytic theory by taking discourse as constitutive of the psyche while 
constructing a metatheoretical basis for such processes allows for a location of agency both within the world and in 
relation to (non-essentialist) internal psychic mechanisms. 
551 See Harré, R & Stearns, P.N. (1995) Discursive psychology in practice. SAGE; Wetherell, M (2003) Paranoia, 
Ambivalence and Discursive Practices: Concepts of Position and Positioning in Psychoanalysis and Discursive 
Psychology. In Harré, R & Moghaddam, F.M. (2003) The self and others: positioning individuals and groups in 
personal, political, and cultural contexts. Greenwood Publishing Group; Hepburn, A & Wiggins, S (2005) 
Developments in Discursive Psychology. In Discourse & Society, Vol. 16, No. 5, 595-601 (2005)
See also Frith, H & Kitzinger, C. (2001) Reformulating Sexual Script Theory: Developing a Discursive Psychology 
of Sexual Negotiation. In Theory & Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 2, 209-232 (2001); 
552 See Edley, N (2006) Never the Twain Shall Meet: A Critical Appraisal of the Combination of Discourse and 
Psychoanalytic Theory. In Studies of Men and Masculinity Sex Roles (2006) 55: 601–608; He notes that Discursive 
Psychology entails reconsidering the relationship between words and the world. Rather than seeing the world as 
reflected in language, discourse theorists view it as made up in and through discourse, primarily in an epistemic 
sense (how we develop knowledge or understanding of the world is shaped by discourse). He notes, however, that 
discourse is also seen as onto-formative. He refers to Kosík, K. (1976). Dialectics of the concrete: A study on 
problems of man and the world. Dordrecht: D. Reidel; I.e. , it is seen as able to bring objects and events into being. 
In relation to the central assumptions behind and major developments of Discursive Psychology he also refers to 
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive Psychology. London: Sage; Potter, J. (1996). Representing Reality. 
London: Sage. and Edwards, D. (1997). Discourse and Cognition. London: Sage. In relation to studies of men and 
masculinity, Edley cogently argues against the use of psychoanalytic theory, and advocates for remaining in the 
arena of discourse. Edley argues that central to the recent work on taking a discourse approach to studying men and 
masculinity is the assertion that masculinity is not something which can be viewed outside of discourse as an 
essentialist way, but is constructed in and through discourse. These studies have looked at how the meanings of 
masculinity are maintained and re-negotiated in discourse and how masculine identities are flexible in construction 
and set to work in a variety of contexts and settings.  Discourse Psychology allows for the flexible use of language 
resources in the local production of masculinities and can account for patterns of consistency as well as the existence 
of recognisably individual selves that are socially constructed.
Amongst many other theorists. In this respect he refers to Judith Butler (1990) Gender Trouble:Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge.
553 Edley, ibid
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3.3 Conclusion
For Bhabha, the stereotype of the 'racial fetish' perpetuates identities predicated on mastery and 
pleasure as well as on anxiety and difference554. In this chapter I have argued, in similar vein, 
although pertaining to 'sexual fetish', that the contemporary definitions and discourses of 'sexual 
fetish' in psychology have come through an historical trajectory of colonialist discourses and 
Freudian psychoanalytic epistemologies, both of which have focused primarily on the 'fetish object'. 
This, I suggest, serves to obscure subjectivities and agency in the realm of the 'sexual fetish' through 
identifying the 'sexual fetishist' through the 'fetish object' of their desire, (i.e. through the 
recognition and disavowal of sameness) which in turn serves to discursively displace 'fetishists'.
Colonial discourses on 'fetishism' assumed simple hierarchical relationships between dominant and 
subordinate subjects. These assumptions led to definitions of 'fetishism' based on a focus on the 
'fetish object', which definitions are, I suggest, unstable and inappropriate as a metatheoretical basis  
for 'sexual fetish'. On closer inspection, such discourses derived from cross-cultural encounters 
based on mutual misunderstanding, and from competing intersections between colonial religion and  
capitalism, which intersected with colonial fetishism and reification discourses.  Unpacking colonial  
discourses evidences an underlying colonial discomfort with its own discursive premises, and 
further reveals relations between coloniser and colonised which were dialectical, rather than  
oppositional. The colonial enterprise failed to acknowledge the colonised's religio-cultural and  
personal frames of reference. Discourses on 'fetishism' obscured points of connection and 
similarities between the colonisers and the colonised, and allowed colonisers to avoid recognising 
their own subjection and subservience to fictions of the immaterial over the material.
Understanding relations between coloniser and colonised in this clearer way opens doors to better 
comprehension for alternative, non-object-focused platforms on which to base metatheory on 'fetish 
sexuality'. These notions of connectedness will be explored in chapters 5 and 6.
Nevertheless, the two-dimensional, object-focused idea of 'fetishism' moved beyond the bounds of 
the colonial enterprise and into Freudian discourses on 'fetishism' which similarly avoided 
recognition of similarity and commonality. Psychoanalytic premises for 'fetishism' are essentially  
object-focused, which, as I will argue further in chapter 4, serves to obscure subjectivities and 
agency. 
554 Bhabha, H. (1994) The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism. In 
The Location of Culture New York:  Routledge. 66-84
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More particularly:
Freudian psychoanalytic constructions are heteronormative and sexist, thereby perpetuating 
assumptions around the priority of the male subject as implicitly power- and object-oriented, 
whether in relation to human or 'fetish object'; and
Adult 'fetishism' is seen as a childish psychological attachment taking place through an  
inappropriate prolonging of normal childhood processes into adulthood. This paradigm 
however, relies on normative references and fails to ground the distinction between 
pathological and non-pathological fetishism sufficiently firmly.
These points create a problematic basis for the exploration of practices of non-normative 
(homo)sexual subjects, whose subjectivities are obscured by the psychodynamic assumption of their 
adopting the subjectivity of a fictively generic heterosexual male.
These failings are partially remedied by re-working the premises of Freud, and/or by reference to a 
linguistic/discursive power-focus. Yet they do not address the fundamental psychoanalytic premise 
of 'lack', which is inherently object-focused thanks to the description of the human psyche as 
irretrievably and oppositionally defined in relation to the absence of physically or linguistically/
discursively described objects, based on a foundational, fictive, singular, universal (object-focused) 
psychodynamic reference point. 
Attempts to combine psychoanalytic theory with discursive explanations, for example through 
Discourse Psychology, do not obviate the problem, since psychoanalytic foundationalism is 
metatheoretically incompatible with discursive accounts. In the context of the psychology of fetish 
sexuality, the foundationalism of psychoanalysis is further epistemologically problematic since it  
tends to obscure subjectivities through the inappropriate prioritising of rationality over valid agency.  
Such a focus hides the personal under the political and under discipline-specific practices, thereby 
failing to acknowledge the fluidity between consciousness and environment, and the complexity of 
human processes driven by a various internal and external, personal and political, rational and 
emotional influences.
It is clear, therefore, that the historical metatheoretical bases for 'fetishism' remain that of an 
insubstantial and unstable reliance on the assumption that it is appropriate to focus epistemological  
attention on the 'fetish object' as the definitional nexus for sexual practices involving material 
objects.
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As I will argue in chapter 4, this kind of foundationalist, object-focused thinking is inappropriate in  
light of the lived experience of 'gay male fetishists', yet it remains the basis for 
contemporary discourses of psychopathology which inappropriately obscure a focus on 
subjectivities through their insistence on an antagonistic relationship between subject and 'fetish' 
object. This, I argue is inappropriate for postmodern ontologies on lived sexual experience, and is  
antithetical to queer frameworks for theorising sexualities, which should prioritise subjectivities of 
gay men who incorporate material objects into their sexual practices, and should further create valid  
and viable epistemological spaces for such people555. As I will further argue in Chapters 5 and 6, a 
more appropriate approach to 'sexual fetish' scholarship is to recognise the role of complex 
embodied experience in exploring the subjectivities of non-normative sexualities.
555 See chapter 2 re queer positioning
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CHAPTER 4
CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOPATHOLOGIES OF 'SEXUAL 
FETISHISM'
Persons who respond only or primarily to objects which are remote from the sexual partner, or remote 
from the overt sexual activities with a partner, are not rare in the population. This is particularly true of 
individuals who are erotically aroused by high heels, by boots, by corsets, by tight clothing, by long 
gloves, by whips, or by other objects which suggest sado-masochistic relationships, and which may 
have been associated with the individual’s previous sexual activity.556
As internationally recognised classificatory systems, the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD) & Diagnostic and American Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which influence 
South African psychology and psychiatry practices, codify contemporary psychiatric classifications 
and diagnoses of 'fetish' sexuality557. Like their colonialist and early psychoanalytic predecessors, I  
argue that they remain focused on the material object involved in sexual practices, and define  
'fetishism' (and the 'fetishist') in terms of the desire for that object, rather than by reference to the 
person doing the desiring558. 
In this chapter I argue that both the categorisation of 'fetishism' and the guidelines for diagnosis rely  
fundamentally on normativity and circular arguments, and are therefore inadequate and unstable  
metatheoretical constructs for unusual sexual practices since they create rather than describe 
psychopathology. 
In contradistinction, the practices of 'fetishists'559 and the complexity of the intersections between 
their sexual orientations, sexual interests and a broader life views transcend simplistic 'pathological'  
vs 'non-pathological' categories which flow from foundationalist frameworks. Their practices refuse 
a regularised, 'one-size-fits-all' psychopathology which fails to acknowledge the multiple and 
complex ways in which 'gay male fetish sexuality' intersects both with marginality and the 
empowerment stolen in the face of heteronorms. Contemporary 'fetish sexuality' reflects 
556 Kinsey,A., Pomeroy,W., Martin,C. & Gebhard,P. (1953) Sexual behavior in the human female. Philadelphia: W.B. 
Saunders Company.  pp. 678-679
557 World Health Organization. (2004). International Classification of Diseases 10 (2nd ed). Geneva: 
WHO. ICD-10, and American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
4-TR. Washington DC: APA.
558 See chapter 3
559  as interviewed in this study. Notably, these are in no way representative of all contemporary ‘fetishists’ but merely 
refelct perceptions of those with whom I spoke. Further, I am only now engaging with their voices in any 
substantive way, since the previous chapters have dealt with the more theoretical and historical frameworks on 
political locations and ‘fetishism’.
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participants' willingness to (re-)negotiate complex intimate lives through compelling albeit often 
uncomfortable desires, while revealing more compelling and complex ways of understanding (and 
therefore describing) human sexual relations with material objects.
4.1 From Freud to the 21st Century: Unpacking Contemporary 
Psycho(patho)logy
Many theorists have critiqued psychology as a regulatory discourse and practice in the context of 
gender and sexual i ty, based on the argument that sexual i ty is discurs ively 
constructed560. In particular, gay and lesbian theorists and those advocating queer approaches to 
identities and practices in general, have coherently argued how psychology serves to legitimise, 
rationalise, regulate and (where necessary) impose disciplinary intervention to ensure 
heteronormative and patriarchal gender norms and sexualities561.
Unfortunately these compelling post-structuralist critiques have fallen on deaf ears as regards 
the categories and diagnostic guidelines of 'fetishism' in the ICD (and DSM). Rather, these 
categories and diagnostic guidelines seem to follow the positivist trajectory of twentieth century  
psychology practice in the West562.
560 See for example Rose, N (1989) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self. London & New York: 
Routledge; Burman, E. (ed) (1990) Feminists and Psychological Practice. London: Sage.; Schweder, R (1990) 
Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Parker, I (1992) Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology. London & New York, 
Routledge; Wilkinson, S & Kitzinger, C (eds) (1993) Heterosexuality: a Feminism and Psychology Reader. London: 
Sage; Parker, I & Speares, R (1996) Psychology & Society: Radical Theory and Practice. London & Chicago: Pluto 
Press; Burr, V (1998) Gender and Social Psychology. London, Routledge; Parker, I (1999) Critical psychology: 
critical links. In Annual Review of Critical Psychology Vol. 1, pp. 3-18; Kitzinger, C (1999) Lesbian and gay 
psychology: is it critical?In Annual Review of Critical Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 50-66; Shefer, T & Potgieter, C-A 
(2006) Sexualities. In Shefer, T, Bonzaaier, F & Kiguwa, P (2006) The Gender of Psychology. Cape Town: UCT 
Press. Painter, D. & Terre Blanche, M. & Henderson, J. (2006) Critical psychology in South Africa: Histories, 
themes and prospects. In Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 5, pp. 212-235 www.discourseunit.com/arcp/5
561 For more general critiques on essentialist binaries, see for example Butler, JP (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity New York, Routledge; Sedgwick, E.K. (2005) Axiomatic. In Morland, I and Willox, A 
(2005) Queer Theory Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire and New York, pp81-95 at 81 Sedgwick suggests we should 
look at binaries beyond heterosexual/homosexual, like knowledge/ignorance and domestic/foreign in ways that 
queer theory attempts to deconstruct apparently non-sexual binarisms as normative concepts. Sexuality binaries are 
just as contradictory and determinative as those of sex, class and race, and have “primary importance for all modern 
Western identity and social organization (and not merely for homosexual identity and culture)” and is “so situated as 
to enable most inextricably and at the same time most differentially the filaments of other important definitional 
nexuses”.
See also Sedgwick, E.K. (2005) Axiomatic. In Morland, I. and Willox, A. (2005) Queer Theory Palgrave 
MacMillan, Hampshire and New York, pp81-95 at 82: As Sedgwick notes, the idea of 'difference' incorporates 
varied forms of sexuality, which are nevertheless carelessly lumped together under the heading ‘sexual orientation’
562 For an overview of psychology, see Goodwin, C.J. (1999) A History of Modern Psychology (second ed)  
John Wiley and Sons; Feigl, H & Scriven, M (2009) The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology  
and Psychoanalysis. University of Minnesota Press
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This desire to regulate and structuralise the psyche through institutionalised practices and such 
professional codes as the World Health Organisation's psychopathological classification of 
'fetishism', continues to mask important ontological questions563. In the context of 'fetish sexuality' 
particularly, this results in a paucity of critical inquiry into the regulatory forms and 
psychopathologising consequences of psychiatric discourses, which perpetuate 
(hetero)normativities.
On further inspection, the categories and diagnostic guidelines of psychopathologising discourses 
prove to discursively reconstruct the 'fetishist' as an essentialist and marginal category of human 
who is separate to others, and separate to the world around him/her. Subjectivities and agency are 
thereby effaced, to the detriment of the multiple and complex perspectives of real people who enjoy 
a diversity of consensual sexual practices.
4.1.1 Contemporary 'Sexual Fetish': the ICD and DSM Classifications
Contemporary psychodynamic constructions of 'fetish sexuality' come out of the work of early 
medical profession pioneers who created a vocabulary and classification system of ‘unusual’ sexual  
See also Bickhard, MH & Campbell, RL (2005) New Ideas in Psychology. In New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 23,  
Issue 1, April 2005, Pages 1-4 pp1: Bickhard and campbell claim that theory was better esteemed early in the 
development of modern psychology, but was substantially delegitimized in the early 20th century. The 1930s 
featured neo-Machian positivism and operationism, which left little space for theory. 
(See the impact of Machian positivism: Ernst Mach (1838–1916). see Smith, L. D. (1986). Behaviorism and logical  
positivism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.) Operationism was rejected in the 1930s, when Hempel showed 
that even the most basic scientific conceptions could not be properly defined operationally. (See Hempel, C. G. 
(1965). Aspects of scientific explanation. New York: Free Press.) Behaviourism was subsequently rejected in the 
1950s in favour of “the cognitive revolution”, where psychologists rejected prohibitions against looking to mental 
processes that were unobservable. (See MacKenzie, B.D. (1977) Behaviourism and the limits of scientific method 
International library of philosophy and scientific method, Taylor & Francis. Also Mackenzie, B.D. (1972) 
Behaviourism and positivism. In Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Volume 8 Issue 2, Pages 
222-231. Also Costall, A (2006) ‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology. In 
Consciousness and Cognition Volume 15, Issue 4, December 2006, Pages 634-654 Special Issue on Introspection. 
He argues that most textbooks specify that modern, scientific psychology took place in three stages, starting with a 
focus on the study of mind based on introspection. This was rejected by Watson as unreliable and effete, and 
redefined as the science of behaviour.) Behaviourism and introspection were replaced by the cognitive revolution 
wherein the mind was seen as the subject of study. Costall argues that these three stages are  mythical in that 
introspectionism was not dominant and introspection remained. He argues that the myth obscures important 
conceptual problems, for example the contemporary idea of “behaviour”. Psychologists were disinclined to follow 
doctrines such as associationism inherited from the older empiricist schools, yet psychology nevertheless held onto 
behaviourism, and often saw such new frameworks as the acceptance of postulating computational processes and 
neural network processes as more powerful ways of framing or summarizing Machian information. Bickhard and 
Campbell note that “[t]oday they are still being pressed into service to account for local data sets about a few 
phenomena here and a few more phenomena there, while their underlying ontologies go unexamined”, and that 
proper theorizing requires for psychological theories to be judged as “realistic models of mental and person-level 
phenomena: criticized as such, explored as such, and tested as such. Genuine theorizing will be in short supply so 
long as psychologists cling to the inductivist, dust-bowl empiricist picture of what good science is supposed to look 
like.” In many places operationalist rhetoric is still taught to students with little in the way of alternative conceptions 
of theory and little guidance on examining or exploring theoretical possibilities
563 such as the Freudian categorisation of psychical 'fetish' in terms of an object-focus, rather than in terms which 
recognise dialectical complexity in the personal and the socio-political. See chapters 5 and 6
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p r a c t i c e s , b a s e d o n p s y c h i a t r i c c a s e s t u d i e s a n d 1 9 t h c e n t u r y p o p u l a r 
novels564. Problematically, such systems resulted in the stigmatising of individuals on the basis of 
their sexual desires565.
The first version of the ICD appeared in 1900 with the intention of classifying deadly somatic 
diseases566. It has undergone various revisions, and the list of deadly and non-deadly diseases has 
proliferated. The ICD included sexual deviation as a general classification in 
1948567, w i t h s u b d i v i s i o n s w h i c h h a v e b a r e l y c h a n g e d f i r s t a p p e a r i n g i n 
1965568. Today, the ICD-10 is the internationally accepted classification and diagnostic system of  
mental and behavioural disorders of the World Health Organization (WHO), and 
embodies contemporary psychiatric classifications of sexual fetishism 569. It functions as a key 
reference for mental health professionals in Europe and South Africa, and chapter F65 provides 
guidelines for the diagnosis of “Disorders of Sexual Preference” requiring psychological  
assistance570. These 'disorders' exclude 'problems associated with sexual orientation', but include the 
'paraphilias' of 'fetishism' and 'fetishistic transvestism'.
Section F65.0 describes 'Fetishism' as the reliance on a non-living object for sexual stimulus. 
'Fetishes', which may be extensions of the human body or particular textures, may vary in  
importance to different psychological subjects, and in some cases enhance sexual excitement 
“achieved in ordinary ways”571. As will be argued later, this implies that any reliance on a material 
object a priori falls under the purview of 'fetishism'.
An associated category, dealt with in section F65.1, is 'Fetishistic Transvestism', which is classified 
as the wearing of c lothes of the opposi te sex principal ly to obtain sexual 
excitement572. It includes 'transvestic fetishism', although the distinction between the two terms is 
564 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press pp244
565 See chapter 3
566 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press pp244
For a brief overview of the ICD as it pertains to a South African context, see Smit, E (2006) Western Psychiatry and 
Gender Identity Disorder (GID): a Critical Perspective. In Shefer, T, Bonzaaier, F & Kiguwa, P (2006) 
The Gender of Psychology. Cape Town: UCT Press
567 (ICD-6)
568 (ICD-8)
569 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press pp244
570 See Addendum 2
571 World Health Organization. (2004). International Classification of Diseases 10 (2nd ed). Geneva: 
WHO. ICD-10
572 World Health Organization. (2004). ibid
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imprecise573. In turn, 'fetishistic transvestism' is distinguished from 'transsexual transvestism' by 
sexual arousal and the overwhelming desire to remove the clothing after orgasm. The section notes  
that 'fetishistic transvestism' is often an earlier phase in the development of transsexualism. As will  
be argued later, this implies that any deviation from gender-normative attire is a priori 'fetishistic'.
The American DSM is seen as the definitive authority on mental disorder in the USA, and is often  
called on as a key reference worldwide574. Although the DSM influences views on 'fetishism' in 
South African psychology and psychiatry575, it is not as central as the ICD which has direct 
relevance as a World Health Organisation standard. The ICD and DSM have influenced each other, 
573 World Health Organization. (2004). ibid
574 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17.
See American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 4-TR. 
Washington DC: APA. The DSM is regularly revised, and is claimed to be factually correct and up-to date with 
newly available information. It classifies “unusual and strong sexual interests” (i.e., paraphilias) as 
psychopathological, a status it claims to be "…supported by an extensive empirical foundation"
See also Watters, E (2010) The Americanization of Mental Illness. In New York Times Magazine, January 8, 2010. 
(from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10psyche-t.html) and Watters, E (2010) 
Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche’. Mass. & Washington DC: Free Press. Watters argues 
that the meaning of mental health globally health has increasingly become 'Americanised': “If our rising need for 
mental-health services does indeed spring from a breakdown of meaning, our insistence that the rest of the world 
think like us may be all the more problematic. Offering the latest Western mental-health theories, treatments and 
categories in an attempt to ameliorate the psychological stress sparked by modernization and globalization is not a 
solution; it may be part of the problem. When we undermine local conceptions of the self and modes of healing, we 
may be speeding along the disorienting changes that are at the very heart of much of the world’s mental distress.”
575 The DSM does not see the leather-sm-fetish community's style of sexuality as necessarily pathological, and the 
DSM-IV (1994 [APA94]) notes new diagnostic criteria that do not classify sexual sadism, masochism and fetishism 
as disturbances solely related to erotic activities
See American Psychiatric Association (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-IV-TR 
Fourth Edition (Text Revision), which categorises Psychiatric Diagnoses. The manual, published by the American 
Psychiatric Association, covers all mental health disorders for adults and children, as well as listing known causes, 
gender, age at onset, and prognosis statistics, and research about optimal treatment approaches. Mental Health 
Professionals use the to gain understanding of illness and potential treatment, as well as for helping 3rd party payers 
such as insurance companies.
The DSM uses multiaxial/multidimensional approaches to diagnosis, since other personal factors impact on mental 
health. It looks at five dimensions:
Axis I: Clinical Syndromes (i.e.the diagnosis, such as depression, schizophrenia or social phobia)
Axis II: Developmental Disorders and Personality Disorders (developmental disorders are usually initially evident in 
childhood, and include autism and mental retardation) (Personality disorders, as clinical syndromes, have long 
lasting symptoms, entailing impacting on the person's way of interacting with the world, and include Paranoid, 
Antisocial, and Borderline Personality Disorders)
Axis III: Physical Conditions affecting the development, continuance, or exacerbation of Axis I and II Disorders 
(including examples such as brain injury or HIV/AIDS, which can result in mental illness symptoms)
Axis IV: Severity of Psychosocial Stressors, as ranked (Disorders listed in Axis I and II can be impacted on by life 
events such as the death of a loved one, a new job, unemployment, marriage etc)
Axis V: Highest Level of Functioning (the person's present level of functioning and highest level during the previous 
year, which helps comprehension of how the above four axes affect the individual and the type of changes to be 
expected
For a short discussion on the DSM in a South African context pertaining to sexualities (albeit paedophilia rather than 
fetishism, see below re consensual vs non-consensual sexualities), see Bowman, B (2005) 
Children, Pathology and Politics: Genealogical Perspectives on the Construction of the Paedophile in South 
Africa. PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, who notes that the American Psychiatric 
Association receives support from Mental Health Professionals in South Africa. The DSM categories are therefore 
of influence in local psychiatric discourses. 
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with very little change in category or content since the early days, particularly in respect of  
Fetishism and Sadomasochism for at least the last three revisions576.
Both the DSM and the ICD qualify the classification of 'fetishism' by stating that the individual  
must be rendered effectively dysfunctional in an important area of their life to be called  
'sick'577. This is intended to exclude from the purview of psychiatrists and psychologists people who 
are not rendered substantially dysfunctional by their 'fetish' interests. On the face of it, this serves to  
p r o t e c t ' n o n - p a t h o l o g i c a l ' a c t i v i t y f r o m c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a s 
psychopathology578.
Notwithstanding this qualification, however, I argue that the ICD (and the DSM) categories for 
'fetishism' are inappropriate, since they discursively recreate psychopathology and inappropriately 
prescribe heteronormative sexual activity, rather than describing sexual diversity. This is apparent 
in two main areas. Firstly, the classifications of sexual dysfunction rely primarily on normative  
comparisons. Secondly, the diagnostic criteria normatively distinguish 'pathological' from 'non-
pathological fetishism'. Both therefore reflect and legitimise existing dominant (heteropatriarchal)  
discourses on sexuality, relationships and the family. This in turn marginalises a wide range of  
people, and obscures subjectivities.
4.2 Psychiatric Definitions of 'Fetishism': Beyond Contemporary 
Simplistic  Constructions
Taking account of poststructuralist (and in particular queer) critiques of psychology as a regulatory 
force arguably means reject ing the very not ion of psychiatric classif icat ion 
in toto, since classification presumes a clarity and certainty about the parameters of human sexual  
experience and meaning where there can be none579. Such classification not only buys into fictions 
that psychiatry and psychology are fully authoritative 'sciences', but also perpetuates the regulatory 
576 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press pp244
577 See Reid, W.H. & Wise, M.G. (1995) DSM-IV training guide, 4th ed, New York: Psychology Press, Brunner/Mazel 
Publishers
578 See Chapter 3 in this regard
579 See Darcangelo, S (2008) Fetishism. in Laws, D.R., O'Donohue, W.T. (2008) Sexual deviance: theory, assessment,  
and treatment. Guilford Press, 2008 at 108 et seq. Darcangelo argues that little empirical work has been done in 
exploring fetishism, and more questions than answers remain. However, I argue that no more empirical work needs 
to be done, since it is more appropriate to do away with classifications and replace them with better metatheory. In 
particular see chapters 5 and 6 in this regard
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roles of the discourse and practice of psychology revealed by contemporary debates in sexualities  
and gender scholarship, and in critical psychology580.
Classifications of 'fetishism', in particular, conflict with broader poststructuralist debates on 
contemporary categorisations and classifications of sexuality and sex-based definitions, about 
which there is also a growing, albeit disquietingly small , sense of popular 
discomfort581. These voices generally approach the argument from the assumption that unusual  
sexual proclivities are discursively constructed, and should therefore not be pathologised through 
perpetuating normative assumptions which irrationally prioritise certain value systems over others.
A closer inspection of the classifications indeed reveals that the categories of 'fetishism' and 
'transvestic festishism' rely on normative bases and are therefore ineffective descriptive tools, since 
they rather function as injunctions prescribing compulsory (hetero)normativity.
4.2.1 The Vestigial Tails of Freudian Categories
There are two foundational problems to the ICD categories flowing directly from their historical  
reliance on Freudian foundations: a basis in unstable ontologies which mistake the constitution of 
the psychical subject, and an inappropriate reliance on dualist, oppositional thinking which 
essentialises fetish practices582.
580 See the context of psychology critiques above: See for example Rose, N (1989) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of  
the Private Self. London & New York: Routledge; Burman, E. (ed) (1990) Feminists and Psychological  
Practice. London: Sage.; Schweder, R (1990) Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human 
Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Parker, I (1992) Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for 
Social and Individual Psychology. London & New York, Routledge; Wilkinson, S & Kitzinger, C (eds) (1993) 
Heterosexuality: a Feminism and Psychology Reader. London: Sage; Parker, I & Speares, R (1996) Psychology & 
Society: Radical Theory and Practice. London & Chicago: Pluto Press; Burr, V (1998) Gender and Social  
Psychology. London, Routledge; Parker, I (1999) Critical psychology: critical links. In Annual Review of Critical 
Psychology Vol. 1, pp. 3-18; Kitzinger, C (1999) Lesbian and gay psychology: is it critical? In Annual Review of 
Critical Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 50-66; Parker, I. (2004) ‘Psychoanalysis and critical psychology’, in D. Hook (ed.), 
with N. Mkhize, P. Kiguwa and A. Collins (section eds) and E. Burman and I. Parker (consulting eds) 
Critical Psychology, pp. 138-161. Cape Town: UCT Press; Painter, D. & Terre Blanche, M. & Henderson, J. (2006) 
Critical psychology in South Africa: Histories, themes and prospects. In Annual Review of Critical 
Psychology, 5, pp. 212-235 www.discourseunit.com/arcp/5  ;  Shefer, T & Potgieter, C-A (2006) Sexualities. In 
Shefer, T, Bonzaaier, F & Kiguwa, P (2006) The Gender of Psychology. Cape Town: UCT Press.
581 For example, the website www.reviseF65.org seeks to “discuss stigmatizing psychiatric diagnoses as they appear in 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), published by the World Health Organization (WHO)”. Their 
purpose is “to eliminate the diagnoses of Fetishism (F65.0), Fetishistic Transvestism (F65.1), and Sadomasochism 
(F65.5) from the current version of ICD (ICD-10)”.  While their stated goal is “not to change the American 
diagnostic system, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American 
Psychiatric Association” themselves, they note that there are people in the US targeting the corresponding (DSM)-
diagnoses”.
582 Note: For the sake of clarity and simplicity, and because the DSM is not directly applicable to South African 
circumstances (although it is influential), I will speak of the ICD classifications and diagnoses from this point, 
although the arguments also largely apply to the DSM
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Firstly, the ICD substantially repeats the Freudian definitions of 'fetishism' and therefore falls into 
the same ontological traps as its early psychoanalytic counterparts discussed in Chapter 3. It thereby 
(re)creates problematic categories based on unstable metatheory which is laced with inappropriate 
foundationalist assumptions around the constitution of the sexual subject as a psychical animal 
evading an inevitable lack. By simply repeating the 'fetish object'-focused discourses inherited from 
colonialist and modernist diatribes, the classifications perpetuate inappropriate assumptions and  
discourses which assume that subjects inherently lack sexual agency583.
Secondly, beyond these foundational ontological concerns, the ICD-10 categories retain two 
i m p l i c i t a n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e v e s t i g i a l t a i l s o f d u a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n a l 
thinking584. These tails emerge from Freud's desire to structuralise the psyche by creating artificial 
links between categories in order to demonstrate their intimate affiliation and to distinguish them 
from each other585. As I will argue, firstly the ICD implicitly and inappropriately links 'fetishism' to 
other psychiatric 'isms', and secondly it establishes 'fetishism' as an a priori pathological category 
which needs to be refuted, thereby placing an 'onus of rebuttal' on the alleged 'fetishist'. Both these  
tails prove to be founded on an inappropriate basis of normativity.
4.2.1a) Connecting People through 'isms': Tarred by the Same Brush
F65 combines unrelated items under the rubric of the 'isms' of unusual phenomena, such as 
consensual behaviours like 'fetishism' and consensual sado-masochism on the one hand, and non-
consensual behaviours like paedophilia on the other586. This implies that both share ‘maladaptive 
qualities’587. It is, however, inappropriate to class people with abusive intentions with those who 
have no such intentions, and, as Reiersøl & Skeid argue, the rationale behind this is clearly 
normative moralising588. The ICD's authors patently do not see any ethical difference between  
consensual and non-consensual behaviour589, rather focusing on what they deem as inappropriately 
583 As discussed in chapter 3
584 I use the term 'vestigial tails' as a tongue-in-cheek reference to Freud's reliance on  Darwinian thinking to justify the 
continued marginalisation. In this regard, see See Hoad, N.W. (1998) Wild(e) Men and Savages: the Homosexual  
and the Primitive in Darwin, Wilde and Freud. PhD Thesis. Columbia University. Hoad argues compellingly that 
late nineteenth century notions of male 'homosexuality' should be located in the context of racial difference and 
white European imperial expansion. More particularly, he argues that Freud relies on Darwin's arguments around 
ontogenetic development as linking into phylogenetic primitiveness to locate theories of psycho-sexual 
development, allowing Freud to conceive of homosexuality as arrested development.
585 Bonnet, G (2002) Pour une nouvelle classification des perversions sexuelles. In Evolutionary Psychiatry 2002 ; 67 : 
496-505, pp497-8. See below on criticisms of Bonnet's argument as being structuralist
586 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press pp251
See below on arguments on descriptions of sexuality as consensual and non-consensual
587 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S ibid
588 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S ibid see below re normative issues
589 This is not to say that the distinction is unproblematic, since 'consensuality' is itself a social construct
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d e s i r e d s e x u a l o b j e c t s , w h e t h e r t h e s e b e h u m a n o r n o t , c o n s e n t i n g o r 
not590. The section therefore categorises 'fetishists' with other 'types' of (transgressive) people, 
thereby essentialising them. This strategy of devaluing and pathologising certain practices by 
conflating them with abusive practices links directly to issues of the inappropriate normative bases  
for diagnosing (as opposed to classifying) 'fetishism', which will be discussed later in more detail.
Further, although the ICD-10 neither connects voyeurism and exhibitionism as did Freud, nor 
explicitly sets 'fetishism' in opposition to any purported opposite, it does connect sadism and  
masochism. Similarly, the ICD-10 clearly identifies 'fetishism' and 'transsexual transvestism' as  
separate psychopathological 'categories'. This implies that 'fetishists' and 'transsexual transvestites' 
are essentially separate kinds of people591 by juxtaposing the categories against each other through 
their relation to normatively proscribed material objects: unusual sexual objects, and gender-non-
conformist clothing respectively592. Yet it insufficiently distinguishes these 'isms' from each other, 
instead relying on normative considerations to fulfil the task593. 
This inconsistent cross-pollination of categories perpetuates the historical desire to define 
phenomena through opposites and to call on dualist discourses594. The result is that the ICD 
becomes self-justificatory: it calls on its own categories and normative judgements on approved  
sexual behaviour, rather than relying on the subjectivities of sexual subjects to explain 
psychodynamic phenomena. As will be discussed later, this in turn means that the categories 
e f f e c t i v e l y proscribe normatively disapproved act ivi t ies ( ' fe t ishism') , thereby 
prescribing normatively approved activity ('non-fetishism'), rather than describing sexual 
subjectivities relating to sexual scripts incorporating material objects as the ICD purports to do.
590 See arguments re describing sexuality on consensual vs non-consensual bases later
591 See later re heteronormative assumptions
592 In regard gender issues and the performance of gendered and sexual identities, see 
Butler, J. (1999) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity NY, Routledge.
593 See above for definitions
See Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press. In the case of 
'transsexual transvestitism', as Reiersøl and Skeid argue, the ICD guidelines do not explain the classification of an 
individual who does not remove the 'offending' (female) attire immediately after orgasm (a key classificatory 
indication for 'transsexual transvestism'), for example because the clothing feels good, or where the subject wants to 
relax, or “wants to continue sexual activity in anticipation of another wave of arousal”. This lack of immediate 
déshabillement automatically and inaccurately implies that the person is a 'transsexual transvestite', whereas the 
person may have no transgendered desires, and 'fetishism' would be more apt as a classification. This implies that 
the boundary between 'fetishism' and 'transsexual transvestitism' are in some senses interchangeable, mutable and 
therefore not useful as separate categories.
594 See introduction re the difference between sadomasochism (S/M) and fetish
135
 
 
 
 
4.2.1b) Categorical Essentialising of Fetish Practices
The ICD assumes that practices can be identified and pinned down, as if they have some essential 
construction. Yet, I suggest, this is not the case.
Firstly, F65.0 establishes 'fetishism' primarily as a pathological and therefore an essentialising  
c a t e g o r y o f p r a c t i c e s t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t o f l a b e l l i n g p e o p l e a s 
'fetishists'595. By means of a document which classifies psychopathologies, the category of 
'fetishism' is codified as identifiable, and is thereby not merely described, but discursively 
(re)created. This establishes an unintentional a priori presumption that all sexual practices which 
incorporate a n y objects fall under the purview of 'fetishism', and therefore that 
all sexual practices are inherently pathologisable. This is problematic, since the implication of the 
mere existence of an inanimate object of sexual interest discursively implies psychopathology 
wherever an inanimate object is involved in sexuality, which feeds assumptions of pathology.
Further, only after creating the category of pathology does F65 qualify circumstances where it is 
not, through the diagnostic guidelines596. By labelling it as an identifiable and inherently 
psychopathologisable practice, F65 implicitly establishes 'fetishism' as a category normatively 
opposed to 'non-fetishism', which implies that the 'fetish' object (and the 'fetishist's' concomitant  
interest in it, and in turn, therefore the very identity of 'fetishist') is constituted in opposition to an  
assumed normatively prioritised absence of a fetish object597.
However, as Moser notes, sexual diversity encompasses a wide range of human behaviour whereby 
virtually anything can have erotic associations598. What has erotic associations can surely only be 
595 See chapter 2 re the issues pertaining to identity politics vs queer theory
596 F65.0 Fetishism: Reliance on some non-living object as a stimulus for sexual arousal and sexual gratification. Many 
fetishes are extensions of the human body, such as articles of clothing or footwear. Other common examples are 
characterized by some particular texture such as rubber, plastic or leather. Fetish objects vary in their importance to 
the individual. In some cases they simply serve to enhance sexual excitement achieved in ordinary ways (e.g. having 
the partner wear a particular garment).
597 See note supra. See later for arguments on normative bases
598 Moser, C (2006) Sexuality, Reproduction and Menopause, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 86-90
This is borne out by the variety of participants' 'fetishes'. Some enjoy objects with overt BDSM associations, 
although not all such objects are sexually stimulating:
“Leather, watersports, scat, and BDSM gear related to bondage and pain play.  While I enjoy assplay and fisting, I 
don’t necessarily “fetishise” dildos....  Gloves are a particularly big turn-on.  Also, certain floggers, whips, canes. 
Strangely paddles have the opposite effect in me.  No interest whatsoever, associated more with corporal punishment 
and the whole “school master” head trip than “straightforward” BDSM” ('Joseph')
Others incorporate objects with more generally sexualised associations, like underwear:
“If I had a million bucks I guess I would spend at least half of it on underwear and swimwear. I love the feeling of 
kinky underwear: revealing, slim cut, supportive and lifting... the attention it generates at the gym and comments 
passed by so-called straight guys are incredible. It’s amazing how many guys love the look of a backless thong or a 
sheer brief but are too damn butch to admit it or get it. Admittedly I don’t do female underwear.”('Jason')
Or more widely to everyday objects which otherwise have no overt sexual connotations, like food:
“Oh, what a pleasure to experience a paw-paw, or a watermelon, or anything else edible, from ice to tender loin of  
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subjectively determinable, and is not implicitly visible in the kinds of object in question. In this  
regard, many ('non-fetishist') sexual practices incorporate material objects, yet remain out of the  
purview of psychopathology599.
In corollary, most 'fetishist' practices do not merely focus on objects, but encompass a broader  
environment which includes objects, people, fantasies and sexual energy, as in ‘Jacques’’ narrative:
“...the whole package makes a difference. I can't look at a very big dildo and get excited by it. I can't 
look at a pair of tit-clamps and get (turned on) by it, because it needs positive or negative energy to 
make it work. I could look at someone and see they have a huge amount of body hair, and I'll go “that is 
very nice!”. I can see someone... and say 'ooh, they've got a huge crotch' ... but you need the right 
situation to make it work.” ('Jacques')
Secondly, sexual practices incorporating objects are assumed to be externally and objectively  
categorisable. This means that the roles of subjectivity and emotional associations in sexual  
practices are not taken into account. Sexual experience cannot be categorised objectively, and  
neither the 'fetish' practices themselves, nor the presence of a 'fetish object' in isolation give 
subjective meaning to the sexual use of material objects:
“Again, depends on the game.  With toilet play, smells are vital.  For all structured BDSM play, leather 
is essential.  I don’t think I could perform in these instances without leather gear and especially boots.  
On the other hand, I don’t so much “get off”on toys as knowing I enjoy the feeling they have up my  
ass.” (Joseph) 
Rather, sexual 'fetish' activity involves a fluid and dialectical connection between subjects and 
physical objects, and the meaning of sexual experience is subjectively experienced through 
emotional associations:
“I genuinely like the idea of taking the body, mind and soul to places it may not otherwise experience. I 
also think it has a lot to do with mindset and how much you are prepared to explore. The thing that  
appeals most to me is the realisation that I can deal with a lot more than previously thought and the  
liberation from an otherwise myopic existence.” ('Jason', who includes exhibitionism and being filmed 
or photographed in his definition of 'fetish')
Therefore the emotional meaning associated with the 'fetish object' in its sexual environment is 
subjectively more important than externally defined categorisations of 'fetishism', 'fetishist' or 'fetish  
pork (all puns intended!)...” ('Jason')
599 Hence the success of whole media industries devoted to displaying scantily clad women as sales tools. In this regard, 
see the many criticisms detailing how men within heteronormative constructions of sexuality are taught to fetishise 
desired others. Women are thereby dismantled into fetishised and desirable parts, and the desired and othered body 
is objectified and fragmented, facilitating normative fetish relations in sexuality.  See below on normative issues
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object', notwithstanding a separate category of 'fetishism'600.
Terminologically juxtaposing 'fetishism' against anything else results in practices being artificially 
boxed into two distinct and oppositional camps: 'pathological' vs 'non-pathological fetishism', 
'fetishist' vs 'non-fetishist', or 'fetishist' vs some other pathologised category. The definitions (as well 
as the diagnoses601) of 'fetishism' are therefore lodged categorically in inappropriate essentialist 
notions that the practice of 'fetishism', people who in some essentialist way putatively are 'fetishists'  
and 'fetish' objects are objectively identifiable.
As will be discussed later relating to diagnosis, this places the alleged 'fetishist' under an onus to 
refute an a priori allegation of pathology, by reference to normative conceptions of propriety, in  
order to qualify as 'sane'602. He/she must therefore demonstrate that the 'fetish' is either absent or is 
merely one element of his/her sexual script, forcing him/her to demonstrate that he/she has not  
renounced the 'normal' sexual aim, whose primary focus must normatively be on a person rather 
than an object603.
4.2.2 The Underlying Categorical Normativity
The categorising of practices (and the concomitant identifications of 'fetishists' and 'fetish objects')  
can only take place through an implicit categorical normativity: the ICD classifications assume that  
all people should in some essentialising way be 'normal'. 
Yet 'fetishists' challenge the very category of 'fetishism' through their practices. 
The participants are marginalised on the basis of their sexual orientations and their unusual sexual  
proclivities604, and are all to a greater or lesser extent non-conformists, with unconventional views 
of what is/should be socially valuable. Albeit problematically605, their 'fetish' practices 
600 See chapters 5 and 6 on this issue
601 See below on diagnosis 
602 See below on diagnosis
603 Bonnet, G (2002) Pour une nouvelle classification des perversions sexuelles. In Evolutionary Psychiatry 2002 ; 67 : 
496-505, pp498This construction also allows the ‘pervert’ to change classification by virtue of a shift of focus from 
object to aim, which negates the principle of classificatory clarity and cohesiveness.
See below for arguments on normative issues as relates to diagnosis
604 See chapters 1 and 2 re the participant constitution and sexual orientation
605 As will be discussed in the Interjection, although on some level the participants' fetish practices may be underpinned 
by a resistance to heteronormativity, at the same time their practices reflect dominant masculine sexuality through 
the 'fetishising' of body parts or their facsimile. Within heteronormative constructions of sexuality men are taught to 
fetishise desired others, and in this way women are broken up into parts that are desirable and fetishised, which is 
part of the way in which the desired and othered body is objectified and fragmented. This facilitates normative fetish 
relations in sexuality.
This is juxtaposed against arguments such as those by Hennen, P. M. (2004-08-14) "Feeling a Bit Under the Leather: 
Performativity, Embodiment and the Specter of Starched Chiffon” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Sociological Association, Hilton San Francisco & Renaissance Parc 55 Hotel, San Francisco, CA. from 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p108280_index.html. Calling on Bourdieu and Butler, Hennen argues that gay 
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challenge both heteronormativity and the fictions of the existence of 'fetishism' as a category, 
through their notions of masculinity, without which 'fetish' does not exist for them:
“I love men with beards and hairy faces. I love hairy men, and I love men who smoke pipe. I've got a 
great fetish for leather. ... Uniforms. I'm very kinky on men with uniforms” ('Henry')
“I enjoy leather, the feel of it on the skin, the masculinity of it, the smell of it, the look of it.” ('Simon')
Through transgressively fetishising masculinity as men they challenge the implicit 
heteronormativity of Freudian fetishism which, as was discussed in Chapter 3 and will be discussed 
below in the context of diagnosis, sees 'fetishism' as a particularly heterosexual male enterprise.
Further, they undermine the distinctions between the category of 'fetishist' and 'fetish object' by  
smudging purportedly clear distinctions between the two. In interesting ways they do this through 
seeing themselves as both subject and object:
“rubber, leather, suspension... so it would be anything to do with that... boots and that. And that's where  
I  think maybe is it not coming back to the trying to show your masculinity. I mean before I came out, 
when I was a youngster I was trying to grow a moustache, because I had a fairly... not really... feminine,  
but I wasn't really masculine. And so maybe that was why I started racing motorbikes. Maybe I wanted  
to get into leather, but certainly I've led that sort of macho lifestyle. So, even now in gay society, I'm not  
turned on by fems, not turned on by the perfect body, I like a masculine person. And getting back to the  
fetish, it's anything to do with that: motorcycle boots, motorcycle leathers, it's that kind of thing that 
turns me on. It's more the male form, i.e. looking at myself in the mirror. ('Jared', my italics) 
They thereby undermine the very category of 'fetishism', which is premised on the essentialist  
discursive separation of 'fetishist' and 'fetish object'.
Moreover, they are proud of the transgressive nature of their 'fetish' practices, despite expecting 
disapprobation and at times responding defensively to questions about their sexuality. Indeed they  
have unconsciously re-labelled these practices as 'fetish' rather than 'fetishism', thereby renaming 
their practices in terms of their own (reclaimed) values:
“I would say a fetish to me is something that you like to do as part of your sexual expression or sexual  
behaviour or sexual enjoyment, or whatever that is seen in the broader public eye as wrong, dirty,  
demonic, bad... you're not supposed to do that.” ('Brian')
leathermen are uniquely located to understand how gender is radically constructed, since they consciously 
hypermasculinise themselves. He argues that gay male leather culture (in the U.S, although arguably in South Africa 
too) should be seen as resistance to consensus associations between homoerotic interest and effeminacy.
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“An act or way of sexual conduct that compliments “normal or average” sexual activities... Anything 
related to sexual intercourse that is done outside “normal or average” sexual limits.  Anything extra that 
enhances the sexual experience.” ('Donald')
“Fetish: anything which is different, different being not quite acceptable to the ordinary straightforward 
person.” ('Henry')
“I see a ‘fetish’ as an attraction to acts or objects not generally associated with “traditional” sexual 
interest or activity, including socially acceptable practices.” ('Jason')
'Fetishism' is not, I suggest, some objectively defined notion, but is defined in terms of social value, 
albeit “not necessarily broadly accepted or universally comprehended, but holding meaning for 
those who own or want to own it”606. Participants use 'fetish' interchangeably as a desirable sexually 
subversive practice and/or a material object, depending on the context in which it is used. This does  
not reflect a confusion or lack of education as to 'correct' terminological use, but rather a  
reclamation and re-labelling of their sexuality and practices in the face of normative  
prescriptions607. They are aware that many people see these practices as 'sick', but they nevertheless 
navigate taboo sexual exploration both to achieve fulfilment and to challenge (hetero)norms, even  
though, in that challenge, they inadvertently support dominant constructions of masculinity which 
serve to 'fetishise' the objects of their sexual desire.
'Fetishists' have reclaimed their power by challenging social norms in (queer) transgressive 
ways608 by re-appropriating the psychopathological category of 'fetishism' under the rubric of 
'unusual' sex acts, albeit, as Moser qualifies:
Unusual is in quotations because these sexual interests are not really unusual. Although research data on  
their incidence and prevalence are not available, in practice there are relatively few patients (or 
physicians), who do not engage in some sexual act that others would view as  
unusual.609
4.2.3 Defining 'Fetishism' Beyond Strict Person/Object/Practice Distinctions
The ontological concerns detailed in Chapter 3 combined with the vestiges of problematic Freudian  
thinking detailed above undermine the objective existence of the categories of 'fetishism'.  
Notwithstanding these concerns, however, the ICD classifications have not appeased 
Böhme's uncertainty as to whether 'fetishism' signifies “the spoken utterance or the speaker; the 
606 Pietz, W (1985) “The Problem of the Fetish I.” RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (1985): 5–17: 7 
607 See chapters 5 and 6 on how this reclaiming and relabeling works
608 See chapter 2 re social proscription in gay/queer contexts. Yet see also the Interjection re ways in which subjects 
both support and challenge (hetero)normativities
609 Moser, C (2006) Sexuality, Reproduction and Menopause, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 86-90
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described object or the describing subject”610.
Moreover, artificially classifying 'fetishism' as a discrete category of psychopathology serves 
merely to rehash the problematic classification of the term ‘perversion’, which McDougal questions 
as psychiatric and psychoanalytic label611. The term has negative connotations, which, like those of 
‘neurotic’, ‘psychotic’, ‘psychosomatic’, results in the obscuring of the psychic structures of each 
clinical category and particularly of people’s remarkable singularity612. Classifications of 'fetishism' 
do not reflect the frames of reference, concepts and categories of the people who enjoy what they  
call 'fetish'613. Indeed, in their attempt to categorise human behaviour, such classifications do not 
describe 'fetish' as played out in the lives of people who enjoy the sexual company of material 
objects. Rather, such classifications prescribe behaviour through normative expectations lodged in 
the very categories themselves. Even before addressing questions of diagnosis, this renders the 
classifications nugatory, since, as with colonial and early psychoanalytic constructions, 'fetishists' 
and their practices are inappropriately shoe-horned into categorical boxes which are divorced from  
human experience and which derive from a focus on proscribed 'fetish objects' and 'fetish practices', 
rather than the subjectivities of people who thereby become practically invisible.
In contradistinction, whereas the ICD classification of 'fetishism' implies something to be tied down  
and judged, the participants prefer to 
“go with the moment and not with the label. ... Depends on the guy you're playing with as well.  If he's  
down with something you might not want to explore, and it seems right at the moment, then you explore  
them. Might find you're missing out on a fetish you didn't know was there.” ('Lawrence')
At face value this fluidity might suggest that such perceptions merely reflect 'non-pathological  
fetishism': that the participants are not sexually bound to particular 'fetish' objects and are therefore 
'not rendered substantially dysfunctional'614. 
610 As noted in chapter 3, this indicates that 'fetishism' serves at the same time to exclude it from consciousness, or at 
least force it to remain peripheral to discourse in any real sense.   
See Böhme, H. (2001) Das Fetischismus-Konzept von Marx und sein Kontext. In Gerhardt, V (ed)(2001) 
Marxismus: Versuch einer Bilanz. Magdeburg: Scriptum-Verlag. 289–319. 30 August 2004 <http://
www.culture.huberlin.de/HB/volltexte/texte/fetisch.html>. Quoted in Brisson, U (2005) Fish and Fetish: Mary 
Kingsley’s Studies of Fetish in West Africa. In Journal of Narrative Theory 35.3 (Fall 2005): 326–340. 
611 See in particular the concept of "Neo-Sexuality" in McDougall, J (1997). Las Múltiplas Faces De Eros. Martins 
Fontes, SP, 2001, pp 186, 188, 192, p 186
612 See in particular McDougall ibid
613 This is even after extracting BDSM from the mix. See thesis introduction re distinguishing fetish from BDSM. 
Although beyond the scope of this research, it is useful to note that Sadomasochism is considered to be “A 
preference for sexual activity that involves bondage or the infliction of pain or humiliation. Notably, 
the diagnostic criteria for masochism and sadism indicate similar pathologising tendencies for alternative sexualities
614 See below re concerns of diagnosis
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Yet a closer look reveals something which negates the psychiatric utility of the very identification of  
'fetishism' (and indeed all categories): The ICD classifications assume a simple, non-contextualised 
sexual interest in material objects by an abstracted psychical subject who should not want to 
overstep the bounds of 'propriety'. In other words, the classifications ontologically assume the 
essentialist and foundationalist value of (hetero)normativity. Clearly 'fetishism' is therefore a 
psychopathological terminological construct, not the accurate and useful description of practices it  
purports to be.
In contradistinction, the participants' 'fetish' is more than the sum of its psychiatric categorical parts, 
and their practices give insight into the problems with contemporary psychiatric definitions. Yet it  
also gives insight into alternative metatheories on which human sexual relations with material 
objects can be based. Whereas the ICD inherently imbues 'fetishism' with pathological associations, 
the renamed and reclaimed term 'fetish' (qua sexual practice itself, either as well as, or disconnected 
from 'fetish objects') incorporates a broader sense which includes people, objects and environments,  
subjective perceptions and emotions:
“...The one [meaning of 'fetish'] is material (sic) thing, something physical. The other is emotional. ... 
Physical is what the person would look like, what I'd like to look like, what I think is nice, what turns  
me on. Emotional is what I can get out of this situation, what I can give my partner out of this situation.  
And the feelings that go around with it, that's the emotional aspect of it. And saying that is a fetish... to  
make someone feel good can be a fetish, whichever way it is, because it goes both ways. You're giving  
and you're receiving ...” ('Jacques')
Object-focused diatribes around the centrality of the 'fetish object' as the definitional nexus for 
'fetishism' as a practice (and therefore the 'fetishist' as a psychopathologised category) must, I 
suggest, therefore be avoided, while dialectical configurations between the material object of sexual  
interest, the sexual partner, emotional associations and heteronormative social constructions should 
be recognised in order to accurately describe 'fetish sexuality' and to found psycho-medical 
discourses and practices on sexual activity which incorporates material objects. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, more functional bases for understanding the phenomenon of 
people-interacting-sexually-with-material-objects therefore lie in epistemologically prioritising the  
subject, rather than the fetish object, through recognising the relationship between  
phenomenological experience and discourse.
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4.3 Psychiatric Diagnoses of 'Fetishism': Problematising Pathological 
vs Non-Pathological Practices
Psychiatric diagnosis of any kind is problematic, since it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As  
argued above, categories of 'mental illness', of which 'fetishism' forms a subset, are discursive 
constructs inappropriately relying on normative considerations to distinguish them from 'mental 
health'. 
Nevertheless, people believe in the authority of psychiatry and psychology. Diagnosis as 
pathological by a putatively authoritative source therefore stigmatises individuals by causing them 
emotional distress and leading them to believe they are indeed essentially 'mentally 
ill'615. Similarly, negative self-esteem from diagnostic-related stigma can potentially be linked to  
problems such as alcoholism, drug dependence or suicide616. These concerns relate to the reliance 
on the putative authority of psychiatric professionals who often perpetuate normative considerations  
of propriety, and sell themselves as the purveyors of ((hetero)normatively defined) 'sanity'.
Further, as a regulatory and structuralising discourse, the ICD-10's diagnostic guidance for 
psychiatric practitioners as to when and how to determine diagnoses is as problematic as the 
definitions of 'fetishism'617. This is particularly so in the context of marginal (homo)sexualities,  
where psychology serves to legitimise, rationalise, regulate and impose disciplinary intervention to  
ensure heteronormative and patriarchal gender norms and sexualities618. Indeed, I suggest, the 
615 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press
616 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) ibid. For discussion on the stigma of diagnosis see also Birchwood, M,, Trower, P, 
Brunet, K, Gilbert, P, Iqbal, Z and Jackson, C (2007) Social anxiety and the shame of psychosis: A study in first 
episode psychosis. in Behaviour Research and Therapy Volume 45, Issue 5, May 2007, Pages 1025-1037
617 See the critiques of psychology as a regulatory discourse and practice in the context of  gender and sexuality supra
For example Rose, N (1989) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self. London & New York: Routledge; 
Burman, E. (ed) (1990) Feminists and Psychological Practice. London: Sage.; Schweder, R (1990) Cultural  
Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Parker, I (1992) Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology. London & New York, 
Routledge; Wilkinson, S & Kitzinger, C (eds) (1993) Heterosexuality: a Feminism and Psychology Reader. London: 
Sage; Parker, I & Speares, R (1996) Psychology & Society: Radical Theory and Practice. London & Chicago: Pluto 
Press; Burr, V (1998) Gender and Social Psychology. London, Routledge; Parker, I (1999) Critical psychology: 
critical links. In Annual Review of Critical Psychology Vol. 1, pp. 3-18; Kitzinger, C (1999) Lesbian and gay 
psychology: is it critical? In Annual Review of Critical Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 50-66; Parker, I. (2004) 
‘Psychoanalysis and critical psychology’, in D. Hook (ed.), with N. Mkhize, P. Kiguwa and A. Collins (section eds) 
and E. Burman and I. Parker (consulting eds) Critical Psychology, pp. 138-161. Cape Town: UCT Press; 
Painter, D. & Terre Blanche, M. & Henderson, J. (2006) Critical psychology in South Africa: Histories, themes and 
prospects. In Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 5, pp. 212-235 www.discourseunit.com/arcp/5  ;  Shefer, T & 
Potgieter, C-A (2006) Sexualities. In Shefer, T, Bonzaaier, F & Kiguwa, P (2006) The Gender of Psychology. Cape 
Town: UCT Press.
618See comments above, and Butler, JP (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity New York, 
Routledge; Sedgwick, E.K. (2005) Axiomatic. In Morland, I and Willox, A (2005) Queer Theory Palgrave 
MacMillan, Hampshire and New York, pp81-95 at 81. As Sedgwick notes, the idea of 'difference' incorporates 
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IDC-10 merely serves to codify and perpetuate these norms and sexualities.
The ICD-10's diagnostic criteria for 'fetishism' prescribe that psychopathology occurs when: 
The individual experiences recurrent sexual urges and fantasies involving unusual objects or 
activities;
The individual either acts on the urges or is markedly distressed by them; and
The preference has been present for at least 6 months619.
The Diagnostic Guidelines therefore indicate that 'fetishism' should be diagnosed only if the 'fetish  
object' is the most important source of sexual stimulation or essential for satisfactory sexual 
response620. As with its Freudian counterpart, the ICD-10 constructs fetishistic fantasies as common, 
and not amounting to a disorder unless they lead to rituals so compelling and 'unacceptable' as to 
interfere with ('normal') sexual intercourse and thereby cause the individual distress.
However, as discussed in Chapter 3 and above, categorical distinctions between 'pathological' and 
'non-pathological fetishism' in the psychoanalytic literature on fetish sexuality are inappropriate  
since they essentialise sexual subjects and foundationalise sexual practices. Since it provides little  
clarity on the limits between 'pathology' and 'non-pathology', the ICD-10 does not ameliorate this  
concern, and indeed perpetuates it in two main areas:
Through the requirement for 'unusual objects', the diagnostic criteria inappropriately import  
(hetero)normativity into the diagnostic process ; and
In the requirement for 'distress and impairment', the diagnostic criteria rely on inappropriate 
(normative) circular arguments which nullify the notion of the agency of a psychical subject.
4.3.1 Morally and Statistically Normative Paradigms for Diagnosis
Rather than being descriptive of a broad population, much early input into theory on 'sexual 
deviation' and the resulting psychiatric diagnostic criteria were informed by anecdotal data and 
varied forms of sexuality, which are nevertheless carelessly lumped together under the heading ‘sexual orientation’
619 World Health Organization. (2004). International Classification of Diseases 10 (2nd ed). Geneva: 
WHO. ICD-10
620 World Health Organization, ibid
See above re the categorical problems on defining 'fetishism' in terms of the essentialised 'fetishist' and fetish object
See Laws, D.R., O'Donohue, W.T. (2008) Sexual deviance: theory, assessment, and treatment. Guilford Press, 2008. 
This work, however, does not substantially re-vision the underlying identificatory or diagnostic  concerns which turn 
the very definitions of 'fetish' or 'transvestic fetishism' on their heads. Rather, it merely identifies the difficulty in 
terminology and diagnosis of the psychopathologies.
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methodological shortcomings, together with fictional literature and case-studies of dysfunctional 
individuals who were in conflict with the law621. Such underpinnings are clearly inappropriate bases 
for diagnosing the 'mental health' of all people, since research of a small group cannot reflect some 
overarching 'truth'622.
Although the explicit link between pathology and criminality has now been removed from 
psychiatric discourses, the implicit (normative) connection between legality and mental health often 
inappropriately remains in psychiatric diagnosis. 
Although 'fetishism' and 'transvestic fetishism'623 are not legally proscribed624, the categorical 
621 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press 
622 In this regard, Foucaultian conceptions of the 'Panopticon' and the policing of morality through the criminal system 
should be taken account of. Like other categories, criminality must not be essentialised.
623 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17pp16. Moser and Kleinplatz see 'cross-dressing' as the wearing of stereotypic 
clothing of the other sex, to be distinguished from ‘[o]btaining erotic enjoyment from the process of cross-dressing, 
[which] is known as transvestism”
The diagnostic guidelines specify that Transvestic Fetishism is distinguished from simple 'fetishism' in that 
'fetishistic clothing items' are worn to create the appearance of a person of the opposite sex. Under usual 
circumstances, more than one item is worn, with a complete outfit, wig and makeup often being used. Note the 
assumption that the wearer is a man dressing in women's clothing, rather than the other way round. See below 
pertaining to heteronormativity
For an earlier exploration hereof, see Buhrich, N & McConaghy, N (1979) Three clinically discrete categories of 
fetishistic transvestism. In Archives of Sexual Behavior Volume 8, Number 2 / March, 1979, Springer Netherlands. 
The article discusses and justifies differentiating the clinical syndromes of marginal transvestism and fetishistic 
transsexualism, and concludes that there appear to be three clinically discrete types of fetishistic cross-dressing: 
nuclear transvestism, marginal transvestism, and fetishistic transsexualism.
See also Brown, (1983) Paraphilias. Sadomasochism, fetishism, transvestism and transsexuality. In 
The British Journal of Psychiatry.1983; 143: 227-23
See also Freund, K, Seto, M.C.  & Kuban, M (1996) Two types of fetishism. In Behaviour Research and  
Therapy, Volume 34, Issue 9, September 1996, Pages 687-694. The authors attempted to differentiate 'fetishism' 
proper and 'transvestism', and determine if 'transvestites' are truly 'fetishistic'. They further divided 'transvestites' into 
gender-conforming and gender-nonconforming as per a score on a gender identity scale. The groups were compared  
using a self-report scale of 'fetishistic' interests, questionnaires on childhood history, parental characteristics, and 
emotional closeness with parents. Further, penile responses of 'fetishists' and 'transvestites' were recorded while 
being presented with images of female and male pubic regions and potential 'fetish' objects such as nylon stockings, 
shoes, panties, underwear and feet. The report concludes that 'fetishists' and 'transvestites' did not differ on self-
reported 'fetishistic' interests, childhood and family histories, nor between penile responses. The conclusion is that 
'transvestites' are 'fetishistic', and are difficult to distinguish from 'fetishists'.
624 In this regard, contemporary research indicates the lack of criminal tendency amongst adherents of 'fetish' and/or S/
M, which militates against arbitrary (criminalising) characteristics being allowed to underpin psychiatric diagnoses. 
Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press, pp246 note: “Kinsey 
(1953) indicated that there is no reason to believe that fetishism leads to crime. Indeed, what do we know about law-
abiding fetishists? In accordance with Kinsey (1953), demographic studies show that there are citizens in “good 
standing” who practice SM (Moser, 1995). The psychoanalyst Robert Stoller (1991) conducted an extensive 
interview study of SM practitioners in the 1980s. His data indicated that there is no evidence for higher prevalence 
crime rates, psychoses or personality disorders among SM subjects in comparison to the general population. Stoller 
(1991, pp. 19-20) wrote: And these people, were one to try to apply character diagnoses to them, are as varied as I 
expect are the readers of this book. Most of my informants are stable in employment; most are college graduates or 
beyond, lively in conversation, with a good sense of humor, up-to-date on politics and world events, and not more or 
less depressed than my social acquaintances. The fact that there are SM and fetish practitioners with psychiatric and/
or criminal records does not warrant pathologizing these practices. One could pick any group with an arbitrary 
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assumptions and diagnoses as mental disorders which follow often stem merely from historical  
precedent625, as a short-cut to dealing with mental gymnastics required to distinguish the point at 
which 'normal' emotional unhappiness purportedly becomes 'psychical dysfunction', which is 
difficult to determine626.
For example, it is difficult to differentiate so-called 'transvestic fetishists' who are subjectively 
d is t ressed or funct ional ly impaired by the i r prac t ices f rom those who are 
not627. Attempts to do so result in clinicians falling back on historical moralising. ‘Transvestic  
fetishism’ comes from definitions by Magnus Hirschfeld in 1910628 at a time when it was illegal in 
many places for men to dress in women's clothing629. In 1936 Havelock Ellis referred to it as 
"Eonism," but did not distinguish the adherents of the practice from what some would now call 
"effeminate homosexuals" and those with non-normative gender identities. Kinsey refrained from 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e p r a c t i c e , d e f i n i n g t r a n s v e s t i s m s i m p l y a s ' c r o s s -
dressing'630. Things have clearly moved on631, and sexual practices that were once considered 
unusual and pathological, such as homosexuality, fellatio and anal sex, are now seen as 'normal'. 
Today there are a variety of people who 'cross-dress' (whether for explicitly sexual purposes or not), 
including 'drag-queens' and 'drag-kings', 'transgendered', 'transsexual' and 'transvestite' people, 'she-
males' and female impersonators (or 'gender illusionists')632. Not to mention heterosexual men 
attending costume parties such as the Mother City Queer Project633. Few of these people are 
characteristic and, provided that the sample is big enough, find psychiatric and criminal cases among them.”
625 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17pp16. Moser and Kleinplatz argue convincingly that there is no objective 
support in the literature for believing that it arises from psychopathology
626 See Bonnet, G (2002) Pour une nouvelle classification des perversions sexuelles. In Evolutionary Psychiatry 2002 ; 
67 : 496-505, pp498 notes that classifications historically don’t take account of the distinctions between 'perverse 
symptoms' and 'perversion' (i.e.between perversion in the structural sense of the term and problematic perversion), 
nor between perversions that hardly pose a problem and those that are really dangerous. He does not, however,  
dismantle the idea of classifications.
627 Wheeler, J, Newring, KAB & Draper, C (2008) Transvestic fetishism, psychopathology and theory. In Laws, D.R., 
O'Donohue, W.T. (2008) Sexual deviance: theory, assessment, and treatment. Guilford Press, 2008 at pp 273 et seq. 
628 See Bullough, V.L., & Bullough, B (1977). Sin, Sickness and Sanity. New York: New American Library.
629 until the advent of democracy in South Africa it was illegal for men to appear in public in women's clothing, through 
the Prohibition of Disguises Act 16 of 1969 and its common-law precursors. For an overview of laws relating to 
sexual orientation in South Africa before democracy See Cameron, E (1994) Unapprehended Felons. In Gevisser, M 
& Cameron, E (eds) (1994) Defiant Desire, Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa Ravan Press, 89-98
630 See Gebhard, P.H., & Johnson, A.B. (1979). The Kinsey data: Marginal tabulations of the 1938-1963 interviews 
conducted by the Institute for Sex Research. Philadelphia, PA: W. B. Saunders Company; see also Kinsey, A.C., 
Pomeroy, W.C., Martin, C.E., & Gebhard, P.H. (1953). Sexual behavior in the human female. Philadelphia, PA: W. 
B. Saunders Company. And Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002) ibid pp16
631 See Benjamin, H. (1966). The transsexual phenomenon. New York: Julian Press. Benjamin referred to a continuum 
between cross-dressers for erotic reasons and people expressing an unusual gender identity (e.g. Transgender).
632 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17 pp16. Note that these appellations are not intended to essentialise any identity 
categories, but are merely called on for ease of reference
633 A 'queer' party held in Cape Town once a year which attracts a range of people
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diagnosable with a psychopathology or markedly disturbed by their dressing habits, although they 
may be emotionally dysfunctional on other bases.
Yet, whereas diagnostic clarity has progressed for other 'disorders', it has not for 
'fetishism'634. 'Transvestic fetishists' and 'fetishists' are still pathologised both discursively and 
through the diagnostic criteria in the ICD-10, particularly through the criterion of ‘unusual objects  
and desires’635. Moral and statistical judgements are thereby terminologically conflated, since  
'unusual' can refer either to moral definitions of 'weird or bizarre' or statistical conceptions of ‘rare 
and uncommon’. Either way, 'unusual' problematically relies on an inherent normative basis for 
diagnosing 'fetishism' in ways akin to the discredited arbitrary criminal profiling of 'types' of people  
on the basis of race, gender and sexuality. This nullifies the diagnostic standards 
in toto, since it is unacceptable to reference morality in diagnosis, and further inappropriate to call  
on statistical norms to gauge psychical functionality.
4.3.1a) Moral Judgments: Diagnostic Links between Heteronormativity and Psychopathology
It is well documented that psychiatry and psychology (and medicine more broadly) have a long  
history of diagnosing psychopathology on the basis of dominant constructions of moral reasoning, 
amongs t which d i agnos ing homosexua l i t y a s a men ta l i l l ne s s i s j us t one 
example636. Notwithstanding strong poststructuralist arguments against it, homophobia persists 
634 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press pp249 “For example, the 
categories of neuroses and psychoses have been substantially refined over time. Surprisingly, the revision of 
ICD-10 omitted ICD-9’s suggestion that “It is preferable not to include in this category individuals who perform 
deviant sexual acts when normal sexual outlets are not available to them” (WHO, 1978, p. 40).
635 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press 
See also Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17 pp16. They note that the “cross-cultural (Ford, C.S., & Beach, F.A. (1951) 
Patterns of Sexual Behavior. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.) and trans-historical (Bullough, V.L., & 
Bullough, B (1977). Sin, Sickness and Sanity. New York: New American Library.) records indicate that cross-
dressing is not rare. However, whether erotic arousal from cross-dressing exists cross-culturally and trans-
historically is much more difficult to ascertain”. Note that it is more difficult to ascertain the historical incidence of 
'fetishism' in a cross-cultural context.
636 See Shorter, E. (1997). A History of Psychiatry. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Inc
See also See for example Rose, N (1989) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self. London & New York: 
Routledge; Burman, E. (ed) (1990) Feminists and Psychological Practice. London: Sage.; Schweder, R (1990) 
Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Parker, I (1992) Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology. London & New York, 
Routledge; Wilkinson, S & Kitzinger, C (eds) (1993) Heterosexuality: a Feminism and Psychology Reader. London: 
Sage; Parker, I & Speares, R (1996) Psychology & Society: Radical Theory and Practice. London & Chicago: Pluto 
Press; Burr, V (1998) Gender and Social Psychology. London, Routledge; Parker, I (1999) Critical psychology: 
critical links. In Annual Review of Critical Psychology Vol. 1, pp. 3-18; Kitzinger, C (1999) Lesbian and gay 
psychology: is it critical?In Annual Review of Critical Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 50-66; 
Painter, D. & Terre Blanche, M. & Henderson, J. (2006) Critical psychology in South Africa: Histories, themes and 
prospects. In Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 5, pp. 212-235 www.discourseunit.com/arcp/5   Shefer, T & 
Potgieter, C-A (2006) Sexualities. In Shefer, T, Bonzaaier, F & Kiguwa, P (2006) The Gender of Psychology. Cape 
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among medical professionals , which is evident in the research part ic ipants ' 
narratives637. Through Foucaultian conceptions of surveillance638, this kind of moralising feeds into 
dominant heteronormative discourses which reject unusual sexual interests, pathologising  
'perversions'639.
It  also feeds into the participants' desire to hide their 'fetish' interests:
“I never never, never spoke to anyone about my fetishes. Because you're the first person I'm actually  
talking to about fetishes.” ('Henry')
Or at least not to broadcast their unusual sexual interests to all and sundry:
“...I'm not scared to talk about it and tell people. But I must re-iterate again, it's part of coming out so  
late in my life. And you say 'oh, you're gay' and I joke and say 'well, I'm not bisexual, I'm trisexual: I'll 
try anything'. I joke. And I'm not scared to tell them I'm into leather. I'm not hiding it anymore. 
I'm not completely open (my italics) Whenever I can get a chance to wear leather, I do. If it's slightly  
overcast I put on leather pants and wear them for the day. I do enjoy that. But I don't hide it  
specifically” ('Jared').
This reticence to 'come out' is further informed by internalised senses of shame and guilt about 
fetish desires and practices:
“... worse than coming out was the dismantling of all that we were told were not only bad but  
pathological.  Who could like shit?  Who could like being pissed on, tied up, and beaten?  But I was  
lucky to immerse myself in a world (San Francisco’s South of Market district) where I was insulated 
from these thoughts by an organised and (generally) supportive BDSM community.” ('Joseph')
“I suppose in the beginning it used to be and feel strange for me to experiment with myself, so there  
used to be a fair amount of shame. I think it’s just simply a case of me having known that what I was 
doing with myself, to myself and what I was shoving into myself, wasn’t normal. It soon became par for  
the course after admitting to myself that I really enjoyed it all – and here I am, partaking in this study, a  
cool lifetime later.” ('Jason')
Town: UCT Press.
637 See Addendum 3
638 See Foucault, M. (1990a). The History of Sexuality: Volume 1. An introduction. New York: Penguin Blackwell. 
Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and Punish. London: Tavistock. Pp192. Foucault notes that “individualisation is 
descending, as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more 
strongly individualised; it is exercised through surveillance rather than ceremonies, by observation rather than 
commemorative accounts, by comparative measures that have the norm as reference.”
639 For example, see Bowman, B (2005) Children, Pathology and Politics: Genealogical Perspectives on the 
Construction of the Paedophile in South Africa . PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
See later re arguments around consensuality and non-consensuality as descriptions of sexuality.
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“...I started accepting my desires more and more and then met my second boyfriend who, when I pulled  
out some rubber gloves during sex one night, stood up and said “I don’t do things like that” with a look  
of such disdain on his face. I then hid my fetish from him to the detriment of our relationship until he 
finally after 3 years was willing to start communicating about it and even exploring it with me. Through 
a number of years I came to accept this is who I am and what I like. It was almost like coming out as 
being gay all over again and a wonderful sense of peace came over me when I finally accepted and 
acknowledged myself.” ('Simon')
Their fear of judgment links into dominant heteronormative discourses of 'propriety' which feed 
both the insecurity of participants and the discursive homo- and 'fetish'-phobia of South African 
society640 and the psychiatric community more narrowly.
Even though mental illness is no longer evidenced by sexual orientation, and it is no longer  
acceptable for therapists to try to ‘cure’ homosexuality, implicit (hetero)normative judgements on  
which forms of sexuality are appropriate and which are not are liable to infiltrate the processes of  
diagnosing such psychiatric categories as 'fetishism'641. Diagnoses of pathology are therefore 
unfortunately often implicitly incorporated into diagnoses of 'fetishism' before such diagnosis even 
occurs. As the recent Consultation note put out by the Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section of the 
British Psychological Society states:
“It is likely that consensual sexualities beyond being homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual - such as  
sadomasochism or having multiple partners - are considered by some mental health professionals to be 
attendant evidence of psychopathology.”642
The (hetero)normative tendencies of clinicians are merely supported by the diagnostic guidelines of 
'fetishism' which are infiltrated with normative heteropatriarchal associations, potentially leading  
clinicians, who call on their power to decide which problems are treatment targets, to encourage 
'fetishists' to desist from 'abnormal' behaviour. This perpetuates normative assumptions around  
which sexual practices are appropriate and which are not.
Unfortunately the ICD diagnostic criteria do not take this into account, merely propping up  
heteropatriarchy, both implicitly and explicitly.
640 See chapter 2 and the Interjection in regard homophobia in South Africa
641 See Richards, C (2007) Consultation on the Mental Health Act 2007 Code of Practice. British Psychological Society 
– Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section. Incorporating moral proscriptions into the diagnosis of mood disorders can 
be seen in the UK in the report on Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual mental health put out by The National Association for 
Mental Health. The report notes that “18% of gay men, 18% of lesbians, 33% of bisexual men and 13% of bisexual 
women who had seen a mental health professional for emotional difficulties stated that they had been told that their 
sexuality was the root of their problems”. See King, M., & McKeown, E. (2003). Mental health and wellbeing of  
gay men, lesbians and bisexuals in England and Wales. London: Mind. p.44
642 Richards, C (2007) ibid
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4.3.1a)i. Implicit (Hetero)Normativity
I suggest that the ICD-10 guidelines on diagnosis should be revisited, since they inadvertently 
pathologise any non-normative forms of sexuality simply because they do not conform to 
heteronormative discourses of what sexuality is and 'should be'. They do this in three main ways.
Firstly, the distinction between 'fetishism' and 'transvestic fetishism' is problematic since it 
inappropriately assumes that 'fetishists' are somehow essentially different to 'transvestic fetishists'. 
This implies that the diagnostic criteria for each should somehow be different from the other, 
although this distinction is not specified or described. It therefore leads clinicians to rely on 
dominant heteropatriarchal constructions which assume that (heterosexual) men who want to dress 
in 'female clothing' are somehow 'sick'643. Following from this, 'transvestic fetishists' are therefore 
discursively assumed to be heterosexual men, despite that, as Moser and Kleinplatz note, "cross-
dressers…are virtually indistinguishable from non-cross-dressers."644 This makes it unlikely for 
(heterosexual or homosexual) women and homosexual men to be diagnosed645. Similarly, 
'fetishism', following Freudian constructions, is also assumed to be limited almost exclusively to 
(heterosexual) men646. This reflects that diagnosis relies on the cultural context in which the 
diagnostic process is located, and in South Africa heteropatriarchal conceptions of masculinity and 
sexual normativity are rigidly policed647.
The second and third concerns on heteronormativity are apparent in 'fetishistic fantasies' being seen 
as “common, but not amounting to a disorder unless they lead to rituals that are so compelling and 
u n a c c e p t a b l e a s t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h i n t e r c o u r s e a n d c a u s e t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
distress”648.
643 And since women, homosexual men and lesbians are discursively invisible, the assumption is that 'cross-dressers' 
are heterosexual men
644 See Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17 pp16 et seq. Referring to Brown, G.R., Wise, T.N., Costa, P.T., Herbst, J.H., 
Fagan, P.J., & Schmidt, C.W. (1996). Personality Characteristics and Sexual Functioning of 188 Cross-Dressing 
Men. In The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders 184, 265-273. They also note the importance of this 
statement, given that Wise and Schmidt were members of the DSM-IV-TR (2000) Sexual and Gender Identity 
Disorders Text Revision Work Group, (i.e., the committee responsible for revising this section of the DSM).
645 None of the present participants indicate an interest in cross-dressing, which opens avenues for more research on the 
intersections between gay men, fetish and constructs of masculinity beyond the definitional issues around fetish 
identified above. One question is how normative masculinities in gay male fetish subcultures intersect with 
heteronormative constructs of masculinity in broader society
646 See chapter 3
647 See Morrell, R (2002) Men, Movements, and Gender Transformation in South Africa. In 
The Journal of Men's Studies, Volume 10, Number 3 / Spring 2002 Men's Studies Press; Reid, G, Walker, L (2005) 
Men behaving differently, Juta and Company Limited; Walker, L (2005) Men behaving differently: South African 
men since 1994. In Culture, Health & Sexuality: An International Journal for Research, Intervention and  
Care, 1464-5351, Volume 7, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 225 – 238; Lemon, J (1995) Masculinity in Crisis? In 
Agenda, No. 24, Monitoring the Changes (1995), pp. 61-71 
648 (my italics) See ICD- WHO, 1993, p. 218 and Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and 
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The second concern lies in the guidelines' specification that rituals should be 'compelling and 
unacceptable', which assumes (heteronormatively) that fetishists cannot undertake sexual activity  
without the 'fetish object'. This seems overly judgmental of 'fetish sexuality', while failing to use  
similar arguments in other areas of sexuality. More importantly, it fails to recognise sexual diversity  
which encompasses a wide range of human behaviour whereby virtually anything can have erotic 
associations649. Most heterosexual people do not have sex with either same-sex or what they see as 
'unattractive' partners, which is often framed as their being 'unable' to do so. Yet their predilections 
are not pathologised, since they conform to heteropatriarchal norms650. Failing to approach 'fetish 
sexuality' in the same way indicates a discursive prioritising of heteropatriarchal norms, and an 
a priori pathologising of non-normative behaviour651.
The third concern lies in the guidelines' problematic priority of 'intercourse', which implies a  
heteropatriarchal focus on procreatively-aimed sexuality, or a facsimile thereof in goal-directed 
('orgasmic') human-human (penetrative) sexual relations. As Martins and Ceccarelli argue, 
‘deviancy’ appears still to be connected to normative conceptions of sexuality, based on 
(hetero)sexual activity being seen as the most important biological function, defined by genital 
penetration with the intention of procreation652. This conflicts with post-structuralist and queer 
conceptions of the functions and roles of sexuality as desire-driven rather than goal-
oriented653. Further, ‘normality’ is culturally and socially defined, and notions of ‘pathological’,  
‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ are regularly questioned by professionals in sexualities scholarship who 
agree that sexuality and procreation are not inherently connected654.
Non-conventional sexual practices should therefore not be used indicate a diagnosis, since people  
with specific unusual sexual preferences are only distinguished from others by these practices and 
not by any essential differences655. Diagnostic criteria for emotional dysfunction (as opposed to 
Sadomasochism.” Co-published simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park 
Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington 
Park Press
649 Moser, C (2006) Sexuality, Reproduction and Menopause, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 86-90
650 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17 pp16 et seq
651 See argument above in terms of categorising 'fetishism'
652 Martins, MC & Ceccarelli, PR, The So-Called "Deviant" Sexualities: perversion or Right to Difference? http://
www.reviseF65.org/cuba1.html presented at the 16th World Congress of Sexology in Cuba in March, 2003. The 
study explores human sexuality in diverse variations like BDSM (bondage/discipline, dominance/submission and 
sadism/masochism) and fetishism in Brazilian society.
653 See chapter 2
654 Martins, MC & Ceccarelli, PR, The So-Called "Deviant" Sexualities: perversion or Right to Difference? http://
www.reviseF65.org/cuba1.html presented at the 16th World Congress of Sexology in Cuba in March, 2003. The 
study explores human sexuality in diverse variations like BDSM (bondage/discipline, dominance/submission and 
sadism/masochism) and fetishism in Brazilian society.
655 Martins, MC & Ceccarelli, PR, ibid
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psychopathology, which, as argued above, is inappropriate) should therefore take account of 
implicit moralising, since clinicians are likely either explicitly to be homophobic or implicitly to  
prioritise heteronormativity.
4.3.1a)ii. Statistical (Hetero)Norms
Since they are often schooled in empirical theory656, clinicians may automatically rely on statistical 
comparisons in the diagnostic process, thinking that such comparisons are 'value-neutral' since they 
purport to presume a level playing field and an absence of moralising. 
However, marginalisation takes place even before subjects come into contact with the community of 
psychologists/psychiatrists. Moral judgement is often politically hidden under statistical norms  
which, by definition, marginalise minorities657 through an insufficient focus on “subjective erotic 
arousal experienced during sexual acts”, whereby “it is easier to observe behavior than to discern 
individual motivation”658.
Activity should not be pathologised simply because it is statistically unusual, and both clinical 
practice and psychiatric diagnostic guidelines should recognise that the very fact of statistical  
classification means discursively and arbitrarily to create norms through the choice of what to  
prioritise, and what to count as statistical comparison-points659. Such references are inappropriate, 
since they assume that psychical concerns of the majority are in some way objectively and  
e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o a n d m o r e c o m p e l l i n g t h a n t h o s e o f t h e 
minority660. It is inappropriate in societies that value freedom to pathologise the unusual on 
656 For an overview of psychology, see Goodwin, C.J. (1999) A History of Modern Psychology (second ed)  
John Wiley and Sons; Feigl, H & Scriven, M (2009) The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology  
and Psychoanalysis. University of Minnesota Press
See also Bickhard, MH & Campbell, RL (2005) New Ideas in Psychology. In New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 23,  
Issue 1, April 2005, Pages 1-4 pp1: In many places operationalist rhetoric is still taught to students with little in the 
way of alternative conceptions of theory and little guidance on examining or exploring theoretical possibilities
657 See chapter 2 about the benefits of queerness as approach to political location. In this regard, statistical comparisons 
are inappropriate since they seek to acknowledge citizenship on a rights-basis, which is implicitly an empirical and 
statistical basis. Further on issues of statistical representation, See Sheikh, A (2002) Why Are Ethnic Minorities 
Under-Represented in US Research Studies? In PLoS Medicine, February 2006, Volume 3, Issue 2  pp 49, from 
www.plosmedicine.org; Concannon, L (2008) Citizenship, sexual identity and social exclusion: Exploring issues in 
British and American social policy. In International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 2008 Volume: 28 Issue: 
9/10 p326 – 339. Concannon argues  that there is institutional hostility towards LGBT people, through policy-
making that characterises difference as abnormal, inferior, of less worth and problematic.  He calls on Queer theory 
to challenge and transform LGBT social exclusion by contributing to the rise in new forms of citizenship.
658 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17 pp16
659 For example, a clinician who deals with a homosexual subject as a member of a minority, even if not being morally 
judgemental, assumes that homosexuality is somehow different to heterosexuality, which imports qualitative 
assumptions. In this regard, see Chapter 2 about the problems with identity politics and marginality
660 It is important to acknowledge that some people might feel psychical discomfort because they are a member of a 
minority. Here, the clinician should deal with the feelings of alienation, not the minority-status of the subject
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normative bases, if there is no interference with the others' enjoyment of life. And further, variety in 
sexuality is no longer statistically highly unusual in diverse societies, and should not be seen as by-
definition dysfunctional where it does not conform to statistical norms.
Therefore processes employed in managing emotional concerns pertaining to sexuality should  
reflect non-(hetero)normative discourses on what sexuality is and what it 'should be'. And psychical 
subjects should not be compared to any kind of norms, whether moral or statistical. 
Instead, I suggest, clinicians should rather try to help patients deal with discomfort and pain related 
to underlying emotional issues661. In so doing they should assist subjects, as complex individuals, to 
become more functional on their own terms, and should only be encouraged to find their own 
subjective sense of well-being, by exploring and dealing with their subjectively understood  
distress or impairment.
4.3.2 Distress and Impairment: Effacing Agency
Both the ICD and the DSM specify that in order to qualify as a sexual disorder, a sexual 'fetish'  
interest must result in distress or impairment, meaning that two criteria must be 
met:662
recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors must take place 
over a six  month period; and
The fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviours must cause clinically significant distress or 
i m p a i r m e n t i n s o c i a l , o c c u p a t i o n a l , o r o t h e r a r e a s o f 
functioning.663
On the face of it, this is not necessarily inappropriate. Yet, I suggest, the diagnostic criteria mis-
classify distress and impairment on two levels. Firstly, they call on circular arguments to define  
distress/impairment, which renders the distress/compulsion criterion nugatory. Secondly, they 
inappropriately import compulsion into diagnosing distress/impairment, which negates psychical  
agency in 'fetish' practices.
661 See Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17
662 See Moser and Kleinplatz ibid in respect of transvestic fetishism
663 American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 4-TR. Washington 
DC: APA., p.575. The case is substantially similar in the ICD
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4.3.2a) Distress/Impairment: Circular Arguments
A condition is intended to be diagnosed only when the patient is thereby effectively disabled,  
whether socially or occupationally664. On the face of it, this implies a purely subjective exploration 
of the subject's functionality. 
However, this diagnostic requirement fails to account for three main issues: inbuilt normative  
assumptions as to 
the existence of distress/impairment; 
the extent of distress/impairment; and
the point at which distress/impairment becomes unmanageable.
Firstly, circular arguments assuming 'fetish practices' to be inherently distressing/impairing are  
often called on to diagnose the distress/impairment diagnostic element of 'fetishism'. Clinicians 
faced with a subject who acknowledges a predilection for sexual activity incorporating material 
objects often (heteronormatively) assume that 'fetishism' is inherently pathological. They thereby 
assume a pre-existing pathology which takes hold of an individual, causing dysfunction from which 
he/she should putatively be 'cured' through diagnosis and treatment.
'Fetish', however, is not inherently distressing or impairing. To the contrary, the participants, for  
example, often obtain a subjective sense of positive benefit from their 'fetish sexuality', taking pride 
in having moved beyond normative constraints665:
“I feel good about it... to sort of know that because you've grown from the mindset where you've been  
told that 'this is bad, this is bad, don't touch there, this is only supposed to be for certain things... and 
you realise that what you're taught is not necessarily what is true, what you have to live your life by.  
And you can have an open mind about your fetishes, and you can sort of live the now, just let it be. Um, 
it makes you feel empowered, you're expressing who you really are” ('Brian')
“I think it gives me a great satisfaction... in that I can, like, face the world, and I don't have to step back 
or anything like that. I can be me. I can be me and my fantasies can be me too.” ('Henry')
“Yes, most definitely. I feel more and more liberated and confident in myself, less insecure about my  
sexual performance and a helluva lot more potent, virile and, well, just plain butch. LOL!” ('Jason')
664 See Richards, C. (2007). Diagnosis under fire. In The Psychologist, 20 (7), p.413
665 even though they may be hesitant to express it in broader forum
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“Absolutely again.  Important to my self-image is my need to feel completely accepting of every part of  
me; not to segregate my sexual experiences from my social or emotional experiences.  It tends help me  
side-step the easy answer, not only in regards to sex but in all walks of life.  To understand what drives  
me or holds me back emotionally, and what perhaps drive others or hold them back. I rarely have  
answers for the latter, but it at least helps me to look a little deeper than I might otherwise.” ('Joseph')
“Definitely, through my voyage of accepting my fetish, I’ve grown and developed in many facets of my  
person.” ('Simon')
Secondly, even in the absence of assumptions that 'fetish' is inherently distressing, clinicians are 
likely, on heteropatriarchal bases, to assume that sexual matters are more distressing or impairing, 
and therefore are more justified in pathology, than non-sexual issues666. This, I suggest, is 
inappropriate, since it ignores life concerns other than the putative 'psychopathology', such as 
bankruptcy or physical disability, which might cause psychical disturbance or dysfunction.
Further, clinicians are likely inappropriately to assume that 'ordinary' intercourse itself does not  
result in ‘distress’667, and that the distress or dysfunction of non-paraphilic (i.e. normophilic) people 
is more likely to result from a paucity of supporting partners (for example through being 
overweight, poor or unattractive) than a (purportedly inappropriate) relation with material  
objects668.
Thirdly, the ICD does not specify the point at which manageable unhappiness becomes distressing/
impairing669. In a circular fashion, the criterion uses the assumption of inherent distress as the  
criterion for determining the point at which distress occurs. In this regard, the motive underlying  
'fetishism' can change and sexual arousal may dissolve, whereby 'the fetish' “becomes an antidote 
f o r a n x i e t y o r d e p r e s s i o n o r c o n t r i b u t e s t o a s e n s e o f p e a c e a n d 
calm"670. 
666 See chapter 2 and the Interjection
667 Reiersøl, O, and Skeid, S (2006) The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and Sadomasochism.” Co-published 
simultaneously in Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 50,No. 2/3, Harrington Park Press, pp. 243-262; and: Kleinplatz, 
P.J. and Moser, C (eds) (2006) Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures Harrington Park Press 
668 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17
Similarly, when (normophilic) women and minorities who are subject to discrimination are seldom diagnosed as 
suffering from a psychopathology simply because they may find difficulties garnering support or acceptance 
amongst sexual partners
669 See argument supra re the assumed mutual exclusivity of 'pathology' and 'non-pathology'
670 American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 4-TR. Washington 
DC: APA., p. 574-5
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This is borne out by the participant perspectives:
“[I see fetish objects as] tools, fun toys,... I see them often as a necessity of... you need those toys to  
have fun, to create your universe. And then other times you don't need those items. Where the ... my 
fetishes evolve all the time, and I won't revert back to the same ones necessarily every time I play. They  
change... and one of my biggest fears... of being boring. I hate being boring or predictable. That's why 
my fetishes for me changes all the time. They are definitely a part of me.” ('Jacques')
To the contrary, 'fetish sex' is often adaptive, not distressing, and is therefore itself a coping skill:
“... release, most people, they get bored. Most people like to play around, and people open up to ... 
people would open up and discuss their fetishes, and it's a way of keeping their own sex-life alive, and 
even coping with things, getting things out of their system. Pain, pain can be a fetish. A lot of people use 
pain as a method of dealing with things and coping with things.” ('Jacques')
Clearly, there is no reason to abandon effective coping skills, yet prioritising certain adaptive  
behaviours over others is illogical when not compared to the effectiveness of such behaviours on a 
case-by-case basis671. 
Clearly, since the current diagnostic criteria for 'distress/impairment' are based on circular 
arguments and are therefore uncontextualised, the diagnostic criteria for 'fetishism' are unhelpful.  
This is exacerbated by compulsion being inappropriately imported into diagnostic standards.
4.3.2b) Distress/Impairment, Compulsion and Agency
As discussed above, 'fetishism' is defined as an a priori psychopathology. This results in the 
assumption that, unlike heterosexual coitus and masturbation, 'fetishism' is inherently compulsive, 
and inevitably results in distress and impairment. In turn, the onus of refuting these assumptions lies 
implicitly on the subject, even though he/she is implicitly denied the agency to do so.
However, for many homosexual and heterosexual adults, ‘perversions like fetishism and 
sadomasochism do not provoke conflict since they are not compulsive or exclusive conditions for 
pleasure. In the case of those for whom such practices are the only access to sex, the desires may 
simply be symptomatic'672.
671 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17
672 See in particular Joyce McDougall and the concept of "Neo-Sexuality" in McDougall, Joyce (1997). Las Múltiplas 
Faces De Eros. Martins Fontes, SP, 2001, pp 186, 188, 192, p 186
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For some participants, 'fetish' features as a more or less constant undercurrent with no real effect on  
their daily life:
“...I'm not influenced by ['fetish'], but I do constantly think about it, and do go on the internet at night,  
and I'm surfing the shops that sell rubber and leather, and I look at those kinds of things, and it turns me 
on just by looking at the pictures. But I'm not really driven by it. But I think I have quite a high sexual  
desire, and it's not very far away from my thoughts. If I see a pretty boy walking down the street or I see  
a man in leathers I'll follow him through the supermarket” ('Jared')
For others, 'fetish' has the potential to get in the way of their lives, and at certain times it does:
“...I live a balanced life in general.  Too much of anything can be a problem.  However, if you do not  
take care, it can become an obsession or addiction.  I know guys who are obsessed with it.” ('Donald')
“Only when I use sex to avoid emotional issues or problems.  I will often tell my partner, “Lets get  
some guy or guys and organize a scene,” just to avoid a problem.  It’s rarely satisfying and often goes 
on longer than reasonable.” ('Joseph')
“Sadly yes. I am in a long-term relationship at present but my partner does not share my fetishes. There 
are certain overlapping elements, but every day, as my interest gains momentum, the chasm between us 
seems to grow bigger. I often have to be more than discrete about my whereabouts even though we have  
discussed this at length and I have his “permission” to fulfill my wants and needs.” ('Jason')
For others, however, 'fetish' is a potentially creative and motivating, rather than inhibiting force, and 
therefore is aspirational:
“ja, it'll occupy your mind, the obsession will drive you to become better at what you do, better at what 
you like. I don't see it as a negative thing... it can become controlling, that you spend all your time  
thinking about sex, which is not a bad thing! (laughter) but it's a good thing, it makes me grow as a 
person, it makes me grow as an entity. It makes me want to explore and exploring more things and more 
avenues. That obsession would be me being driven enough to reach places, to reach atmospheres that  
I've never been before. So I think to become an obsession, I see it as drive, to be driven.” ('Jacques')
'Fetish' is therefore clearly not a static orientation to objects true to all 'fetishists' or to each one over  
t ime , bu t , I sugges t , i s a d i a l ec t i ca l r e l a t i onsh ip which mos t o f t en does 
not result in compulsion, but rather shifts and changes both form and meaning in the context of the 
subject's ongoing life673.
Following from this, the ICD diagnostic assumption that distress and impairment is inherently 
linked to compulsion leads to an assumption that 'fetishism' is inherently dysfunctional and that  
673 See chapter 6 re 'orientations'
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'fetishist' subjects (defined as a priori psychopathological674) have no choice in their practices in 
that they are irretrievably and irremedially diagnosable as psychopathological.
Yet at the same time it provides the caveat of 'non-pathological fetishism' which serves as the 
rebuttal to the accusation of being an a priori 'fetishist'. This creates an interesting Escherian 
theoretical conundrum675: how can someone presumed to be without agency muster the agency to  
demonstrate that they have agency and are therefore not a 'fetishist'? By implication they cannot,  
and need an external psychiatric diagnosis to free them of the weight of psychopathology, 
whereafter they can be acknowledged to express their agency676. This in turn, I suggest, negates the 
idea of anyone having any inherent agency.
However, in contradistinction to this assumption, many participants in the present research see their 
'fetish interests' as a choice, without the 'assistance' of a clinician. 
“No, not a lifestyle, rather a frame of mind. [A] choice, as I can switch it off.” ('Donald')
“an interest. I think of it more as an interest than a lifestyle.... I don't feel driven towards it... I'd like to  
explore it. I mean... ” ('Henry')
“The desire to explore my fetish sexuality compels me to explore it by choice. I could choose to only 
have vanilla sex or abstain, just as anyone else. I chose this lifestyle and therefore feel compelled to 
honour my decision.” ('Jason')
They therefore patently exercise the agency implicitly negated/downplayed by the 
ICD-10677.
Further, describing 'fetishism' as something categorisable and psychopathologisable implies that it is  
a 'condition' which exists from birth onwards and never shifts678. This is not the case:
“...For my part, I felt a compulsion to explore it in my youth. I was driven in a way that was again 
disproportionate to the time I allotted other activities or relationships.  Now, it’s a little of both. While at 
times, I do think that it’s about recapturing the physical and emotional experiences I had when first  
exploring various BDSM activities.  Which is why I tend to push some of these fetishes more to the so-
called “edge” – not to prove anything other than my body can still feel something new.” ('Joseph')
This is not to imply that there is no emotional trauma in these participants' lives, or that they are not 
674 See above
675 Graphic artist Maurits Cornelis Escher (1898-1972), who created fascinating images of physical spaces which turn 
in on themselves and could never exist in the material world. See http://www.mcescher.com
676 See chapter 3
677 See chapter 6
678 And links into the notion that psychical activity is based on an inevitable 'lack'. See Chapter 3
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beset by problems such as compulsive/addictive behaviour or psychological trauma. Rather, 
however, it implies that their 'fetish sexuality' is made up of more than simple and irrepressible  
compulsion, and cannot easily be diagnosed as psychopathological on the basis of their 'distress' or 
'impairment', which may shift and change.
Clearly, therefore, diagnosing 'fetishism' as per the ICD diagnostic standards provides little clarity 
on which circumstances constitute pathology and which not. More damningly, to do so 
inappropriately imports both moral and statistical (hetero)normativity into the diagnostic process  
through its requirement for subjects to be attached to 'unusual objects'. Further, the diagnostic 
criteria's reliance on 'distress and impairment' is based on inappropriate (normative) circular 
arguments relating to prior assumptions of pathology and psychical addiction/compulsion, which 
nullify the notion of the agency of a psychical subject. 
All concerns such as addiction and/or compulsion should therefore be dealt with separately to 
'fetish', and none should be psychopathologised679.
This means that the ICD's diagnostic criteria do not serve to describe the complexity of subjective 
human psychical states and the multiple and complex ways in which people process their emotions 
or understand their practices. Instead, the criteria inappropriately serve normatively to 
prescribe sexual activity, thereby inappropriately perpetuating dominant (heteropatriarchal)  
normative social constructions.
4.4 From Psychopathology to Psycholiberation
From the aforegoing, 'fetish' should clearly not be psychopathologised, since the purportedly  
'objective' categories and diagnostic criteria are primarily informed by (hetero)normative 
assumptions of what sexuality is or should be. 'Fetish sexuality', like homo- or heterosexual  
sexuality, is, I suggest, no more than another variation of sexual practice, and indeed, as with any 
sexual practice, cannot be adequately described through categories and diagnoses. To profess to do 
so merely perpetuates heteronormativities and thereby to prescribe practices while denying the role 
of choice and agency in sexual practices.
In order to obviate this, the subjective concerns and circumstances of psychical subjects are better 
679 Moser, C. & Kleinplatz, P.J. (2002). Transvestic fetishism: Psychopathology or Iatrogenic Artifact? In 
New Jersey Psychologist, 52(2) 16-17
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served by obviating all assumptions pertaining to emotional states and reasons for distress. Yet 
many contemporary approaches to psychopathologising discourses simply seek to throw light on 
their problematic nature, with few solutions proposed. 
The tendency to focus on reclassifying perversions, rather than reconceiving their bases, or indeed 
reconceiving the idea of perversion itself, is concerning, since it serves merely to (re)structuralise 
the psyche in some foundational way, rather than deconstructing it and finding alternative ways to  
approach a multiplicity of sexualities. 
For example, Wheeler, Newring and Draper merely advocate longitudinal clinical research as a way 
f o r w a r d , p a r t i c u l a r l y l o o k i n g a t h o w c h i l d r e n ' s p r a c t i c e s e x t e n d i n t o 
adulthood680. Loonis proposes redressing classifications of erotic fantasy, which he problematically 
notes is not a secondary psychical phenomenon, but is at the core the psychic economy and 
psychodynamics, and always behind sexual behaviour681. He however neither addresses how 
sexuality, 'fetish' or fantasy are discursively pathologised, nor does he propose alternatives to 
'treatment'. Rather, he merely advocates replacing the classifications with Freudian and Lacanian  
theories relating to partial impulse, where sexual perversion should be seen as a perversion of the 
four underlying constructs thereof: the upsurge, the source, the object and the aim, allowing for a 
differentiation between fantasy and reality682. He suggests that this allows an alternative 
classification, which takes account of a range of perversions and allows for better distinction 
between perversions associated with the subject, those needing therapeutic treatment, and those 
requiring penal sanctions for criminal activity683. Yet this merely rehashes the same metatheoretical 
problems. Similarly, Bonnet does not substantially question the reasons to classify perversion at all,  
but remains content to reclassify 'the perversions' by separating the ones worthy of psychiatric 
management from those causing no psycho-social problems684. However, as argued above, the 
classification of 'perversion' pathologises sexual alterity altogether.
680 Wheeler, J, Newring, KAB & Draper, C (2008) Transvestic fetishism, psychopathology and theory. In Laws, D.R., 
O'Donohue, W.T. (2008) Sexual deviance: theory, assessment, and treatment. Guilford Press, 2008 at pp 273 et seq 
at 282-283. Note that they do not substantially re-vision the underlying identificatory or diagnostic  issues with 
regard to 'fetish' or 'transvestic fetishism'.
681 Loonis, E, (1999) Approche Structurale des Fantasmes Erotiques Journal of Evolutionary Psychiatry 1999 ; 64 : 
43-60, Elsevier, Paris pp59-60. Loonis, ibid, pp43-60: After researching both ‘pathological’ and ‘non-pathological’ 
respondents, he conceives of four basic groups of fantasy: temporal erotic fantasies (with build-up to make-believe, 
action, oneiric rhythms, and final triggering phases relieving the erotic fantasy); logical (vertical and horizontal 
fractal structures and contexts fitting into each other); roles (with three entreaties including desire, taboos and 
diversion); and sets of themes (disobedience, phallic exhibitionism, restraint and humiliation)
682 See chapter 3 in this regard
683 Bonnet, G (2002) Pour une nouvelle classification des perversions sexuelles. In Evolutionary Psychiatry 2002 ; 67 : 
496-505  pp503 et seq
684 Bonnet, G, ibid , pp502
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4.4.1 Alternatives to Classification
Given the underlying instabilities to both the categories and diagnostic guidelines of 'fetishism' 
detailed above, it is important to go beyond merely bandaging a broken system. In line with 
discursive critiques of psychology, gender and sexualities, the metatheoretical basis of the clinical  
categories of 'fetishism' and 'transvestic fetishism' must therefore be done away with 
in toto, so as to conceptualise better ways of locating sexuality than through relying on variations of  
'perversion', which cannot be abstracted from their (hetero)normative associations.
It is therefore important to remove all references to psychopathology from local, national and 
international mental health codes or practices685. In this regard, Richards suggests that psychiatric 
definitions be re-phrased as 'transgressive sexualities'686, and proposes a psychological/psychiatric 
code which distinguishes only between coercive and non-coercive sexual activity:
“Sexualities and/or identities that are not coercive in nature - that is where the parties involved are able  
to, and do give consent - should not be considered to be de facto evidence of psychopathology or  
attendant to psychopathology. Those sexualities may be, but are not limited to, non-coercive variations 
of the following: Heterosexuality, Homosexuality, Bisexuality, Asexuality, Polyamory, Monogamy, 
Non-Monogamy Transsexualism, Dual Role Transvestitism, Fetishism, Fetishistic transvestism, 
Exhibitionism, Voyeurism, Sadomasochism687.
Similarly, sexual diversity could be described as ‘neo-sexualities’688, thereby obviating the 
pejorative term and associations of ‘perversions’, which McDougall suggests only be used to label 
desires and conditions imposed by sexual agents on others who are not interested in the sexual  
script, (for example rape, voyeurism and exhibitionism), or for where the agent seduces someone 
who is non-responsible (such as child or mentally disturbed person)689. This kind of approach 
suggests that the diagnostic categories should be excluded from the ICD and DSM classifications, 
and should be not be called on as evidence of psychopathology.
Notably, though, merely relying on 'coercive' vs 'non-coercive' as descriptors of sexuality does not 
address questions of the socially constructed nature of society and culture, and therefore of  
685 In line with queer thinking on the subject, it would be preferable to do away with all mental classifications 
in toto, yet this is unlikely to happen, and so, in the spirit of pragmatic political practice (see Chapter 2), simply 
doing away with psychopathological classifications will have to do
686 Richards, C (2007) Consultation on the Mental Health Act 2007 Code of Practice. British Psychological Society – 
Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section
687 Richards, C (2007) ibid
688 See Joyce McDougall and the concept of "Neo-Sexuality" in McDougall, Joyce (1997). Las Múltiplas Faces De 
Eros. Martins Fontes, SP, 2001, pp 188
689 McDougall, (1997), ibid, p 188. See also Martins, MC & Ceccarelli, PR, The So-Called "Deviant" Sexualities: 
perversion or Right to Difference? http://www.reviseF65.org/cuba1.html
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coercion, which arguably relies on dominant moralities and constructions of sexuality and  
normative standards for definitions of what counts as dangerous or damaging, and what counts as 
consenting. In this respect, the ways in which Denman690 and Langdridge691 distinguish 
transgressive from coercive sexualities are instructive, since such distinctions would enable 
questions of agency (and concomitantly choice) to be incorporated into descriptions of sexuality.
These kinds of solutions are politically compelling, since they largely obviate moralising in the 
description of sexualities692. However, they describe sexualities and sexual activities more from an 
e x t e r n a l p e r s p e c t i v e t h a n t h r o u g h e x p l a i n i n g h o w s u b j e c t i v e ' p s y c h i c a l ' 
processes693 might work in non-essentialist or foundationalist ways. They therefore do not 
necessarily sufficiently describe how the material, the immaterial and the discursive elements of  
personal experience interconnect, and therefore the kinds of agency a subject expresses in a sexual 
context, which description is, I suggest, a sine qua non for developing a more functional 
poststructuralist metatheory for sexuality which incorporates material objects, and metatheory more 
broadly.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter reviews the notion of psychopathological classification and diagnosis. It thereby opens 
the door to re-organising existing epistemologies through rejecting those which rely on normative  
considerations, whether explicitly or implicitly, and finding more functional and forward-looking  
metatheoretical solutions. 
I suggest that psychopathologising 'fetish practices' is inappropriate, since it essentialises human 
experience and perpetuates heteronormative discourses. In particular, the ICD (& DSM) 
classifications and diagnostic criteria are, I suggest, in themselves insubstantial.
Firstly, the classifications merely inappropriately repeat the discredited historical 
classifications of ‘perversion’, through incorrectly assuming an uncomplicated, non-contextualised 
sexual interest in material objects by an abstracted normatively-bounded psychical subject. They 
690 Denman, C. (2004). Sexuality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
691 Langdridge, D. & Barker, M. (Eds.) (2007). Safe, Sane and Consensual: Contemporary Perspectives on  
Sadomasochism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
692 Subject to clearly defining what is meant by 'coercive' and 'non-coercive'
693 See chapter 3 re perspectives in discursive psychology which problematises the notion of a distinct 'internal' vs 
discursively constructed 'psyche', in conjunction with chapter 5 re the constitution of the subject
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t h e r e b y o n t o l o g i c a l l y a s s u m e a n e s s e n t i a l v a l u e t o ( h e t e r o ) n o r m a t i v i t y, 
and fail to describe 'fetish' as played out in the lives of people who enjoy the sexual company of  
material objects. Rather, they prescribe sexual behaviour through essentialist and foundationalist 
normative expectations lodged in the categories themselves. 'Fetishism' therefore becomes a 
psychopathological terminological construct rather than a functional description of practices.
In contradistinction, however, the participants' perceptions and practices of 'fetish' (which they have 
reclaimed from 'fetishism') give insight into descriptive epistemologies of 'fetish sexuality', which 
should clearly not be based on object-focused definitional diatribes around the centrality of the 
dualistically separated 'fetish object' (as proscribed material sexual object) as the definitional nexus 
for 'fetishism' as a practice (and therefore the 'fetishist' as a psychopathologised category). In 
contradistinction, their practices indicate dialectical configurations between material objects of  
sexual interest, sexual partners, subjective perceptions, emotional associations and heteronormative 
social constructions694.
Secondly, the ICD-10 diagnostic guidelines for diagnosis of 'fetishism' as psychopathology are 
insufficient in that they provide little clarity on the circumstances which do or do not constitute  
pathology (which is in itself indefensible). They inappropriately import both moral and statistical  
(hetero)normativity into the diagnostic process through the requirement that subjects be psychically  
attached to 'unusual objects'. Further, the requirement of 'distress and impairment' is based on 
inappropriate (normative) circular arguments relating to prior assumptions of pathology and 
psychical addiction/compulsion, which undermine the notion of subjects' psychical agency. Since it 
is inappropriate both to conflate and to psychopathologise issues such as addiction, compulsion and 
'fetishism', this indicates that the diagnostic criteria fail to describe the complexity of subjective  
psychical states and the multiple and complex ways in which people process their emotions or  
understand their practices. Instead, as with the psychopathological definitions, the diagnostic  
criteria normatively prescribe sexual activity, thereby inappropriately perpetuating dominant  
(heteropatriarchal) normative social constructions by rationalising the construction of 'fetishism' as 
a pathology while valuing other compulsive, repetitive practices like heterosexuality.
In order to obviate this, the subjective concerns and circumstances of psychical subjects are better 
served by obviating all categories and diagnostic criteria, and finding alternative ways to describe  
sexuality which incorporate both normative and non-normative sexual variety. One compelling  
694 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, more functional bases for understanding the phenomenon of people-interacting-
sexually-with-material-objects therefore lie in an epistemological focus on the subject as he/she interacts 
phenomenologically with discourse and his/her environment.
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approach is to rephrase the historical variations of 'perversity' as 'transgressive sexualities', 
approaching them as variations of sexual diversity and calling on distinctions between coercive and  
non-coercive sexual activity, subject to closer definition of coercion, danger, damage and consent,  
which are in themselves socially constructed notions.
Such solutions, however, merely describe sexualities and sexual activities from an external 
perspective, and do not successfully explain in detail the ways in which a subject's 'internal'  
psychical processes695 interact with his/her environment, and therefore the kinds of agency a subject 
expresses in a sexual context. As will be argued in subsequent chapters, discursive constructions on 
their own are not enough to explain subjectivities, agency and the relationships between people and 
the material world, either in the context of fetish sexuality, or in the context of human experience  
more broadly. In order to find more functional and theoretically stable bases on which to found  
complex sexual cartographies which do not merely re-inscribe the 'fetishist' as a poor lost soul 
hopelessly dependent on pre-existing, foundationalist and dysfunctional drives, or as a creature 
haplessly subject to discursive flows, it is necessary to look further than merely unpacking and 
renaming regulatory discourses. As I will argue, psychical discourses on 'fetish' should instead aim 
at avoiding normative, object-focused psychopathologising sexual categories. Instead, I suggest, 
they should call on subject-oriented reference points696. This of necessity entails exploring the 
constitution of the subject, together with the extent to which subjects have the agency to make their  
sexual choices, and the personal and political roles of sexual activity involving material objects.
695 See chapter 3 re perspectives in discursive psychology which problematises the notion of a distinct 'internal' vs 
discursively constructed 'psyche', in conjunction with chapter 5 re the constitution of the subject
696 See particularly chapter 5 and 6 re the role of the body and embodiment
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INTERJECTION
RE-ORIENTING SCHOLARSHIP TOWARDS THE 'SUBJECT' OF 
SUBJECTIVITIES
As discussed in Chapter 3, the historical epistemological focus in the anthropological  
feitiço697 and in psychoanalytic 'fetishism'698 was clearly on the 'fetish' object, which was called on 
to identify, marginalise and pathologise people using material objects for religio-cultural or sexual 
purposes. As further discussed in Chapter 4, this narrow framework has been perpetuated and 
codified in the contemporary ICD definitions and diagnostic criteria for 'fetishism', which, similarly 
to its predecessors, avoids describing the use of material objects in terms of the subject at all. Such 
definitions and criteria heteronormatively proscribe subjects' use of objects and yet confusingly, 
also define subjects in terms of objects, without the presence of which the subject cannot be 
classified, and therefore diagnosed and 'cured'. Rather than describing people or practices as ICD 
classifications and diagnostic criteria respectively purport to do, they discursively recreate and 
prescribe heteronormativity, thereby failing to acknowledge subjectivities and assuming that there is 
some objective ontological standard of 'meaning' which subjects should meet, whether religiously 
essentialist or philosophically foundationalist.
Through inappropriately relying on conceptions of what is 'natural' to define people (and thereby to 
diagnose practices), these 'scientific' psychiatric discourses have replaced earlier constructions of 
'nature', which was used to represent the 'God-given' order of things, with normative conceptions of 
pathology699. Both versions rely on nature as both an aesthetic thing and a moral touchstone,  
whereby700:
people's behaviour is regulated in terms of what is 'natural', meaning normative, where 
conformity to the 'natural' is prescribed. In this way, procreative heterosexuality and 
heteropatriarchal norms of sexual exploration are institutionalised through regulatory norms;
697 See chapter 3. Colonialist discourses were premised on pseudo-darwinian ideas of cultural superiority intermingled 
with Catholico-Christian norms which proscribed 'idol-worship' and circumscribed 'appropriate' psychodynamic 
human-object relations respectively. 
698 See chapter 3. The psychiatric discourses on 'fetishism' which followed were based on the assumption of a fixed, 
fictive, singular, universal psychodynamic reference point of 'lack', whereby psychodynamic constructions are 
inevitably defined in opposition to the (fetish) object. 
699 Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 267-292 
pp272
700 Lock, M (1997) ibid
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nature justifies and legitimises medical discourses and practices, e.g. the interpretation of  
pregnancy and menopause as disease-like conditions, and more specifically the 
psychopathologising of unusual sexual enjoyment;701
people are regularly morally judged as wild, uncultured or inappropriately proximal to  
nature, thereby being dangerous. E.g. the purportedly 'unclean' nature of women's bodies, as  
opposed to the orderly ones of men, and perceptions of BDSM and fetish as dangerous;
individuals or institutions are regularly encouraged to or discouraged from interfering with 
nature itself, based on the opposing ideas that we should either improve on nature, or abstain 
from disrupting the 'natural order'. E.g. 'curing' the psychopathology of fetish is seen as a way 
to 'fix' what is broken, or to turn the subject into a 'normal' (i.e.'natural') member of  
society702.
However, as Lock notes:
“It is clear that nature cannot be taken as immutable, as has been its dominant representation throughout 
modernity--the bedrock upon which the culture games are played. Nature is represented by means of 
cultural categories; nature/culture boundaries are contested, and nature is called upon to do cultural 
"work"--that is, it participates in commentary on social life, and it forces itself, selectively, into our 
consciousness.”703
Far from being clear and concise tools for assisting individuals to manage psychical  
functionality704, the frameworks for viewing 'fetishism' at our disposal inappropriately base psycho-
medical practices on the 'natural', which is an inappropriate location for metatheories on sexual  
practices, since what is seen as 'natural' is indeed discursively constructed and merely serves to 
perpetuate damaging normative frameworks.
I suggest that routes to more useful frameworks which avoid determinist reliance on 'the natural' 
should interrogate the roles of theory, politics and the personal in scholarship, so as to move  
towards relatively value-neutral epistemological frameworks which take into account variety and 
diversity in human practices and subjectivities, yet which at the same time recognise and counter  
(hetero)normativities.
701 See chapters 3 and 4, and see Conrad, P (1992) Medicalization and Social Control. In Annual Review of Sociology 
18 (1992): 209-232
702 See chapter 4
703 Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 267-292 
pp272
704 However one might determine this if not in any normative way. See below and chapter 6 in this regard
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Heteronormative Dualities
Following my argument in Chapter 2 on the instability of identities, I suggest that there is an 
implicit equation which justifies discursive heteronormativity and homophobia through fictions that 
people who engage in (unusual) same-sex sexual pract ices must essent ia l ly 
' be ' 'homosexuals', who are assumed to be both qualitatively and quantitatively different to 
'heterosexuals'. In turn this is based on fictions that people are essentially discrete entities who are 
s om ehow fundam en t a l l y s epa r a t e f r om each o t he r and f rom (non -hum an) 
objects705. This creates/recreates normative proscriptions against 'inappropriate' 'fetish' sexuality. 
Heteronormativity relies on the purported ability, in essentialist or foundationalist ways, to 
distinguish one human being ('the homosexual'/'the fetishist') from others ('heterosexuals'/'non-
fetishists'), and from each discrete (fetish) object with which that human is juxtaposed, thereby 
valuing the purportedly identifiable 'heterosexual non-fetishist' over the 'homosexual 
fetishist'706. Dominant heteronormative discourses perpetuate assumptions through prioritising 
(procreative) human-human sexuality and marginalising non-normative practices, thereby under-
estimating the values which subjects attribute to objects, and to the material world more  
broadly707. Such heteropatriarchal normative discourses 'stick' to individuals, through reliance on 
hyperbolic, distorted or fabricated stories about sexual groups or issues, and through the use of 
evocative language and imagery708, which  translate into ‘sticky signs’: words that accumulate 
affective value709. Discourse is unpredictable, and “the plurality of discourses in operation during 
a n y p a r t i c u l a r c o n f l i c t m a y t r i g g e r u n e x p e c t e d r e a c t i o n s a n d 
counterreactions”710. They stress danger and disease, and use provocative language, and symbols, 
scapegoating and depravity narratives, often exported through the media and public 
figures711.
705 This is particularly seen through how historical anthropological views of the 
feitiço were based on essentialist conceptions of cultural superiority, and how psychoanalytic theory has constructed 
the human being as being psychically defined through an essential ontological lack (chapter 3)
706 See chapter 2 in this regard
707 See chapter 4
708 See chapter 2. See also Ahmed, S (2004) The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge pp92.  Ahmed 
refers to ‘sticky signs’: words that accumulate affective value. In this way heteronormativity is discursively 
reproduced through texts which work emotionally through the ‘sticking’ of signs onto bodies, and sex panic script 
language therefore uses cultural and historical meaning attached to broader negative affects in sexual culture, to 
prompt fears of sexual transgression and perversion.
709 Ahmed, S (2004) The Cultural Politics of Emotion New York: Routledge. Pp92. Ahmed notes that emotions are not 
in texts. Rather, texts work emotionally through ‘sticking’ signs onto bodies.
710 Hochschild, A.R (1979) Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure. In American Journal of Sociology  
85 (1979): 551 – 75, pp557
711 Specifically perpetuated through sex panic narratives. See chapter 2 in respect thereof
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'Fetish': Conflating Homophobia and Heteronormativity
The media, as primarily a consumer-focused capitalist enterprise, mirrors heteronorms in a  
somewhat schizophrenic fashion, rather than shifting them. On the one hand, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the media represents 'homosexuality' as unitary and calls to attention the ways in which  
non-normative sexual orientation is marginalised, and how 'homosexuals', as supposedly 
identifiable entities, are socially maligned because they are assumed to be visible. Yet on the other  
hand, the media largely fails to represent 'fetish' at all, resulting in the invisibility of both 'fetishists'  
and their practices712. 
When 'fetish' is depicted, it is framed in contradictory terms: in hushed tones as being something 
sexy yet at the same time dirty and secret: 
“The media projects an image that being “bad” is sexy then turns around and derides the person for being 
“bad.” It’s okay to be “sick” on Nip/Tuck and get turned on by it, or to make it a joke on Desperate  
Housewife (sic), but it’s still very much about being “sick” or “ridiculous.” ('Joseph')
Alternatively, it is spoken of with derision, and participants feel self-conscious and/or marginal:
“I think the media takes it in a negative way.... I think they frown on it. Either they frown on it or the  
make light of it as a comedy. ... I think they should realise it's quite serious, and it's an integral part of 
some people. They should accept it as such.” ('Henry')
“Fetish seems to always get represented as something perverted or dirty and for the sick minded. It is 
either viewed from this angle or it is made a joke of. Its upsetting as it creates more barriers to have to  
break down.” ('Simon')
These normative discourses on fetish sexuality, which are clearly at play in the heteronormative  
world, also pervade gay communities. Participants often feel excluded from broader gay life, and  
marginalised within the gay communities:
“...The first time SAleathermen participated in Pride, they wanted to put us #36 out of 37 (37 failed to 
show up for the orientation) and only back down when I questioned their decision, placing us at 28.  On 
the other hand, media partners have expressed support, partly perhaps because they hope for something of 
a freak show.  Is that fair?  On a personal level, it has affected some of my partner’s previous friendships  
because I was no longer “acceptable” in their circles.  It may not have just been my “outness” about 
leather/BDSM, but it certainly played a part.  And the worse part is the hypocrisy amongst those who call 
me up stoned for “pig sex” then ignore me publicly, or make up stories about outrageous encounters that 
they most likely are secretly aroused by.” ('Joseph')
712 This is particularly so in the local media, but also in the American (and to a lesser extent European) popular media 
on which South Africa so heavily relies
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“...we are forced to be in groups.  “Others” in the gay community sometimes frown upon it.  I think some 
are afraid of burly leather men, haha.  I am athletically built, although I look a bit aggressive in my 
demeanour.  I am not aggressive though, yet I feel outside the mainstream LBGT community.” ('Donald')
This indicates that the normative discourses which pervade society more broadly are equally at play 
in marginal communities, who, as I will discuss later, both perpetuate and subvert normativities. 
In the present instance, more mainstream gay communities perceive 'fetishists' in similar negative  
ways to those represented by heteronormative discourses:
“There seems to be a lot of preconceived ideas of what leather sex is about and people seem scared of it.  
They seem to think leather sex entails dark, tortured souls wandering around having indiscriminate 
sex.” ('Simon')
“... people are horrified when I tell them that... the twinks who start chatting me up in the clubs and they  
say 'well, tell me your darkest secret' and some of them are horrified cos they are little ... and they're 
horrified that somebody could be... I'm not into pain, not into spanking, not into whipping, but they 
immediately think that and say S/m the connotation is pain, blood, torture... when people ask me, or I tell 
them they immediately think it's all whipping pain domination roleplay kind of thing.” ('Jared')
These kinds of perceptions are often covert, yet at other times result in overt negative  
sentiment against 'fetish' sexuality, surprisingly from within its own ranks:
“All the time, and more often from those within the SALeathermen community (since I don’t often speak  
about BDSM in such detail outside the group).  There remains lot of internal constraints and issues that 
hold many within the group back.  They will talk about what is “acceptable” and what is “sick,”  
effectively demonising discussions of these thing within our own community.  It’s sad. There’s too much 
racism and misogyny still, which is something less than subtle.  On the other hand, avatars on the website  
allows for some discussions, albeit brief, on scat, for instance.  But for the most part, we remain skittish  
and negative about the very pursuit we’re supposed to be embracing.” ('Joseph')
This complex relationship between perceptions appears to be interconnected with many participants'  
tendency to merely reproduce heteronormative scripts in their practices.
Participants' Repetitions of Heteronormativity
One need not scratch far below the surface to see that, even though they in some ways pride their 
'transgressive sexualities'713, the participants often fail to question their implicit (hetero)normative 
assumptions around male primacy and compulsory masculinity. 
713 See chapter 4 on how they have re-appropriated the term 'fetish' from 'fetishism'
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One instance of this is the ways they problematically compartmentalise and 'fetishise' the body parts 
of sexual partners, reflecting dominant heteronormative discourses around the objectification of  
certain body parts which stand in for the whole sexual partner:
“...the area from the ear down to the chin, ... and a man's forearms ... , and certain people's under-arms I  
find very erotic. ... the way a man stands as well. ... The chin area I think has got to do with being shaven  
or unshaven. It's a hair thing there. I prefer men with moustaches or beards. ... the forearms I don't know, I  
think it's a strength thing there. Cos I like really strong forearms and hairy ones as well. ...” ('Henry')
“...I like someone who is larger than a normal gay male. ... there is definitely a fetish of bigger in 
proportion. And that's related in a sense to nipples, cocks, balls... and obviously, anus. Fisting is definitely  
a f e t i sh , v a c u u m p u mp in g i s a f e t i sh , mo s t b o d y mo d i f i c a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l . . . 
balls, I enjoy small balls and a big cock. ... bigger is good, bigger is nice, bigger is better to work with! I  
can do a lot more with someone who's got an inflated penis than I can do with someone that you can't find 
it, type of thing... ('Jacques')
As a result, the partner's validation as a complex human being is effaced:
“Funnily, the one area of the body that 'fades' in importance during BDSM play is the face.  I tend to  
objectify my partner to some degree and identity is most tied to the face.  So I instead focus on individual  
body parts, and funny that includes the eyes, but not the face.  ...I don’t particularly like masks, but I often 
find myself covering the mouth and nose with my hands – not only to gag that person but to see the eyes 
but lose the face.” ('Joseph')
“... if someone had a lot of piercings, that idea would turn me on, by just looking. It doesn't have to lead  
up to sexual contact. ... I'm a highly sexual person, so I could look at anyone... even a female... with great 
tattoos, and great body piercing and go... I would never have sex with her, but it's still a sexual turn-on. 
The fact that her mind has evolved. She's in a different state of mind than what a normal person is, and I  
associate with that.” ('Jacques') 
Further, some participants enjoy bodily functions such as 'barebacking' (sex without a condom), 
'watersports' (urine), 'scat' (faeces) and sweat:
“Bare backing definitely, whenever I can get it.  ... The sensuality of a bare cock in your ass/ your bare 
cock in someone else's ass is far far better than condom sex.  Water sports, I am interested in and the 
thought of it turns me on.  ... I love the idea of a guy screwing me, ejaculating inside me and then wash it  
out with urinating in me.” ('Donald')
“I'm into watersports. I love a man to pee on me. It turns me on. The smell again there. It must also smell  
right. ... I'll even drink it if it tastes right. ... I'm not into scat. That would turn me off totally. His underarm 
can drive me insane... If certain people have gone jogging, and came home just like that, I'd probably 
want to lick the sweat off them.” ('Henry')
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“Bodily functions/fluids are normal and common to everybody. ... I have recently experienced water 
sports for the first time and may I say I found it incredible. At present I am not ready to take it in the 
mouth although seeing it on DVD does appeal. Multiple men pissing all over me while I am fucking or 
being fucked is a huge turn-on for me and I would love to try it sometime. Semen in and over me is the  
best – having a man withdraw at orgasm, cumming over my asshole then immediately continue fucking 
me in his own juice. ...” ('Jason')
“I enjoy watersports – I guess the humiliation factor is what makes this exciting.” ('Simon')
This problematically mirrors a repetition of heteronormative patriarchal fetishising and humiliation  
of the 'other', by reconstituting the human object as a material one714.
From this angle, the participants' practices do not substantially negate dominant heteronormative 
scripts of compulsory masculinity, nor do they drastically transgress heteronormative boundaries or  
express vociferous resistance to normative constraints715.
Many of the participants seem to see themselves as 'gay' in some essentialist way, rather than 
'queer'. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is problematic since it perpetuates dualist conceptions of  
their practices as some kind of overt reaction to heteronormative roles, which largely seem to reflect 
dominant discourses. In other words, the participants often tend to see themselves as inherently 
being gay, which is discursively constructed as some kind of 'second class citizen'. They thereby 
seem, I suggest, to think of themselves as by definition 'outside' of normative structures, and they 
call on their 'fetish practices' to set them apart from the society which makes them pariahs in a kind  
of display of defensiveness bordering on aggressiveness which belies a discomfort at being seen as 
the 'other' whose desires, as I will discuss in Chapter 6, are seen as a 'failed space'. 
In so doing, they consider themselves in some essentialist way to 'be' 'homosexual fetishists', as if 
that is somehow different to other varieties of 'fetishists'. They thereby assume that their 'fetish' is 
somehow different to the way other people interact with material objects. Because they focus  
themselves on how others see their practices as 'wrong', I suggest, therefore, that the extent of their  
heteronormative repetition remains opaque to them. This may be linked to their largely mistaking 
714 Perspectives on dominance and submission are available in Cosgrove, P (1999) Edmund Burke, Gilles Deleuze, and  
the Subversive Masochism of the Image. In ELH 66.2 (1999) 405-437. The Johns Hopkins University Press; 
Langdridge, D & Butt, T (2004) A Hermeneutic Phenomenological Investigation of the Construction of 
Sadomasochistic Identities. In Sexualities, Vol. 7, No. 1, 31-53 (2004); Knox, J (2005) Sex, shame and the 
transcendent function: the function of fantasy in self development. In Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2005, 50, 
617–639; Langdridge, D (2005). Actively dividing selves: S/M and the thrill of disintegration. In 
Lesbian and Gay Psychology Review, 6(3), pp. 198–208.
715 Yet in comparison, pertaining to the queer subversion of masculinities through hypermasculinities and the 'bear' 
motif, see Palmieri, F.M (aka Warbear) (2005) 21st Century Schizoid Bear: Masculine Transitions Through Net 
Pornography. In Jacobs, K, Janssen, M & Pasquinelli, M (eds) (2005) Clickme: A Netporn Studies Reader. 
Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, Colophon
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heterosexuality for heteronormativity, assuming that the ways in which they do transgress  
heteronorms counts as a rejection of, rather than merely a challenge to and reflection of 
heteronormativity.
Clearly there is a complex relationship with normativities both within the 'fetish' group and more 
broadly, which complexity deserves more unpacking in relation to how people and groups  
incorporate and perpetuate heteronormativities. Yet, as I have indicated in Chapters 1 and 2, to 
reveal those complex relationships merely through discursive lenses, such as those often applied by 
scholarship seeking to explore the complex cartographies of subjectivities, can tend, in a 
predominantly identity-based discursive environment, to create further determinist assumptions  
which attenuate subjectivities by treating subjects as some kind of spectral object, mistaking 
discursive flows for the complexity it seeks to unpack.
Discursive Description vs Metatheoretical Construction
Inside (relatively narrow) scholarly environments such as those of sexualities studies which support 
complex cartographies of subjectivities with a strong awareness of heteronormative underpinnings,  
purely discursive readings of participant practices make strong theoretical sense, and can be put to  
good use to guide scholarship aimed at informing (queer) liberatory political action.
Yet an argument such as the present is not primarily intended for queer activists or scholars, but is 
aimed at furthering some kind of change in a broader social sphere, and in particular in the often  
conservative and reactionary psycho-medical community which, as I have argued in Chapters 3 and 
4, unconsciously repeats the dominant (heteronormative) and very powerful institutionalised and 
discursively-constructed blindness towards unusual sexual practices716.
The psycho-medical community's perceptions of both 'homosexuality' and 'fetishism' are both 
created through and in turn recreate a sense of shame around sexuality, which is reflected in public  
discourses, and enables and legitimises specific ways of thinking, talking and feeling about sex in 
public717. Rather than furthering acceptance of sexual alterity, such discourses 'other' unusual  
sexualities by publicly rejecting them, either explicitly or through feeling and expression rules  
which are interwoven in the language and symbols of both the general public and 
716 A key example is the highly-lauded ICD on which most psycho-medical practitioners call as an authoritative source
717 Hochschild, A.R (1979) Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure. In American Journal of Sociology  
85 (1979): 551 – 75, pp557
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conservatives718. Such rules govern social interactions and are social guidelines for how people 
produce and manage effect, and cover daily emotional life719. Similarly, norms of expression or 
display govern emotional behaviour and generally circumscribe the appropriate range and intensity 
of communication and interpretation of feelings720. In this way they ensure that emotions remain 
within the range of the social. Indeed, emotion, far from being an unmediated response, is a social  
per formance encompass ing meaning sys tems , norms , mot iva t ion and socia l 
reaction721. The often conservative conventions of the psycho-medical fraternity often interact with 
this repression of sexuality, linked to the socialised sense of shame722. Sexuality remains fear-
inducing since the biological imperative threatens the symbolic of the socio-cultural world and of 
personal identity723. Sex is frightening and is therefore displaced from discourse, only being 
acceptable if referred to indirectly. Since sexuality is the direct object of repression, it includes in its  
purview anything else repressed, which results in the individual’s most shameful and unexpressed 
needs becoming sexualised724. Shame is in turn perpetuated through professional discourses such as 
those of psychologists who refrain from referring directly to sexuality and sex, rather focussing on  
c o n c e r n s o f a t t a c h m e n t , d e p e n d e n c e , a b a n d o n m e n t f e a r s , a g g r e s s i o n a n d 
envy725.
These concerns imply that a pragmatic approach should be adopted in re-conceiving psycho-
medical metatheory in the face of dominant political and social paradigms. Such a re-conception  
must take account not only of the (heteropatriarchal) discourses at play in society more broadly, but 
of the complexity of how these discourses are perpetuated both by psychical and social processes of 
daily life, for example through the participants' practices, and by the psycho-medical fraternity in 
approaching those practices.
718 Hochschild, A.R (1979) ibid, pp557.
719 Hochschild, A.R (1979) ibid
720 Thoits, P (1989) The Sociology of Emotions. In Annual Review of Sociology 15 (1989): 317–42
721 See Irvine, J.M. (2004) Talk About Sex: The Battles over Sex Education in the United  
States, University of California Press; Irvine, J.M. (2008) Transient Feelings: Sex Panics and the Politics of 
Emotions. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies - Volume 14, Number 1, 2008, pp. 1-40
722 Mollon, P (2005) The Inherent Shame of Sexuality. In British Journal of Psychotherapy 22(2), 2005, pp167 et seq. 
pp168
723 Mollon, P (2005), ibid. He argues that the development of the symbolic socio-cultural world may be dependent on 
sexual repression, which may have resulted in displaced signification and symbol-creation via dreams and language. 
However, see chapter 4 re concerns pertaining to psychoanalytic theory
724 Mollon, P (2005), ibid
725 Mollon, P (2005), ibid, pp 168. See chapter 4 re concerns pertaining to psychoanalytic theory, and to criticisms of 
psychoanalysis as pertains to the focus in psychoanalysis of sexuality. Note the criticisms of the psychopathological 
focus on sex in fetish sex, rather than on underlying issues such as attachmemnt, dependence etc. In this regard, I 
argue that psychologists and psychiatrists should focus on the subject, rather than the fetish object, and should move 
beyond the social shame associated with sexuality so as to address these issues, rather than ignoring them through 
the refusal to discuss sexuality.
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The Role of Participant Narratives: Radical Constructivism
Although in part this thesis is aimed at furthering a political goal of shifting paradigms by 
condensing liberatory discourses, it is also aimed at serving as a resource for new policies and 
psycho-medical practices within the dominant heteropatriarchal discourses. In this context it is  
therefore not only important for me to reflect on how practices reproduce normativities, but also to 
actively move away from heteronormativity by advocating expressly non-normative frameworks 
from which to re-conceive future thinking and action. In order to achieve both of these, and to move 
from pathologising heteronormative liberal humanist discourses to more appropriate queer 
epistemologies, I must be careful of the kinds of discourses I implicitly reproduce through the 
scholarship by repeating discursive binaries.
As discussed in Chapter 2, identity-politics-driven gay and lesbian activism is generally taken more 
seriously than the highly compelling anarchism of queer deconstructivism which is often seen as 
vague and woolly since it refuses to demarcate clear boundaries. Gay rights voices therefore take 
priority over and garner more positive responses than more coherent queer approaches, 
since, as Oksala notes, in its current formulations resistence to normative power 
only seems possible in the interstices between competing regimes726. 
Unfortunately, gay and lesbian politics merely re-inforces heteronormative discourses by failing, in  
their political claims for non-discrimination, to challenge discursive assumptions that people are  
both quantitatively and qualitatively different727. Instead, they assume that people a re indeed 
quantitatively different from each other and the material world, but not qualitatively different (in  
other words that 'homosexuals', and therefore 'homosexual fetishists', are a different albeit equal 
species to 'heterosexuals'). They thereby fail to challenge the ontological underpinnings to  
heteronormative discourses, and only oppose their representations.
In l ine wi th queer chal lenges to normat iv i ty, however, ' soc ia l ' c la ims for  
validation728, amongst which are included those of (gay male) 'fetish sexuality', should, I suggest,  
move beyond merely resisting dominant discourses, thereby perpetuating them through accepting 
their inevitable primacy. Such claims should challenge both discrimination and the essentialising 
d i s c o u r s e s w h i c h u n d e rp i n i t , i n o rd e r t o e s c a p e c i r c u l a r r e p e t i t i o n s o f 
heteronormativity and to move beyond merely resisting it. 
726 Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In 
Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 2004)
727 See chapter 2
728 As opposed to 'political claims. See chapter 2
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Therefore, I suggest, a 'social' claim for the validation of sexual practices as complex relations  
shou ld a im to cha l l enge p re jud i c i a l p rac t i c e s , he t e ronorma t ive d i scourse s 
and the underlying metatheory for human sexual relations which support both. Any such revised  
metatheory should therefore not simply counter the instances of normativity and prejudice in some  
oppositional way, but should aim to rephrase heteronormativity.
This does not mean that such metatheory should pretend that heteronormative discourses do not 
exist. Rather, the metatheory should counter heteronormativity on two levels: by countering its 
primacy, and by carefully laying the groundwork for rendering it impotent. Such epistemologies  
should, I suggest, remain both value-neutral and explicitly non-heteronormative, thereby serving as 
a basis for clear anti-normative political action to be undertaken. In other words, if the metatheory  
underlying psycho-medical practices (for example on 'fetishism') is relatively value-neutral,  
heteronormativity on the part of psycho-medical practitioners (and scholars) will, I suggest, become 
explicit, rather than hidden in the folds of implicitly heteronormative classifications and diagnoses.  
Such practitioners will thereby not be able to rely on normative considerations to either classify or 
diagnose purported pathologies like 'fetishism' without having to acknowledge their biases, and they  
will therefore have to become more accountable.
More specifically to the present argument, following Butlerian conceptions of the performativity of  
identities, all essentialist assumptions of static and immutable identity must be destabilised. This 
includes assumptions, such as those implied by the ICD classifications/diagnostic criteria and its  
predecessors, that people are somehow essentially not part of the material world, and that they 
therefore in some way transcend their material circumstances. These arguments are often used to 
validate unverifiable religious claims that people have an identifiable 'soul' or 'spirit' which  
transcends both the body and the material things of the world729. They also underlie problematic 
p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a r g u m e n t s t h a t p e o p l e a r e d r i v e n b y f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t 
drives730. To assume such is to support and perpetuate essentialist generalisations that people are in 
some way objectively identifiable, and therefore can/should be normatively controlled, rather than  
tha t a l l people are effectively similar,  but are (inappropriately) discursively constructed as  
(heteronormatively) different, and, as discussed above, that people in some ways 
choose to partially support and partially subvert heteronorms.
729 Note the difference between the present argument that people are indeed materially (as well as discursively)  
constructed in a post-structuralist sense, on the one hand, and that they are essentially a Cartesian mind-body 
duality on the other. I am not arguing the latter, and indeed recognise that the material is itself discursively 
constructed, by which I mean that the value of the material is discursively constructed, whereas discourse cannot 
construct the materiality of the material, which pre-exists culture. See arguments below
730 See chapter 4
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In contradistinction, as I will argue later in more detail, simplistic post-structuralist arguments that 
people are purely discursively created might, if read in a dualist political or scholarly environment,  
indicate that people are somehow separate to each other and their environment. Following from 
this, basing psycho-medical metatheory (which is what this thesis is aimed at re-phrasing) solely on 
discursive deconstructions of participant practices as they relate to normativities (rather than 
exploring the relationships which these practices reveal between people and objects as they relate to 
ontologies of the 'subject'731) merely discursively reproduces notions of an essential difference 
between people and each other (thereby reproducing identity politics) and between people and 
objects (thereby discursively prioritising immateriality over materiality and reproducing the  
problematic discourses of 'fetishism'732). Therefore, to discursively recreate the assumed ontological 
opposition between people and objects by merely redirecting a (heteronormative) epistemological 
focus on the 'fetish object' to an ('anti-heteronormative') epistemological focus on a presumedly 
unitary 'fetish subject' (which would be the case if I were to take a purely deconstructivist line by  
constructing discursive readings of participant practices) would recreate foundationalist and/or 
determinist discursive assumptions about how people in some essential way are not part of the 
material world themselves733.
In this regard, as Butler notes, radical constructivism and poststructuralism are misunderstood in 
that they are both brought down to linguistic monism and determinism734. Such arguments would 
therefore imply that all 'fetishists' are alike, based on the circumstances of specific research 
subjects, who, like all people, are marked inter alia by race, gender, class and 
sexuality735. In the contemporary political identity-politics-based environment this would therefore  
tend to recreate constructions of 'fetishists' as if they are essentially or foundationally constituted,  
and indeed would recreate assumptions that 'fetishism' is objectively identifiable, thereby further 
locking people who engage sexually with the material world into circular definitions as 'fetishists', 
qua separate class, waiting to be classified and diagnosed736. This would merely reproduce 
undesirable determinist discourses through essentialising 'gay male fetish sexuality' as inherently 
he t e ropa t r i a r c ha l , w h i c h i n t u rn w ou l d t e nd t o e s s e n t i a l i s e pe op l e m ore 
broadly737.
731 See chapters 5 and 6
732 See chapter 3 in this regard, in particular what ethnological 'feitiço' reveals about materiality and discourse 
733 See below where I argue how people are indeed constructed in the intersections between materiality and discourse
734 See Butler, J (1993) Bodies That Matter:On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York: Routledge
735 Indeed, such arguments would not imply this if read exclusively by those compelled by queer theory, but would not 
necessarily convince those who still inappropriately cling to binaries, since they would read the participants as being 
representative of all 'fetishists'
736 See chapter 4
737 This is particularly so in the contemporary identity-based political arena. See chapter 2 in this regard
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Further, discursive analyses can, unless extremely clear about their parameters, tend to elide the  
complexities of individual subjectivities with political and/or social groups, thereby inappropriately  
c r e a t i n g a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t c o m m o n , u n m a r k e d p r e - p e r s o n a l r e f e r e n c e -
points738, which in turn renders opaque the complexity of subjectivities. Such approaches can easily 
'other' people by denying them complexity as subjects through negatively judging their practices as  
being inherently problematically normative (or, if read through a conservative lens, that normativity  
is unproblematic), and by mistaking the complexity of their lives as being uncompromisingly and 
singularly complicit with (or alternatively challenging to) damaging normativities. It therefore risks  
inappropriately prescribing yet another set of practices through implying a binary and mutually 
exclusive relationship between normativity and non-normativity and therefore between 'normative' 
and 'non-normative subjects'. In other words, it can essentialise the idea of 'non-normativity' as an 
objectively identifiable and opposite category to 'normativity', which is difficult to avoid since, as  
P e r p i c h n o t e s , t h e r e i s n o r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t e r m i n o l o g y t h a t a v o i d s 
binaries739.
In contradistinction, people have complex relationships with normativities, and their practices often  
at the same time both support and subvert normative frameworks. 
For example, the participants, as 'gay men' implicitly undermine compulsory heteronormative  
procreative sexuality and concomitantly have re-appropriated the term 'fetishism' as 
'fetish'740. Through the process of both seeing and not seeing difference in the objectification and 
fetishising of bodies and non-human objects, they undermine clear distinctions between the role of 
(human) sexual partners as either person or 'fetish object'. Although on one level this is a replication  
of heteropatriarchal practices, on another it indicates that participants' relationships with materiality 
fudges the limits between human and object in ways which undermine heteropatriarchy through 
undermining normative distinctions between the material and the immaterial, and between objects  
and people.
Further, as seen above, they engage in humiliating practices, yet render the humiliation patent and 
view it as a desirable part of their sexual alterity, rather than unconsciously subsuming it into 
'ordinary' intercourse. Even though this is not necessarily apparent to them, they are, as Hennen  
argues calling on Bourdieu and Butler, uniquely located to understand how gender is radically 
738 See below, and Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
739 Perpich, D (2005) Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 
(Summer 2005) 75-91. See later for argument pertaining to discourse and the connectedness of people and the 
material world.
740 See chapter 4
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constructed, since they consciously hypermasculinise themselves741. He argues that the gay male 
leather culture (in the U.S, and arguably in South Africa too) should be seen as resistance to 
consensus associations between homoerotic interest and effeminacy742. Some of the participants on 
some levels thereby challenge normative concepts of what 'should' be 'fetishised' (in other words 
question the concept of 'reification') by engaging in voluntary humiliation as both dominant and 
submissive partner, and thereby, I suggest, 'reify' the practice of humiliation rather than (/as well as) 
'fetishising' a (human) object743. Further, they are at times the ('Top') humiliator, while at others 
voluntarily the 'humiliated' 'other' ('bottom'). This implies a subversion (albeit not a rejection) of 
heteropatriarchal norms within dominant heteronormative discourses of compulsory masculinity.
Clearly, therefore, sexual enjoyment incorporating material objects is not inherently a reproduction 
or rejection of heteropatriarchy in an either/or way, but can be explored on various (discursive) 
levels, and is further dialectically at times about the object and at times about the sensual experience  
of subjects who both are and are not seen as equals (contrary to the implications of psychoanalytic  
theory and the ICD classifications and diagnostic criteria744).
In other words, I suggest that the value of the participants' contributions to both scholarly/political 
action and psycho-medical metatheory lies in the relationships between people and objects which  
underlies their practices. A closer inspection of their practices reveals that, even though the 
content of their practices may largely be normative, the relationships between the participants and 
the material world which underlies the practices reflects that sexuality, whether predominantly  
normative or transgressive, cannot merely be seen through essentialist mind-body dualities, nor 
through deconstructivist theorising alone. In other words, the relationships between human, object 
and discourse which underlie the participant practices reveal alternative metatheoretical constructs  
for both 'fetishism' and sexuality more broadly which should, I suggest, be explored in order to 
reframe the existing dualist and divisive psycho-medical discourses on 'fetishism'. 
741 Hennen, P. M. (2004-08-14) "Feeling a Bit Under the Leather: Performativity, Embodiment and the Specter of 
Starched Chiffon” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Hilton San 
Francisco & Renaissance Parc 55 Hotel, San Francisco, CA, Online PDF obtained on 2009-05-26 from http://
www.allacademic.com/meta/p108280_index.html. 
742 See Hennen, P. M. (2004-08-14) "Feeling a Bit Under the Leather: Performativity, Embodiment and the Specter of 
Starched Chiffon” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Hilton San 
Francisco & Renaissance Parc 55 Hotel, San Francisco, CA. from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p108280_index.html. 
743 This arguably relates to their own 'relabeling' of 'fetishism' as 'fetish', which, through a queer lens implies a re-
appropriation of heteronormative labels (see Chapter 4), but through another lens implies a misrecognition of the 
purported difference between people, objects and practices. See chapter 5 in this regard.
744 See chapters 3 and 4
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Revising Metatheory Beyond Binaries of 'Same' vs 'Other'
This begs the question as to how such relationships should be seen beyond deterministic 
deconstructions of how they perpetuate or subvert normativities.
I suggest that revised metatheory should reflect that political change is not merely collectively 
driven through overt political action driven by scholarship on how and where normativities is 
perpetuated745. Creating spaces for (queer) subversion of normativity, and more importantly, for the 
validation of non-normative practices should, I suggest, entail transcending artificially de- or over-
valuing 'otherness' (thereby epistemologically recreating it, in the present instance through 
discursively constructing 'fetishists' as either largely normative or transgressive in an either/or way 
by conducting simplistic discursive analyses of participants' practices) and should deconstruct the 
very idea of 'otherness'. Such spaces are thereby not successfully created by generalising about 
group enterprises, but by encouraging individual exercises of anti-normative challenge, which often 
takes place furtively, strategically and pragmatically746. Social change most often happens through 
both collective mobilisation driven by activists/theorists and the individual day-to-day activities of 
sexual subjects. Through their practices and performances, both partly support  
normativities747, yet partly subvert them, and thereby shift dominant paradigms through their  
choices, behaviour and how they challenge norms, and rephrase and 'normalise' their practices over 
time748. Enabling the mobilisation of anti-normative activity therefore requires acknowledging the 
daily circumstances of subjects in which dominant discourses are shifted incrementally and 
within the dominant paradigms of identity politics and compulsory heteropatriarchy, rather than  
merely by focusing on how subjects repeat (or reject) normativities749.
As I have argued, spaces for the queering of sexuali ty should therefore be 
established beyond disciplinary and philosophical trajectories which construct people as 
diametrically opposed to the material world in some essential way750, or as foundationally 
constructed in relation to pre-existing immaterial drives751. Following concepts of ‘Undisciplined 
745 See chapter 2 for notions of pragmatic activism
746 See chapter 2
747 As discussed in chapter 2, it is virtually impossible to subvert heteronormativity in all spaces and at all times, since 
to do so would render daily life unmanageable, and would negatively impact on work, home and political life
748 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven F. Rendall (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985). de Certeau corrects Foucault by calling to the importance of individual instances of cultural 
appropriation. See chapter 6 in this regard. See also chapter 2 re the role of queerness as pedagogy
749 See chapter 2 for notions of pragmatic activism. See below on the accessible vs the intelligible body
see also
750 See chapter 3
751 See chapter 4
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Theory’ as a reflexive location that “understands its position in the between as an occasion to 
theorise ambivalence”752, subjects should, I suggest, be conceived of in the intersections between 
dominant discourses and embodied experience to re-invigorate complex approaches to the (non-
e s s e n t i a l ) s u b j e c t . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , I s u g g e s t t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' 
relationships between the phenomenal and the discursive are more compelling places to look than 
how their practices may discursively repeat heteronormativity. 
Moving Forward
I suggest that metatheory on 'fetishism' should do more than merely shift focus from the 'fetish' 
object to a generic (gay) 'fetishist' subject described in purely discursive terms, which serves to 
perpetuate, rather than undermine, heteropatriarchal discourses. This is particularly important when 
the task is, as in the current argument, to reframe epistemological metatheory on which to base 
psycho-medical professional practices.
To focus solely on discursive readings of participant practices in an attempt to clarify metatheory 
would, I suggest, merely prioritise the ways in which participants do or do not reproduce 
heteropatriarchy. In turn, this would result in my reconstructing binary oppositions between  
'normative' and 'non-normative' sexual practices, which are inappropriate as ontological bases.  
Instead, I focus on theoretical arguments which unpack the constitution of the subject and sexual 
practices, calling on participant narratives to support the appropriate points, rather than as scholarly  
subjects whose narratives are being subjected to rigorous discursive analyses. Although the latter 
are important, as described above, they are not the main focus of the thesis argument, and I will 
therefore leave such in-depth exploration for another forum.
Rather, I suggest, what is required is that the idea of both materially-based and discursively-
constructed 'identity' be unpacked, and that heteronormativity be understood beyond dualist notions  
o f ' h o m o - ' a n d ' h e t e r o s e x u a l '753, a n d c o n c o m i t a n t l y ' f e t i s h i s t ' a n d ' n o n -
fetishist'754, and thereby human and object. I suggest that a metatheoretical revision, such as this 
thesis attempts, should therefore recognise how complexity plays out within dominant discourses, 
and the future potential for change in reaction to oppositional discourses and heteronormativity 
rather than readings of how present formulations of heteronormative discourses are repeated: in  
other words, purely on a discursive deconstruction of the past or present.
752 See chapter 1 in this regard, and in particular Genosko, G (1998) Undisciplined Theory. Sage: London, Thousand 
Oaks, New Delhi
753 See chapter 2 re the value of queer theories and the failings of identity politics
754 See chapter 4 re psychopathological definitions
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The remainder of the thesis will therefore be based primarily on theoretical arguments which 
interrogate the constitution of the subject (Chapter 5), and the extent of agency subjects have and 
the role of choice in (sexual) practices and social groups (Chapter 6). These arguments will map a 
way forward for metatheorising sexualities scholarship and psycho-medical practices on two levels. 
Firstly, Chapter 5 will clarify the description of 'fetishists', which, as described in Chapter 4, cannot 
be described by the patently heteronormatively prescriptive ICD classifications for 'fetishism'. 
Rather, a subject-oriented (rather than either a subject- or object-focused) approach, which enables a 
departure both from Cartesian dualism and broad-stroke reliance on the generalities of discursive  
frameworks, serves to acknowledge the complexity of subjectivities755. As I will argue, the subject 
should not be seen as being constituted through essentialising discourses such as the historical 
frameworks on the feitiço and early psychoanalytic foundationalism, as well as the codified object-
focused ICD definitions of the 'fetishist'. Rather, I suggest, the constitution of the ('fetishist') subject 
should be acknowledged to lie not merely in the participants' repetitions of heteropatriarchy, but in  
the kinds of relationships they have with the phenomenal world, which of necessity require an 
acknowledgement of how these relationships perpetuate normativities. These relationships reveal  
that there is an alternative to reproducing heteropatriarchal discourses by merely positing a  
purportedly singular and identifiable 'subject', thereby obviating essentialist and foundationalist  
diatribes around the constitution of the subject.
Secondly, Chapter 6 will explore the extent of subjects' agency, in comparison to early 
psychoanalytic theory and the ICD diagnostic criteria which imply that subjects have limited or no  
agency. This argument will lead into an exploration of what same-sex sexual practices which 
incorporate material objects entail, if not what is prescribed by the problematic ICD diagnostic 
criteria which, as discussed in Chapter 4, specify compulsory heteropatriarchy.
This will, I suggest, challenge the infiltration of heteropatriarchal norms into psycho-medical 
practices, thereby hopefully assisting in the dissipation of harmful heteropatriarchy both personally  
and publicly756.
755 See Hayles, N.K (2002) Flesh and Metal: Reconl guring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments. In 
Con  gurations, 2002, 10:297–320 at 297 et seq The Johns Hopkins University Press and the Society for Literature 
and Science. Hayles notes that it is important, yet difficult, to avoid dualistic thinking, but it is important to begin 
with the idea of relations rather than assuming pre-existing entities. In this way we can acknowledge, in an 'anti-
Cartesian' way, that embodied experience comes from the relations between brain and body as well as the ongoing 
engagement of embodied interactions with environment. See below
See also Damasio, A.R. (1994) Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam. 
756 Whether and to what extent individuals actively engage with the change in political space enabled by such revised 
frameworks, and choose to subvert heteropatriarchy through their practices is another question, one over which 
nobody but they have any control, and one which cannot be 'objectively' determined or predicted. See chapters 1 and 
6 in this regard
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CHAPTER 5
RE-ORIENTING THEORY TOWARDS COHESIVE SUBJECT-
ORIENTED PARADIGMS FOR 'FETISH SEXUALITY'
“the givenness of being, the givenness that is given with the very fact that we understand something 
(whatever it may be and however confused) when we say ‘being’ . . . can be summarized as follows: 
being itself is given to us as meaning. Being does not have meaning, but being itself, the phenomenon of 
being, is meaning”757
It is clear from the preceding chapters that the historical ethnologies of the 
feitiço and psychopathologies of 'fetishism' are highly problematic758. Yet, with startlingly little self-
reflexivity, the ICD merely reproduces the destructive discourses of its predecessors, classifying 
'fetishism' by codifying and thereby essentialising the 'fetishist' in terms of the 'fetish object', which 
itself can only be defined in circular terms: the 'fetishist' is normatively adjudged 
a priori to be inappropriately attached to material objects, which are thereby defined in  
heteronormative terms as 'fetish objects', which in turn in a circular fashion defines the 'fetishist' in  
heteronormative terms759. The practical (and metatheoretical) value of 'fetishist' as a classificatory 
term is therefore so internally contradictory and confusing as to be at best questionable and at worst 
laughable760. The result of this catastrophe of circular logic is that, rather than 
describing 'fetishists', the ICD classifications prescribe heteronormativity and further marginalise 
unusual sexual proclivities.
As noted in the Interjection, the role of the discursive construction of the individual should be 
recognised, so as to avoid merely transferring the epistemological focus from a fetish object to a  
purportedly unitary liberal-humanist subject founded on essentialist and foundationalist discourses. 
However, a generic poststructuralist subject entirely constructed by discourse is equally 
inappropriate. Instead, as I will argue in this chapter, the subject is a complex phenomenologically-
conceived entity, described both in terms of discursive construction and a matrix of embodied  
experience incorporating mind, body and environment, which recognises individual political and  
personal circumstances of the subject, and thereby a more rounded reflection of subjectivities.
757 Nancy, J-L. (2000). Being singular plural. Trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne  O’Byrne. Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press. pp2
758 See chapter 3
759 This is since without the presence of the object the subject cannot be classified or diagnosed in the first place. See 
chapter 4 and Interjection
760 Apter, E (1993) Fetishism and Materialism, in Apter, E and Pietz, W (eds) (1993) Fetishism as Cultural  
Discourse, Ithaca: Cornell University Press pp3
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5.1 Towards Subjective Orientations: Recognising Materiality and 
Discourse
As discussed in Chapter 4, differentiating coercive from non-coercive sexual activity is, within  
certain parameters, a useful way to protect marginalised and at-risk people in our 
society761. Such distinctions between coerciveness and non-coerciveness categorise activity by  
focusing on (human) sexual objects, thereby appropriately dealing with instances of child 
molestation/abuse, rape or sexual violence762. Yet, arguably, they describe nothing about the sexual 
subject, who thereby effectively becomes invisible. Nor do they reveal the processes involved in 
'non-coercive sexual activity', such as in 'sexual fetish' where the sexual focus is non-human 
material objects and where there is no necessary human 'object' to protect from damaging actions.
Following both gay rights and queer l iberatory paradigms, ' fet ish sexuali ty ' 
qua human-object sexual relations should therefore be neither proscribed nor psychopathologised 
since consent does not enter the equation. Yet, as described in the Interjection, understanding sexual  
exploration of the material world and including it more functionally in psycho-medical discourses 
on sexuality requires more than merely avoiding narrow, object-focused diatribes of pathology.
Rather, the shift of focus from object to subject requires a revision of contemporary debates over 
nature/nurture, biology/culture763. Through critical theory we need to ‘unmask’ apparently inherent  
“powers of agency as alienated and phantasmagoric representations of human definitions and 
performances, reducing what appear to be natural properties which emanate from the object itself as  
delegated actions and properties of humans.”764 Unpacking the constitution of the subject must 
therefore, I suggest, take cognisance not only of the discursive construction of the individual, but of 
the materiality of the contemporary social world, in which world ‘thing-ness’ and ‘person-ness’ are 
losing their difference765. It is therefore necessary to explore the idioms of reification and fetishism 
not only as incidences of heteronormative repetition, but as spaces where the relationship between 
the social and the material can be reconsidered766. This requires notions of the subject to be founded 
761 See chapter 4
762 In this respect, there are certain arguments for the acknowledgement of childhood sexualities, the sometimes fuzzy 
line between consensual and non-consensual intercourse, and BDSM where certain expressions of violence are 
acceptable and others not on a case-to-case basis. In regard to the latter, see the thesis introduction
763 Oyama, S. (2000). The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental systems and Evolution, Revised and Expanded. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. pp92-93
764 Pels, D, Hetherington, K & Vandenberghe, F (2002) The Status of the Object: Performances, Mediations, and 
Techniques. In Theory, Culture & Society 2002 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 19(5/6): 1–
21
765 See chapter 4 re concerns about coerciveness vs non-coerciveness as a distinguishing factor 
766 Pels et al ibid
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on politically coherent, non-essentialist, non-foundationalist and relatively value-neutral  
frameworks767, so as to enable forward-looking and non-determinist views of queer sexuality. Yet at 
the same time, such conceptions should be cohesive enough to inform psycho-medical services  
within the contemporary identity-politics based environment768. As I will explain, this in turn means 
that a coherent notion of the sexual subject must take account of how 'the body' mediates between  
discourse and the material. 
5.1.1 Acknowledging 'the Body' and Re-Invigorating Experience
The material, and by implication 'the body', is often argued to be produced by culture769. Lock notes 
that fluidity, pastiche and hybrids of postmodernity have been used to replace oppositional thinking,  
and that subjectivity is not a metaphysical unit opposed to a body which is merely a collection of 
organic parts. But she also appropriately cautions that recognising this can lead to avoiding 
responsibility and exchanging politics for the hyper-real770. This equates to erasing difference, 
which especially feminists are loathe to do given the complexities of gendered difference. 
Cognisance must therefore be taken of a middle path. Clearly both culture and materiality play a 
role in subjectivities. Cartesian cause/effect and subject/object oppositions are clearly not  
appropriate as bases for metatheory771. Yet, contrary to the fears implicit in much deconstructivist 
scholarship, creating some kind of epistemological order does not mean merely translating, in 
reactionary ways, how normativities are discursively reconstituted772. Indeed, constructing 
epistemological order does not necessarily merely equate to the imposition of power-based control  
through scholarship773.
In order to effectively counter (hetero)normativities, it is imperative, I suggest, that we clarify not  
only what the world 'shouldn't' look like, but how it 'should' in non-determinist ways, so as to make 
explicit the ways in which essentialisms and foundationalisms are inappropriate, thereby rendering 
767 As value-neutral as possible given the discursively constructed nature of all cultural frameworks
768 See chapter 2 re political perspectives
769 See Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 
267-292 pp270.
See Sahlins, M (1976) Culture and Practical Reason Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp 4 Sahlins assumes 
that biology is a given but that culture is basically autonomous, thanks to the symbolic systems that create it through 
meaning rather than the material. Lock notes that “in seeking to counter the empirico-materialist wing of mid-
twentieth-century anthropology, Sahlins situates himself firmly on the culture-as-driving-force end of the nature/
culture spectrum”
770 See above re the need to differentiate between politics and metatheory. See Rojek, C and Turner, B.S. (eds.) (1993) 
Forget Baudrillard? London: Routledge
771 In regard 'fetish', see chapters 3 and 4
772 See Oyama, S. (2000a). The ontogeny of information: Developmental systems and evolution, revised and 
expanded. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. pp92-93. See also Interjection, supra.
773 See Oyama, S. (2000). ibid. See also Interjection, supra.
184
 
 
 
 
their proponents more accountable774. Therefore, any conception of a workable political solution to 
deterministic discourses should entail some kind of post-poststructuralist transformation and 
emergence into a future which has erased (hetero)normativities775, which hopefully will one day be 
relegated to the status of quaint relics of a distant past. Failing this, scholarship runs the risk of  
merely re-invigorating them through critiquing them and thereby projecting forwards, while failing  
to come up with viable alternatives. This implies, I suggest, that re-visioning 'fetishism' should  
entail de-essentialising and de-reifying sexuality, through transgressively reconnecting the material  
and non-material (human) being by calling on both Pietz' and Marxist readings of fetish-as-
capitalist-critique776.
This in turn implies that the very idea of 'fetishism' should be unpacked in both scholarly and sexual  
contexts. Whereas it is useful to identify how practices 'fetishise' sexualities or capitalist 
frameworks and thereby inappropriately perpetuate normativities, it is equally important not to 
assume that 'fetishism' is a valid and useful lens in itself. As described in the Interjection, the 
participants sexually 'fetishise' body parts, and perhaps thereby, in a Marxist sense, 'fetishise' those 
parts by prioritising them as objects to be 'owned', thereby perpetuating heteropatriarchy through 
effacing their sexual partners' personalities in favour of body parts. Yet the scholarly depiction of 
those practices must surely delve deeper in a more self-critical way, exploring what is meant by the 
analytical use of the term 'fetishising' to describe practices. Scholarship should, I suggest, thereby 
not merely reproduce assumptions that there is some essential notion of 'fetishism'. Transgressing 
these two layers means deconstructing more than practices, but unpacking the idioms of materiality 
which underlie the practices and their scholarly depictions.
To do so entails expanding on notions of re-connecting the material with the non-material in order  
to critique notions that culture is merely displaced onto ideas or material things, as opposed to that  
grounded, sensual human experience, through the ‘itness’ of embodied being, makes material an 
identity that society reifies777. In transgressively reconnecting people and objects beyond essentialist 
or foundationalist perspectives, the negative history of 'the fetish' can, I suggest, be reconnected “as 
a synonym for sorce ry and wi tchcra f t (feticaria) t o a n o u t l a w s t r a t e g y o f 
dereification”778. This creates an opening for historical discourses of 'fetishism' to function as points 
774 See chapter 2 re the difference between gay and queer politics, and the importance of moving beyond mere 
deconstruction given the primacy of identity-politics.
775 Oyama, S. (2000). The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental systems and Evolution, Revised and 
Expanded. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. pp92-93
776 Apter, E (1993) Fetishism and Materialism, in Apter, E and Pietz, W (eds) (1993) Fetishism as Cultural  
Discourse, Ithaca: Cornell University Press pp3
777 Apter, E (1993) ibid
778 Apter, E (1993) ibid
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from which to renegotiate the construction of the 'fetishist' through re-visioning the boundaries 
between him/her and the 'fetish object', which, “in spite of itself, unfixes representations even as it 
enables them to become monolithic ‘signs’ of culture”779. 
In this regard, the failings of colonialist discourses on 'fetishism' are instructive points of 
departure780. I suggest that forward-looking metatheory should incorporate notions of the dialectical 
relations between people (as both material and immaterial entities) and discourses called on to 
marshal both mind and body as personal-political resources. I suggest that this more complex 
understanding of the relations between the material, immateriality and power gives some insight  
into how we can view 'fetish' in contemporary sexual context, by incorporating notions of 
discourses and the body into contemporary notions of sex incorporating material objects, and 
thereby (sexual) relations with material objects in ways which do not assume the primacy of 
humans as immaterial beings in some determinist way, put on the planet to dominate.
5.1.1a) Towards a Non-(Hetero)Normative Constitution of the Subject
Discursive constructions of practices allow theorists to address questions as to which bodies matter, 
and why, politically-speaking781, and therefore inform political and social approaches for managing 
issues like heteronormativity, compulsory masculinity, sexism, HIV or STD transmission. Yet on 
their own I suggest that they do not reveal the constitution of the 'subject' in fetish sexuality in a 
way which avoids implicit reliance on heteropatriarchy, whether through seeing the individual as an 
psychopathologisable mind, foundationally defined in opposition to material objects, or  
deterministically as a discursively described victim (or perpetrator) of heteropatriarchy.
Instead, as I will discuss, subjects should ontologically be understood through the relationships 
between embodied being, the world around him/her and dominant heteropatriarchal discourses, in 
order to demarcate a complex locus of subjectivity which does not reproduce heteropatriarchy and 
does not rely on reactionary essentialist sexual identities782. As I will argue, the linkages for this lie 
not in the contemporary practices of 'fetishists', but in the ontologies reflected by their relationships  
with the material: the intersections between mind, body, material environment and discourse and 
notions of subjectively perceived 'meaning', all of which find their connecting point in 'the body'.
779 Apter, E (1993) ibid
780 See chapter 3
781 Butler, J (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. New York: Routledge
782 See chapter 2
186
 
 
 
 
5.2 The Subject-Self: Internal Coherence of Mind, Body and Discourse
The fictive mind-body split has been challenged by poststructuralist, feminist and queer theories  
which cri t ique Eurocentric, patriarchal, heterosexist underpinnings of dualist 
thinking783. Following these views, mind and body are not separable in a Cartesian way, and the 
body is not just physical matter subservient to the mind. Yet conversely, mind and body are not 
merely a singular notion described from the outside in the mould of liberal humanist  
anthropocentric constructions. Rather, the notion of 'meaning' should be interrogated as the central 
point of departure in describing the subject from a poststructuralist (queer) perspective. 
Even before the height of poststructuralist thinking, Epstein argued incongruously yet compellingly 
in favour of subjectively conceived 'meaning'784. S h e argued that Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological and Wittgenstein's language philosophies have a common starting-point in 
assuming that attempts to explain the human subject must transcend the Cartesian dichotomy of  
Thought and Extension (mind and body) and move into more complex ideas of integrating mental 
within physical785.
Merleau-Ponty replaces the idea of 'substance' with 'form' or 'structure', while Wittgenstein develops 
an analogy between language and the human body where both get meaning similarly, thereby 
becoming intelligible786. Epstein argued that the two philosophers' views are similar in that:
the dichotomy between thing and consciousness must be surpassed
the mental and the physical must be blended to create an expressive body and meaningful  
structure
traditional substantial-ontological approaches must be replaced with a functional one
an in-depth analysis of Meaning is the appropriate way to understand human beings
Merleau-Ponty argues that cognition takes place through, rather than prior to, the body787. 
783 See Bordo, S (1993) Unbearable Weight:Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body. Berkeley: Univ. of California 
Press; Butler, J (1993) Bodies That Matter:On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.”New York:Routledge; Butler, J (1990) 
Gender Trouble:Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York:Routledge; Bourdieu, P. Trans Nice, R (1977) 
Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
784 Epstein, M.F. (1975) The Common Ground of Merleau-Ponty's and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Man. In 
Journal of the History of Philosophy Volume 13, Number 2, April 1975 p221-234
785 Epstein, M.F. (1975) ibid
786 Epstein, M.F. (1975) ibid
787 Merleau-Ponty, M (1945) trans. Colin Smith (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Humanities Press
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In this regard, Butler calls attention to the psyche as being 
"that which constitutes the mode by which [the] body is given, the condition and contour of that 
givenness. [But] the materiality of the body ought not to be conceptualized as a unilateral or causal effect  
of the psyche in any sense that would reduce that materiality to the psyche or make of the psyche the 
monistic stuff out of which that materiality is produced and/or derived"788.
Merleau-Ponty further understands the body as the vehicle of comprehension of the phenomenal 
world, where objectivity and subjectivity meet789. For him, the body is communicative and the 
means by which we 'have' a world. He argues against empiricist-causal natural science and 
introspective psychology as means of understanding human beings. Both are 
“one-sided and therefore inadequate: empiricist science and objective behaviorism view the body as an 
object of physical nature, amenable to mechanistic explanation, while intellectualistic and vitalistic  
psychology work on the assumption of a disembodied mind, a pure subjectivity that dwells over and 
above physical nature.”790 
Both approaches see the body as an 'outside' without an 'inside' (a thing) and a mind as an 'inside'  
without an 'outside' (consciousness)791. Human bodies confound this dualism, in their complex and 
ambiguous psycho-social construction. Merleau-Ponty sees three orders of things: matter (physics), 
life (biology) and mind (psychology) as structural rather than ontological, with the relation between 
them being integrated rather than causal/deductive792. While the biological can't be reduced to the 
physical, the mental can't be reduced to the 'vital'. There are always new structures and meanings 
projected onto the world by consciousness, and people are always introducing new cycles of 
behaviour through varying cultural objects793.
Consciousness neither pre-exists nor is a force added to a material body, and people can't be 
understood by either psychology nor biology alone. Epstein acknowledges that human beings are 
not defined according to either a mental (psychological) or a physical (biological) reality only.
788 Butler, J (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York:Routledge, 66
789 Merleau-Ponty, M (1945) trans. Colin Smith (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Humanities Press
790 Epstein, M.F. (1975) The Common Ground of Merleau-Ponty's and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Man. In 
Journal of the History of Philosophy Volume 13, Number 2, April 1975 pp222
791 Merleau-Ponty, M (1945) trans. Colin Smith (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Humanities Press 
pp108: "the reflective attitude simultaneously purifies the common notions of body and soul by defining the body as 
the sum of its parts with no interior, and the soul as a being wholly present to itself without distance."
792 Epstein, M.F. (1975) The Common Ground of Merleau-Ponty's and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Man. In 
Journal of the History of Philosophy Volume 13, Number 2, April 1975 pp210 notes: “The integration achieved at 
the different levels carries with it a relativization of the notions of "body" and "soul"; at the physical level the body 
is a mass of chemical components in interaction; at the biological, there is the dialectic of the living being and its 
environment; at the human level there is the dialectic of the social subject and its group. Each of these levels is 
"soul" with respect to the preceding one, "body" with respect to the following one
793 Epstein, ibid pp222
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Rather, they should be explored through integration of the two:
“To explain a person's conduct by the history of his libido (as Freud often does), and to relate his acts only  
to the universe of biology, is to substitute the pathological for the normal. This explication is valid only in 
the case of a person who has not integrated his vital energies into a new whole, and in whom the  
biological forces continue to act independently and autonomously. In a normal case, even instincts are  
transformed and humanized when integrated into the new whole which is a human 
being.”794
Perception is thereby not a collection of amorphous sensations synthesized in intellect, but 
integration in a meaningful form bringing together content and form.
“ t h e s o u l r e a l i z e s i t s e l f t h r o u g h t h e b o d y a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e t r a n s f o r m s  
i t into a phenomenal body and transfers it outside of physical space. The connection between mind and 
body is based on the significance of a structure which confers meaning on a piece of matter and makes it  
live.”795
This incorporates the idea of structure as enunciated in Gestalt psychology, which conceives of the 
unity of the interior and the exterior796.
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, sees language as a tool to achieve meaning, through the analogy 
between words becoming signs and carrying meaning on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
physical body that becomes a living human, where a 'soul' is not added to the body but the body has 
(subjective) meaning that transcends the physical797. Thinking is not incorporeal, and neither can 
what gives life to the body be abstracted from it798. This links to notions that the mental/emotional 
are both seen and 'performed' through physical behaviour799.
794 Epstein, ibid pp224. See chapter 4 re problematic issues around psychopathology in toto
795 Epstein, ibid pp226
796 See Koffka, K (1999) Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Volume 7 of International library of psychology, philosophy, 
and scientific method, Routledge. Ellis, W.D (1999) A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology, Volume 2 of International 
library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. Routledge. Ash, M.G. (1998) Gestalt psychology in 
German culture, 1890-1967: holism and the quest for objectivity. Cambridge studies in the history of  
psychology, Cambridge University Press
See also Read, S.J.; Vanman, E.J. & Miller, L.C. (1997) Connectionism, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Processes, 
and Gestalt Principles: (Re)Introducing Cognitive Dynamics to Social Psychology. In 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 26-53 (1997), looking at relations between connectionist 
modeling and Gestalt principles. Westheimer, G (1999) Gestalt theory reconfigured: Max Wertheimer's anticipation 
of recent developments in visual neuroscience. In Perception 28(1) 5–15: This paper looks at Wertheimer's 
conception of Gestalt theory whereby the properties of any of the parts are circumscribed by the structural laws of 
the whole. Westheimer argues that neurophysiological research into cortical processing of visual stimuli has opened 
up a need for organising principles, and ideas such as contour salience and figure segregation, which used to be the 
arena of Gestalt psychology, are now appealing in light of combinations between neural modeling, and 
psychophysical and electrophysiological approaches to understand neural mechanisms of cognition;  Rock, I & 
Palmer, S (1990) The Legacy of Gestalt Psychology. In Scientific American. December 1990, 263 (6) pp48-61
797 Wittgenstein, L. trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963) Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blakewell
798 By this I do not mean any kind of essentialist or religious conception of 'soul' or 'spirit'
799 See Wittgenstein, L. trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963) Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil 
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This kind of approach has flowed, albeit in doctored form, into Butler's re-interpretation of Freud's 
bodily ego and Lacan's mirror stage, whereby the body is seen to be made up of indissoluble  
psychic and corporeal elements800. Clearly body and mind are interdependent in that both require the 
other: the body gives itself (signalling its presence) to the psyche, which receives, translates and 
transforms the signals801. This is what Vasterling calls the body's persisting dynamic 
materiality802. This demarcates a kind of relationship between mind and body, but does not take 
account of political influences which underlie (hetero)normative repetitions, and therefore too 
closely approximates liberal humanist diatribes.
5.2.1 The Body, Language and Discourse
Dynamic materiality is not simply constructed between material bodies and minds. Body and mind  
are not merely physically interconnected. They are in turn connected to discourse and language, 
which both constructs and is constructed by material relations803. Language is both a tool to connect 
meaning, and is the way in which discourse comes about804. Shifting from seeing 'mind vs body' to 
'mind/body' must therefore account for political changes which, as Sullivan argues from a feminist 
perspective, should undercut, rather than reinforce, dominant personal and cultural patterns, by 
subverting the status-quo805. She notes that Merleau-Ponty's focus on an anonymous or pre-personal 
quality to body experience demonstrates a false universality, while his perspective on bodily 
intentionality keeps him in a subjectivist philosophy that is not sufficient to account for 
difference806. 
It is therefore important to explore how discourse functions in constructing the 'body'.
Blakewell
800 Butler, J (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York:Routledge Yet see the criticisms 
of post-freudian thinking in chapter 4
801 Butler, J (1993) ibid
802 Vasterling, V (1999) Butler's sophisticated constructivism: A critical assessment. In Hypatia. Bloomington: Summer 
1999. Vol. 14, Iss. 3; pg. 17-40
803 See Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 
267-292 pp270
804 See Wittgenstein, L. trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963) Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil 
Blakewell; Relating to sexuality, see also Foucault, M. trans. Sheridan, A (1979) 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage; Foucault, M, Trans. Hurley, R. (1978) 
The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1. New York: Pantheon; Butler, J (1990) Gender Trouble:Feminism and the  
Subversion of Identity. New York:Routledge; Butler, J (1993) Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex."  
New York: Routledge; Butler, J (1997) Performative Acts and Gender Constitutions: An Essay in Phenomenology 
and Feminist Theory. In Conboy, K, Medina, N, & Stanbury, S (eds)(1997) Writing on the Body: Female 
Embodiment and Feminist Theory. New York: Columbia University Press
805 Weiss, G (2002) The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) pg 
187-200, reviewing Sullivan, Shannon. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, 
and feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
806 Merleau-Ponty, M (1945) trans. Colin Smith (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Humanities Press
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5.2.1a) There Is No 'Body'
The body was historically constructed oppositionally as physical matter, and as sense and 
sensations807. Babb speaks of Körper (the body) as something identified/described from the outside, 
located in terms of spatial relations and categorisation, and linked to time, space and 
events808. This can be clearly seen in the historical anthropological and psychoanalytic constructions 
of 'fetishism' which separated mind from body, focusing on the former through rejecting the latter's 
connection to material objects809.
Perpich notes that Western philosophical traditions have constructed the body in opposition to 
s p e e c h a n d l a n g u a g e , a n d a s i n e f f a b l e , p a s s i v e , i m p e n e t r a b l e , 
unintelligent810. More recently, however, postmodernism has viewed the body as primarily a 
linguistic and discursive construct811. Centrally, Foucault re-invigorated interest in embodiment 
t h r o u g h e x p l o r i n g h o w t h e b o d y i s f o r m e d t h r o u g h s o c i a l a n d c u l t u r a l 
practices812. Other key postmodernists have developed this, arguing that there is no 'body'. 
Baudrillard's 'body' is constructed as an immaterial informational structure, whereby 
"the human body, our body, seems superfluous in its proper expanse, in the complexity and multiplicity of 
its organs, of its tissue and functions, because today everything is concentrated in the brain and the 
genetic code, which alone sum up the operational definition of being"813. 
In similar vein, the Krokers see the body as 'second-order vision' and 'floating body parts' that call  
attention to the disappearance of the body into a fluid and changing display of 
signs814. They signal that perhaps the body no longer exists, disappearing ideologically (into 
fashion), epistemologically (into the Cartesian consciousness) and semiotically (into tattoos and 
'floating signs')815. Deleuze, in conceptions of 'rhizomatic' virtuality, argues that there being no 
'body' means that there is no determinate nature or privileged code whose plan is separate and  
untouched by circumstances816. From a feminist perspective, Grosz calls to reject the idea of 'the 
807 Babb, G (2002) Where the Bodies are Buried: Cartesian Dispositions in Narrative Theories of Character. In 
NARRATIVE,Vol. 10, No. 3 (October 2002)
808 Babb, ibid
809 See chapters 3 and 4
810 Perpich, D (2005) Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 
(Summer 2005) 75-91
811 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp147 et seq
812 Relating to sexuality, see particularly Foucault, M, Trans. Hurley, R. (1978) The History of Sexuality. Vol.  
1. New York: Pantheon
813 Baudrillard, J, trans. Schutze, B. & Schutze, C. (1988) The Ecstasy of Communication. New York: Semiotext(e) pp 
18
814 Kroker, A and Kroker, M (1987) Panic Sex in America. In Body Invaders: Panic Sex in America. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, pp. 20-21.
815 Kroker, A and Kroker, M (1987) ibid
816 See for example Deleuze, G, Trans. Patton, P (1994) Difference and Repetition. New York: Columbia University 
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body', arguing that there are only bodies of various kinds817.
As Butler notes, the body derives meaning in discourse only through the context of power relations, 
particularly gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality818. Post-structuralist conceptions of 
experiential embodiment are thereby important for feminist and queer theory, and for understanding 
the important role of the body in unpacking implicit historical ontological dualisms and resisting 
normative and prescriptive discourses on gender and sexuality819.
5.2.1b) But There Is Embodiment
Yet simplistic readings of the construction of the body through discourse are problematic in that  
they can deny or underplay the importance of materiality, thereby narrowing both what is meant by 
'subject', and negating the scope for the subject's engagement with the world through his/her  
agency820. In turn, given how such approaches are politically read through the identity-politics  
l e n s e s w h i c h p r e va i l , t h i s t e nds t o c r e a t e de t e rm i n i s t d i s c ou r s e s on t he 
subject821. More specifically, although discursive constructions of the body are imperative in  
descriptions of how people have related to dominant discourses in the past and present, I suggest 
that they do not describe the future, since they cannot prescribe in advance what forms human  
interactions with the discursive and material world will take. They therefore cannot wholly form the  
foundation for psycho-medical epistemologies822.
In order to better locate the sexual subject, I suggest that it we should look beyond fictions of there  
being an essential Cartesian 'body' on the one hand, or an entirely-discursively-constructed 'no 
body' on the other. This implies incorporating more complex notions of embodiment related to 
discursive power relations, and yet still located in time and space. 
Lock notes that the body refuses to be pinned down, whether with or without the soul/mind, and 
that much of cultural studies thinking speaks of the distinctiveness of human beings, while at the 
same time denying the distinctiveness of the body823.
Press, pp208-9 relating to virtuality and the real; Deleuze, G and Guattari, F trans. Massumi, B (1992) A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. London: Continuum
817 Grosz, E (1994) Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp 19
818 Butler, J (1997) The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp94
819 Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 
2004)
820 See Interjection, supra, and chapter 6
821 See chapter 2
822 See above and chapter 6
823 Margaret Lock (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter Configurations 5.2 (1997) 267-292
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“Discourses about body surfaces ... inform us, often brilliantly and provocatively, about the 
normalization in popular culture of dominant ideologies for social life and about resistances to them, 
resistances that at times transcend anomie, and move toward a creative body politics; but the interiority  
of the body usually remains all the while "black-boxed" (in the idiom of the sociologists of science), a 
tedious universal, and therefore consigned to the biological sciences.”824
She argues that the body is elusive, since it can't be represented fully yet at the same time can't be  
experienced without representation. Calling on Kirmayer825, who addresses concerns about the 
passivity of the body in contemporary medical practice, she argues for "the body's insistence on 
meaning": attention should be paid to how the body "presents" itself in "substance and action,"  
rather than simply as an implement for reflection and imagination.
This means that the body should be differentiated from embodiment. The former is an ideological or  
cultural construct, described ex post facto to explain cultural/social circumstances and power 
dynamics, while the latter is something which people experience and then describe and use in a  
forward-looking way to give meaning and direction to their lives. Embodiment always destabilises 
'the body', yet can be difficult to use, resulting in many theorists problematically preferring the 
abstraction of 'the body' to the specifics of embodiment826. The body is incorporated into culture, 
w h e r e a s e m b o d i m e n t i s o n l y s o i n c o r p o r a t e d t h r o u g h r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e 
body827. Embodiment is not more 'natural' than the body, and does not imply an essentialist  
self828. This is parallel to Buddhist meditation which sees the unified self as an illusion made up of 
various subsystems, positions which various contemporary theorists in the cognitive sciences have 
taken up829. As a result, theorists uncovering the ideological bases of naturalisation serve to 
denaturalise 'the body' rather than embodiment830. In this way, discourse affects the body, while 
experiences which take place material circumstances affect embodiment.
The body is always a normative relation to a set of criteria, whereas embodiment is contextual and 
located in place, time, physiology and culture, making up enactment as a specific thing in a moment  
in time constituted from the 'noise of difference'831. Relative to the body, embodiment is “other and 
elsewhere, at once excessive and deficient in its infinite variations, particularities, and 
824 Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 267-292 
pp267
825 Kirmayer, L (1992) The Body's Insistence on Meaning: Metaphor as Presentation and Representation in Illness 
Experience. In Medical Anthropological Quarterly 6 (1992): 323-346
826 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp147 et seq
827 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
828 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
829 Varela, F.J., Thompson, E, and Rosch, E (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
830 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 
831 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
193
 
 
 
 
abnormalities”832. It is always infiltrated by culture, and is in tension with cultural 
hegemonies833.
Embodied human experience, and therefore the functioning and exploration of sexual practices, is  
more effectively described through Leib than Körper834. Leib describes the subjective experience of 
embodiment available to consciousness, and focuses on structures that differentiate elements of 
experience into comprehensible pieces, allowing people to orient themselves and operate within the 
world835. Leib consists of a range of processes, and importantly incorporates sensation coming from 
external and internal stimuli ('exteroception' and 'interoception'), 'motility', and the parts of  
experience beyond consciousness or control, such as involuntary visceral processes ('viscerality') 
and habits ('habitus').
Exteroception is the experience and awareness of external stimuli via bodily surface organs. Visual 
and aural stimulus leads to awareness away from the body, which leaves a sense of disembodiment. 
This leads to the perception both of bodily absence and presence, for example, the feeling one has 
while thinking of something other than what is physically present836. Interoception, on the other 
hand, is the consciously perceptible internal sensations coming from the viscera, such as adrenalin 
rushes, fatigue and hunger.837 Whereas exteroception is multi-dimensional and constituted by the 
five senses which are spatiotemporally and qualitatively different, interoception is singular and 
made up of 'inner sensation'. It is not easily located spatially within the body, and is a feeling with 
vague, indistinct borders838. Whereas exteroception is continuous yet interrupted, interoception is 
not. For example hunger comes and goes, but the ongoing process of digestion is unconscious.
Motility is where movement in space is allowed by the perceptions of environment, kinesthesia, 
internal sensations and control. Subjectively, however, perception of motility is more important than 
motility itself.
Viscerality, as Leder argues, is of equal importance to consciousness, since the visceral reactions 
like digestion, circulation and sleep allow the proper functioning of life but are not  
832 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
833 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
834 Babb, G (2002) Where the Bodies are Buried: Cartesian Dispositions in Narrative Theories of Character. In 
NARRATIVE,Vol. 10, No. 3 (October 2002)
835 Babb, G (2002) ibid
836 Babb, G (2002) ibid
837 See Leder, D (1990) The Absent Body. Chicago:Univ. of Chicago Press; and Leder, D (1999) Flesh and Blood:A 
Proposed Supplement to Merleau-Ponty. In Welton, D (ed) (1999) The Body:Classic and Contemporary 
Readings. Malden:Blackwell Publishers, p200–10
838 See Leder, D (1990) ibid and Leder, D (1999) ibid
194
 
 
 
 
conscious839. Without these, life would not be possible.
Bourdieu's idea of habitus (the habit-forming processes instituted by social processes, like building 
o rgan i s a t i on e t c . ) en s u re s s pon tane i ty and s i t ua t e s and s hapes cons c ious 
perception840. Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty's views diverge in that the former sees the social 
dimension as a conditioning factor to the perceptual, rather than as second layer on top of 
perception841. Bourdieu notes that habitus and environment can mismatch, causing crisis:
“practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the environment with which 
they are actually confronted is too distant from that to which they are objectively 
ﬁtted”842
In this way, when unforeseen situations, obstacles, and opportunities arise, habitus responds 
conservatively and prioritises familiar and comfortable practices over radical changes which might  
be more appropriate843.
Further, looked at through the lens of Lieb, the 'lived body' is instrumental in developing abstract 
reasoning, which is supported by various research traditions844.
5.2.2 Embodiment and Discourse
However, embodiment seems to have faded from many accounts of discursive construction. Oksala  
suggests that perhaps Foucault's approach to experience (particularly in relation to anarchic bodies), 
and his references to “the body as the locus of resistance” are “merely naive slippages into the idea 
of a prediscursive body”845. She asks 
“Do we have to accept Butler’s reading of the Foucaultian body according to which these passages are 
implicit contradictions within his thought? Are bodies and pleasures within the same discursive order as 
sex and sexuality? What can bodies and pleasures as an alternative to sex-desire mean? Do they 
presuppose an understanding of experience?”846
839 See Leder, D (1990) ibid and Leder, D (1999) ibid
840 See Bourdieu, P. Transl. Nice, R (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
841 Babb, G (2002) Where the Bodies are Buried: Cartesian Dispositions in Narrative Theories of Character. In 
NARRATIVE,Vol. 10, No. 3 (October 2002) pp206
842 Bourdieu, P. Trans Nice, R (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. pp78
843 Babb, G (2002) Where the Bodies are Buried: Cartesian Dispositions in Narrative Theories of Character. In 
NARRATIVE,Vol. 10, No. 3 (October 2002) pp206. See chapter 6 re agency and how this process works
844  For example, in research into cognitive science, linguistics, historical linguistics, cognitive psychology, 
developmental psychology, gesture and discourse analysis. See Johnson, M. (1987) The Body in the Mind: The 
Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press
845 Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 
2004) pp102
846 Oksala, J (2004) ibid
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Even though Foucault's conception of the panopticon speaks of the regulation of both body and 
mind, 'embodiment' as an experiential concept seems to disappear, through the shift of emphasis 
from physical sensation to mental impression, and the hierarchy of oppression that counts control of 
mind as more dangerous than power over body847. By concentrating on large scale broad-stroke 
discursive shifts rather than embodiment and individual experiences, Foucault seems to ascribe a 
kind of universality to 'the body', as opposed to the singularity of subjective embodied 
experience848. In this way, Foucault's concept of the sexual body has been criticised as a naive 
account of a pre-discursive body in that he fails to show why certain individuals occupy certain 
subject positions, rather than others849. He further unsuccessfully addresses the problem of 
singularity, where subjects construct their positions, and where some construct them more than 
others850. In this regard, De Certeau corrects Foucault by calling attention to the importance of 
individual instances of cultural appropriation851.
Hayles argues that a focus on 'oppression' as a singular idea obscures the ways in which oppression 
is perpetuated, i.e. through embodied practices:
“Fissuring along lines of class, gender, race, and privilege, embodied practices create heterogeneous 
spaces even when the discursive formations describing those practices seem uniformly dispersed 
throughout the society. The assimilation of embodiment into discourse has the additional disadvantage of 
making it difficult to understand exactly how certain practices spread through a 
society.”852
Reminding us of the role of action in discursive norms, Hayles argues that the cultural conditions  
that allow the disappearance of the body are more than merely the (passive) explicit linguistically-
mediated discourses around the body, but include changing production, consumption and 
communication patterns853, which are all related to material conditions.
847 Foucault, M. trans. Sheridan, A (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage, p. 205.
848 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp153
849 See Scott, J. (1992). Experience. In Butler, J and Scott, J (eds)(1992) Feminists theorize the political. New York: 
Routledge; Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In 
Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 2004). Oksala discusses the trajectory of the importance of experience in feminist 
theory, from the 1970's position of experience being of paramount importance through Joan Scott's accusation of 
feminist attempts to make experience visible as being naive.
850 Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In 
Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 2004)
851 de Certeau, M, trans. Rendall, S.F. (1985) The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press
852 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp153
853 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid. She frames the disappearance of embodiment in terms of informatics, as the material, 
technological, economic and social structures making possible the information age. The late capitalist issues of 
overproduction and underconsumption makes necessary the phasing out of workers, and their bodies, through such 
practices as increased temporary and contract workers, leveraged buyouts which shift focus from the product to the 
profit, and the creation of increasingly consumable and repeatable events provided by growing service industries in 
place of the creation of material products that will remain. This necessitates a greater, more accurate and faster flow 
of information, which in turn feeds multinational corporations that do not need to be geographically close to 
customers in order to be efficient. This in turn results in a more flexible system of location for production enterprise 
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The body, however, is indispensable to human life, and the calls of postmodernists to view the exit 
of the body is rather a new way (or subjectivity) of seeing the very real 
body854. The body's dematerialisation through a focus on discourse indeed depends on the material  
in complex and specific ways, both politically and personally, and on the circumstances of  
embodiment which dematerialisation would obfuscate855.
Embodiment, seen through the lenses of Leib and its intersections with discourse, can clearly be 
seen in the participant practices. As alluded to above, the participants' desires reflects 
both thoughts and the feelings they experience in their bodies, in ways which shift and change. 
Further, their embodied experience is problematically informed and often driven by hetero-
patriarchal normative conceptions of beauty and sensuality, and by discursively constructed scripts  
of compulsory masculinity. Yet, contrary to dualist conceptions, these desires are not merely carried  
out by bodies instructed by free-floating minds, but are experienced and understood viscerally  
in and through their bodies, and indeed both support and subvert heteropatriarchy856. This begs the 
question as to how conscious this support and subversion are on a metatheoretical level.
5.2.2a) The Intelligible vs the Accessible Body
There is a large body of work which has recently attempted to bridge the gap between discursive  
constructions and lived experience, and thereby to bring back both the body and embodiment into  
explanations of social processes857. In this vein, it is useful to distinguish the intelligible from the 
accessible body in order better to understand how the material interacts with discourse in the 
construction of the 'mind-body'.
Contrary to what many post-structuralists might argue, materiality is not entirely a linguistic/
discursive/social construct. In this respect, there is a difference between 'appearance' and 'being':  
while language enables 'being', it does not fully circumscribe 'appearance'.
infrastructure and human beings who run it, where material constraints seem to be optional rather than given. This 
results in a decrease in focus on materiality, which implies that direct experience with material conditions is replaced 
by information.
In contradistinction, see Haraway, D (1991) Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: 
Routledge; Balsamo, A (1996) Technologies of the Gendered Body. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press
854 See Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid. She frames this in terms of the cross between informatics with the immateriality of 
information.
855 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
856 See above
857 See for example Featherstone, M, Hepworth, M & Turner, B.S. (Eds) (1991) The Body: Social Process and Cultural  
Theory, Sage Publications Ltd; Weiss, G, Haber, H.F. (Eds) (1999) Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections  
of Nature and Culture, Routledge; Shilling, C (2003) The body and social theory. Published in association with 
Theory, Culture & Society, SAGE; Coupland, J & Gwyn, R (Eds) (2003) Discourse, The Body, and 
Identity, Palgrave Macmillan; Waskul, D & Vannini, P (Eds) (2006) Body/embodiment: Symbolic Interaction And  
the Sociology of the Body. Ashgate Publishing; Turner, B.S. (2008) The Body and Society: Explorations in Social  
Theory (Published in association with Theory, Culture & Society)(3rd ed) Sage Publications Ltd; 
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Butler implicitly claims that language is the condition under which materiality can be said to 
appear858. Following Foucault, this indicates that materiality appears when its contingency upon 
discourse is done away with859. Vasterling argues that Butler refers to ordinary notions of materiality 
as a given, extralinguistic reality860. The idea of 'appearance' has a strong phenomenological-
ontological tradition, particularly through Heidegger's idea of 'being' as synonymous with 
' a ppe a r i ng ' , i . e . s om e t h i ng c a n e x i s t on l y i n s om uc h a s i t a ppe a r s t o be 
there861. Appearance is therefore epistemologically dependent but ontologically independent of  
language, which is reversed into dependence if language conditions the possibility of appearance, 
i . e . i f l a n g u a g e e n a b l e s t h i n g s t o a p p e a r a n d d e t e r m i n e s t h e l i m i t s o f 
reality862. Because language is contingent and varies over time, the limits of 'reality', as perceived 
and labelled, are also variable and contingent. However, this remains linguistically monist, thanks to  
its exclusion of ontologically independent, extra-linguistic reality863.
In the Kantian sense, 'appearance' is epistemological, with ontological repercussions, in that  
knowledge of reality is confined to appearances, whereas what things 'are' cannot be 
known864. In this way, knowledge does not determine reality's ontological limits. Vasterling argues, 
according to this logic, that Butler could be saying that access to ontologically independent extra-
linguistic reality is possible, rather than denying such a reality865. In this way, language determines 
how reality appears to us, and if materiality appears as a given, extra-linguistic reality, it is still an  
effect of language, even though materiality and reality are not reducible to linguistic effects or  
semantic constructions of language866. Yet reality cannot be fully captured, and the reach of 
knowledge is limited.
The relation between intelligibility and accessibility is therefore one-way: that which is intelligible 
is accessible, but not vice versa867. If we understand something we can refer to or name it, which 
referral or naming is always mediated by language. However, following hermeneutics, we can 
indeed understand things that we cannot articulate, although such understanding is not independent  
of language868. We need a context of what we understand in order to understand new things that face 
858 Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex". New York: Routledge. Pp31 & 251
859 Butler, J. (1993) ibid
860 Vasterling, V (1999) Butler's sophisticated constructivism: A critical assessment. In Hypatia. Bloomington: Summer 
1999. Vol. 14, Iss. 3; pg. 17-40
861 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
862 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
863 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
864 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
865 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
866 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
867 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
868 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
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us. This 'context of habitual understanding' requires its own limits, which we register as a lack of 
the capacity to articulate, rather than just a lack of understanding869. This indicates firstly that 
accessibility is wider than intelligibility, secondly that accessibility does not fully determine  
awareness of reality, and thirdly that intelligibility matches linguistic capacities.
In this regard, Butler claims that what really persists is the demand in and for language, that 
prompts and calls to be explained, described, diagnosed etc870. This body is accessible, albeit not 
necessarily intelligible, which results in a demand for language in order to articulate and make 
intelligible. This body is not yet intelligible, and exceeds the linguistically constructed body and the  
limits of sexed, gendered and sexualised bodies, which are, of course, not neutral, but defined and 
regulated by oppressive heteropatriarchal norms. These norms interpenetrate the lived experience of  
the body and implicate themselves into the normative and 'natural'871.
As Vaster l ing argues , l ived exper ience i s not res t r ic ted to the in te l l ig ib le 
body, otherwise homosexual desires would not manifest, since most social environments compel 
heterosexuality872. She therefore argues that the unintelligible body is both a critical force and a  
creative resource873. People sometimes feel that the intelligible body doesn't fit, and is even 
oppressive, which indicates a (pre/un-conscious) awareness of an alternative, albeit not an 
essentially-defined one. Restricting accessibility would make it impossible to enjoy alternative  
experiences of the body874.
Secondly, accessing what exceeds the intelligible body could be a strong motive and resource for  
criticism and change. As a demand in and for language, the unintelligible body could lead to new 
meanings and discursive practices with respect to the body875.
However, as Vasterling notes, Butler's expression of the body as demand for language is  
incompatible with her epistemological position876. Language, if it defines the limits of accessibility, 
is restricted to what is nameable, articulable and comprehensible, which position precludes 
preconscious experience of unintelligible bodies877. This is supported by the psychoanalytic 
influence in Butler, where the normative standards of sex, gender and sexuality initiate the psychic 
869 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
870 Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex". New York: Routledge. pp67
See Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
871 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
872 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
873 See chapter 6, and see Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
874 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
875 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
876 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
877 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
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function of rejecting the unintelligible body878. This precludes pre-conscious experience. Butler 
applies this to Western culture as a whole, which Vasterling says is empirically not plausible and 
politically self-defeating, given that norms differ from place to place and person to 
person879. Given these variables, psychic reaction in relation to the unintelligible body might be  
anything from rejection to celebration.
From the aforegoing, the 'subject' is clearly not an essentialist Cartesian separation of mind and  
body, nor is he/she simply constructed through discourse. Rather, the 'self' and 'being' is about  
experientially- and relationally-conceived embodiment, dialectically circumscribed both by 
discourse and materiality, and to be seen primarily through accessibility, rather than mere 
intelligibility. Constructing metatheory for psycho-medical discourses in this way leads to an 
explicit recognition of the role of damaging normative discourses in the construction of the 
individual. This, in turn, enables (yet does not prescribe) a clearer notion of the ways in which 
normativity is perpetuated, and therefore enables a clearer delineation between the normative/
subversive aspirations of sexual subjects on the one hand, and those of the psycho-medical 
fraternity on the other.
Notably, such a value-neutral framework from which to undertake anti-normative activity does not 
necessarily encourage or prescribe anti-normative practices and therefore normative shifts. As 
Vasterling notes, the subversion inherent in the abjected, unintelligible body will probably not 
change much for the better, because that which is excluded from consciousness merely subverts 
intelligible reality, rather than disappearing880. This subversion requires conscious action to mobilise 
it to useful ends, failing which it will serve merely to consolidate normative standards regulating the  
intelligible body, or will result in mental/emotional breakdown881.
This construction of the individual combines with the notions of transactional relations which 
follow and complex conceptions of agency, to enable sexual subjects to make choices about their  
lives882.
878 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
879 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
880 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
881 Vasterling, V (1999) ibid
882 As noted above, the participants in some ways consolidate normative standards, and yet in other ways mobilise 
subversion. As I will discuss below and in chapter 6, through the above construction of the subject, individuals can 
be informed as to the influence of both materiality and discourse in their own lives. They can thereby realise that 
they are not essentially, foundationally or deterministically constituted, and, being free from both prescription and 
proscription, can choose to embrace anti-normative practices. However, they may equally choose to substantially 
perpetuate normativities as they appear in many ways to do currently, since they are the agency to make their own 
choices and therefore to prioritise normativities should they wish. Therefore the above construction does not 
prescribe a way forward for anti-normative political activity
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Yet, as mentioned above and will further be dealt with in chapter 6, these constructions describe the  
parameters of the sexual subject in order to demarcate value-neutral (non-heteronormative) 
metatheory on which to base complex cartographies of the sexual subject based on what they 
'are' (in non-liberal-humanist terms) and what they do. From these cartographies, anti-normative 
political action can be conceived and undertaken.
5.3 The Subject: External Coherence through Transactional Relations
As I have argued, the subject is an embodied being made up of an experientially-circumscribed 
mind-body in dialectical relation with discourse. Yet viewing complex conceptions of the self in the  
abstract, with no further discussion on the nature of that self in relation to the 'non-self' implies that  
subjective experience is universal and oppositional. Thoughts and desires are not merely 'internal', 
as has historically been viewed. Rather, as Dewey argues, egocentric Western rationality should be 
m e d i a t e d w i t h a m o r e p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h , w h e r e b y t h e s u b j e c t i s ' i n -
relation'883. In order to ascertain the constitution of the subject in relation to other subjects, material  
objects and discourse, it is therefore important to unpack what is meant by both 'self' and 'other', and 
to contemplate the limits or boundaries between bodies and things.
5.3.1 The Organisation of Mind/Body and Environment
Rather than the self being a distinct and separate 'person' oppositionally located to other people or  
things, there is, I suggest, a fluid organisation of entities with indistinct boundaries and limits, 
which are in transactional relation with each other.
In a non-Cartesian way, embodied experience thereby comes from the relations between mind and 
body as well as the ongoing engagement of embodied interactions with environment. Similarly, 
abstract ideas of the body come from the relations between prevailing cultural formations and 
b e l i e f s , o b s e r v a t i o n s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t a p p e a r t o m o s t a s e m p i r i c a l 
evidence884. These categories are always defined ex post facto and come out of a flux too complex, 
interactive and holistic to be seen as a single thing885. As Hayles notes, we should refuse 
embodiment a status in advance of relation, which in turn enables environmental changes coming  
883 Seigfried, C.H. (2002)  Shedding Skins. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 173-186
884 Hayles, N.K (2002) Flesh and Metal: Reconcguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments. In Con  gurations, 
2002, 10:297–320 at 297 et seq The Johns Hopkins University Press and the Society for Literature and Science
885 A term proposed by Mark Hansen “From Image to Affect: Making Sense of New Media Art,” presentation 
at UCLA, May 2001.
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out of systematised and organised flux886. In speaking of embodied experience, we must begin with 
relation rather than pre-existing entities, which often underpin essentialist liberal-humanist 
discourses around an individual's coherency and singularity887.
5.3.1a) Relationality and the Problem of Anonymity
Such liberal humanist discourses have historically founded the prioritising and essentialising 
debates supported by the physical sciences, and in particular evolutionary theory which has often 
been misused to justify essentialising discourses based on presumed 'naturalness' of difference in 
gender and sexual orientation888. To counter such debates around essentialist and modernist 
conceptions of evolution and inheritance which idealize genes as the hidden truths of nature, and 
taking the starting-point of 'relation' in a logical direction, Oyama works to build a systems-oriented  
c o n c e p t i o n o f n a t u r e a s a ' d e v e l o p m e n t a l s y s t e m ' l i n k i n g o rg a n i s m a n d 
environment889. She calls on systems theory and Einsteinian relativity to refuse fictions about 
transcendent coding for mind and for body, and argues that a dichotomous construction related to 
predisposing genes and accidental development serves to reinstate nature-nurture 
oppositions890. In this way, the virtual becomes actual, and questions about genes and the 
environment often shift to questions about power/control, and desires to clearly distinguish between 
entities which drive action and those which have things done to them891.
If matter is not inert, then, in the construction of form, neither foundationalist conceptions of a  
mindlike force like a God or a secular stand-in, nor genes with a prescriptive intention imposed on 
existence need be postulated892. Nor need one establish ultimate or centralized control if information 
is relative or relational in nature. Events are not significant or meaningful, nor diminish uncertainty,  
( i . e . b e c o m e i n f o r m a t i v e ) , e x c e p t i n r e l a t i o n t o a l a r g e r c o n t e x t o r 
structure.893 This turns the focus away from the defining characteristics of the material world (i.e.  
how the 'fetish object' defines the 'fetishist') and towards the subject. Instead of changing focus to a 
presumed singular subject, this changes focus to the relationship between the subject 'organism' and 
the developmental system: “the changing complex of interacting influences, some of which are  
886 Hayles, N.K (2002) Flesh and Metal: Reconcguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments. In Con  gurations, 
2002, 10:297–320 at 297 et seq The Johns Hopkins University Press and the Society for Literature and Science
887 Hayles, N.K (2002) ibid
888 Such arguments are often used in the 'psy' sciences which have in the twentieth century aligned with positivist 
thinking. See chapter 4 and the Interjection in this regard
889 Oyama, S. (2000a). The ontogeny of information: Developmental systems and evolution, revised and expanded. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. pp92-93
890 Oyama, S. (2000a) ibid
891 Oyama, S. (2000a) ibid, pp12 and 87.
892 Oyama, S. (2000a) ibid, pp14
893 Oyama, S. (2000a) ibid, pp14
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inside the organism’s skin and some of which are outside but all of which... count as essential 
contributors to the emergence of form and variation, with both constancy and variation now 
understood as emerging in the same way”894.
Thinking the body as radically open to indeterminacy in this way runs counter to deep assumptions  
and agendas. In expanding comprehension of the biological body, Oyama's developmental systems 
theory posits that there is no body. Rather, diverse natures come to the fore as individual bodies 
route various ontogenetic pathways, where certain aspects are common among individuals, while 
others are unique895.
This is compelling in its parallels to how the individual is constructed through both materiality and 
discourse detailed above, and to postmodernist approaches such as Baudrillard, the Krokers and 
Deleuze around there being 'no body'896. Yet it risks accusations similar to those levelled at the 
phenomenologically embodied 'self', as Sullivan argues pertains to Merleau-Ponty: that embodiment 
is experienced in a (heterosexual) male gendered body that occupies the position of the generic 
body897. Noting that all bodies are marked by race, gender, class, sexuality etc., she argues that a 
common, unmarked pre-personal body is inappropriate as identifier, and that phenomenology is  
therefore limited through subjectivism and universalism898. It is therefore inappropriate to 
underestimate the power of discourse by assuming that materiality is merely a kind of inert system, 
and that culture is not elevated to some reified status itself899.
Sullivan understands Merleau-Ponty as speaking of human existence projecting itself onto the 
environment in cultural objects, which she takes to mean that Merleau-Ponty has a subjectivist 
position of intentionality where meaning derived from experience comes from the individual alone.  
Weiss, however, argues that Merleau-Ponty's conception of habits are automatically non-reflective 
patterns of conduct900. Rather than thinking of 'anonymous' bodily experiences, Weiss argues that it 
894 Burlein, A, (2005) The Productive Power of Ambiguity: Rethinking Homosexuality through the Virtual and 
Developmental Systems Theory. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 2005) pp36, referring to Oyama (2000a), ibid 
pp33 and 43
895 Burlein, A, (2005) ibid, pp36
896 Supra. See Baudrillard, J, trans. Schutze, B. & Schutze, C. (1988) The Ecstasy of Communication. New York: 
Semiotext(e) pp 18; Kroker, A and Kroker, M (1987) Panic Sex in America. In Body Invaders: Panic Sex in 
America. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 20-21.; See for example Deleuze, G, Trans. Patton, P (1994) Difference 
and Repetition. New York: Columbia University Press, pp208-9 relating to virtuality and the real; 
Deleuze, G and Guattari, F trans. Massumi, B (1992) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. London: 
Continuum
897 Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
898 Sullivan, S. (2001) ibid
899 See chapter 2 and the Interjection on how culture is called on in South Africa to support heteronormativity and 
homophobia
900 Weiss, G (2002) The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) pg 
187-200, pp193. She calls on Merleau-Ponty Merleau-Ponty, M (1945) trans. Colin Smith (1962) Phenomenology of 
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would be better to talk of 'general experiences', since 'anonymity' can be a positive thing which 
allows society, institutions and people to flourish901. In order to explore a more viable position than  
these, yet to take the thread of thinking further, it is necessary to explore how such 'general  
experiences' play out.
5.3.1b) Relationality: Transactional Models of Dynamic, Permeable Co-Constitution
Sullivan turns to Dewey's pragmatism in order to work out a 'transactional model' of identity and  
truth, arguing for replacing traditional dualist thinking about bodies and their relationships with 
environments with situated perspectives902. Alternatively to anonymity in bodily transactions with 
others, bodies are thereby transactional, which recognises that meaning-creation is socially 
constructed through an appreciation of differences903.
Seigfried also calls on Dewey, as well as Nietzsche, to de-emphasise the hypothetical construction 
of the body in place of mutual responsiveness and situatedness904. Skins are permeable, allowing for 
movement between inner and outer worlds905. In this regard, the participant practices of transmitting 
body fluids negates explicit boundaries between human subject, sexual partner and material objects:
“...there's something weird for me, or strange for me... how can I put it... there's something that lies on a 
deeper level that maybe a lot of people's not aware of... is when we exchange fluids... it's... the molecules 
that was flowing around inside that person's body is now in yours. And that to me in a way symbolises the  
connection that has taken place between the two people. And if you ... that's how I explain it for myself.  
Why it is mindblowing to feel hit cum shooting down your throat, and you think OK I'm part of this man, 
I'm ingesting his molecules” ('Brian')
This reflects that the distinction between mind/body and 'fetish object' is fluid (pun intended), and 
fudges clear distinctions between the subject and urine or semen. It also undermines distinctions  
between humans inter se, neither of whom can lay exclusive claim to the fluid (as 'object'). Further,  
it questions whether body fluids are 'living' matter and therefore part of the subject, or not living 
and therefore 'fetish objects' in themselves.
In this way a skin does not function as a metaphor for concealment, but rather is an appeal to live in 
Perception. New York: Humanities Press 142–46
901 Weiss, G (2002) ibid
902 Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
903 This is not the same as saying that individuals are essentially different and categorisable in terms of their differences
904 Seigfried, C.H. (2002)  Shedding Skins. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 173-186
905 Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. See Seigfried, C.H. (2002)  Shedding Skins. In 
Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 173-186
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it, which is akin to how Dewey tries to avoid the sedimentation of explicit boundaries between 
body-mind-society-environment906. His use of the term 'experience' refers to the interaction between  
organism and environment, nature and the social, rather than brain action. However, he 
unfortunately connected experience with 'nature' and 'culture', and Seigfried notes that his 'body' is 
imbricated with opposition to mind, soul and spirit907. As Sullivan points out, bodies have no 
e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e s b u t a r e m a d e a n d r e m a d e t h r o u g h s o c i a l a n d c u l t u r a l 
environments908. Therefore, if we see bodies as transactional, we can avoid the trap of seeing being-
in-the-world as an imposition of intentions, value and meanings onto objects and others in the 
world909. On face value, this avoids determinist thinking.
Following Weiss, however, neither Merleau-Ponty, Dewey nor Sullivan think it worthwhile to view 
the organism as shaping the meaning of its experience, thereby creating the concept of an active  
organism and passive world910. Nor do they conceive of an active world and a passive organism, 
since neither demonstrates lived experience to its fullest extent. All three see bodies as interacting  
with their environments, which include people, ideas and institutions in transactions which, for 
Dewey, are dynamic and co-constitutive. This approach gives neither organism nor environment  
a n y l o g i c a l o r e t h i c a l p r i o r i t y o v e r t h e o t h e r , b u t r a t h e r a n 
interdependence911. In this way, bodies and environments are in non-foundationalist ways in 
permeable, dynamic relationships with each other, where culture affects bodies and bodies affect  
culture. Environments are not thereby constituted to fill needs, but organisms have distinctive  
experiences in those environments912. This is in concert with notions of 'fetishism' not in any 
essential way being identifiable through separating out 'fetish subject', 'fetish object' and the 
environment in which the practices take place.
906 Dewey, J. (1978) Some implications of anti-intellectualism. In The middle works. Vol. 6, ed. Boydston, J.A. 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; Dewey, J. (1979) The logic of the judgments of 
practice. In The middle works. Vol. 8, ed. Boydston, J.A. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press; Dewey, J. (1980a) Democracy and education. In The middle works, Vol. 9, ed. Boydston, J.A. Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; Dewey, J. (1980b) The need for a recovery of philosophy. In 
The middle works. Vol. 10. Ed. Boydston, J.A. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; 
Dewey, J. (1981) Experience and nature. In The later works. Vol. 1, ed. Boydston, J.A. Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; Dewey, J. (1984) Affective thought. In The later works. Vol. 2, 
ed. Boydston, J.A. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; Dewey, J. (1988) Unity of 
science as a social problem. In The later works. Vol. 13, ed. Boydston, J.A. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press. See Seigfried, C.H. (2002)  Shedding Skins. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 173-186
907 Seigfried, C.H. (2002)  Shedding Skins. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 173-186
908 Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp65
909 See Seigfried, C.H. (2002)  Shedding Skins. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 173-186
910 Weiss, G (2002) The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) pg 
187-200
911 Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
912 See Seigfried, C.H. (2002)  Shedding Skins. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 173-186
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5.3.1c) Indistinct Boundaries and Discourse
These experiences take place corporeally through and between entities with indistinct boundaries  
(i.e. humans and objects). In this regard, Nancy rethinks corporeality in ways that are important for  
feminist and queer thinking about the body913. He rejects the idea of a unified, integrated body of  
humanis t discourse in favour of dis integra ted bodies made up by mul t iple 
alterities914. This view is of the human body as 'singular plural' through a process of denaturing and 
de-familiarising, whereby writing excribes meaning while at the same time inscribing 
significations915. The body is similarly constantly being excribed, allowing the conception of 
the body beyond the traditional dualisms in their rationalist and a-historical structures. This  
i n d i c a t e s t h a t b o d i e s a r e n e i t h e r e x c l u s i v e l y i n d i s c o u r s e n o r i n  
matter916. Nancy addresses questions of proprietary interests in one's body and the attendant 
questions of what ownership means, and what the body means, looking to issues of whether bodies 
are natural substances, organic wholes or whether the unity given to the body is merely 
conventional, arbitrary, or linguistic917. With regard to ownership, certain questions arise: What does 
it mean to 'have' a body? Who is the 'I' who 'has' it, if it isn't part of the body? Can one have a body 
distinct from the 'I'?918 Nancy conceives of the body as disintegrated, and as a series of contiguous 
terms or states919. It is neither fullness nor void, outside nor inside, part nor whole, function nor 
finality, but rather a skin “folded, refolded, unfolded, multiplied, invaginated, . . . orificed, evading, 
invading, stretched, relaxed, excited, shattered, linked, unlinked”920.
Nancy develops an ontology inspired by Heidegger, starting from the question of the meaning of 
being. Further than Heidegger, however, Nancy considers 'being' as co-existing and co-appearance. 
Nancy considers that “the givenness of being, the givenness that is given with the very fact that we  
understand something (whatever it may be and however confused) when we say ‘being’ . . . can be 
summarized as follows: being itself is given to us as meaning. Being does not 
have meaning, but being itself, the phenomenon of being, is meaning”921. Questions on 'being' 
should therefore relate to meaning rather than to the status of the human as a kind of 'thing'. In this  
913 Nancy, J-L (1992) Corpus. Paris: Métailié. See Perpich, D (2005) Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the 
Ideal of Integrity. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 2005) 75-91
914 Nancy, J-L (1992) ibid. See Perpich, D (2005) ibid
915 Nancy, J-L (1992) ibid. See Perpich, D (2005) ibid
916 Nancy, J-L (1992) Corpus. Paris: Métailié.
917 Nancy, J-L (1992) ibid
918 Nancy, J-L (1992) ibid
919 Nancy, J-L (1992) ibid
920 Nancy, J-L (1992) ibid, pp16
921 Nancy, J-L, trans. Richardson, R.D & O’Byrne, A (2000a). Being singular plural. Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press. pp2
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way, being-in-the-world is inextricably connected to us and is shared between different subjects. In 
turn, he connects meaning to apophansis: “Meaning begins where presence is not pure presence but 
where presence comes apart (“se disjoint”) in order to be itself as such. This ‘as’ presupposes the 
distancing, spacing, division of presence”922. Meaning is plural and at the same time determinate, 
and the possibility of a thing being itself, i.e. identity, depends on the possibility of its being  
different from other things, and on being connected to other things and the world. In turn, this is not  
a shopping list of things connected to each other one at a time. For Nancy, meaning is only possible  
when meanings are circulated, weblike, which goes in all directions at once. In this way all of being 
is connected to all of the rest of being.
Nancy differs from Heidegger in his account of bodies. Heidegger still sees meaning in relation to 
non-material phenomena. Nancy, on the other hand, sees meaning as dependent on bodies, 
i . e .m e a n i ngs a r e t he po i n t s o f c onne c t i on be t w e e n he t e roge ne ous bod i l y 
surfaces923. How a being is intelligible is not in relation to its utility, and meaning is not about 
intentionality or human aims and possibilities924. 
Rather, a function of language is attributed to people, where “[t]he speaker speaks for the world,  
which means the speaker speaks to it, on behalf of it, in order to make it a ‘world’. As such, the  
speaker . . . occurs as its representative but also, at the same time . . . in anticipation of it, before it,  
exposed to it as to its own most intimate consideration”925 Language doesn't exist outside the world. 
Rather, speakers represent the world, in the way that they are a representative thereof, and in the 
way that they give sense to it, having been already exposed to it. Being human is therefore 
qualitatively different from being 'thing', but this difference is not essential, and the human being is 
neither superior or primary in respect of the derivative existence of things: “The difference between 
humanity and the rest of being (which is not a concern to be denied . . .), while itself being 
inseparable from other differences within being (since man [sic] is ‘also’ animal, ‘also’ living, ‘also’ 
physio-chemical), does not distinguish true existence from a sort of sub-existence. Instead, this 
difference forms the concrete condition of singularity”926. 
922 (my italics). See Nancy, J-L, (2000a) ibid pp2: “The plurality of beings is at the foundation of Being. A single being 
is a contradiction in terms. Such a being, which would be its own foundation, origin, and intimacy, would be 
incapable of Being, in every sense that this expression can have here”. See Perpich, D (2005) Corpus Meum: 
Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 2005) 75-91 at note 2. Perpich 
notes “Being, for Nancy, is always being-with-one-another; being cannot be properly said in the singular alone. It is 
always the plurality of singular beings. Similarly, for him a single meaning would also involve a contradiction or an 
impossibility and for the same reasons.”
923 See Nancy, J-L (1992) Corpus. Paris: Métailié and Nancy, J-L, trans. Richardson, R.D & O’Byrne, A (2000a). 
Being singular plural. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
924 ibid
925 Nancy, J-L, (2000a) ibid pp3
926 Nancy, J-L, (2000a) ibid pp18
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This perspective does not see humanity or human-ness as an essence but as a product of difference, 
both of linguistic signifiers and of heterogeneous bodies. Nancy notes that we are only human in  
relation to other (non-human) objects. In other words, by being bodies, rather than just possibilities 
and purposes, we are shown the world and are representatives of it. He sees being-a-singularity as 
inherently being with other singularities, while the plurality of “being-with” is to coexist and co-
appear as singularities, rather than to be an aggregate or a totality927. The body is therefore 
disintegrated and constituted in a series of contiguous terms or states. Bodies have multiple limits 
and multiple borders, and the subject is complex rather than unitary 928. Perpich, addressing 
criticisms of Nancy, argues for affirming a multiplicity of bodies existing in a multidimensional 
field, (which she insists on, instead of a continuum) rather than as dichotomously organised in a 
linear fashion929. This is a complex idea, but, as Perpich notes, takes a step in the right direction,  
even though there unfortunately remains no non-binary terminology 930.
That bodies have multiple limits means that all bodies divide and relate to themselves and others  
along multiple borders931. This may seem to be in conflict with feminist theories for which bodily 
integrity is imperative, and Perpich correctly notes that this conception may be seen as a white,  
heterosexual, male construction related to privilege. She also notes that if contact and contiguity are 
privileged in construing meaning, Nancy’s theory may not account for psychic formation and the 
internalization of gender and sexual identity, which in turn intersects with race, class, ethnicity, and 
other categories necessary for identity formation932.
Nancy doesn't address these criticisms. But he does pay attention to bodies ordinarily seen as  
b o r d e r l i n e , n e i t h e r l o c a t i n g t h e m a t t h e o u t e r l i m i t s , n o r a t t h e 
centre933. Bodies such as intersexed, surrogate, pregnant, (counter culturally) modified, 
technologically altered, and 'fetishist' bodies defy traditional binary categories and are marginalized 
in traditional philosophical discourses, and often also in feminist discourses, not to mention 
heteropatriarchal normative popular discourses. 
The humanist ideal of bodily integrity, and the ideas of 'control' over the body, life and meaning by  
a rational mind are problematic. On the one hand the idea of bodily integrity is useful to grant rights  
927 See Perpich, D (2005) Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 
(Summer 2005) 75-91
928 Perpich, D (2005) ibid
929 See Perpich, D (2005), ibid
930 Perpich, D (2005), ibid
931 Perpich, D (2005), ibid
932 Perpich, D (2005), ibid
933 Perpich, D (2005), ibid
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to marginalised people in order to protect them, but on the other hand they also maintain a fictive  
fantasy about the essential corporeal nature of people, and the impermeable boundaries between  
people and things934. Yet simplistic discursive conceptions of how people interact with the world, 
whereby groups of people are subject to normative discourses in determinist ways are similarly 
problematic. Clearly therefore an alternative must be forged.
5.4 Towards 'the Subject' in 'Fetish' Sexualities: Beyond the 
Reification of Things
As explained above, the boundaries between 'bodies' and 'world' are not explicitly drawn, neither in 
terms of their material limits or their discursive formation. In this way we can refuse to see  
the natural and the sociocultural as separate, so as not to make mediation between them 
invisible935. Lock, calling on Latour, argues that a hybrid “object-discourse-nature-society” 
construction is appropriate, where networks of confluence should be understood and 
portrayed936. This kind of hybrid thinking allows us to look at how nature and society are perceived  
to be autonomous, and to understand how inanimate things can be seen as actors, thereby avoiding 
issues of hierarchy, difference and boundary disputes937.
Sexuality and corporeality are inseparable. The notion of corporeality as a distinctly labelled 
concept implies that there are boundaries between people and the things which constitute material 
culture from which it is impossible to escape938. As Graham notes: “[w]e are so reliant on things that 
we are often inseparable from them”939. Yet a clear boundary between things and people cannot be 
demarcated. People are not conclusively immaterial ideas demarcated by discourse, neither are they 
discrete physical beings which end at their skins. Rather, from one perspective, are themselves 
objects which include bodies and things, both constructed by discourse and inhabiting a material 
world as objects940. Looking at people in this way enables sexuality (and marginal sexual interests 
934 See chapter 2, re the failings of identity politics, and how they are a double-edged sword
935 Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 267-292
936 Latour, B (1993) We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
937 Note further the similarities here between people-world as hybrid, and Bhabha's conceptions of hybridity in the 
postcolonialist context. See chapter 2 re problems in this this regard as pertains sexualities.
938 Graham, M (2004), ibid
939 Graham, M (2004), ibid
940 See also Deleuze, G and Guattari, F, trans. Massumi, B (1992) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
London: Continuum; Law, J and Hassard, J (eds.) (1999), Actor Network Theory and After. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Graham, M (2004), ibid, calls attention to writings on the cyborg. See Haraway, D (1991) A Cyborg Manifesto: 
Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century. In Haraway, D (ed.)(1991) 
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, pp149–81. 
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like 'sexual fetish') to be unpacked beyond heteronormatively defined 'appropriate' combinations of 
sexed bodies, beyond 'race', ethnicity, and nationality, and beyond constructions of sexuality in 
either-or configurations of material vs discursive. Graham argues that we should be more 
'artifactually literate', since then we could recognise the complexity of the things which surround us. 
We could therefore better situate sexuality in a material context incorporating objects and thereby  
opening up sexuality gender and sex to troubling ideas941. Rather prosaically looking at its germanic 
etymology, he notes that the word 'thing' is a reification of time, process, deliberation and dispute, 
a n d t h a t b o t h t h i n g s a n d t h e ' t h i n g s ' o f w h i c h t h e y a r e p a r t a r e 
reifications942. They are also sexed, thanks to the etymology of the Latin 'secare', the putative origin  
of the word sex, which means 'to cut'. In this way, he claims, things are cut from relations with 
people, places, materials and the history that created them so as to make discrete 
objects943. He warns against sexuality becoming a 'thing' in this way where bodily practices, tastes, 
pleasures, desires, moral judgements and so on are collected together944. To construct such a 
collection is merely to deterministically demarcate the boundaries between normatively described 
entities, or physically described objects. Yet people are both.
Contrary to the assumptions underlying the ICD classifications, 'fetish sexuality' cannot be pinned 
down as 'being' something. Indeed, there can be no such thing as 'fetishism', since the exact point at 
which the 'fetishist' ends and the 'fetish object' begins cannot be determined. Rather, sexuality 
incorporating material objects is emergent, multiple, and mobile, and necessitates an understanding 
of nature, culture and discourse in ways other than through the either/or frameworks of the 
(psychopathological/cultural) impossible vs the (material) real945. Looking at swirls and 
intersections between discourse, the embodied subject and the material world allows an 
acknowledgement of more complexity in describing the 'fetishist', (and thereby of 'fetish object' and 
sexual practices) than is currently enabled through simplistic either/or psychopathological, 
phenomenological or discursive approaches946. At the same time it enables a view of 'things' which 
helps materialise what we call sexuality, and which, if de-reified, opens them up, making of 
sexuality an opened-outward and connected function947.
941 Graham, M (2004) Thinking Sex, Thinking Gender. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 2004 
10(2):299-303 pp298
942 Graham, M (2004) ibid
943 Graham, M (2004) ibid
944 Graham, M (2004) ibid
945 See Burlein, A (2005) The Productive Power of Ambiguity: Rethinking Homosexuality through the Virtual and 
Developmental Systems Theory. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 2005)
946 Such a construction of the subject is further an ontologically preferable location for the scholar or psycho-medical 
practitioner him/herself, who forms part of the discursive/phenomenal environment in which the subject lives, and 
therefore impacts on both the practices of the subject and the ways in which dominant discourses shift over time. 
947 Graham, M (2004) ibid
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5.5 Conclusion
In order to acknowledge 'the fetishist subject', the object-focused discourses on 'fetishism' should, I 
suggest, not simply be re-directed to matching ones focusing on an essentially/foundationally-
conceived independent or discursively- and deterministically-constructed generic subject. This 
implies that it makes no difference whether or how a 'fetish object' is or isn't under the control of the 
'fetishist', or what function the 'fetish object' serves. Based on this recognition, the ICD's 
classifications of 'fetishism' clearly cannot be replaced with epistemologies which describe a 
'fetishist' subject at all. Whereas the ICD's categories of 'fetishism' heteronormatively prescribe the 
existence of a separately identifiable 'fetishist', a closer look at the constitution of the human subject  
reveals that, ontologically-speaking, the subject is not a discrete materially-conceived entity at all 
capable of being described in absolute terms. 
Instead, the object, environment and discourses form an undivided whole which have an effect on a 
subject and the cultural, social and political system in which practices occur. The subject is created  
and maintained in the transactional intersections and relations between the embodied  
being948, discourse949 and environment, the material and discursive limits between which are fluid. 
These transactional intersections lodge people into a shared spatio-temporal environment which is 
the context for lived experience950. Experience is thereby organised in its own structure, in terms of 
intentionality, embodiment, intersubjectivity and temporality 951.
Therefore, to take a more rounded look at subjectivities while developing explicitly non-
heteronormative metatheory, I suggest that we should consider 'fetish sexuality' as embodied 
experience in itself, which yet remains embedded in heteronormative social structures. This 
epistemological approach should therefore be seen as a 'subject-orientation' towards sexualities, 
rather than a 'subject-focus', which does not rely on the approval/acceptance of a majority, and 
therefore is inherently value-neutral952.
948  See Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 
(Fall 2004). She notes that Even though the sexual body is discursively constructed as an object of scientific 
discourses and disciplinary technologies, embodiment is experiential and therefore is capable of multiplying, 
distorting, and exceeding discursive definitions, classifications, and coordinates
949  This takes place through embodied experiences which surface in language and affect metaphoric networks in 
culture, which in turn dialectically impact on the quality and meanings of embodied experiences
See Johnson, M (1987) The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 18-35. See also Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In 
Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp153
950 Wyllie, M (2005) Body Subjects. In PPP vol. 12, no. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2005) The Johns Hopkins University Press 
209-214
951 Wyllie, M (2005), ibid
952 See chapter 4.  This is either on the basis of moral or statistical norms, and results in an 'anti-normative' construction
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With this insight, 'fetishists' are neither static essentialised creatures with inherent pathologies as 
historical constructs would see them, nor are they psychopathologised entities foundationally 
defined through their unattainable desire for material objects, as psychoanalytic theory would have  
it. Yet further, they are not entities deterministically defined by dominant discourses. Rather,  
'fetishists' do not exist as discretely identifiable entities at all, whether through definitions which 
rely on pre-determined normative notions of the 'fetish object', or foundationalist conceptions of the  
'fetishist'. Rather, people who incorporate material objects into their sexual scripts  
are themselves a kind of relationship with the world and dominant discourses. In this way they are 
characterised by mutability and potential, rather than stasis and inevitability.
Founding psycho-medical discourses on such a basis therefore renders heteronormativity more 
explicit, which in turn means that its discursive repetition and its deleterious effects can be better  
managed and 'policed'. Rather than relying on compulsory heteronormativity to purportedly 
'describe' 'fetishists', scholars and psycho-medical practitioners will therefore have to become 
explicit about their discriminatory practices, and will thereby themselves become more explicitly 
accountable for how/whether they perpetuate damaging heteronormative discourses.
If dealt with on this basis, people who enjoy the sexual company of material objects can be 
schooled to recognise heteronormativities more explicitly, and can move beyond mere reactionary  
repetitions thereof. They can acknowledge their benefit to the world around them, not 
despi te their sexual proclivities (which most people often mistake as 'identities'), but 
because they see the world differently. This means that, far from being strictly definable as either  
material or discursively-constructed entities, such people are bundles of potential bounded only by 
the warp and weft of their life experiences.
Chapter 6 explores in more detail what sexuality incorporates material objects, as embodied 
experience, entails in terms of agency and choice. This dialectical relationship which 
i s the 'subject' forms the basis for rethinking agency in ways which address the difficult task of 
avoiding dualistic thinking, given the predominant binary discursive constructs at our disposal, and 
given the historical war between monists and dualists about how people and things are 
arranged953. In so doing, this, I suggest, founds alternative and more coherent approaches to what is  
currently termed 'fetish practices'.
953 Hayles, N.K (2002) Flesh and Metal: Reconcguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments. In Con  gurations, 
2002, 10:297–320 at 297 et seq The Johns Hopkins University Press and the Society for Literature and Science. See 
also Damasio, A.R. (1994) Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam
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CHAPTER 6
SUBJECTIVITIES AND AGENCY: SEXUALITY 
INCORPORATING MATERIAL OBJECTS AS A RESOURCE FOR 
RECOGNISING PERSONAL VALUE
The central premise [of habitus] is not that the cogitating mind can be certain only of its ability to be 
present to itself, but rather that the body exists in space and time and through its interaction with the 
environment defines the parameters within which the cogitating mind can arrive at its "certainties," which  
not coincidentally almost never include the fundamental homologies generating the boundaries of 
thought. What counts as knowledge is also radically revised, for conscious thought becomes as it were the 
epiphenomenon corresponding to the phenomenal base the body provides.954
As discussed in Chapter 5, contrary to the ICD definitions of 'fetishism', the 'fetishist' cannot be 
described in terms of heteronormative circular arguments which essentialise the subject through  
specifying him/her in terms of 'inappropriate' sexual objects955. Such classifications normatively 
discursively construct the 'fetishist' in essentialist ways, presuming that he/she is implacably subject 
to undeniable desires which should be 'cured'. This problematically implies that the subject is not 
really a subject at all. Equally, the 'fetishist subject' is not classifiable purely through discursive 
(de)constructions, which, in dominant identity-based discourses, can tend to deterministically locate  
him/her as the object of domineering social structures956. Rather, the subject is constituted by 
dialectical and fluid relations between materiality and discourse957. This implies that the 
construction and functions of agency should also be rephrased, so as to replace the heteronormative 
prescriptions underlying the ICD's diagnostic criteria for 'fetishism'. 
This chapter argues that people who incorporate material objects into their sexual scripts indeed  
engage notions of agency. Instead of merely being passive recipients of heteronormative discursive  
constructs, such subjects (who cannot be labelled as 'fetishists') actively engage in the constitution  
of their world through their sexual practices (which cannot be labelled 'fetishism'). They re-phrase 
oppressive norms through phenomenological self-re-orientation towards a queer, embodied sense of 
empowerment, and thereby reconstitute pervasive negative perceptions as a positive, intelligible 
sense of self-value.
954 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp160
955 See chapter 4
956 See the Interjection and Chapter 5
957 See chapter 5
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6.1 Agency
Historically, 'fetishists' were constructed through religious doctrinal paradigms, and later through 
what have been seen as inevitable psychodynamic processes appropriate to all places and 
times958. Such constructivist thinking explains the ('fetishist') subject as constituted by pre-existing  
controlling forces, bound either by essentialist, pre-existing immaterial drives, or by powerful,  
discursively constructed social formations. Such determinist theories are debilitating to feminist and  
queer theories, since they do not enable viable concepts of agency959.
More recently, Foucaultian Poststructuralist thinking has rephrased the subject as primarily 
constituted by discourse960. However, the problem with Foucaultian conceptions of bodies and 
pleasures is that they cannot be attained by the intentional subject with conscious choices and 
practical solutions961. In Foucault there can be no real intentional agency, since bodies and pleasures  
count merely as resistance by means of experimentation on what is necessary and what is 
historically contingent962. In this way, resistance to normative power only seems possible in the 
interstices between competing regimes963. 
As discussed in the Interjection and Chapter 5, to transcend this limited version of both personal  
and political activity, we should go beyond both merely relying on deconstructivist readings of the 
'subject', while at the same time not re-invigorating Cartesian discourses which construct the subject  
as a disembodied mind by assuming that the subject is discursively unconstrained. Such a complex  
epistemological route forward is revealed through acknowledging not only that the 'fetishist' cannot 
be 'classified' and thereby demarcated at all, but through recognising the potential in relationships 
between humans and objects964. 
Rather than assuming that body and mind are dualistically separated, or assuming that the body is  
entirely discursively constructed, I suggest that appropriate starting-points for interrogating agency 
are located in Lock's hybrid Latourian “object-discourse-nature-society” construction of the 
subject965. This implies that networks of confluence966, and therefore conceptions of who or what 
958 See chapters 3 and 4
959 Vasterling, V (1999) Butler's sophisticated constructivism: A critical assessment. In Hypatia. Bloomington: Summer 
1999. Vol. 14, Iss. 3; pg. 17-40
960 See chapter 5
961 Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 
2004)
962 See Oksala, ibid
963 See Oksala, ibid
964 as argued in Chapter 5, see Chapter 3
965 See Chapter 5. Latour, B (1993) We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
966 See Chapter 5. Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 
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engages in cho ice , and how they do so , cen t re on the sub jec t s locus o f 
relation967. 
In other words, since the subject is a kind of relationship between materiality and discourse, rather  
than a stable entity with clear material or discursive boundaries, there can be no material 'centre' to  
the subject. Rather, the connecting point between subjectivity, discourses and the material world is  
where agency should logically be located. Such point of connection is the notion of embodied  
experience (rather than 'the body'), which is the locus of subjectivities, and the connecting point 
between the multiply constituted subject and the world around him/her. 
Yet such embodiment must necessarily take special account of normativities which seek to replace  
notions of embodiment with those of 'the body', since, as Butler comments, “perhaps the body has 
come to substitute for the psyche in Foucault—that is, as that which exceeds and confounds the 
injunctions of normalization”968. Such determinist theories negating materiality (and therefore 
subjectivity) by making it into a kind of linguistic object are inappropriate as a starting-point for  
theories of the body969. Since the subject i s embodied experience, such theories are, I suggest, 
equally inappropriate for theories of agency970.
6.1.1 Subjectivities: Dialectics between Discourse and the Phenomenal
Re-visioning subjects as complex beings, who relate to both material and discursive influences, 
acknowledges their having some wiggle-room in the choices they make971. I suggest that these 
choices be described in terms of a sense of agency related to both the present and the future, rather 
than through a pre-existing set of backward-looking, essentialist or culturally-bounded limitations.
Yet at the same time, the subject does not have unfettered choice, given the complex relations 
between the mind/body/environment, and given the powerful influence of discursive constructs.  
Therefore we should not only to unpack what constitutes the subject, but how subjectivity works 
and the functions it fulfils. This necessitates an interrogation of the constitution of agency, not only  
through acknowledging that mind-body-environment-culture are interlinked972, but how they are so 
linked, and therefore what the subject can or cannot do given the constitution of those linkages.
(1997) 267-292
967 See chapter 5.
968 Butler, J. (1997). The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp94
969 Vasterling, V (1999) Butler's sophisticated constructivism: A critical assessment. In Hypatia. Bloomington: Summer 
1999. Vol. 14, Iss. 3; pg. 17-40
970 See chapter 5
971 See chapter 5
972 See chapter 5
215
 
 
 
 
6.1.1a) Re-Framing Foucault: Acknowledging the Dialectics of the Phenomenal
Radical constructivism has been challenged, especially by certain feminists who object that  
subjectivity and agency are attenuated973. Butler, however, speaking of the discursive construction 
of both body and agency, responds that radical constructivism and poststructuralism are 
misunderstood in that they are both brought down to linguistic monism and 
determinism974. Vasterling counters charges of linguistic monism by recalling Butler's intention to  
deconstruct the body as a natural, pre-linguistic given, hence to deconstruct the claim that the body 
is linguistically constructed975. Butlerian referentiability is a general epistemological argument 
concerning language's relation to reality976. The linguistic construction of the body does not mean 
that it originates, causes or composes it977. Rather, references to the body are further formations 
thereof, and language is always in some way performative978. In other words, explaining a body as 
'being' something requires a pre-existing knowledge of what that 'something' is (e.g. 'gay', 'male', 
'fetishist'). As Oksala argues, Foucault's position, as a counterattack against normalising power, 
really presupposes an experiential conception of the body979.
However this does not mean that the body has some kind of necessary 'being' outside of linguistic 
constructions. Contemporary constructivism holds that cultural practices are the basic premises on 
which are built experience and knowledge, from which agency develops980. Yet clearly 'natural' 
elements and events do not take place entirely through material human experience (and the  
body)981. Indeed, 'nature' itself is constructed, through language, conceptual systems, theoretical  
constructs, ideology, political power, institutional practices etc982. In this way, culture defines and 
973 Vasterling, V (1999) Butler's sophisticated constructivism: A critical assessment. In Hypatia. Bloomington: Summer 
1999. Vol. 14, Iss. 3; pg. 17-40. See also Benhabib, S., Butler, J, Cornell, D, and Fraser, N. (1995). 
Feminist contentions: A philosophical exchange. New York: Routledge. Pp21 and 111 respectively: 
Benhabib accuses Butler of doing away with ideas of selfhood, agency and autonomy, arguing that Butler's concept 
of performativity cannot explain the make-up of the self and the resistance that the self can make when confronted 
by power and discourse systems. ibid pp68. Further, Fraser criticises Butler's concepts as being structurally 
incapable of answering normative questions like how to distinguish between better and worse practices of 
subjectivation
974 See Butler, J (1993) Bodies That Matter:On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York: Routledge
975 Vasterling, V (1999) Butler's sophisticated constructivism: A critical assessment. In Hypatia. Bloomington: Summer 
1999. Vol. 14, Iss. 3; pg. 17-40
976 Vasterling (1999) ibid
977 Vasterling (1999) ibid
978 Vasterling (1999) ibid
979 Oksala, J (2004) Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience. In Hypatia vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 
2004)
980 Adamson, T (2005) Measure for Measure: The Reliance of Human Knowledge on Things of the World. In 
Ethics & the Environment, 10(2) 2005 175-194
981 Adamson, T (2005) ibid.
See also the Intercession
982 Adamson, T (2005) ibid. See also the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis re linguistic determinism: Sapir, E. (1929) The Status 
of Linguistics as a Science'. In Sapir, E (1958) Culture, Language and Personality (ed. D. G. Mandelbaum). 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Whorf, B.L. (1940) Science and Linguistics. In 
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measures nature (by which is meant the 'physiological'), rather than nature defining culture. People 
are inherently part of the 'natural' world, which pre-exists culture yet which is re-framed and 
comprehended through discourse.
Neither does it mean that there is nothing but linguistic constructions. Rather, language mediates 
knowledge of the body. As Butler notes, that language constitutes the subject does not mean that  
language fully determines the subject983. Similarly, that agency results from discursive conditions 
does not mean that agency is entirely controlled by these conditions984.
I suggest that conceptions of agency should therefore be based on something other than either/or  
constructions of backward-looking, linear causal reaction either to discourses or to materiality. As I  
will argue, such conceptions of agency should rather be based on understanding that people respond 
phenomenologically to both discourses and the material world, based on the subjective meaning 
they perceive, which meaning is obtained through embodied experience985.
6.1.1b) Inscribing and Incorporating Practices
Embodied experience situates the self as a 'present-being': both as 'not-absent' and as existing in the 
here-and-now986. The subject is 'present' for him/herself partly based on past experiences which 
determine the subjective meaning of his/her existence, which meaning is dialectically constructed  
through both discourse and materiality by means of inscribing and incorporating practices.
Inscribing practices are those which define culturally appropriate ways of performing the self, 
prescribed by discursively-constructed norms987. They are simply copied between contexts, and 
correct and modulate performances incorporated into bodies988. Following Merleau-Ponty and 
Connerton, incorporating practices are actions encoded into bodily memory by repeated 
performances until they become habitual989. Incorporating practices are linked to 'nature' in that they 
are seen to be a-cultural. Yet examples like walking, talking and moving are culturally specific, and  
therefore discursively bounded. Incorporating practices include learning, but this doesn't imply that 
Technology Review 42(6): 229-31, 247-8. Also in Whorf, B. L. (1956): Language, Thought and Reality (ed. J. B. 
Carroll). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
983 Benhabib, S., Butler, J, Cornell, D, and Fraser, N. (1995). Feminist contentions: A philosophical exchange. New 
York: Routledge. 135-137
984 Benhabib, S. Et al (1995) ibid
985 See chapter 5 re the constitution of the subject. See also See also Gallese, V. & Umiltà, M. A. (2002). From self-modeling 
to the self model: Agency and the representation of the self. In Neuro-Psychoanalysis 4:35–40.
986 See chapter 5
987 See Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp153
988 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
989 Merleau-Ponty, M (1962) The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith. New York: Humanities Press, pp. 
98-115, 136-147; Connerton, P (1989) How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See 
Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
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what is learned is necessarily consciously understood. Such practices are always performative and 
instantiated, and therefore are improvised on in specific contexts990.
Together, inscribing and incorporating practices form cultural constructs. Incorporating practices are 
not more 'natural' than inscribing ones, and neither requires a coherent, continuous essential self to  
explain embodied experience991. Both, however, have an effect on the embodied being who 
recognises the subjective and social meaning of experiences in his/her body (which thereby 
becomes accessible), yet does not necessarily consciously understand that meaning (which is not  
necessarily automatically intelligible)992. Subjective meaning in the present is therefore dialectically 
constructed through both inscribing and incorporating practices, and is neither entirely exclusively 
discursively nor materially constituted.
Both inscribing and incorporating practices promote heteronormativity, which prescribes 
heterosexuality (or the approximation thereof through the sanitising of sexual 
practices993). As I will argue later, at the same time they enable people who enjoy the sexual  
company of material objects in a same-sex context ('gay male fetishists') to re-orient themselves by  
adopting subversive sexual practices which challenge heteronormativity. This takes place through  
such subjects revising the content of incorporating practices for their own (potentially empowering) 
purposes, thereby rephrasing what is appropriate and what not. In so doing, they challenge 
heteronormative notions of which material objects are appropriate to incorporate into sexual scripts, 
and which not, thereby destabilising more broadly ‘sanitised’ sexual practices which hinge on 
heteronormative models of propriety. Notably, however, in contradictory fashion, on some levels the 
subjects make choices to support and perpetuate such discourses through maintaining their 
gendered, racialised and otherwise stratified positions, and they thereby buy into dominant 
discourses on sex, masculinity and hegemonic male sexuality994. 
Yet to acknowledge this is not to prescribe that subjects will continue to do so, or in what ways.  
This opens up questions as to how the past, present and future feed into agency.
990 Hayles, N.K. (1993) ibid
991 Varela, F.J, Thompson, E and Rosch, E (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
992 See chapter 5 on accessibility and intelligibility
993 Notably, heteronormativity and what is considered normal sexual practices are broader than heterosexuality. As 
noted in Chapter 2 and the Interjection, both heterosexual and non-heterosexual practices include clear prescriptions 
on what counts as acceptable sex. Further, co-opting homosexual sex into heteronormative models through 
institutions such as marriage can validly be argued to be about diffusing the subversiveness of non-heterosexual 
forms of sexual intimacy and relationship. In both sexualities, practices are discursively described as appropriate and 
acceptable, mirroring heteronormative notions of family, love, romance and so on.
994 See Interjection
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6.1.2 Agency: From Present Subjectivities to Future-Orientations
The subjective (embodied) assumptions and comprehensions of what a subject's identity or his/her 
experiences is/are does not describe the future, and therefore does not prescribe the choices subjects 
make. In other words, subjects do not inherently reproduce normativities in pre-determinable ways.  
To attempt to predict such repetitions merely results in falling back into deterministic thinking.  
Such choices and the parameters on what choices c an be made (in other words agency) are 
necessarily lodged in the present, and are therefore subject to discursive prescriptions. But I suggest 
those choices are made as much through a sense of what the subject wants to feel in the future as  
they are lodged in the discursive constructs of the present. This implies, as Lock points out, that the 
body, and, I suggest, an embodied sense of agency, should be read as more than just where  
subjectivity and representation are mediated995.
Bodily experience is generally antithetical to empiricist, idealist and determinist perspectives. For  
example, bodily orientation is too relative and flexible to be the direct result of objective relations in  
nature, and too dependent on objective circumstances to be located in abstract ideas and 
principles996. Neither naturalism nor idealism are sufficient in themselves, and yet both are  
instructive997. Indeed, I suggest that subjects conceived in complex phenomenal ways are better 
served by seeing agency as constructed through a radical phenomenology which enables a broader  
view of both the subject's abilities and construction998. 
Phenomenology focuses on experience showing itself in its complexity without the imposition of  
prior theoretical prejudices999. Merleau-Ponty realised that the body's complexities are a key to  
experience, not an obstacle thereto. I suggest that acknowledgement of such complexity should 
therefore be used as a metatheoretical framework for understanding agency, as lodged in complex  
discursively- and phenomenologically-conceived subjectivities, influenced by both discursive 
frameworks and embodied experience. In this regard, subjective experience is not simply a reaction  
to discourse and practices external to the body.
995 Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 267-292
996 Adamson, T (2005) ibid, pp184. This is similar to concerns over the ambiguities that pervade vision, touch, 
sexuality, temporality etc. 
997 Adamson, T (2005) ibid
998 Lock, M (1997) Decentering the Natural Body: Making Difference Matter. In Configurations 5.2 (1997) 267-292. 
This is particularly important when talking of agency expressed through the body in interacting with the social, such 
as when describing 'fetish' practices
999 Adamson, T (2005) ibid. Problematically, these complexities at the same time challenge the Husserlian task of 
uncovering structures of intentionality that ground experience, which in turn creates the risk of overlooking and 
distorting experiential complexities. See the Interjection on the need to move beyond theoretical prejudices
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6.1.2a) Orientations
Rather, the embodied subject takes part in his/her own creation1000. People's choices are instead 
based on dialectical orientations either towards or away from dominant norms and material  
parameters, in a present- and future-oriented way.
Just as discourse writes the body, the body writes discourse, through its orientation in space and  
time1001. This orientation (e.g. walking vertically) creates a library of experiences encoded in 
language through pervasive metaphorical networks (e.g. being 'morally upright', 'in/out', contained/
u n c o n t a i n e d ' e t c . ) w h i c h r e i n f o r c e a n d r e - i n s c r i b e s o c i a l a n d l i n g u i s t i c 
norms1002.
Following Husserl's second volume of Ideas, and his conception of 'Leib' (the living body1003), 
Ahmed notes how orientations are about starting points, where the ego perceives things in relation  
to its own domain in a particular orientation1004. What is important, according to Husserl, is the 
space given to the lived body and the intimacy of touch1005. When things are in proximity to the 
body they become more than things, since they can be sensed and touched, and they make and leave 
impressions1006. We experience objects as inhabiting space because we also occupy space,
“such that the boundary between the co-inhabitants of space does not hold. The skin connects as well as  
contains. The non-opposition between the bodies that move around objects, and objects around which 
bodies move, shows us how orientations involve at least a two-way approach, or the “more than one” of 
an encounter”1007.
1000 See Merleau-Ponty, M (1962) The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith. New York: Humanities Press, 
and Kirmayer, L (1992) The Body's Insistence on Meaning: Metaphor as Presentation and Representation in Illness 
Experience. In Medical Anthropological Quarterly 6 (1992): 323-346, who both insist this
1001 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp153. See inscribing 
and incorporating practices, supra
1002 Johnson, M (1987) The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 18-35. 
See also Hayles, NK, (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170. These norms are 
informed by practices, which are implicated in their objectification in things. See Graham, M (2004)Thinking Sex, 
Thinking Gender. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 2004 10(2):299-303. They are also informed by 
identities of gender, sexuality, 'race'/cultural origin etc, which Hayles criticises Johnson for paying insufficient 
attention to. 
Sexual practices which incorporate material objects, which are about the performances of identities, are themselves 
objectified through language. See chapters 2 and 5 for the constitution of the subject, and the mutability of identities: 
the subject is not a statically conceived identity, and therefore identities are not static, nor essential. This is in 
concert with queer paradigms. See Butler, J (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity. London: Routledge. Thinking of gender and sexuality as an effect rather than a cause is a way of 
recognising that effect is often not separable from the things out of which effect comes and is expressed
1003 See chapter 5
1004 Husserl, E (1989) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second 
Book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp165.
1005 Husserl, E (1989) ibid pp 155. 
1006 Husserl, E (1989) ibid pp 155. 
1007 Ahmed, S (2006) Orientations: toward a Queer Phenomenology. In GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
(12:4) 543-574 pp551
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Bodies are shaped by their contact with things and people in an interactional way, whereby people  
and objects give meaning to each other and affect what bodies can do. The Husserlian 'horizon' is  
what can be reached (or not) in that “[t]he body becomes present as a body, with surfaces and 
boundaries, in the showing of the limits of what it can do.”1008 Following Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty, these horizons are 'sedimented histories', affected by the history of the body and the society 
in which it lives1009.
6.1.2b) Orientation through the Body as Measure
The embodied subject is not merely a static and stable entity, but is constantly negotiating its 
location in relation to other things1010. This takes place through subjects orienting themselves by 
using the body to measure themselves, surroundings and things1011.
Socrates viewed knowledge as a kind of measurement, as did Kant who postulated that perception 
occurs through a mediation that enables a stable experience of objects, even though it seems to be 
direct and immediate1012. As Merleau-Ponty notes:
The notions of nature and reason, for instance, far from explaining the metamorphoses which we have 
observed from perception up to the more complex modes of human exchange, make them 
incomprehensible. For by relating them to separated principles, these notions mask a constantly 
experienced moment, the moment when an existence becomes aware of itself, grasps itself, and expresses 
its own meaning1013.
1008 Ahmed, ibid pp552
1009 This terrain is well-trodden through Bourdieu's habitus and Butler's focus on feminist applications for 
phenomenology, looking at how history influences acts and actions.
See Steinbock, A (1995) Home and Beyond: Generative Philosophy after Husserl. Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press; Bourdieu, P (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, and the idea of habitus as used by Husserl speaking of how habits are acquired and become 
customary: Husserl, E (1989) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological  
Philosophy, Second Book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic, pp118. Ahmed, ibid, notes that the term came into social theory mostly through Bourdieu, adding to a 
social or relational phenomenology. See also Butler, J (1997) Performative Acts and Gender Constitutions: An Essay 
in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory. In Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist  
Theory, ed. Katie Conboy, Nadia Medina, and Sarah Stanbury (New York: Columbia University Press) pp 406. 
1010 See chapter 5
1011 a view inspired by Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body as a measurant of things. See Adamson, T (2005) 
Measure for Measure: The Reliance of Human Knowledge on Things of the World. In Ethics & the 
Environment, 10(2) 2005 175-194; Merleau-Ponty M (1968) The Visible and the Invisible. Translated by Alphonso 
Lingis. Evanston,IL: Northwestern University Press. Pp136: “It is the body and it alone, because it is a two- 
dimensional being,that can bring us to the things themselves, which are themselves not flat beings but beings in 
depth, inaccessible to a subject that would survey them from above, open to him alone that, if it be possible, would 
coexist with them in the same world.” Also,“I was able to appeal from the world and the others to myself and take 
the route of reflection, only because first I was outside of myself, in the world, among the others, and constantly this 
experience feeds my reflection”.
1012 Adamson, T (2005) ibid
1013 Adamson, T (2005) ibid, pp181 quoting Merleau-Ponty, M (1964) Eye and Mind. In The Primacy of Perception. 
Translated by James M.Edie. Evanston,IL: Northwestern University Press. 10–11
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In this regard, Adamson notes that philosophy, in accounting for human experience, must take more 
a c c o u n t o f t h e a m b i g u i t i e s , o v e r l a p p i n g s a n d c o m p l e x i t i e s o f b o d i l y 
experience1014.
The body incorporates both nature and culture into experience. As measurant of things, the body 
locates itself neither exclusively as thing, since it incorporates ideas, nor as idea, since it has axes, 
depths and measurements1015. The body, as a 'thing among things', is therefore in relationship with 
things and is 'of them', using i tself as measurant of both i tself and other 
things1016.
Phenomenological experience, as complex, rich and stratified, is always an experience of 
something1017. Measurement therefore takes place by comparison against a norm, which is 'things'  
not abstract ideas1018. The body is therefore a means of 'echo-locating' the self in relation to the  
w o r l d , t h e r e b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g b o t h n a t u r e a n d c u l t u r e , m a t e r i a l i t y a n d 
discourse1019.
The body-as-norm, qua thing, can in turn be measured, which implies a reversibility whereby the 
body reverses measurement, and becomes the 'measuree' (thing measured) as well as the 
'measurer'1020. The hand apprehends movement, texture etc., and is also felt/perceived/experienced 
by the other hand. It is also felt from both inside and outside the body. This 'reversibility thesis' 
means that the body is subject to the same properties as other 'things' (visibility, heat 
1014 Adamson, T (2005) ibid, pp181
1015 More than merely establishing the existence and location of 'non-self' things, through sight, sound, smell, taste etc. 
the body also functions as a 'natural' measure of attributes such as texture, relative speed 
etcSee Adamson, T (2005) ibid
1016 See Merleau-Ponty, M (1968) The Visible and the Invisible. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston,IL: 
Northwestern University Press. 137: “For if the body is a thing among things, it is so in a stronger and deeper 
sense than they: in the sense that, we said, it is of them, and this means that it detaches itself upon them, and, 
accordingly, detaches itself from them. It is not simply a thing seen in fact (I do not see my back), it is 
visible by right, it falls under a vision that is both ineluctable and deferred. Conversely, if it touches and sees, this is 
not because it would have the visibles before itself as objects: they are about it, they even enter into its enclosure, 
they are within it, they line its looks and its hands inside and outside. If it touches them and sees them, this is only 
because, being of their family, itself visible and tangible, it uses its own being as a means to participate in theirs, 
because each of the two beings is an archetype for the other, because the body belongs to the order of things as the 
world is universal flesh.”
1017 Wyllie, M (2005) Body Subjects. In PPP vol. 12, no. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2005) The Johns Hopkins University Press 
209-214
1018 This does not deny that how 'things' are perceived is mediated/constructed by discursive norms, but merely notes 
that it is not the norms/abstract ideas which are used as measures, but the things themselves
1019 Certain pre-requisites are necessary for seeing the body as measure: 1. the body as a norm or measure is used to 
describe a thing, rather than an abstraction, idea or category; 2. the body, as a norm, must be 'proximal' to the thing 
being measured, in order to serve as a measure i.e. It should touch or be near the thing measured; 3. the body which 
measures and the thing being measured need to be homogeneous as regards the attribute measured. e.g. something 
without weight cannot measure weight
1020 Adamson, T (2005) Measure for Measure: The Reliance of Human Knowledge on Things of the World. In 
Ethics & the Environment, 10(2) 2005 175-194
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etc.)1021. It also means that greater sensitivity and integration of body life with the things of nature  
takes place1022.
The body's general ability to measure is independent of what is being measured. This (organic) 
ability is by definition meaningful, since measurement is the function of using the things of nature,  
which include the body, as norms1023. The body doesn't insert human norms into the relation with 
nature, but rather measures by taking the things of nature normatively. This introduces what is seen 
as a 'natural' mediation of experience1024. This argument avoids anthropocentric constructionist or 
essentialist arguments around the 'naturalness' of people in terms of power relations 
inter se or in relation to other objects, while not denying that human norms are discursively 
constructed. The body merely describes the form, shape, relative distance, speed, etc. of other things 
in relation to itself, whereas the personal and social value placed on the things measured is a  
separate, normative concept. The explains that things have an effect on us, but not the content or  
extent of that effect, which are reflected through other lenses1025.
For example, the fact that the body can be seen has a notable effect on our experiences, and our 
'being seen' by others in turn teaches us to see1026. This can clearly be 'seen' (pun intended) in the 
participants' practices. Although they problematically repeat normative power relations of 
dominance and submission, they also call on the senses in ways most people don't, and thereby 
dialectically call on their prior awareness and become more aware of their phenomenal experiences.
Some pay particular attention to the role of sight and vision:
“...I could sit at a glory hole and just look at guys peeing and find that very erotic. Peep through the door 
and watch them pee, without them knowing, and not even having anything to do with them. That I find 
very erotic...”('Henry')
1021 See also Dillon, M.C. (1997) Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press; Hass, L. (1999). 
Sense and Alterity: Rereading Merleau-Ponty’s Reversibility Thesis. In Olkowski, D and Moreley, J (eds) 
Merleau-Ponty, Interiority and Exteriority, Psychic Life and the World. Albany: State University of New York Press 
pp. 91–106; Yount, M Two Reversibilities: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. In Busch, T and Gallagher, S 
Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Post-Modernism. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 213–226.
1022 Adamson, T (2005) Measure for Measure: The Reliance of Human Knowledge on Things of the World. In 
Ethics & the Environment, 10(2) 2005 175-194
1023 Adamson, T (2005) ibid
1024 Which in turn is used to support normativities. See Interjection
1025 Adamson, T (2005) ibid. For example, through exploring psychodynamic processes.
1026 See argument later re the role of proprioception in transformation. See also Featherstone, M (2006) Body Image/
Body Without Image. In Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 23, No. 2-3, 233-236 (2006) re consumer culture, identity, 
movement, proprioception, reflexivity
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This is so, even though this problematically reinforces dominant 'othering' discourses of voyeurism:
“I remember walking at Sandy Bay, and coming across a man who was having sex with a woman. And it  
was so erotic to me.... They didn't know I was there. I shot my load and I walked back a little and came  
whistling, and they were lying there as if nothing had happened! (laugh) It was such a turn-on to 
me” ('Henry')
In contradistinction, despite the dominance of visual influence in our media-driven society, some 
have become more aware of the role of other senses through their sexual practices:
“touch and smell ...not vision so much. Ja, smell more than anything else. I can stand next to someone 
who is really unattractive visually, and be turned on. ... If I'm blindfolded, yes, that does heighten my 
sense of feeling and my sense of smell.” ('Henry')
By engaging in 'sensory deprivation', for example through blindfolding, some participants subvert 
the dominance of the visual in order to broaden their experiences:
“I don’t find any interest related to sensory deprivation when I’m dominant.  However, it’s incredibly 
important when I’m submissive and the act of using all other senses when vision is deprived is a major  
component of this.” ('Joseph')
Clearly this is not a constant under all circumstances, but is related to the roles adopted during 
sexual play aimed at 'fooling' the senses in order to enable some kind of alternative awareness of the 
phenomenal world, and one's (material) place in it. As one participant notes:
“The physical sensation of sex, to me, forms only a part of the whole experience. I think that all one’s 
senses play a collective part in leading to the ultimate climax, which is of course why we all try new 
things. The senses work so well together that by depriving a person of just one of them enhances the rest. 
This is where it gets very interesting since the brain isn’t equipped to adapt so quickly and is therefore 
immediately confused by what it is in fact sensing. This phenomenon makes the whole experience of 
restraint, blind-folding, sensory deprivation so much the more enjoyable for me as it creates a lot more  
anticipation of the unknown. The brain is after all the biggest and most powerful sex organ....” ('Jason')
Although these practices may re-creating dominant (heteronormative) discourses which serve to 
marginalise the 'other', they are not intended by the participants as such, and are instead aimed at  
heightening the senses, and thereby gaining subjective value through explicitly relating with the 
material world through a more 'present' experience of phenomenal relations:
“It’s all about heightening senses beyond what we usually experience or are told to experience.  It’s why 
pain play is so amazing to me personally.  Not as punishment but as an exploration of my body and its  
often contradictory responses, both physical and emotional.” ('Joseph')
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At the same time, these experiences do not take place in a vacuum, and play themselves out in a  
context which the participants see as transgressive:
“It makes my body come to life. Seriously. Again, I think the brain is the most potent sexual organ in the 
body and by enacting/living out one’s fantasies, you are in the position to take the entire body and elevate 
it to a much higher level physically and of course spiritually. By living out my fetishes I feel more  
confident, potent, virile, and sexy and therefore am more aware of, and susceptible to any external  
stimuli. ... In my case I am not too fond of nipple play and if the guys gets too rough it can actually turn 
me off big time. More subtle of my fetishes, the CBW and cock rings/weights for example seriously 
heightens my personal awareness – especially when I wear it to the office or in public. My body does feel 
more alive than normal which in turn gives me a lot more self-confidence and sexual radiance...” ('Jason')
Clearly, participants are highly aware of the sensory nature of their practices, which carry subjective 
meaning for them both for the sensations themselves and the roles they play in intersecting with  
discursive norms1027. This demonstrates the mediated, normative nature of experience (and 
knowledge), whereby subjects call on dominant discourses which they both perpetuate and subvert  
by means of explicitly playing with their senses, in order to heighten experiences, and become more 
'present'. At the same time, this allows for nature (and therefore material things) to play an  
important role in organising human experience. This implies that experience is neither purely 
discursively, nor purely phenomenally described, but takes place in terms of relationality between 
(embodied) materiality, discourse and subjectivity.
Einsteinian relativity uses the same idea of relation1028. It underscores shifts from absolute to 
relative thinking, whereby conceptions of absolute space and time don't locate us 
anywhere1029. Contrary to popular belief, as Adamson argues, this doesn't lead to subjectivist  
thinking, since the standards of measurement are already part of the space-time we are measuring. 
This use of a local region allows us to orient ourselves rather than impose our own ideas on the 
region. In this way, relative and local norms are used to create objective measurements by using the 
non-absolute, and thereby at the same time avoiding subjectivities1030.
1027 See below for more on the role of social proscription in transgressive practices
1028 Yet see comments in chapter 5 re concerns about positing generic pre-personal subjects
1029 Adamson, T (2005) Measure for Measure: The Reliance of Human Knowledge on Things of the World. In 
Ethics & the Environment, 10(2) 2005 175-194
However, see also chapter 5 for the criticisms of systems theory as a lens to view the subject
1030 Adamson, T (2005) ibid
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6.1.2c) Dialectical Measurement: Present/Future Orientations
The measurement and reversibility theses support arguments that the body is part of the 
world1031. The relationship between embodied being and the world around him/her is complex, and 
cannot be adequately described using causal relationships, since they work through processes in an 
atomistic way1032. Rather, relationships between people and things are dialectical. A subject's 
experience of an object (or person) is not made direct because he/she is causally influenced by the 
spatial proximity of objects (or people)1033. Causal relations are useful to describe 'past learning', but 
such 'past learning' is not an external cause, and is part of the subject's continuing experience, rather  
than a determinant thereof1034. Having reason to believe that something will/should be in experience  
(e.g. expecting to see an object in any given circumstances) is not sufficient to explain the 
experience, or to predict the outcome of an experience1035.
In a dialectical relationship, on the other hand, the subject transforms the world of experience into 
h i s /he r ' own ' env i ronmen t , wh ich g r an t s mean ing t o t he env i ronmen t f o r 
itself1036. This is not a kind of idealism, nor does it advocate a transcendental 
subject1037.
A dialectical relationship implies a present and future orientation. Immediate experience is only a  
small part of what a subject experiences, since he/she can experience absent, impossible, future,  
past and ideal objects1038. 'Lived time' is therefore not completely intersubjective, but is also 
objective because shared by others, and because it relates to biological and cosmological 
time1039. Experiences of lived time are a combination of cognitive temporal experiences,  
intersubjective and objective time1040.
Since experience is not simply past-oriented, it is as much intentional as it is reactionary. This  
intentionality presupposes that there are present- or future-oriented reference points beyond the 
subject's historical experiences, which references are in turn made up of external 
1031 See chapter 5
1032 Wyllie, M (2005) Body Subjects. In PPP vol. 12, no. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2005) The Johns Hopkins University Press 
209-214
1033 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
1034 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
1035 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid. Rationality is necessary to assess the validity of the context
1036 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
1037 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
1038 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
1039 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
1040 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
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relations1041. The content of experience is therefore not entirely internally-determined. Experience 
has a significance beyond itself and is an experience of something other than the self, where subject 
and object are part of the same world-creating process1042. In this way the body is ontological, and is 
unified rather than divided into theoretical frameworks, where the relationship between cause and  
effect is dialectical, rather than stratified, in what Merleau-Ponty calls the 'intentional 
arc'1043. In other words, human activities are not immanent, but rather have intentional 
characteristics1044.
In this way, the body-subject actively orientates him/herself under influences of the world, rather  
than passively being subject to the world. This orientation takes place from a particular subjective 
perspective. The intentional arc is a closed feedback-loop between body-subject and world, which 
results in the body-subject knowing (or being able to choose) how to react in coherent ways, 
making meaningful experience1045.
Fuchs speaks of the implicit/explicit distinction of temporality 1046. When the implicit/explicit 
context of an experience shifts, the intentional arc can also shift, which might take place when the 
way a person relates to objects becomes explicit as part of the context where all objects appear in a  
specific way. For example, where someone loses a loved child, that trauma becomes the context for  
dealing with other children. All experience is then seen in terms of the one important experience  
once it is lodged1047.
The dialectical yet lodged nature of phenomenological experience can be seen in certain participant  
narratives which seek to explain specific fetishes or fears. Clearly, these can be explained ex post 
facto as having a genesis, but could not have been projected into the future. Further, such 
explanations are not necessarily conscious or intelligible to the participant, but become 
1041 Wyllie, M (2005) ibid
1042 Merleau-Ponty, M (1962) The Phenomenology of perception, trans. C. Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, Ltd. pp213
1043 Merleau-Ponty (1962), ibid, pp136 
1044 See the conflict between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty. In this regard, see Lawlor, L (1998) The end of 
phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty. In Continental Philosophy Review, Volume 31, 
Number 1 / January, 1998, Springer Netherlands, pp 15-34. Looking at Deleuze's The Logic of Sense (1969) and 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Lawlor argues that, even though Deleuze's challenge is 
double through immanence and difference (the paradox of expression), there are similarities between the two in the 
idea of a past that has never been present. What is needed, however, is an interpretation of expression in Merleau-
Ponty's unfinished The Visible and the Invisible.
1045 Wyllie, M (2005) Body Subjects. In PPP vol. 12, no. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2005) The Johns Hopkins University Press 
209-214
1046 Fuchs, T. (2005). Implicit and explicit temporality. In Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12, no 3:195–198. at 
196
1047 Dreyfus H. L. (1983). Alternative philosophical conceptualizations of psychopathology. A version of a 
paper given at a Symposium on the Conduct and Framework of Therapy, Harvard Medical School, Department of 
Continuing Education, June 16–18, 1983.
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experientially accessible in the 'intentional arc'. 
In their narrations, participants acknowledge and re-perform past experiences, thereby projecting 
desires into present and future experience:
“... my lover and I, we have a fetish about pipes. I find a man smoking a pipe extremely sexy... always 
have... I always used to take it back to... there used to be a man in the garage behind our house, and he  
used to smoke a pipe, and I used to find him very attractive. I used to watch him and play with myself...  
wank myself... and even come, type of thing like that. But then I go even further back, and I can 
remember being... my mother sitting on a chair reading a book, and I've got my head just above her knees,  
cos that's the height I was. And my eldest brother on my father's side, who also smoked a pipe, used to 
chase me around the chair saying he was going to cut off my cock, and put it in his pipe and smoke it!  
And ever since then I've been attracted to men with pipes.” ('Henry')
“I do think that it often relates to a person's background. Family, social structure, you know... I can tell  
you my own, ... at school I grew up with corporal punishment, again having corporal punishment done to 
me. And using a cane on someone is sort of getting back at what people did to you...” ('Jacques')
Such descriptions show how these participants have made retrospective associations between sexual  
desire and particular material objects/fetish practices, and in so doing, have dialectically constructed 
forward-looking sexual scripts through backwardly-causal explanations. Yet it would be impossible 
to project these circumstances causally into the future from the present.
Not all examples of experiences are as value-neutral:
“... always in my life I was afraid of long grass. I could never put my finger on it. I could never say: Oh, 
it's because of this. There could be snakes in the long grass, there could be spiders in the long grass. Um, I 
mean... I don't like snakes. I avoid snakes. But I'm not that scared of spiders and I'm not that scared of  
snakes. But I wouldn't go into long grass. And, in my forties I bumped into, or came into contact with a 
coloured guy who was really... let's say he was, shall we say really low-classed coloured. Very rough,  
dirty, yucky kind of coloured guy. And he recognised me. And I recognised him too. I could say that he 
used to live in that area where I live, when  I was a child. And he said to me “Ja, ek het jou genaai!”- “ja, I  
fucked you when you were young!”. And I said “No ways, you never fucked me!” Cos I knew, as far as I 
was concerned he had never done that. And it was a couple of weeks later that suddenly I remembered  
that I was walking down a lane. Now the lane was sand and grass and what have you. And there was long 
grass there. And as this little child, four, five, six years... no, not six years, it must be younger, he made 
me sit on his lap without a pants, in the long grass. And suddenly I realised why all my life I was afraid  
for long grass....” ('Henry')
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“... I have spoken to a guy who was tied up and shoved into a dark closet by his grandmother. And now, 
he's a very vengeful sadist, who goes out to hurt people. And I don't think is for sexual gratification. His is  
definitely payback to whoever possible...” ('Jacques')
Clearly, abuse can manifest in fears, desires and practices1048. Yet simple causal explanations cannot 
predict how experiences will proceed from an event into the future. Psychopathologising tendencies 
might assume that the trauma suffered by 'Henry' has rendered him dysfunctional. Yet this is not the 
case. At 60-something years old, he is at peace about his past, his sexual orientation, and his desires 
which incorporate material objects. This implies that his personal orientations have intersected in  
complex ways with discursive constructions, and that his choices have in certain ways countered the 
normalising forces of his social environment, while affording him elements of personal satisfaction.
Agency is therefore not something simply wrestled from dominant discursive powers. Nor is it 
simply an uncomplicated 'doing' in response to a causally-defined foundational psychical past.  
Rather, it is the complex and multiple intersections between personal and political contexts, and is 
present- and future-oriented in some kind of aspirational way, which can be seen from at least one  
participant's desire to experience (sexual) variety, as opposed to being obsessively driven:
“... there's obviously a lot of... I wouldn't say they're fetishes, but ideas I want to explore... but definitely 
to be put in a box, and say 'you're not allowed to think out of the box,' frustrated me. Maybe that's why I  
explore more now that I did as a child.... ” ('Jacques')
This implies that the embodied agent locates him/herself in relation both to normative constructs  
and lived experience. Whether or how he/she takes that opportunity up is a question of choice, 
albeit bounded by powerful discursive imperatives. His/her embodied activities are therefore 
responsive to circumstances, both 'external' and 'internal' to the subject (however one might 
delineate those), and may or may not be part of the psychodynamic processing of abuse or  
dysfunction. They are however dialectically constructed not just in reaction to the past, but towards 
the present and future. Whether this is a plausible or attainable future or not is another question.
6.1.3 Agency: Conclusions
Clearly, subjects do not merely react, in unconscious knee-jerk ways, to essentialist or determinist  
notions of pre-existing drives, as proposed by psychopathological constructs. Nor do they simply 
respond like automatons to pre-existing discursive constructs as proposed by (certain readings of) 
Foucaultian thinking. Rather, their subjectivity is grounded in phenomenal experience, and their  
1048  as is implied in psychopathological constructs of 'fetishism'- see chapter 4
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agency is borne of the sense of meaning they, as embodied beings, hold of their life, as constituted  
by their orientations to the world around them. This orientation takes account both of discursively-
constructed normative constraints and phenomenological experience. 
Rather than deterministically looking backwards in a causal way, and reacting entirely to pre-
existing frameworks or deterministic experiences, desires and choices are therefore dialectically 
oriented towards both the restrictive, past-focused normative parameters of discursive 
constructions, and embodied experience with absent, impossible, future, past and ideal objects. In  
this respect, agency is constructive, yet not deterministic.
Such a version of complexity and inter-relatedness of phenomenological orientation, measurement  
and orientation can be glimpsed in the participants' enjoyment of their senses in their sexuality  
which incorporates enjoyment of material objects. As discussed in Chapter 5, there is really no such 
thing as 'fetishism' or indeed 'gay male fetish' in any determinable way which sets it apart from 
other (sexual) experiences. Therefore, the participants' perceptions reflect similar notions of  
embodied experience to everyone else, whereby enjoyment shifts and changes and is different for 
each person. The agency of 'gay male fetishists' is therefore not something which is any different to 
that of anybody else. Yet clearly the participants choose to see their sexual practices as 'fetish 
sexuality', and, within bounds, to relish their practices in ways which other people do not, even 
though all people incorporate material objects into their sexual repertoires, whether sexy lingerie,  
high heels or butt-plugs.
It therefore remains to ask what function sexual interaction with material objects serves, and more 
narrowly, how same-sex exploration incorporating material objects may add value to subjects' lives.
6.2 Same-Sex Sexual Practices Incorporating Material  Objects as 
Recognition of Personal Value
Men who enjoy the sexual company of material objects in the context of same-sex practices ('gay 
male fetishists') do not simply react to dominant tropes. Rather, I suggest, they call on the 
phenomenal world in order to effect personal emotional re-orientations. They call on their embodied  
agency to place themselves in socio-emotional and physical locations which support their positive  
value, which they can thereby acknowledge. As I will argue, and in contradistinction to the 
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(heteronormative) implications to the ICD diagnostic categories1049, such sexual activity does not 
describe by-definition dysfunctional people lost in their own psycho-dramas, but is rather a process 
of (partially) enabled subjects recognising a sense of positive self-value.
Queer (or at least non-normative) bodies engaged in transgressive practices, such as those of the  
participants of this research, refuse to remain hidden1050. Yet at the same time, the participants do not 
all advertise their practices in their everyday intersections with a dominant non-transgressive 
public1051. Their practices in this respect are at times and in some ways transgressive while still  
supporting heteronormative discourses1052. They do not necessarily effect political change, nor are 
they intended to. However these practices, and the social groups in which they take place, provide 
safe spaces, away from the specular invasion of dominant discursive prescriptions, in which  
personal change and transformation can potentially take place. As I will argue, people such as the 
participants re-orient themselves through both social and sexual affiliations with others with similar 
interests and sexual practices through interactions with material objects. This re-aligned sense of  
'self', which nevertheless cannot be described in essentialist ways, rephrases their subjective sense 
of self-value away from perceptions of their sexuality as being a failed space, and towards an 
empowered and functional sense of self-in-community.
6.2.1 Personal Re-Orientation through Human Interaction
That boundaries between the body and the world are not explicit indicates that (partially)  
transgressive bodies, such as the participants, dynamically, co-constitutively and transactionally  
i n t e r a c t w i t h t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s , w h i c h i n c l u d e p e o p l e , i d e a s a n d 
institutions1053. This gives neither organism nor environment any logical or ethical priority over the 
other, but rather an interdependence1054. Bodies and environments are in permeable, dynamic 
relationships with each other, where culture interacts with bodies and bodies interact with  
culture1055. In this way, environments are not constituted to fill needs, but organisms have distinctive 
experiences in those environments1056. As I will argue, the distinctive experiences which take place 
1049 See chapter 4
1050 See Interjection: even though their practices largely perpetuate heteronormativity, they belie an attempt to redress 
such normativity through explicit relations with the material world
1051 See above
1052 Nor are they necessarily intended to. See chapter 2: in this regard, 'fetish' practices are not necessarily identity-
politics-based challenges to heteronormativity, but, as I will argue, are partially queer challenges to normativity
1053 See chapter 5
1054 Sullivan, S (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
1055 Sullivan, S (2001) ibid. See also Weiss, G (2002) The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies. In 
Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) pg 187-200
1056 Sullivan, S (2001) ibid. See also Weiss, G (2002) ibid
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between people in the 'safe' spaces of 'fetish sexuality' serve to re-orient people who enjoy the 
sexual company  of material objects. As I will argue, this re-orientation angles subjects away from 
their sense of dysfunction and marginality, and towards self-value1057.
6.2.1a) Heteronormative Orientations
Ahmed foregrounds the oft-ignored 'orientation' part of 'sexual orientation', so as to re-theorise the 
sexualisation of space and the spatiality of sexual desire1058. She notes that orientation is important 
in relation to action, and to objects that can help people find their way. Phenomenological 
consciousness, as located in relation to objects, is worldly, situated and embodied. Further, bodies 
take shape through “tending toward objects that are reachable, which are available within the bodily  
horizon.”1059 This means that bodies obtain orientations by repetition of certain actions, either in 
relation to physical objects or to ideal objects with which embodied entities identify.
In other words, orientations are about repetitive 'tending towards' over time, which requires a 
present state-of-being, an element of desire towards something, and the passage of time. This 
implies, Ahmed argues, that sexual orientation is not something one 'has', but something one 'tends 
towards'. So 
“to become straight means not only that we have to turn toward the objects given to us by heterosexual 
culture but also that we must turn away from objects that take us off this line. The queer subject within 
s t r a i g h t c u l t u r e h e n c e d e v i a t e s a n d i s m a d e s o c i a l l y p r e s e n t a s a 
deviant.”1060 
T h i s i s a c o m p e l l i n g a c c o u n t o f h o w c o m p u l s o r y h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y i s 
perpetuated1061. People are required to tend towards some objects rather than others, in order to  
obtain familial and social love. In the context of sexualities, people are required to tend towards the 
opposite gender and the values, capital, aspirations, projects and styles, and physical objects  
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h a t g e n d e r . T h e s e f o r m t h e ' f i e l d o f h e t e r o s e x u a l 
objects'1062. Ahmed further notes that “heterosexuality would be an effect of how objects gather to 
1057 On how individuals experience agency in relation to others, see Farrer, C., & Frith, C.D. (2001). Experiencing one-
self vs another person as being the cause of an action: The neural correlates of the experience of agency. In  
Neuroimage 15, 596–603.
1058 Ahmed, S (2006) Orientations: toward a Queer Phenomenology. In GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
(12:4) 543-574
1059 Ahmed, S (2006), ibid, pp543
1060 Ahmed, S (2006), ibid, pp554
1061 See Rich, A (1993) Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence. In Abelove, H, Barale, M.A. and Halperin , 
D.M. (eds) The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader. New York: Routledge pp229. 
1062 Butler's term. See Butler, J (1997) Performative Acts and Gender Constitutions: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory. In Conboy, K, Medina, N and Stanbury, S (1997) Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and  
Feminist Theory, (New York: Columbia University Press)
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clear a ground, of how objects are arranged to create a background”, rather than just a grouping of 
objects1063.
6.2.1b) Normativity, Invisibility and Marginalisation
As much as this explains heterosexuality, it also describes how queer orientations such as those of 
the participants are seen as 'failed space'. Although participants are mostly 'out' as 'gay men', there 
appears to be an invisible line of propriety beyond which participants are not comfortable to 
advertise their 'fetish' interests, rather opting for privacy:
“...[I am 'out' in terms of my fetish interests']... maybe in order of how perceived perverse they might be,  
to select people, obviously.” ('Brian')
“Out in the community I move in.  Out towards my long time partner.  Others no.  I see no reason why I  
should advertise it. The people I want to know and who can have pleasure with me in this regard all 
knows (sic).” ('Donald')
This is partly through a non-specific fear of censure by normative society which renders non-
normative sexualities incorporating material objects invisible and therefore marginal. It is  
increasingly acceptable in dominant discourses to be seen as 'homosexual', yet arguably, only 
because the approved 'homosexual identities' and practices have been incorporated into 
heteronormative conceptions of appropriateness1064. Although media influences arguably no longer 
project taboos on 'homosexuality' as strongly as in the past1065, there remains a discursive 
proscription of and shame associated with sexuality, and a concomitant prescription of sanitised 
sexual practices1066.
Further, in instances where participants are 'out', they expect the topic to be contentious or 
remarkable, and are therefore self-conscious, in particular in the face of potential judgement by 
family and friends:
“[I am 'out'] as much as one can be in South Africa. My face is up on my sex profiles and most of my  
friends know about my interests. To date, my partner’s family don’t know but, while being Jewish, they 
are very Episcopalian in their ability to turn away and pretend that something doesn’t exist.” ('Joseph')
1063 Ahmed, S (2006) Orientations: toward a Queer Phenomenology. In GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
(12:4) 543-574, pp559
1064 See chapter 2 and the Interjection
1065 See chapter 2 and the Interjection
1066 See chapter 2 and the Interjection
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“I am openly gay and to a certain degree out i.t.o my fetishes as I refer to it often in public, whether to  
gauge a reaction or in jest. My family will not understand so they are kept in the dark. My partner knows 
very well and so do a very select group of close friends. The topic of sex, let alone sexuality, makes  
people so very uncomfortable but I have found that the more blatant you are about yourself, strangely, the  
more they appreciate it (OK, there are limits).” ('Jason')
This shame and the resultant desire to hide non-approved sexual practices clearly does not reflect 
some kind of psychopathology1067. Yet neither, in contradistinction, does it reflect wholehearted and  
proud transgression of norms1068. It therefore begs the question as to what function such practices 
serve for people such as the participants, and more particularly, why they remain comfortable 
identifying their practices as 'fetish sexuality', notwithstanding the discursive constructions of such 
practices as failure.
6.2.1c) Queer Re-Orientation
Oppositional models of reading sexuality postulate that the individual can call on nothing other than 
him/herself to counter purported threats to autonomy1069. Sullivan claims that this model is illusory 
and harmful since it is based on the principle of exclusion of much of meaning in terms of 
relationships, objects and institutions1070.
In contradistinction, however, calling on transactional models of bodies as a lens through which to 
view sexual practices involving material objects releases claims to autonomy and epistemological  
and ethical superiority, calling on other resources to promote flourishing, dignity and 
worth1071. Seen in this way, people such as the participants create 'safe' spaces for themselves, such 
as parties, events and online communities1072. They collect to relax, talk and/or to have sex in these 
spaces with like-minded people, whether such people are those who share their particular sexual  
interests:
“...if you have a fetish, I suppose you would want to be in contact with people like-minded” ('Henry')
1067 See chapter 4
1068 Which is further supported by how participants implicitly both support and subvert heteronormativity. See Chapter 2 
and the Interjection
1069 Sullivan, S (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press., 106–109. See chapter 2 re oppositional lesbian and gay identity 
politics
1070 Sullivan, S (2001) ibid
1071 Sullivan, S (2001) ibid
1072 Two such local online and real-time communities are SALeathermen (www.saleathermen.org.za) for gay men, and 
Collarme  (www.collarme.co.za) for heterosexual and gay BDSM enthusiasts
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Or who don't see them as morally degenerate or 'mentally ill':
“... We need to remove the “sick,” “bad,” “stupid,” “dangerous” and “ridiculous” labels that are attached  
to normal, productive and honest members of society.” ('Joseph')
This is often by way of garnering a sense of liberation:
“...I can only say that [being open about sexualities and sexual interests] helps to set us free.” ('Simon')
This re-orientation takes place through the 'queering' (albeit not necessarily a rejection) of 
(hetero)norms. In a spatially 'straight' world, the oblique is odd1073. Similarly, in a heteronormative 
world, unusual sexualities are odd. But the world is not entirely straight. The slanted things exist, 
yet are only slanted if the viewer is looking at them from the orientation of the vertical (or if the  
g e n e r a l l y - a c c e p t e d o r i e n t a t i o n o f v e r t i c a l i s a s s u m e d t o b e t h e 
'norm')1074. The slanted world can become the norm for any given viewer, depending on his/her  
orientation or perspective1075. Social spaces in which the participants collect disorient the 'straight', 
which is otherwise only prioritised in and through heteronormative orientations. As one participant  
rather defensively notes in an attempt to explain his sexuality:
“you know, when I meet straight guys, they never shake my hand and say 'Hi, I'm Bob and I like to fuck  
women”, so I don't say “Hi, I'm H..., I like to fuck men” ('Henry')
Although in so doing they perpetuate heteronormative scripts, the participants retire from daily 
compulsory heteronormative performances and the need to justify or explain themselves. This is 
often primarily a social experience, rather than a political one:
Qu: so [connecting with like-minded people is] a social element?
“yes” ('Henry')
Qu: not a political element...?
“No, not a political element” ('Henry')
They re-organise social and bodily space in their social collectives through practices which create  
the habitus of which Bourdieu speaks, wherein embodied knowledge is well-structured, coherent 
and elaborate despite no formal recognition thereof 1076. The environment creates habitus which is 
1073Ahmed, S (2006) Orientations: toward a Queer Phenomenology. In GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
(12:4) 543-574. See also Ahmed, S (2004) The Cultural Politics of Emotion New York: Routledge. pp85.
1074Ahmed, S (2006) & (2004) ibid
1075 Ahmed, S (2006) & (2004) ibid
1076 Bourdieu, P (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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changed, learned and perpetuated through embodied practices. This habitus is not a set of rules, but 
rather “a series of dispositions and inclinations which are at once subject to circumstances and 
durable enough to pass down through generations1077. It is conveyed not only through the 
observation of bodily movement but also through the orientation and movement of the body 
through cultural spaces and temporal rhythms”1078, which allow thought and action by providing a 
framework for thinking.
Habitus takes place through the intersection between subjective awareness and the body, which 
Merleau-Ponty argues are the same (body-subject)1079. His 'projective intentionality' is a kind of 
body intentionality that supersedes conscious awareness1080. This is not about a body creating 
experiential meaning through narcissistic reflexivity. Rather, it means that the body continually  
projects itself onto the world in multiple transactions, some anonymous and some 
personal1081. These transactions establish habits and in turn establish a sense of self. This is not an 
imposition of meaning onto others. Rather, people have multiple intercorporeal exchanges with  
environments and are engaged in body activity which transforms their environments and 
themselves1082.
The social 'fetish' collectives serve to engage what Brennan refers to as “transmission of affect”, 
whereby social processes have biological and physical effect, and socially induced affect shifts the 
body and is transmitted to social groups1083. Calling on social theories and neuroendocrinology, she 
further argues that affects call up thoughts and people become emotionally attuned via chemical and  
electrical exchanges, feeling the atmosphere of a space through unconscious olfaction. Just as where 
a depressing feeling in a room is transferred to someone entering, a sense of camaraderie and 
upbuilding shared values is transferred in social collectives.
1077 In the present context, this 're-orientation' is passed onto future members of the community, rather than from parent 
to child. In this way the cultural norms and visual identifiers of the 'leather' scene have been transmitted from 
Europe and the USA to South Africa. As one participant notes: 
“Fetish does follow trend, silly as it may seem, but because of the internet, there’s really no longer “lag” in the 
development of trends, be they fashion or types of sexual practices.” ('Joseph')
1078 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170, pp160
1079 Wyllie, M (2005) Body Subjects. In PPP vol. 12, no. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2005) The Johns Hopkins University Press 
209-214
1080 Weiss, G (2002) The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) pg 
187-200, reviewing Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Weiss, ibid pp193, calls on Merleau-Ponty, M (1962), 
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith. New York: Humanities Press pp142–46
1081 See chapter 5 about anonymity
1082 Weiss, G (2002) The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) pg 
187-200, 
1083 Brennan, T (2004) The Transmission of Affect. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp1
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Such is the case with the participants, who appreciate a space where they can find a sense of safety  
from normative judgement:
“[a community] helps to create a culture and a network of support to the individuals of the 
community.” ('Simon')
“... we are pack animals and need support in numbers. It’s about the camaraderie and the Brotherhood in 
my opinion. It’s about a collective mind and interest, just like a book club or rugby team. Soort soek 
soort, soos hulle sê. We have to stick together and let petty crap go in order for a real fetish community to  
firstly survive and secondly to thrive.” ('Jacques')
They often feel that this 'safe space' is not just for them, but is potentially an empowering facility  
for others in similar circumstances:
“[the community] also helps younger generations to make the step easier for them when coming to terms 
with their sexuality.” ('Simon')
C o l l i n s s i m i l a r l y a rg u e s f o r e m b o d i e d e m o t i o n “ a n d i t s e n t r a i n m e n t i n 
collectivities”1084. He argues that human bodies sharing space synchronise and align rhythmically, 
which results in the group leaving the space with heightened senses of their moral correctness and 
the need to stick to their symbols and defend them. This is of course applicable to religious and 
conservative meetings which mobilise reactionary panic-discourses1085, but equally, as can be seen 
through at least one participant's response, in the social spaces where 'fetish' sexuality is both a 
reactionary response to heteronorms and a pro-active process of self-re-orientation:
Qu: Do you see fetish sexuality (yours or others) as a rebellion against general social norms?
“Only in regards to questioning the concept of “fixed” societal ideas, what is wrong and right in a society  
of constant social turmoil and transformation.  So yes, to consider BDSM as a “dirty little secret” is  
something I’d rather not do.  Times only change when you force uncomfortable issues on those around  
you....” ('Joseph')
Clearly, therefore, people such as the participants create social spaces in which to re-orient  
themselves away from normative effacement, proscriptions and prescriptions, thereby 'owning' their 
own perspectives and lives. Phenomenological interaction between individuals in the safe spaces of 
collectivities serves to re-orient people who enjoy the sexual company of material objects, who 
1084 Collins, R (2004) Interaction Ritual Chains Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. See See Irvine, J.M. (2004) 
Talk About Sex: The Battles over Sex Education in the United States, University of California Press; Irvine, J.M. 
(2008) Transient Feelings: Sex Panics and the Politics of Emotions. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies  
- Volume 14, Number 1, 2008, pp. 1-40 pp28
1085 See chapter 2
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thereby have the opportunity to value themselves in the face of prevailing proscriptions. They 
exercise their powers of agency to challenge (albeit not entirely reject) aspects of heteronormativity 
which they do not want to support, and to create what they see as safe social spaces for themselves  
and others like them interested in similar sexual performances1086.
6.2.2 Re-Orientation through Embodied Experience of Material Objects
Not only does this personal re-orientation take place through relationships with socio-political  
spaces, but, I suggest, through phenomenological interaction with material objects, whether in these 
safe spaces or in private.
Subjects' meaning-creation is socially constituted through bodily transactions with people and the 
environment, through an appreciation of similarities and differences1087. These transactions are not 
anonymous, but transactional1088. Husserlian conceptions of touch imply that bodily proximity is 
a b o u t i n t i m a c y i n a n o n - o p p o s i t i o n a l , d i a l e c t i c a l , i n t e r a c t i o n a l 
relation1089. It also implies that meaning-creation is dialectical between the subject and the material  
which is touched1090.
This takes place through the interactions between individuals in the environment. It also happens 
through interactions between the subject and the material object. Rather than Pietz’ view of  
'fetishism' as “subjection of the human body . . . to the influence of certain significant material  
objects that, although cut off from the body, function as its controlling organs at certain moments”, I  
suggest that the interaction is dialectical and phenomenological, taking place through the subject's 
agency and affording the subject a positive self-value1091.
The 'self' is something other than a 'core' individual identity remaining the same throughout 
life1092. Rather, people are 'bundles of habits' dynamically emerging through interaction in a shared  
environment1093. In this respect, habits are both will and agency, and people who enjoy material 
1086 See chapter 2 re issues pertaining to political rights: This collectivity has a different function to identity-politics-
based political organisation aimed at acquiring or maintaining rights. Specifically political aims may take place in 
'fetish' environments such as pride parades, yet do not necessarily take place in all 'fetish'-oriented environments, 
such as parties, events and online clubs.
1087 See Grafton, S. T., Fadiga, L., Arbib, M. A. & Rizzolatti, G. (1997). Premotor cortex activation during observation 
and naming of familiar tools. In Neuroimage 6:231–36.
1088 See chapter 5
1089 Husserl, E, (1989) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological  
Philosophy, Second Book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. pp155.
1090Ahmed, S (2006) Orientations: toward a Queer Phenomenology. In GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
(12:4) 543-574. 
1091 Pietz, W (1985) The Problem of the Fetish I. In RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (1985): 5–17: 7
1092 See chapter 5
1093 following Sullivan and Dewey. See chapter 5. See also Sullivan, S (2001) Living across and through skins:  
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objects sexually are able to work dialectically with and against pre-existing (hetero)normative  
expectations and life narratives by re-orienting themselves towards the present and the future  
through their sexual play with material objects.
This process is complex, where sexuality interplays with phenomenological embodied experience, 
physical and emotional orientations, and imagination. As I have argued, the processes enable  
subjects to re-phrase themselves in ways other than as necessarily 'failed', and to re-orient 
themselves towards subjectively-conceived empowerment and centrality, through a process of 
learning and habituating. It further enables them to project desires and aspirations into the future 
through living their imagination out in the present. They do this by calling on fantasy (often through 
pornography1094) to integrate images and sensations into an internal 'reality'/experience. These serve 
to establish and maintain a sense of subjective value1095.
6.2.2a) Phenomenological Learning through Material Objects: Present-and Future-Orientations in  
“Actively Becoming”
The sexual subject calls on material objects to locate him/herself phenomenologically in the present,  
through learning which is both experiential and participatory1096. People do not learn only what they 
are formally taught, but experientially through bodily experiences1097. Incorporated knowledge is 
Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press., 106–109; Dewey, J. 
(1978) Some implications of anti-intellectualism. In Boydston, J.A. (ed) The middle works. Vol. 6, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. ---(1979) The logic of the judgments of practice. In Boydston, J.A 
(ed) The middle works. Vol. 8,. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. 
---(1980a) Democracy and education. In Boydston, J.A (ed) The middle works, Vol. 9. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press ---(1980b) The need for a recovery of philosophy. In Boydston, J.A (ed) 
The middle works. Vol. 10. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; 
---(1981) Experience and nature. In Boydston, J.A (ed) The later works. Vol. 1. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press; --- (1984) Affective thought. In Boydston, J.A (ed) The later works. Vol.  
2. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; --- (1988) Unity of science as a social problem. 
In Boydston, J.A (ed) The later works. Vol. 13. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press
1094 For more on pornography, see Jacobs, K., Janssen, M. & Pasquinelli, M. (eds) (2007) 
C'LICKME: A Netporn Studies Reader. Amsterdam: Colophon, Institute of Network Cultures.
1095 However, as alluded to in the Interjection, this problematically also potentially serves to keep them ignorant of their 
own normative practices. This implies that such interactions need to be consciously and widely mobilised to effect 
deeper non-normative change.
1096 See supra re inscribing and incorporating practices. See also Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In 
Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170. 
For the interconnections between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, see Smith, D.W., Thomasson, A.L (2005) 
Phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press. This work brings together phenomenology and 
analytic philosophy, showing they might address each others' central concerns. Topics addressed are consciousness, 
intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content.
1097 See Bresler, L (2004) Knowing bodies, moving minds: towards embodied teaching and learning. In 
Volume 3 of Landscapes: the arts, aesthetics, and education, Springer; Dohn, N.B. (2002) Roles of the Body in  
Learning. Centre for the Interdisciplinary Study of Learning, University of Aalborg, Denmark. Referring to 
Merleau-Ponty's 'body-schema' and 'affordance', Dohn differentiates 'intentional learning' from 'learning as we go 
along'. She indicates that the body contributes to learning on three levels: action, body-schematic structure, and body 
as 'learner'; 
See also Streeck J. (2002) A body and its gesture. In Gesture, Volume 2, Number 1, 2002 , pp. 19-44(26) John 
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deeply layered into the body, and contains the improvisational, making it contextual rather than 
abstract1098. Such learning resists change, is partly screened from consciousness through its habitual 
nature, and can define the boundaries of conscious thought1099. Dreyfus calls on Merleau-Ponty, 
Michael Polanyi, Jean Piaget, and other phenomenologists to specify three functions of embodied 
learning1100:
an "inner horizon" (a partly determined yet partly open idea arranged around anticipation);
the universal nature of the anticipation, (which relates it to other appropriate contexts in  
connection patterns that are fluid and shifting); and 
the transferability of anticipation between senses.1101 
In this respect learning is both present- and future-oriented, and serves to link embodiment and 
memory in the present. This is apparent in performative rituals, commemorative ceremonies and  
body practices, which must be enacted to carry meaning and have force 1102. These enactments create 
habitual actions and movements which sink below consciousness and settle as individual and group 
Benjamins Publishing Company. Streeck looks at gestures made by a car-mechanic at work, which reflect the grasp 
that hands have of their life-worlds. Some gestures are recurrent, as part of a set of communicative forms used to 
understand routine tasks, while others are abstracted from completed instrumental actions. Both demonstrate the 
knowledge his body has obtained in its daily experience: the body’s being-in-the-world; 
See further Ruby, P., and J. Decety. 2001. Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: A PET 
investigation of agency. In Nature Neuroscience 4:546–50.
1098 For relationships between learning and phenomenology see particularly Zahavi, D (2002) First-person thoughts and 
embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and 
phenomenology. In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 1, Number 1 / March, 2002, Springer 
Netherlands, pp 7-26. Zahavi looks at certain of the main theses concerning self-awareness in recent thinking on the 
philosophy of the mind, which overlaps notably with phenomenology. He argues the benefits of more collaboration 
between these two areas. In this regard, see the work of Bermúdez: Bermúdez, J.L, Marcel, A.J., Eilan, N (1998) 
The body and the self. MIT Press. See also Zahavi, D (2003) Phenomenology of Self. In Kircher, T, & David, A.S. 
(2003) The self in neuroscience and psychiatry. Cambridge University Press; Bermúdez, J.L (2001) Nonconceptual 
Self-Consciousness And Cognitive Science. In Synthese, Volume 129, Number 1 / October, 2001 129-149.  He 
explores areas of intersection between neuroscience and philosophy in the study of self-consciousness, noting that 
highly conceptual forms of self-consciousness come from foundations of nonconceptual self-awareness, in particular 
through visual perception, somatic proprioception, spatial reasoning and interpersonal psychological interactions. 
For intersections between participatory/transformative learning and embodiment, see Ferrer, J.N., Romero, M.T. & 
Albareda, R.V. (2005) Integral Transformative Education. In Journal of Transformative Education, Vol. 3, No. 4, 
306-330 (2005) who propose a participatory approach, rather than "cognicentrism", to an integral education 
incorporating all human dimensions into learning and inquiry, including body, vital, heart, mind, and spirit. 
1099 See Merleau-Ponty, M (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith. New York: Humanities Press, pp. 
98-115, 136-147; Connerton, P. (1989) How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1100 Dreyfus, H.L (1979) What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artficial Intelligence, rev. ed. New York: Harper and 
Row. Referring specifically to those not ordinarily found in digital programs
1101 Dreyfus, H.L (1979) ibid
1102 See Leistle, B (2006) Ritual as Sensory Communication: A Theoretical and Analytic Perspective. In Köpping, K-P, 
Leistle, B., Rudolph, M (2006) Ritual and identity: performative practices as effective transformations of social  
reality. Volume 8 of Performances: intercultural studies on ritual, play and theatre, LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-
Münster. See Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp160 for 
insight into the connections between ritual and learning
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practices which are future-oriented in that they entail anticipation. For subjects, these present- and 
future-oriented practices entrench a sense of personal well-being both in terms of 'who they are',  
and 'who they can be', i.e. their aspirations. As two participants note:
“['Fetish' sex] gives me a great satisfaction... in that I can like face the world, and I don't have to step back  
or anything like that. I can be me. I can be me and my fantasies can be me too.” ('Henry')
“Important to my self-image is my need to feel completely accepting of every part of me; not to segregate  
my sexual experiences from my social or emotional experiences.  It tends help me side-step the easy 
answer, not only in regards to sex but in all walks of life. To understand what drives me or holds me back 
emotionally, and what perhaps drive others or hold them back. I rarely have answers for the latter, but it at  
least helps me to look a little deeper than I might otherwise.” ('Joseph')
Clearly, therefore, the embodied-subject learns about him/herself in an empowered light, and 
thereby (re-)locates him/herself through bodily repetition of the preferred actions and positions of 
his materially-located desires, which are actions and positions accessible if not necessarily  
intelligible to him/her1103.
This location is linked to the body's proprioceptive abilities1104. Proprioception is transmitted 
through inner ear and internal nerve endings and defines body boundaries, allowing us to feel that  
we live in our bodies1105. It is therefore present-oriented. Sometimes this can be lost through disease,  
1103 See above re inscribing and incorporating practices, see also Merleau-Ponty, M (1962) Phenomenology of 
Perception, trans. Colin Smith New York: Humanities Press pp. 98-115, 136-147; Connerton, P (1989) 
How Societies Remember Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1104 See De Sousa, R (1990) The Rationality of Emotion, Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1990. De Sousa argues that reason 
and emotion are not antagonists, and that emotions are a kind of perception. The scenarios in which they are learned 
provide a dramatic structure, whereby they gain an important role in rational beliefs, desires, and decisions.; 
See also De Preester, H (2007) The deep bodily origins of the subjective perspective: Models and their problems, In 
Consciousness and Cognition Volume 16, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 604-618. She argues that neuroscience 
often focuses on ‘visceral’ bodily dimensions to generate hypotheses the establishment of consciousness: the ‘in-
depth body’ which is generally not governed by the subject's intentions. This demonstrates the intimate link between 
vital and visceral regulatory processes and consciousness/subjectivity. She argues that the subjective perspective 
makes up itself through auto-constitution, where the ‘in-depth’ body, rather than being the object of brain 
representations, is built-in to the subjective perspective, in a non-objectified way. The subjective perspective thereby 
gets ‘interoceptive thickness’.
1105 See Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170 pp166. See also 
Trifonova, T (2003) Matter-Image or Image-Consciousness: Bergson contra Sartre. In 
Janus Head, 6(1), 80-114, Pittsburgh. Trifonova distinguishes consciousness and matter through looking at the 
connecting points and differences between Bergsonian conceptions of perception and consciousness, on the one 
hand, and Sartrean ideas of consciousness and the image, on the other. Trifonova concludes that Bergson's ‘matter-
image’ represents a pure, impersonal state coming before the split/delay which is consciousness, whereas Sartre’s 
view is obtained by ‘image-consciousness.’ Trifonova argues that it is necessary to go through an intermediary 
phenomenology of the image to be able to express a phenomenology of consciousness, since Sartrean consciousness 
is an origin, empty of objects. Consciousness cannot therefore be studied directly, but can only be imagined, since it 
is not knowledge but being. A phenomenology of consciousness must be mediated by the image, since one must 
conceive of a metatheoretical move from fullness to emptiness, rather than the other way around. In this way, both 
Bergson and Sartre see the image as transcendence between consciousness and its objects, and between transparency 
and object solidity.
On the implicit functioning of the body in everyday experience from a phenomenological perspective, see Fuchs, T 
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but ordinarily allows a link to be created between the body and habitually used 
objects1106. Sports people and musicians use the tools of their trade, such as golf clubs or violin 
bows, as if they were an extension of the body, and material resistance to the object is like  
resistance to the body. Similarly, subjects call on material objects to serve as extensions of their 
bodies1107. The participants similarly use their leather gear, butt plugs, dildos and other 'fetish'  
accoutrements as extensions of their bodies.
The awareness of this function is complex, in that the body experiences objects intentionally and  
itself non-intentionally1108. The embodied self has pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness, which 
enta i l s experiencing the body as the loca t ion where ac t ion and percept ion 
converges1109. In this regard, neither proprioception nor intention alone underpin self-awareness, 
which is enabled through sensori-motor integration. This enables sensitivity to the sensory 
consequences of action via the monitoring thereof1110.
Subjects entrench the experiences apperceived through proprioceptive abilities through habitual 
actions, which over time gives meaning to physical sensations1111. The subjective meaning attributed 
(2005) Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in Melancholia and 
Schizophrenia. In PPP, vol. 12, no. 2, june 2005, pp95-107
On cognition and emotion and how postural embodiment relates to expressive behaviour, emotion and feeling, see 
also Niedenthal, P.M., Barsalou, L.W., Ric, F. & Krauth-Gruber, S. (2005) Embodiment in the Acquisition and Use 
of Emotion Knowledge. In Barrett, L.F., Niedenthal, P.M. & Winkielman, P (2005) Emotion and 
Consciousness. NY, London: Guildford Press. Pp29-30. They also deal with how affective imagery is accompanied 
by emotion processes, relating to stimulus identification and memory (see pp33 et seq)
1106 For more on the relationship between proprioception and touch, see de Vignemont, F., Ehrsson, H., Haggard, P. 
(2005) Bodily Illusions Modulate Tactile Perception. In Current Biology, Volume 15, Issue 14, Pages 1286-1290. 
They look at interactions between proprioception and touch as a powerful means of investigating implicit body 
representations underlying touch. They note that touch differs from other exteroceptive senses, since the body is 
perceived to be part of the thing being perceived. A primary quality of a material object, such as its size, is directly 
affected by the perception of the size of the body part which touches it. They created proprioceptive illusions 
pertaining to the length of subjects' body parts through vibrating the arm tendons. Subjects estimated tactile 
distances which felt bigger when the touched body parts felt elongated. They conclude that the perception of tactile 
objects references an implicit body representation, which is contributed to by proprioception.
1107 See Reynaert, P. A. (2007) A Non-Representationalist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness. In 
Phenomenology 2005. Zeta Books. Reynaert argues that phenomenology's noetico-noematic analysis can help 
distinguish phenomenal consciousness from qualia (phenomenal properties of the perceived object). Connecting a 
phenomenology of the lived experience of the body with noetic phenomenology can identify bodily self-awareness 
or subjective experience.
1108 Legrand, D (2006) The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. In 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 5, Number 1 / March, 2006, Springer Netherlands. On 
Subjectivity and the Body, see also Legrand, D., Brozzoli, C., Rossetti, Y., & Farnè, A. (2007). Close to me: 
Multisensory space representations for action and pre-reflexive consciousness of oneself-in-the-world. In 
Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 687–699; Gallagher, S (2007) The spatiality of situation: Comment on Legrand et 
al. In Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 16, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 700-702. See also  de Preester, H, 
Knockaert, V (2005) Body image and body schema: interdisciplinary perspectives on the body, Volume 62 of 
Advances in consciousness research. John Benjamins Publishing Company
1109 Legrand, D (2006) ibid
1110 Legrand, D (2006) ibid
1111 See Gellhorn E (1964) Motion and Emotion: The Role of Proprioception in the Physiology and Pathology of the 
Emotions. In Psychology Review 1964 Nov;71:457-72; Barrett, L.F., Niedenthal, P.M., Winkielman, P. (2005) 
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to these actions is entrenched through the relationship between those sensations and the material  
world in which they take place, which, for the subject, includes material objects. 
This relationship may be simply to enjoy the experience or may be intended for, or be perceived as 
'healing', which I suggest is the ability to remain emotionally, physically and socially 
'present'1112.
Learning is therefore both experiential (which includes present-orientation) and intentional (and  
therefore future-oriented), if not necessarily conscious. Subjects engage their powers of agency to 
interact with material objects and environments, which they use/occupy repetitively to learn new 
things. They thereby locate their value in the present and re-situate themselves as empowered/
Emotion and consciousness. Guilford Press; See also the role of proprioception and emotion in Alexander Technique 
and complementary healing: Davis, C.M. (2003) Complementary therapies in rehabilitation. SLACK Incorporated; 
Bermúdez, J.L, Marcel, A.J., Eilan, N (1998) The body and the self. MIT Press, see Kabat-Zinn, J (2003) 
Mindfulness-Based Interventions in Context: Past, Present, and Future. In Clinical Psychology: Science & Practice. 
10(2):144-156, Summer 2003.
1112 Enjoyment of practices, although on the surface 'present-oriented' (i.e.living in the moment), is related to the past, 
present, future by means of the subject's orientation. Similarly, I suggest, 'healing' entails the emotional processing 
of the past in order to reach what the subject hopes will be a brighter future. This sense is subjective, not objective.
Conceptions of 'healing' which incorporate 'positive meaning' cannot, I suggest, be based on essentialist, 
foundationalist or determinist conceptions of approval by some deific or foundationalist force, the order of 'nature', 
or (middle class) normative heteropatriarchal notions of what people 'should' be. It is not a moralistic or 
deterministic position which prioritises any specific social and cultural pre-requisites in order to enable feelings of 
self-worth.  Rather, 'healing', which can be linked to 'well-being' and 'happiness' are, I suggest, subjective processes 
contextualised through the subject's relationships and through how dominant discourses intersect with phenomenal 
circumstances. Following anti-(hetero)normative arguments of queer theory, they are based on a sense of the 
individual valuing what gives meaning and order to (his/her) human life is important. (See Ahmed, S. (2007–8). The 
Happiness Turn. In New Formations 63, no. Winter: 7–14. For different philosophical traditions of happiness see 
also McGill, V.J. (1967) The Idea of Happiness, New York: Frederick A. Praeger; Sumner, L.W. (1996) Welfare,  
Happiness and Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.) This incorporates conceptions of emotion based on a subject who 
is not necessarily fully (consciously) 'present' to him/herself, and is therefore not in a perpetual state of calmness, 
but rather that the subjective has the means to manage feelings of ambivalence, confusion, depression and trauma 
within a broader discursive/social environment. As I will argue later, these notions are allied to an almost Buddhist 
sense of 'presence' which both revolve around striving for a subjective sense of peace about one's being-in-the-
world, matched with an acknowledgement of the ability and responsibility to make choices and decisions in a non-
utopian society. 'Healing' is therefore, I suggest, a pragmatic rather than foundationalist personal embodied psychical 
functionality, within a broader social sphere conceived of dialogically and dialectically, whereby individuals aim to 
engage in balanced ways with their community while at the same time mobilising their own resources to create 
meaning in their lives and behaving in ways which reflect an interdependence between themselves and the world 
around them, rather than either an independence or co-dependence.
See the role of body-based awareness development in transformational healing, such as yoga: A.N. Singh (2006) 
Role of yoga therapies in psychosomatic disorders. In International Congress Series, Volume 1287, April 2006, 
pp91-96 (Psychosomatic Medicine - Proceedings of the 18th World Congress on Psychosomatic Medicine, held in 
Kobe, Japan, between 21 and 26 August 2005); Morley, J (2001) Inspiration and Expiration: Yoga Practice through 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of the Body. University of Hawai'i Press; Smith, B.R. (2007) Body, Mind and 
Spirit? Towards an Analysis of the Practice of Yoga. In Body & Society, Vol. 13, No. 2, 25-46 (2007); Singleton, M, 
Byrne, J (2008) Yoga in the modern world: contemporary perspectives. Routledge, Curzon Hindu studies series, 
Taylor & Francis; Cuomo, N.C. (2007) Integrated Yoga: Yoga with a Sensory Integrative  
Approach. Jessica Kingsley Publishers;
See specifically tantric yoga pertaining to intersections between embodiment and sexuality: Morley, J (2008) 
Embodied Consciousness in Tantric Yoga and the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. In Religion and the Arts, 
Volume 12, Numbers 1-3, 2008 , pp. 144-163(20).; For possibilities for incorporating the body into sex therapy, see 
Kleinplatz, P.J (2001) New directions in sex therapy: innovations and alternatives. Psychology Press
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present beings validated in their presence1113. 
Through embodied interactions with the material, the subject learns more about his/her present/
presence and his/her aspirations. I suggest that doing so in the queered environments of private or 
public 'fetish scenes'/events enables a 'gay male fetishist' subject to re-phrase the dominant  
perception of his sexuality as a failed space, and thereby to re-orient himself more positively.
6.2.2b) 'Reality' and 'Fantasy': the Activation of Future-Oriented Imagination
In this regard, the subject's desires connect with the repetitive performance of his/her sexual scripts  
using material objects through activation of the imagination, which should be distinguished from 
the psychoanalytic Imaginary1114.
The subject's projective intentionality does not necessarily take place in a goal-directed or conscious  
way, but through connecting imagination (rather than the Imaginary) with embodied experience  
t h r o u g h J u n g i a n t r a n s c e n d e n t p r o c e s s e s o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d 
phenomenologically1115.
Colman argues that real imagination depends on the ability to recognise the absence of the object of 
imagination from the material world1116. 
1113 Re sense and agency, see Tsakiris, M., Schütz-Bosbach, S. and Gallagher, S. On agency and body-ownership: 
Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections, In Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 16, Issue 3, September 
2007, Pages 645-660. They look at methodological problems in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, 
presenting experiments relating to the interplay between motor and sensory information. They focus on how 
multisensory signals interact with body representations to develop the sense of body-ownership, as it inter-relates to 
the sense of agency. Looking at efferent and afferent signals experience of subjects' own body and actions,  
pertaining to self-recognition and the recognition of others' actions, they suggest that the coherent experience of the 
body depends on the integration of efferent ('carrying away') and afferent ('carrying towards') information in action.  
Overall, whereas afferent signals provide the distinctive content of one’s own body experience, efferent signals 
structure the experience of one’s own body in an integrative and coherent way.
1114 See chapter 4 re psychoanalysis. 
Re the intersections between body image and body schema based on the distinction between reflective and non-
reflective intentionality, see also van Bunder, D & van de Vijver, G (2005) Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis on 
the Mirror Stage- Different Metaphysical Backgrounds on Body Image and Body Schema. In de Preester, H, 
Knockaert, V (2005) Body image and body schema: interdisciplinary perspectives on the  
body, Volume 62 of Advances in consciousness research, John Benjamins Publishing Company. Inter alia they 
discuss the differences between phenomenological and psychoanalytic viewpoints.
See further Modell, A.H. (2003) Imagination and the meaningful brain. Philosophical Psychopathology, Bradford 
Books, MIT Press. Modell claims that intrapsychic complexities of human psychology enables people to use 
metaphor to interpret, displace, and transform feelings.
1115 See Jung, CG (1916) The Transcendent Function. CW, 8 Princeton, NJ: Bollingen [reprinted 1960]; Brooke, R 
(2000) Pathways into the Jungian world: phenomenology and analytical psychology. Routledge. See also Küle M 
(2004) Self-individualization as the Main Principle in the Phenomenology of Life. In Tymieniecka, A-T 
Imaginatio Creatrix, Analecta Husserliana, The Pivotal Force of the Genesis/Ontopoiesis of Human Life and  
Reality Volume 83, Section I, Springer Netherlands pp 47-56
1116 Colman, W. (2006) Imagination and the Imaginary. In Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2006, 51, 21–41
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This recognition is implicit in some participants' acknowledgement that there needs be no sexual 
contact for the 'fetishistic' fantasy to be effective:
“Qu: so is (fetish) related to them, as people?
“often, no, just the idea. Just the... if someone had a lot of piercings, that idea would turn me on, by just 
looking. It doesn't have to lead up to sexual contact. ... I'm a highly sexual person, so I could look at 
anyone... even a female... with great tattoos, and great body piercing and go... I would never have sex  
with her, but it's still a sexual turn-on. The fact that her mind has evolved. She's in a different state of  
mind than what a normal person is, and I associate with that.” ('Jacques') 
This approach leads to envisioning symbol formation as having a transcendent function between 
presence and absence as opposites1117.
Colman notes that Lacan's model of the three psychic realms of the real, the imaginary and the 
symbolic are similar to his differentiation of the Imaginary from Imagination in, for example, the 
importance given to the experience of absence and lack in the creation of the symbolic. However,  
Colman arrives at his argument through Jung1118, Winnicott1119, Steiner1120 and the Post-Kleinians. 
The ability to imagine depends on a sufficiently differentiated ego to be able to relate to the 
unconscious as an equal partner1121. In this regard, sexuality incorporating material objects, rather  
than being a priori dysfunctional and psychopathological, requires an advanced sense of self-
awareness1122, which some participants have and others do not1123.
With this focus, Colman distinguishes the 'imaginary' (as a deceptive illusion at play in the 
1117 Colman, W. (2006) ibid, abstract. The psychoanalytic Imaginary assumes an implicit negativity, and is a defensive 
misuse of imagination in an attempt to refute ‘negation’where “negation is defined as all those aspects of the world 
that constitute a check to the omnipotence of fantasy—e.g., absence, loss, difference, otherness etc.” See chapter 4  
in regards psychoanalytic negation. 
1118 Colman, W. (2006), pp21. See Jung, CG (1916) The Transcendent Function. CW, 8 Princeton, NJ: Bollingen 
[reprinted 1960]. Jung described imagination as the transcendent function: symbolic imagination emerging from the 
conflict between conscious and unconscious
1119 'fantasying', as opposed to dreaming and living. See Winnicott, D. W. (1945) Primitive emotional development. In 
(1958) Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis. London: Tavistock
—— (1953) Transitional objects and transitional phenomena.  In (1974) Playing and Reality. London: Penguin 
Books
—— (1958) Psychoses and child care. In (1958) Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-
Analysis. London: Tavistock
—— (1967) The location of cultural experience. In (1974) Playing and Reality. London: Penguin Books 
—— (1971) Dreaming, fantasying, living. In (1974) Playing and Reality. London: Penguin Books
1120 'psychic retreats'. See Steiner, J. (1993) Psychic Retreats. Pathological Organisations in Psychotic, Neurotic and  
Borderline Patients. London: Routledge
1121 a relation which may be attenuated in narcissistic positions
1122 Although these ideas are often related to pathological organisations of personality, Colman focuses more on absence 
and negation in how people negotiate their relatedness to the world, which is a more interactive view of human 
development. See chapter 4 in regard to the implicit negativity of lacanian lack
1123 See the Interjection re the repetition of heteronormative discourses
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pathological) from a more positive sense of 'imagination' as a 'creative illusion' in order to express  
symbolic reality1124. In so doing, he counteracts Lacanian view of the 'real' as the original state of  
being, where the individual is not aware of a lack or absence. He argues that this should not be seen 
as 'real', since 'reality' needs to include a sense of both absence and presence in a symbolic whole  
object, without which the result is psychotic delusion. 
This implies that the psychical comparator is the subject's (phenomenological) experience, rather 
than a universal lack1125. 
In the present instance, imagination is for the participants at times about escapism from experiences  
of dominant normative prescriptions:
“Fantasy is for escapism, a realm where circumstances and realities are as we would like them to be. For  
me this is very clear and so to escape to these fantasies is also good for the soul.” ('Simon')
Yet it is not merely an escape from an unpleasant past, but is a forward-looking aspiration:
“...Fetish sex makes many fantasies more accessible and able to be lived out. Definitely in terms of what I  
like (role-play), fantasy plays a huge role” ('Simon')
In non-normative environments fantasy is more than an aspiration. It can often readily be 
actualised, and therefore becomes a precursor to action:
“In the circles I sometimes operate in (sic), especially in as far a fetish sex is concerned, there is little  
difference between fantasy and reality.  If you fantasize about a particular act, you will find people who  
will comply” ('Donald')
Imagination is therefore not simply passive, but calls on active, body-based experiential processes  
to help the subject effect Jungian individuation1126. Imagination thereby realises the possible in 
Husserlian/Merleau-Ponty-esque vein where embodied intentionality is a forward-thinking mode of 
psychical-processing and self-orientation.
1124Colman, W. (2006) Imagination and the Imaginary. In Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2006, 51, 21–41
1125 See chapter 4. See Colman, ibid pp24. Colman notes that the major differences between his conception and Lacan's 
model are that the Lacanian imaginary is a universal and necessary process whereby the ego's internal image is  
created. Colman, however, sees 'the imaginary' as a way of getting over absence and lack which comes about only 
after absence and loss become unbearable through the individual's inability to sufficiently contain painful 
experiences
1126 See Jung, CG (1916) The Transcendent Function. CW, 8 Princeton, NJ: Bollingen [reprinted 1960]. 
Jung described symbolic imagination emerging from the conflict between conscious and unconscious as the 
transcendent function. Important here is his notion of individuation. Yet I suggest that he did not incorporate notions 
of embodiment fully to express ideas of human relationships with both the material and discourse
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Moreover, imagination enables self-aware subjects to breach gaps between desire and reality:
“Fantasy will never be matched by reality. Your mind may know exactly how something will feel and 
where your body will take you and how you will react, but in reality it will always be different. One will 
never find that one sexual partner who will live up to one’s pre-conceived set of criteria... this is where 
porn (to me at least) becomes even more important; it helps fill a lot of gaps...” ('Jason')
This reflects that the a priori assumption of irretrievable lack leading to psychopathology does not 
apply, but rather that the subject should, metatheoretically, be presumed to merely be present in a 
value-neutral way, rather than either 'mentally ill' or 'well', whereby imagination is the unconscious 
par tner to the ego as a cent ral tool in sexual play incorporat ing mater ial 
objects1127.
In most cases, the relationship between ego and unconscious is managed appropriately, available to  
the individual as a functional relational tool for processing and managing internal psychical conflict  
on a number of different levels, and to assist in positive psycho-social re-orientation in ways which 
I suggest are comparable to other forms of creative expression like art and literature.
6.2.2c) Imagination and Virtuality
Conceived in this way, I suggest, imagination functions similarly, albeit not through the same 
mechanisms, as virtuality, and thereby virtual reality. What they both create is 'real', even if not  
materially manifested1128. Virtual reality uses the embodied subject's ability to create a link between 
1127 See chapter 4
Calling on Plaut's 1966 paper, Colman argues that imagination depends on the ability to trust, linked to ego-strength. 
Plaut, A (1966) Reflections on not being able to imagine. In Journal of Analytical Psychology, 11, 2, 113–33. 
Reprinted in Analytical Psychology: A Modern Science. Plaut differentiates between fantasy and imagination which 
Colman links to his own differentiation between imagination and the imaginary, where the latter is about defending 
against imagination. As Colman notes (Colman, ibid , pp28):
Plaut’s definition of fantasy is the same as Freud’s—i.e., frustrated wishfulfilments, but such fantasies are not 
necessarily defensive even if they are escapist. It is quite possible to engage in typical wish-fulfilling activities 
such as day dreaming and masturbatory fantasy in full awareness of their unreality—i.e., the essential difference 
between fantasy and material actuality is preserved. It is only when this difference is obliterated that fantasy 
becomes destructive, undermining the capacity for imagination as well as the relation to material actuality.
1128 However, see the conflict between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty. In this regard, see Lawlor, L (1998) The end of  
phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty. In Continental Philosophy Review, Volume 31, 
Number 1 / January, 1998, Springer Netherlands, pp 15-34. Looking at Deleuze's The Logic of Sense (1969) and 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Lawlor argues that, even though Deleuze's challenge is 
double through immanence and difference (the paradox of expression), there are similarities between the two in the 
idea of a past that has never been present. What is needed, however, is an interpretation of expression in Merleau-
Ponty's unfinished The Visible and the Invisible.
See also Steeves J.B. (2001) The virtual body: Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy of imagination. In 
Philosophy today, 2001, vol. 45, no4, pp.370-380, DePaul University, Chicago. Steeves argues that, contrary to 
traditional interpretations of the thinking of the young Merleau-Ponty, perception and imagination are not related 
hierarchically, but dialectically through how the virtual body relates to bodily performance, and through reference to 
the Sartrean theory of the Imaginary.
On the relationship between the body and memory, whereby memory is reproductive in operation, see Casey, E.S. 
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t h e b o d y a n d a n o b j e c t t o s i m u l a t e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a n d e f f e c t o f t h a t 
link1129. 
Similarly, when the material 'fetish' object in question is part of the human body, it is
“. . . a representation [as opposed to the real thing]. But if you have certain physical fetishes, ... it's 
something that's there, something you can hold onto. Even on myself, I like body hair. I've got a hairy 
chest, I've got a hairy stomach. So I carry that with me. I have a piercing with a... a large piercing , which 
I enjoy. I have tattoos on my body which I see every day, I admire every day and I enjoy.” ('Jacques')
At the same time as it 'isn't' real (i.e. is a symbol) this representation is also very real:
“So often it's not just a representation, but it's a physical development.” ('Jacques')
In this regard, Deleuze distinguishes the virtual and the real whereby: 
“The virtual is fully real insofar as it is virtual. Exactly what Proust said of states of resonance must be 
said of the virtual: ‘Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract,’ and symbolic without being 
fictional”1130. 
The virtual is actually a part of the real object, whereby the object is partly in the virtual “as though  
into an objective dimension” while it also partly exists in reality1131. Virtual reality should not be 
dualistically conceived, since the virtual is actualised. This is not merely a logical process where the 
possible, qua 'not real', becomes real (realisation)1132. Both the virtual and imagination are connected 
to reality through multi-layered causal connections which are not determined in advance but allow  
for creativity and innovation1133. Using this analogy, active individuation is not vague and 
undifferentiated, but determinate and open. 
(1984) Habitual body and memory in Merleau-Ponty. In Man and World, Volume 17, Numbers 3-4 / September, 
1984, pp 279-297
1129 Hayles, N.K. (1993) The Materiality of Informatics. In Configurations 1.1 (1993) 147-170;  Murray, C.D & 
Sixsmith, J (1999) The Corporeal Body in Virtual Reality. In Ethos, Vol. 27, No. 3, Body, Self, and Technology 
(Sep., 1999), pp. 315-343. They call on phenomenology to explore user embodiment in virtual reality applications. 
They call on views of embodiment as sensorial immersion, and use accounts of "disrupted" bodies such as phantom 
limb and dissociation of the self from the body, paralysis, and objectified bodies as contexts and claim that virtual 
reality is an embodied experience, which can help in the radical transfiguration of the body and its sense 
construction. Murray, C.D. & Gordon, M.S. (2001)Changes in Bodily Awareness Induced by Immersive Virtual 
Reality. In CyberPsychology & Behavior. June 2001, 4(3): 365-371. They explore influences of immersive virtual 
experiences on the perceptual awareness of the body, finding that various subjects experience higher levels of skin, 
muscular, and cardiovascular awareness, higher levels of body boundary ambiguity and aural awareness.
1130 Deleuze, G (1994) Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, pp208-9
1131 Deleuze, G (1994) ibid
1132 Deleuze, G (1994) ibid. This implies that the possible becomes real not merely because thinking of events or life 
excludes the new.  In this regard, the only difference between the possible and the real is that the real exists, which is 
immaterial
1133 Burlein, A (2005) The Productive Power of Ambiguity: Rethinking Homosexuality through the Virtual and 
Developmental Systems Theory. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 2005), pp30
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This matches with Deleuzian rhizomatic thinking in that 
“it conceptualizes an event not as the orderly progression (or realization) of an essence that begins as a 
root whose plan determines what unfolds next, but as a multiplicity whose development is not tied to 
some root but proliferates like bulbs or tubers, any point of which can be connected to any 
other”1134
Virtuality involves a similar kind of bodily experience as 'imagination-activated-through-material-
objects' does for subjects, where material objects allow the subject to connect with his/her  
imagination which reflect a sexualised reality other than, or over and above ordinary experiences.
This does not presume that fantasy and reality in all cases equate, mean the same thing to everyone,  
or are satisfying, since the meaning of experiences is specific to the individual's expectations and 
embodied perception.
However, whereas virtual reality 'de-actualises' experiences, 'fetish' sexuality 'hyper-actualises' it, 
depending on the experience, partner/s and object/s being used. 'Puppy training', for example uses 
paraphernalia such as a muzzle, leash, prosthetic puppy dog tail, and paw-mitts to allow the subject 
to experience 'being' a canine. This takes place in a 'real-time', three-dimensional space which is 
different to the 'real-world', yet does not simply create the experience in a 'virtual' space. The 
virtuality of the experience is not computer-generated, as in virtual reality, but takes place in the  
fictive space of the imagination of the subject as played out with objects in the space between  
sexual partners.
In this regard, and contrary to the assumptions of the ICD diagnostic criteria which see relationships  
with material objects as normatively dysfunctional and obsessive1135, fantasy and concomitant 
sexual activity incorporating material objects can serve to create and maintain personal connections:
“I think sometimes [fantasy is] very necessary. I think it's an integral part of a relationship.... um, I don't 
want to say it'll keep the person there, but it'll certainly keep interest of both people, um, life and sex and 
relationships wouldn't be boring, it'd be permanently different, every time different. That's what I find 
interesting.” ('Henry')
1134 Burlein, A (2005) ibid, referring to Deleuze, G and Guattari, F (1988) A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and 
schizophrenia, vol. 2. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press pp3–25
1135 See chapter 4
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More than that, fantasy and concomitant material exploration with a partner is often a means to 
explore more than the sexual partner's performances of identity:
“Again, for me, it’s more about the experience with a certain person and what you ... suspect lies under 
the “real world” façade.” ('Joseph')
In other words, it is to engage with what underlies people's public personae
6.2.3 Re-Orientations Conclusions: Relations between Learning and Materiality
Clearly, learning is both cultural (and therefore discursive) and 'natural' (i.e. 
'physiological')1136. As an example, people learn to maintain physical balance through nature pulling 
on the body in various directions1137. This requires a response, and the subject is required to actively 
d o s o m e t h i n g t o o b t a i n a d e s i r e d o u t c o m e ( e . g . t o b a l a n c e o n 
something)1138. At the same time as the subject becomes more 'natural' by balancing, he/she becomes 
more 'cultural' through both the fact that he/she balances/walks, and through the style in which he/
she does so1139. In other words, the subject becomes more 'cultural' through his/her entry into 
culture1140. The idea and 'reality' of balance becomes cultural through the relationships with other  
people who are also to a greater or lesser extent physically and emotionally in balance, and by the  
things which physical balance enables, such as social interaction, mobility, the ability to use hands 
while balanced on legs etc. Obtaining body balance represents the coming together of parallel 
processes: becoming more 'natural', and more 'cultural'1141.
Similarly, the sexual use of material objects further habituates the subject to the experience of such 
sexuality, and therefore to an alternative way of being human, and at the same time concretises the 
subject in the (sub)cultural norms of 'fetish sexuality' practices. As such, the subject does not merely  
learn to work with a new mechanical tool, but, through proprioceptive perception, imagination and 
habituation through repetition, locates himself in a cultural milieu. This milieu (the sexual 'fetish'  
environment such as a leather 'scene') encourages learning and 'echo-locating' the self in relation not 
only to the practical elements of using a material object (such as, for example a dildo), but also to 
the exploration of an internal and fantasy world which is experiential, aspirational, forward-looking. 
And not defined by pathologising or demonising (hetero)normative discourses. 
1136 Adamson, T (2005) Measure for Measure: The Reliance of Human Knowledge on Things of the World. In 
Ethics & the Environment, 10(2) 2005 175-194
1137 Adamson, T (2005), ibid
1138 Adamson, T (2005), ibid
1139 Adamson, T (2005), ibid
1140 Adamson, T (2005), ibid
1141 Adamson, T (2005), ibid
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6.3 Conclusion
The chapter has argued firstly that agency is neither the reactionary response to essentialist or 
determinist notions of pre-existing drives proposed by the ICD's diagnostic criteria, nor to 
discursive constructs proposed by much poststructuralist thinking. Rather, it is grounded in 
phenomenological experience and personal meaning derived from the orientation of the self in 
relation to the world which surrounds the subject, which means that it is mediated by normative 
constraints. Desires and choices are not borne of causal backwards-looking reaction to pre-existing 
frameworks or experiences. Rather, they are dialectically oriented in relation to both normative  
discursive constructions and embodied experience with absent, impossible, future, past and ideal  
objects. In this respect, agency is constructive, yet not deterministic, and the agent exercises 
(bounded) choice. Since 'fetishists' are not entities separate to any other person, or to the material 
world, the agency of 'gay male fetishists', like their constitution discussed in Chapter 5, is therefore 
not something different that of anybody else, and is not merely an inevitable reaction to essentialist,  
foundationalist or determinist structures. This begs the question as to what functions (sexual) 
interaction with material objects perform, and more narrowly, how same-sex exploration 
incorporating material objects ('gay male fetish sex') adds value to subjects' lives. 
Secondly, this chapter has argued that complex orientation and agency enables 'gay' male subjects 
who incorporate material objects into their sexual scripts to call on the social collectives and the 
material world around them to re-align themselves both socially and emotionally. In turn, this re-
phrased and re-oriented sense of self allows them the freedom to rephrase their own subjective 
sense of self-value away from perceptions of their sexuality as being a failed space, and towards  
more of a subjective and therefore contextualised sense of empowerment, in the face of judgement.
As I have argued in Chapter 4, psychopathologies, and in particular the ICD diagnostic criteria,  
normatively construct 'fetishism' as backward-looking and object-focused, and it therefore 
prescribes heteronormative practices. Instead, as I have argued in this chapter, the subject orients  
him/herself phenomenologically to the present and the future as a valuable being. This creates a  
powerful framework on which to base views of conceptual spaces in which subjects can develop 
their awareness of where/who they are (in other words their current positive subjective meaning),  
and where/who they are aspiring to be (in other words the future-oriented value of the self). These 
spaces can take the place of 'therapeutic cure', and can assist subjects to develop awareness of their 
needs and desires and engage complex notions of agency, thereby 'echo-locating' themselves in 
relation to other people through learning, imagining inherent possibilities, and realising them 
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phenomenologically. This adds up to recognising a subjectively defined sense of personal value, 
both socially and personally, through a phenomenological re-orientation towards a more empowered 
and less heteronormative alternative to the world in which they ordinarily live.
This description of processes intentionally does not prescribe that subjects are inherently 
emotionally 'functional'/'dysfunctional' (however one might describe this), since to do so would be 
to construct determinist metatheory to replace the inappropriate essentialising and foundationalising 
ICD diagnostic criteria. Nor does it describe subjects as inherently supportive or transgressive of 
heteronorms. I suggest that these kinds of value judgements can only be made by the subject him/
herself on an individual basis. 
Framing 'gay male fetish sexuality' in this way forces scholars, activists and psycho-medical 
practitioners to become more explicit about their own heteronormative predispositions, as well as 
those of the subjects which whom they are dealing. Such people must therefore become more 
accountable for their own biases, and to distinguish between the practices of individuals in a 'health-
care' context and their own ontological frameworks. Such practitioners would thereby be enjoined 
to deal with psycho-medical subjects as individuals, rather than as representatives of approved of or 
maligned groups.
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CLOSING PARENTHESIS
REPHRASING SAME-SEX SEXUALITY INCORPORATING 
MATERIAL OBJECTS
If we were more artifactually  literate, we would routinely take into account more than we normally do of 
the formidable complexity of even the humblest thing. Things have forced me to situate sexuality in a  
material context. This context includes objects that open up sexuality, gender, and sex to things that can 
trouble their meaning. When considering the meaning of the terms sexuality, sex, and gender, context is 
all. Without it, abstract and reductive statements abound: witness the oedipal conceits of 
psychoanalysis1142. 
The Museum of Modern Art in New York recently hosted an exhibition of performance art by 
Serbian artist Marina Abramović, entitled 'The Artist is Present'1143. The piece entailed Abramović, 
beautifully dressed in a flowing outfit, sitting for eight hours a day or more in a chair in front of a  
table, on the other side of which museum-goers would take a seat and simply look at her for as long 
as they could or wanted to. Some lasted a few minutes, others sat for extended periods. Some never 
returned, while others returned multiple times.
Their facial responses were photographed, revealing some fascinating insight into the notion of the 
spectacle1144. Some were sceptical, some surprised, others caught in a brief moment of some intense  
personal emotional conflict which at times reflected in the tears coursing down their cheeks. 
On the face of it the work is about patrons watching a live artwork, consisting of a woman, who 
may otherwise appear unremarkable, voluntarily offering herself up as a spectacle. Yet the 
photographs of the patrons revealed to me something more poignant: the spectators were really the 
spectacle, depending on who was watching, and from which vantage-point. There were so many 
different faces and bodies, all engaged in their own individual and inexplicable explorations of a 
moment in life. Caught in the moment of trying to see what this exhibition was all about, these  
people had become less self-aware, and in that moment became more honestly present, since, as far  
as they were concerned, this exhibition was about the artist, not about them. In the moment of  
taking on the role of spectator, they more honestly reflected (rather than consciously trying to 
represent) a sense of their own confusion in attempting to come to terms with the art piece. 
1142 Graham, M (2004) Thinking Sex, Thinking Gender. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 2004 
10(2):299-303 pp298
1143 http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2010/marinaabramovic
1144 http://www.flickr.com/photos/themuseumofmodernart/
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More importantly, since the exhibition was not mediated by the lens of a camera or a sculptor's 
tools, they could explore their inner conflicts and what the interaction meant to them, without the  
mediating force of an artist explicitly trying to tell them something via an artistic medium. This was 
only possible because, as far as they were aware, they were not themselves being inspected by 
anyone other than the artist. Indeed, not even by the artist, since she remained impassive, neither  
touching nor communicating with them. The participants could merely be present and experience 
the exhibition1145. 
To me, the exhibition itself was 'present', in three-dimensions, and constituted by the patrons'  
interactions with the phenomenal world in which they had placed themselves by attending the  
MoMA. Indeed, the experience of the piece did not, as the exhibition title might suggest, reflect that 
'The Artist is Present', so much as enable 'The Audience' to be 'Present'. Or at the least question 
whether the artist was Abramović or each person sitting in front of her. 
My thesis in some ways explores this notion of presence, which is very often negatively impacted 
on by the authoritative gaze. In the present instance, 'fetishists' have historically been defined,  
ethnologically demonised and psychiatrically pathologised by the dominant discourses of various 
contemporary eras, thereby attracting undue attention. Yet their subjectivities have largely been  
ignored, and they remain subjectively, albeit not discursively invisible. The various dominant  
discourses on 'fetishism' since its genesis in the sixteenth century have assumed that 'fetishists' are 
in some essentialist, foundationalist or determinist way evil or ill. In postmodernist times, they have 
been assumed to be ineffably subject to dominant discourses, and the epistemological focus has 
been on how their practices have either perpetuated or subverted normativities. All these discourses 
make a range of assumptions about the value and meaning of their lives, and effectively assume that 
they have no agency to make much of a choice themselves. As a result, people who incorporate  
material objects into their sexual scripts become some kind of façade or spectre, and their  
subjectivities are attenuated. More importantly, they are not acknowledged a space in which to 
explore their lives.
1145 Of course the mediated version which I saw on the internet is also subject to various readings, and I do not profess 
to have anything but a subjective response to what I saw. As I imply in my argument, this sense of subjective 
impression is part of the concern addressed by this thesis. As Casey Schwartz, who has a master's degree in 
psychodynamic neuroscience from University College London, notes of the exhibition in her blog article 'The Art of 
Silence' (http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-05-06/the-art-of-silence):
“Abramovic’s photos tap into the basic fascination we have with other human beings—the desire to stare, compare, 
assess, decode, and assume. In a sense, the Flickr stream is an extension of the Rorschach nature of the exhibit. 
Abramovic says nothing. She puts no boundaries on how long each visit will last. She offers little movement and 
very few expressions, though sometimes, her eyes well with tears. Across from her, people’s reactions have been 
unpredictable, and many walk away from the encounter with their own understanding of what went on.” 
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The Subject is Present
So many discourses to which people are subjected pretend to be authoritative accounts of what 
constitutes (appropriate) human experience. Some, such as the positivist constructions of the 
'feitiço' and 'fetishism', make the individual who explicitly explores the material world around him/
her into some kind of spectacle, subject to the disapproving gaze of either a deific force, a pre-
existing foundationalist internal drive or some other controlling entity outside of him/her. The ICD  
classifications of 'fetishism' merely perpetuate this notion through labelling people as 
a priori mentally ill, thereby adding a Gestapo-like disapproving gaze of the psychiatric community 
into the mix.
This kind of discursive prescription militates against individuals being present in the moment of  
their explorations of their emotions, and of the materiality in which their emotions play out, since  
they most often are at least partially aware of the prescriptions and proscriptions to their  
explorations of the world. Similarly, discursive accounts of human experience construct the 
individual as being irretrievably subject to dominant social forces to which they must conform, or  
which they must fight in order to maintain a little quiet space of contemplation in which to just 'be'.
Neither of these options is conducive to allowing the 'spectacle' (the psycho-medical subject) to 
become the spectator of his or her own life, and thereby to create his or her own meaning and 
comprehension of the rather strange phenomenon of material existence. Rather, both options force 
people into seeing themselves as one side of a binary, in opposition to other people (whether some 
kind of authority or the faceless scowl of a judging public) and subject to their 
scrutiny1146. Even if individuals have loosened themselves from the shackles of monotheistic 
religion (which many have not), they remain bound by (hetero)normative prescriptions based on  
binaries of sexuality and sexual orientation which lock them into claiming either/or identities as  
'gay'/'straight', 'mind/body', 'me/object' and/or 'me/other-purportedly-unitary-human'. More 
importantly, in the face of these perceived prescriptions, people most often marshal their own life 
performances, in the Butlerian sense, trying desperately to conform to 'God's will', 'sanity', or 
'normal sexuality'. In so doing, they remain inscrutable to themselves, and thereby remain absent 
from their phenomenal experiences, and thereby, ultimately, from their own short lives.
This thesis is an attempt to counter such thinking, and in some small way to re-set the clock so that 
(psycho-medical) subjects need not inexorably be prescriptively bound by either history or fictions 
1146 Perpich, D (2005) Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity. In Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 
(Summer 2005) 75-91. See later for argument pertaining to discourse and the connectedness of people and the 
material world.
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of indomitable (heteronormative) control, while still recognising the inevitable influence of both. In 
so doing, I argue against simple cause-effect thinking, and advocate for conceiving of sexuality in  
terms of complex relations in the Butlerian mould, whereby thinking of sexuality as an effect rather 
than a cause is a way of recognising that effect is often not separable from the things out of which it  
comes and is expressed1147. Such things are material objects, which is particularly visible in the 
context of (same-sex) sexual practices which incorporate material objects, or what  
epistemologically remains labelled 'fetishism' or 'fetish sex'.
The thesis is not about the power dynamics between people, which, in the context of 'gay male  
fetish sexuality' often takes place through performances of bondage, discipline and sado-
masochism1148. Rather, it is about the quiet sexual spaces in which individuals experiment with  
physical objects, and thereby explore what it might mean to them to be a sentient being in a world  
constituted by their own and other people's and objects' materiality, which it is impossible to escape, 
s i nce “ [w]e a re so r e l i an t on t h ings t ha t we a re o f t en i nsepa rab l e f rom 
them”1149. By acknowledging that sexuality unfolds in conversation with the things which constitute 
material culture, we can see how embodied beings 're-orient' themselves through practices, which  
incorporate things that materialise what we call sexuality. But at the same time we should be careful 
not to make sexuality into a 'thing' itself, made up of some kind of collection of bodily practices, 
tastes, pleasures, desires, moral judgements and so on1150. Rather, I suggest, we need to de-reify 
'things', by which I mean both bundles of ideas and material objects, thereby opening them up, and 
making of sexuality an opened-outward and connected function, and putting together what is  
separated into sexes, sexualities and sexual orientations1151.
This is clearly not what psychopathologising discourses do. Instead they perpetuate fictions that 
people are objectively identifiable, and concomitantly are necessarily 'bad', 'mad' or 'sad', or running 
screaming from these states. These fictions serve to prevent subjects from learning about and 
experiencing themselves, and finding alternative ways of being on their own terms. They keep 
people locked into closed circuits of self-definition which perpetuate a misery most often classified  
in heteronormative terms. They thereby inhibit people from recognising their own subjectively-
phrased worth, and reconsidering and re-inventing themselves incrementally on an ongoing basis. 
1147 Butler, J (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: Routledge
1148 See introduction
1149 Graham, M (2004) Thinking Sex, Thinking Gender. In GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 2004 
10(2):299-303
1150 Graham, M (2004) ibid
1151 Graham, M (2004) ibid
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This latter option is what this thesis attempts to open up, whether or not individuals can or want to 
do so in given instances.
Clearly the 'fetish' games and the social spaces in which they take place serve a function for 
'fetishists'. Sometimes these games cover up deep emotional pain, sometimes they hide deep desires 
for 'normality', and sometimes for a while they switch off, or at least turn down the volume of, 
heteronormative assumptions around materiality, and the roles these subjects are expected to play.  
This is not to deny the power of discourse in the construction of sexual subjects, nor of the cultural  
power-plays which predominate. Yet it begs the question as to which metatheoretical frameworks  
should be adopted for same-sex activity incorporating material objects, if not the 
psychopathologising and heteropatriarchy-prescribing mechanisms laid down in such psycho-
medical categorisations as the ICD classifications and diagnostic criteria for 'fetishism'.
Given the identity-politics-based social and political system which predominates, and the 
dominance of heteronormative discourses both inside academia and popular culture, there should 
clearly be something to replace these classifications and diagnostic criteria. Failing which, scholars 
and psycho-medical practitioners, many of whom outside poststructuralist studies are arguably  
rather reactionary, cannot/refuse to see past dualisms, and will replace the current explicitly 
heteronormative diatribes with implicit ones of the same flavour.
Clarification should therefore be obtained on what is to replace the ICD's categorical definition of 
'fetishism' (and therefore 'fetishist') beyond the object-focused and/or foundationalist diatribes of 
psychoanalysis. Clarification should also, therefore, be obtained as to what is to replace the ICD's 
purported 'description' of 'fetish practices' incorporated into the diagnostic criteria.
These parameters govern the question asked by this thesis: what led up to the dualist metatheory of  
the ICD classifications and diagnostic criteria on 'fetishism', and with what should they be replaced?
The answer, as I have argued, is simply that a metatheoretical structure for psycho-medical practice  
s h o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e t h e ( n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t ) d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n p e o p l e 
inter se. It should also acknowledge the distinctions between people and material objects in  
complex ways. It should distinguish between people (currently attempted through the ICD's 
classification of 'fetishism') and practices (currently established through the ICD's diagnostic 
criteria). More crucially, however, as I have argued, it should acknowledge the connecting points  
between people, and between people and objects. 
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In so doing, I have attempted to clarify two things:
the ways in which people (heretofore known as 'fetishists') cannot be pinned down into 
essentialist, foundationalist or determinist categories, and cannot be defined or categorised  
either by comparing them to material objects, whether heteronormatively prescribed or  
proscribed, or by assuming some kind of essentialist, foundationalist or determinist subjective 
constitution; and
since subjects cannot be defined in advance through certain specific criteria, subjects' 
practices do not reflect simplistic, identifiable pathologies, and are neither purely discursively  
created nor purely driven through unfettered choice borne of their material circumstances.
As such, the argument of this thesis serves to clear the metatheoretical playing field in relation to  
what is psycho-medically viewed as 'fetishism', by running two arguments side by side and yet 
overlapping each other.
The primary argument is an exploration of metatheory underpinning psycho-medical discourses on  
'fetishism', and arguing in favour of a queer phenomenological perspective to replace the existing 
divisive one. This argument is based on clarifying a scholarly position on ontologies of the personal.
The second argument, which is implicit in and intertwines with the first, underlies the framework I 
propose that 'fetishists' cannot, contrary to historical epistemologies, be defined in any essentialist, 
foundationalist or determinist way, and therefore cannot be 'defined'. Rather, sexuality which 
incorporates material objects (which is arguably all sexuality), is not a 'diagnosable illness', but is 
rather a potential personal transformatory practice which re-aligns and re-orients subjective worth. 
This framework specifically does not comment on the extent to which subjects become aware of the 
political implications to their practices, nor does it deal with how heteronormativity is discursively 
perpetuated. It therefore does not explore how subjects either do or do not perpetuate  
heteronormativity, nor are inherently subversive in these practices. Such an approach therefore  
neither describes nor prescribes overt political action on the part of subjects, but is, I argue, a  
compelling value-neutral metatheoretical foundation from which scholars and psycho-medical  
professionals can work, and behind which they cannot hide their own pre-existing normative 
assumptions and thereby explicitly or implicitly perpetuate heteronormativities.  
On this basis, such scholars and practitioners can, I suggest, be held more accountable for their 
actions, without the dubious luxury of relying on inherently normative constructions of 'fetish 
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sexuality' to justify their own political conservatism. 
On the basis of this metatheory, and in response to conservative agendas, queer-aligned scholars, 
activists and psycho-medical professionals can therefore actively counter normativities and 
challenge the status-quo in more direct ways.
The Explicit Argument: 'The Subject is Present'
Chapters 1 and 2 locate the research methodologically and politically. Chapters 3 and 4 largely 
follow a Foucaultian genealogical analysis of the development of the epistemologies of 'fetishism',  
which, I argue, have at all points along the way been divisive and 'fetish object'-focused. Chapters 5 
and 6 then suggest a break with this history by approaching 'fetish sexuality' from a more inclusive,  
subject-oriented, queer phenomenological paradigm, which does not merely re-establish people who 
incorporate material objects into their sexual scripts as clearly identifiable and therefore essentialist  
notions of human beings.
Chapter Summary
Chapter 1 establishes the methodological underpinnings for the research, noting that the thesis is  
neither a positivist hypothetico-deductivist work, nor is it an empiricist unfolding of 'knowledge', 
pre-existing truths or incontrovertible 'reality', borne of experientially or experimentally derived  
'facts'. Instead, it suggests that the thesis both argues and reflects a need for change in the 
underlying epistemologies for viewing humans, not in terms of simplistic oppositionalist diatribes, 
but through explorations of process, relationality and an awareness of materiality.  This has entailed  
discourse analytic qualitative research which reflects a feminist/queer epistemology and 
participatory methodologies, which themselves reflect the substantive argument in a recursive way.
Chapter 2 addresses social and political locations of 'gay male fetish sexuality', arguing that 
simplistically conceived gay rights discourses are inappropriate for both political and social claims 
for validation. These paradigms, often premised on essentialist views of identity as unitary and  
coherent, are perhaps (partially) useful (or at least pragmatically utilitarian, given that they are  
theoretically flawed) when applied to political claims for access to rights denied to sexual 
minorities, yet are inappropriate for the revision of psychopathological metatheory (so-called 
'cultural' claims), based on demands for the recognition of value and for exclusion from policing.
259
 
 
 
 
More appropriate frameworks for approaching social change lie, I suggest, in queer theories, which 
conceive of identity as multiple and complex. However, queer theories must be mobilised 
pragmatically in concert with gay rights discourses, which should be re-assessed in light of their 
highly problematic flaws. In this regard, I have called on queer processual locations for rephrasing  
'gay male fetish sexuality'. In particular, I argue that same-sex sexuality incorporating material  
objects should be located as a resource for recognising subjective value. This, as argued in chapter 
5, does not assume a liberal humanist essentialised unitary self but rather relies on a subject which  
is a kind of relationship, dialectically constituted between embodied materiality and 
(heteronormative) discourse. As argued in Chapter 6, it thereby assumes a subject which is mutable 
potential and capable of self-re-orientation.
Chapter 3 argues the contemporary psychiatric definitions and discourses of 'sexual fetish' have 
come through an historical trajectory of colonialist discourses and Freudian psychoanalytic  
epistemologies, both of which have focused primarily on the fetish-object as the nexus of definition  
both for 'fetish practices' and therefore 'fetishists'. This focus has resulted in 
multiple and contradictory beliefs in both a recognition and the disavowal of difference which has  
obscured subjectivities and agency through classifying the sexual 'fetishist' as essentially 
identifiable.
I argue that the early psychoanalytic premises for 'fetishism' presume patriarchal heteronormativity 
and assume that 'fetishists' are merely reliving childish psychological attachments. They 
problematically assume that the 'fetishist' inherently adopts the subjectivity of a fictively generic 
heterosexual male. Notwithstanding attempts to remedy these failings by re-working Freud's 
premises, and/or by calling on a linguistic/discursive power-focus, psychoanalytic constructions of 
'fetishism' do not address the fundamental premise of 'lack', which is inherently 'fetish-object'  
focused since it describes the human psyche as irretrievably and oppositionally defined in terms of 
the absence of physically or linguistically/discursively described 'objects'. 
This results, I suggest, in the tendency to obscure subjectivities through the inappropriate 
prioritising of rationality over valid agency, thereby hiding the personal under the political and  
under discipline-specific practices, and failing to acknowledge the fluidity between consciousness 
and environment, and the complexity of human processes driven by a various internal and external,  
personal and political, rational and emotional influences.
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Chapter 4 argues that the ICD (& DSM)1152 classifications and diagnostic criteria which codify the 
psychopathology of 'fetishism' are inadequate on two main fronts, since they essentialise human 
experience and perpetuate heteronormative discourses through reproduction of structuralist 
categorical and therefore diagnostic impulses.
Firstly, I argue that the classifications merely inappropriately repeat the discredited historical  
classifications of ‘perversion’, through incorrectly assuming an uncomplicated, non-contextualised 
sexual interest in material objects by an abstracted psychical subject. They thereby ontologically  
assume an essential value to (hetero)normativity, and fail to describe 'fetish' as played out in the 
lives of people who enjoy the sexual company of material objects. Rather, I suggest, they 
prescribe sexual behaviour through essentialist and foundationalist (hetero)normative expectations 
lodged in the categories themselves. 'Fetishism' therefore becomes a psychopathological 
terminological construct rather than a functional description of practices. In contradistinction, 
however, the participants' perceptions and practices of 'fetish' (which these participants have 
reclaimed from 'fetishism') indicate dialectical configurations between material objects of sexual  
interest, sexual partners, subjective perceptions, emotional associations and heteronormative social  
constructions1153.
Secondly, I argue that the diagnostic guidelines for 'fetishism' provide little clarity on the 
circumstances which do or do not constitute pathology, and inappropriately import both moral and 
statistical heteronormative comparables into the diagnostic process through the diagnostic 
requirement that subjects be psychically attached to 'unusual objects'. Further, the requirement of 
'distress and impairment' is, I suggest, based on inappropriate (normative) circular arguments 
relating to prior assumptions of pathology and psychical addiction/compulsion, which undermine 
the notion of subjects' psychical agency. Since it is inappropriate both to conflate and to 
psychopathologise issues such as addiction, compulsion and 'fetishism', this indicates that the 
diagnostic criteria fail to describe the complexity of subjective psychical states and the multiple and 
complex ways in which people process their emotions or understand their practices. Instead, as with  
the psychopathological definitions, the diagnostic criteria normatively prescribe sexual activity,  
thereby inappropriately perpetuating dominant (heteropatriarchal) normative social constructions by 
rationalising the construction of 'fetishism' as a pathology while valuing other compulsive,  
1152 World Health Organization. (2004). International Classification of Diseases 10 (2nd ed). Geneva: 
WHO. ICD-10, and American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
4-TR. Washington DC: APA.
1153 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, more functional bases for understanding the phenomenon of people-interacting-
sexually-with-material-objects therefore lie in an epistemological focus on the subject as he/she interacts 
phenomenologically with discourse and his/her environment.
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repetitive practices like heterosexuality.
As I argue, these issues should be dealt with by focusing on the subjective concerns and 
circumstances of psychical subjects, thereby obviating all categories and diagnostic criteria, and 
finding alternative ways to describe sexuality which incorporate both normative and non-normative 
sexual variety. One compelling approach is to rephrase the historical variations of 'perversity' as  
'transgressive sexualities', approaching them as variations of sexual diversity and calling on 
distinctions between coercive and non-coercive sexual activity, subject to closer definition of  
coercion, danger, damage and consent, which are themselves socially constructed notions. Such 
solutions, however, merely describe sexualities and sexual activities from an external perspective,  
and do not successfully explain in detail the ways in which subjectivities (which incorporate what is  
often referred to as 'internal' psychical processes) interact with the cultural and phenomenal  
environment, and therefore the kinds of agency a subject expresses in sexual contexts.
T h e Interjection sets the scene for the remainder of the thesis, by contextualising the most  
appropriate scholarly role for laying bare ontological metatheories suitable to replace the  
inappropriate heteronormative ICD classifications and diagnostic guidelines, while avoiding 
essentialising discourses for both subjects and practices. 
It argues, through referring to the arguments in Chapters 1 and 2, that a discourse analytic method 
unpacking participants' repetitions of heteronormative discourses is appropriate for laying bare the 
present circumstances of subjects, and for 'political' claims for inclusion in rights-based structures. 
Men such as the present participants who incorporate material objects into their same-sex sexual 
practices clearly d o reproduce heteropatriarchy through their practices, reifying heteronormative 
scripts by repeating them, albeit in unusual spaces and with unusual sexual partners. Yet at the same  
time, they make these practices explicit, albeit not necessarily consciously or in public. This  
indicates that they undermine the (hetero)normative assumptions around the immateriality of human  
existence and the priority of the material over the immaterial. In so doing, they refuse to accept that 
objects are merely objects to be (hetero)normatively owned, and that people are inherently separate  
to objects and thereby cannot be (hetero)normatively owned. They play sexual games which mimic  
the putative 'ownership' of material objects through games where they are at times 'owners' of 
people, or themselves the 'owned'. Although these games can validly be discursively unpacked as 
reproductions of heteropatriarchal power-plays, they are at the same time subtle challenges to the 
specific forms of power which dominate, and which imply that only men may dominate and only 
women may be dominated.
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They further play sexual games which fudge the distinctions between people and objects, by calling 
on those objects as extensions of people. For example, through replacing a human penis with a  
dildo, they question whether the human penis is indeed human or an object itself. In corollary, they  
challenge the (heteronormative) primacy of human-human procreative sex by playing with said 
dildo in a same-sex environment, thereby subverting assumptions that male-female penetration is 
the only acceptable sexual option.
However, in a political and social environment which prioritises dualist thinking and identity-
politics, such an approach can tend to be inappropriately co-opted as indicating some kind of 
essentialist, foundationalist or determinist constitution of the sexual subject through mistaking 
discursive analysis as substantive description. It is therefore, I suggest, inappropriate as a basis for  
'cultural' claims seeking the recognition of personal value, and demanding that subjects be excluded  
from either explicit policing or discursively constructed (hetero)normative comparisons. Such is the  
present argument which seeks to (re)conceive metatheory in a forward-looking way for use by 
psycho-medical practitioners dealing with subjects who incorporate material objects into their  
sexual scripts. 
I argue that it is further inappropriate since a queer scholarship should not only reveal 
heteronormativities where they occur, but should refrain from perpetuating heteronormativity by 
prioritising such normative dualities by means of the research being done. Rather, I suggest, an 
exploration of how discourse intersects with the material is a more appropriate starting-point for re-
theorising sexuality incorporating material objects. This sets the scene for the remaining two 
chapters which clarify metatheory on the constitution of the (sexual) subject (Chapter 5) and the 
practices of incorporating material objects into sexual scripts (Chapter 6)
Chapter 5 argues that acknowledging the subject in sexual practices by way of a replacement for the 
heteronormative prescriptions in the ICD's classifications of 'fetishism' does not simply entail re-
directing object-focused discourses to matching ones focusing on a simplistically-conceived 
putatively independent subject. The latter would simply be to inappropriately repeat essentialist,  
foundationalist and determinist (liberal humanist) discourses on the purportedly unitary nature of  
individuals. Rather, notions of 'subject' should acknowledge the dialectical roles in subject-creation 
of subject-as-material-being, object-as-material-thing, discourse and embodied experience. 
As I argue, 'fetish sexuality' is emergent, multiple, and mobile, and necessitates a complex  
understanding of 'nature', 'culture' and discourse. In this way, 'fetish subjects' are not merely 
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pathological minds, nor in any finite way 'stand-alone' entities separable from fetish objects, other  
people or the environment more broadly. Rather, they are entities dialectically-described in relation  
to discourse and materiality. They are created and maintained in the transactional intersections and  
relations between the embodied being, discourse and environment, the material and discursive 
limits between which are fluid. These transactional intersections lodge people into a shared spatio-
temporal environment which is the context for lived experience which is organised in its own  
structure in relation to intentionality, embodiment, intersubjectivity and temporality.  
This implies that there is really no such thing as either 'fetishism', or 'the fetishist', as determined in 
the ICD classifications, and that people who explicitly incorporate material objects into their sexual  
scripts should not be approached as if they are in some way separate to other people or objects.
Chapter 6 argues that people such as the participants nevertheless identify their sexual practices as 
'fetish', which may imply that perhaps they are merely repeating heteronormative discourses in  
some kind of ineffable and determinist way. Yet, I suggest, if the subject is constituted through a 
dialectical relationship between discourse and materiality as I argue in Chapter 5, that subject 
cannot merely be subject to dominant discourses, and must have some agency.
This chapter explores the constitution of (sexual) agency and the functions which sexual practices 
incorporating material objects fulfil. It argues that sexual activity involving material objects is 
neither the pathologisable practice prescribed in ICD diagnostic criteria or in early psychoanalytic 
theory which similarly postulates the subject as irretrievably the victim of foundationalist drives and  
therefore has no substantive agency. Nor, I argue, does the subject live in exclusive perpetual 
reaction to discursive constructs as proposed by much poststructuralist thinking.
Rather, I suggest that agency is grounded in phenomenological experience and personal meaning 
derived from the orientation of the self in relation to the material world which surrounds the subject,  
yet mediated by normative constraints. Desires and choices, rather than being causally defined and  
backwards-looking in response to pre-existing frameworks or experiences, are, I suggest, 
dialectically oriented towards both normative discursive constructions, and embodied experience 
with absent, impossible, future, past and ideal objects. Agency is therefore constructive, yet not 
deterministic, and the agent exercises choice, albeit largely discursively bounded.  This implies that  
some subjects will be more influenced by discourses, while others will be less so. Concomitantly,  
some will be more influenced by their material circumstances than others.
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I argue that this complex orientation and agency enables subjects sexually to call on the social  
collectives and the material world around them to re-align themselves both socially and 
emotionally. In turn, this re-phrased and re-oriented sense of (non-unitary) 'self' allows them the 
freedom to rephrase their perceptions of their sexuality as being a discursively-described failed 
space, and towards an empowered and functional sense of their own subjective value. This takes 
place through subjects re-orienting themselves phenomenologically to the present and the future as 
valuable beings. This creates a conceptual space in which subjects engage in awareness 
development of where/who they feel themselves to be (i.e. their current positive subjective 
meaning), and where/who they aspire to be (i.e. the future-oriented subjective value). They thereby 
develop awareness of their needs and desires, and engage complex notions of agency, thereby 'echo-
locating' themselves in relation to other people (and things) through learning, imagining inherent 
possibilities, and realising them phenomenologically. This adds up, I suggest, to accessing personal 
and social value.
I argue that seeing non-normative human sexual relations incorporating material objects (i.e. 'gay 
male fetish sexuality') as a means of recognising personal value, both in terms of human-human  
relations, and in terms of a validated relationship to materiality, means that, through  
phenomenological 'projective intentionality', transactional flourishing for 'fetishists' is about a sense 
of location in the present and future. This paradigm acknowledges the role of the body/embodiment 
in 'fetish sexuality' practices in order to develop complex cartographies of human subjectivities. At  
the same time it validates consensual, 'gay male fetish sexual practices' as potentially self-
transformative and socially-transformative (albeit not necessarily practices which politically  
destabilise normativities), and as resources for realising subjective value in a larger normative social  
environment which marginalises alterity.
Accordingly, instead of the relationships between 'fetishist' and 'fetish object' indicating a 'cause' of 
presumed pathological activities, I suggest that such relationships dialectically are both created by  
and create new forms of subjective meaning for people who incorporate material objects into their 
sexual scripts and the environment around them. This takes place through such individuals-in-
community perpetuating or undermining stereotypes, juggling cultural norms of sexuality and 
gender, and appropriating or rejecting socially approved sexual roles (or various combinations of 
these, dependent on their subjective circumstances and the forms and power of dominant discourses 
in their localised environments1154.
1154  as with the present participants, who cannot really be 'classed' as 'fetishists' in any singular way, since they have 
various interests, desires and world-views, some of which perpetuate heteropatriarchy and some of which subvert it
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Personal 'Transformation'
This sexual 'subject-orientation' (rather than 'object-focus'), which acknowledges that people are 
multiple and that the subjective meanings of their practices cannot be tied down in advance,  
recognises that people are constituted in the interstices between material and discursive constraints,  
through phenomenological conceptions of embodied experience.
This paradigm does not, however, prescribe the extent and duration of the personal transformation 
enabled by fetish. Nor does it intend to, since this would disengage the notion of individual agency.  
Rather, as I argue, in exploring their sexuality, subjects who incorporate material objects into their 
sexual scripts, qua 'actively becoming' beings, choose to enter the social and psychical environment  
of 'fetish' in which they have the opportunity to explore and value themselves, and thereby 
potentially to transform themselves emotionally if they don't like what they see. Neither the need 
for, nor the activation of transformation are pre-determined, nor is the extent or duration of this 
transformation, which depends on the individual in question, the specifics of the (discursive) 
environment in which he/she lives, and his/her own experiential journey. Therefore, I suggest, 
whether and to what extent individuals are psycho-socially benefited or caused detriment cannot be 
determined in advance by grand psychological, sociological or indeed poststructuralist narratives.
Ontologically, therefore, people can to a greater or lesser extent choose what to make of their lives,  
and should not be prescribed some specific formulation of 'mental health' (as opposed to 
'pathology') or 'well-being' (as opposed to 'illness'). Of course, as I imply in chapters 5 and 6, those 
people who occupy the discursively marginalised groups have much less (if any) of a choice than 
those who are more advantaged, but, as Foucault would arguably have pointed out, these dialectics 
are not set in stone, and power dynamics can shift and flow, depending on what people individually 
and collectively do with them. Further, as implied in Chapters 5 and 6, the desires and choices of 
those who are discursively prioritised are thereby neither inherently more nor less valuable than 
those of the most marginalised. Even though people are discursively bounded, they call on the 
contemporary power-plays, together with the materiality at their disposal to make sense of their  
lives.
Psycho-medical frameworks aimed at encouraging human benefit should therefore not assume that 
subjective meaning is defined from somewhere outside of the subject, such as through a deific 
force, (hetero)normative (or 'anti-heteronormative') discursive priorities or any other essentialist, 
foundationalist or determinist conceptions. This kind of philosophical basis, which imports 
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recognition of the inherent value of all things is implicit in such approaches as buddhism and 
'ubuntu'1155, and seeks to manage human processes and social structures through recognising the 
presence and complexity of individuality-in-community, rather than denying it by imposing  
supervening foundationalist assumptions or determinist projections onto human 
endeavour1156.
Tension, Equilibrium & 'Emotional Transformation'
The complex subjectivities, agency and 're-orientation' away from (hetero)normativities which I  
have argued in Chapters 5 and 6 imply that the discursive and the material co-exists in a kind of  
tension. In more concrete terms, some 'fetishists' are more comfortable moving out of their very 
restrictive heteropatriarchal circumstances by merely going to a few parties and dressing up in  
leathers. Others challenge heteronorms by enjoying proscribed experiences such as 'golden 
showers'. Others relish the chance to challenge what some might see as the very foundations of 
heteropatriarchy: the fictive distinctions between male and female, by engaging in cross-dressing or 
even transcending gender (for example 'gender benders' or transgendered people). This implies that 
there are a diversity of interests, and perhaps that there is some kind of discursive barrier of 
propriety beyond which certain individuals are not prepared to go, while others are. Yet clearly there 
is no objective line to cross, failing which transgressive practices would all be the same, which is 
patently not the case, given the diversity of desires and practices. 
This in turn implies that there is some kind of tension between competing discourses and how they 
manifest. For example pertaining to the current participants, the discourses which prioritise  
heteronormativity have a certain pull on them, while those which prioritise what they might see as  
'transgression' (for example pornography showing macho men in sexual situations which arguably 
repeats heteronormativity) pull them in another direction. The participants' present circumstances  
1155  Ubuntu is the Southern African indigenous belief-system that 'people are people through other people'. As 
Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu has said, “Africans have this thing called UBUNTU. It is about the essence of 
being human, it is part of the gift that Africa will give the world. It embraces hospitality, caring about others, being 
able to go the extra mile for the sake of others. We believe that a person is a person through another person, that my 
humanity is caught up, bound up, inextricably, with yours.”
See Ngoenha, S.E. (2006) Ubuntu: New model of global justice? In Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems, Vol. 5 (2) 2006: pp125-134. Ngoenha argues that injustice and inequalities  cannot necessarily 
be dealt with by liberalism. Ubuntu, as restorative rather than punitive justice, could enable a weaving, or re-
weaving of relations at the planetary level rather than deepening wounds.
See also LJ Nyaumwe, L.J. & Mkabela, Q (2007) Revisiting The Traditional African Cultural Framework Of 
Ubuntuism: A Theoretical Perspective. In Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge 
Systems, Vol. 6 (2) 2007 pp152-163; Nkondo, G.M. (2007) Ubuntu as public policy in South Africa: A conceptual 
framework. In International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and  
Transdisciplinarity, Volume 2, Issue 1 June 2007, pp88-100
1156 This is not to say that the frameworks of both buddhism and indigenous Southern African belief-systems themselves 
avoid religious over- and under-tones, or are implemented in the same ways.
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reflect that tension. Although they may have 'normal' lives as sales representatives or businessmen, 
their sense of self is equally constructed by their sexual exploits and what they see as their  
'transgressions'.
Similarly, it implies a tension between dominant discourses and embodied desire. For example, 
even though the dominant discourses compel the participants to lead 'ordinary' middle class lives, 
they still feel compelled to 'transgress' these norms through their sexual exploits (which, as 
discussed in the Interjection, are often merely heteronormative repetitions).
Further therefore, as I have argued in Chapter 5, if individuals are neither entirely materially nor  
discursively constructed, there must for each individual be a point at which 'transgression' becomes  
such, and is not merely discursively defined as transgressive in some abstract way. In other words,  
that some 'fetishists' take pleasure in having a dildo inserted in their anuses while others do not, or  
prefer inserting it, means that there is an ontological fluidity between the material and the  
discursive, which is clearly visible in the diversity of practices between individuals. It also implies 
that, even though individuals such as the participants seem often to define their own rigid limits in  
relation to (or perhaps in fear of) discursive norms, such limits are discursively described, not 
exclusively (hetero)normatively defined nor proscribed in response to contemporary norms. In this  
regard, an individual's relationship with both the material and the discursive is potentially fluid, and  
shifts over time as discourses shift and flow.
This in turn indicates that each individual must experience some kind of tension between what is 
discursively proscribed, what is discursively prescribed, and the material things which represent 
such discursive instructions.
This further implies that, in order for individuals to be comfortable with their sexual desires (such  
as sexuality incorporating material objects), the subjective reasons for their enjoyment (for example 
that it makes them feel 'masculine' or 'loved' or 'transgressive' or a million other things), and the 
material expression of that enjoyment (for example, having a large penis-shaped object inserted into  
their anus), there is some kind of personal/subjective (rather than objective) aspirational equilibrium 
which a subject is seeking to achieve. In other words, subjects cannot, as I have argued, be  
compared to some foundationalist psychodynamic comparison point such as an inevitable lack, 
which is backward-looking. Rather, by implication, their 'personal transformation' is explained in 
terms of some kind of emotional equilibrium which they individually are trying to achieve given the 
discursive injunctions to which they are subject, and taking place within the material environment  
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in which they live (but of course which material environment is itself (heteropatriarchally) 
discursively described/constructed as being either 'good' or 'bad'). As implied by the fluid nature of 
relationships between the material and the discursive, this 'transformation' is neither inherently 
connected to nor disconnected from 'fetish' interests or 'fetish objects'. 
Further, as is implicit in both the notions of a non-unitary subject and 'transformation', 'fetish 
interests' change and mutate over time. This in turn indicates that 'personal re-orientation/
transformation' does not involve the 'cure' of pathology, which notion often underlies contemporary 
psycho-medical discourses.
'Transformation' of Personal Futures
In an attempt to obviate moralising language, many contemporary popular psycho-medical  
discourses which do not speak of 'curing pathology' speak of assisting 'functionality' and 
encouraging 'well-being'. Such are the ministrations of the million dollar 'self-help', 'healing' and 
'happiness' industries which offer Oprah-fied notions of mental health through instant gratification. 
These conceptions imply a value-neutral state whereby subjectivity is not influenced by  
normativity, which is patently false1157, as is the further implication that 'healing' comes from 
somewhere outside of the subject1158, which is merely more of the same kind of thinking as in 
psychopathological constructs dealt with in chapters 3 and 4. 
Such constructs are subject to discourse-based critiques in terms of class, race and sexual  
orientation, whereby dominant power relations prioritise bourgeois ('white', heteropatriarchal) 
conceptions of 'happiness' enabled only through access to resources. Yet at the same time, clearly  
material wealth is not a guarantor of either emotional stability or 'well-being', failing which the 
above mentioned industries would not have any future, and the only happy people populating the 
world would be wealthy. 'Personal transformation' can therefore not be predominantly a social 
phenomenon compared to any objective (normative) standards. Rather, in line with the arguments 
set out in chapters 5 and 6, I suggest that 'personal transformation' is equatable to 'emotional  
presence', as contextualised by the subject's relationships and the intersections between dominant 
discourses and phenomenal circumstances.
1157 I suggest that the same arguments apply here as in those applicable to the pathologising discourses described in 
Chapter 4
1158 Whether that be through a new and improved version of religion, or a self-help book by an 'expert' offering solutions 
in 10 easy steps
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This does not equate to some kind of liberal humanist 'transformation' which implies that the  
subject is meant to transform from some unsubstantiated normative sub-par state to an equally 
normative 'optimal', utopian state, both of which states are premised on fictions of a stable and static  
'self'. As described in Chapter 5, the subject is not ontologically unitary, but rather is a bundle of 
fluid possibility and is therefore transforming, shifting and changing all the time. 'Personal  
transformation' therefore equates to 'coming into ones self', whatever the subject sees that 'self' to be  
in light of the dominance of discursive instructions and the subjective perceptions of materiality.  
Indeed, since that 'self' is an entity of flow and fluidity, 'transformation' describes merely a  
movement from one subjectively oriented state to another. For some, like the less 'transgressive' 
participants who largely recreate heteronorms through their practices, this partially means shifting 
social paradigms (re-orienting themselves) so that they see themselves as valuable  
in terms of social norms. For other more 'transgressive' subjects who subvert such norms in more 
express ways, this equates to transcending the subjective need to rely on heteronorms to a greater  
extent for their self-worth. Either way, I suggest that there can be no objective determination as to 
the function or end-goal of 'personal transformation', or indeed, as I have argued in Chapter 6, what 
counts as 'healing'. 
In the case of some subjects this might mean overcoming the internalisation of marginalisation by 
seeing themselves as more 'normal'. In other cases, this might mean destabilising the very nature of 
what is (normatively) socially defined as valuable, and therefore the need to be recognised by 
society at all. This latter of course does not describe or prescribe how society sees that particular 
subject, and therefore whether or how he/she is accepted, but merely delineates the aim of the 
subject to become less attached to what discursive prescriptions mean to him/her, and therefore to  
how such prescriptions will influence his/her life going forward.
More particularly, as I have implied throughout this thesis, this conception of 'emotional presence' 
cannot be based on essentialist, foundationalist or determinist conceptions of the subject, approval  
by some deific or foundationalist force, the order of 'nature', normative heteropatriarchal notions of 
social status or 'scientific cures'. Rather, following anti-(hetero)normative arguments of queer 
theory, it must entail notions of what is subjectively valuable. In other words, subjects 'personal 
transformation' entails recognising the subjective value of what gives meaning and order to (his/her) 
human life1159. 'Emotional presence' can therefore not be a moralistic or deterministic position which  
1159 See Ahmed, S. (2007–8). The Happiness Turn. In New Formations 63, no. Winter: 7–14. In this regard, as Ahmed 
appropriately notes, it is more fruitful to look at what 'happiness' does than trying to clearly define what it 
is.
For different philosophical traditions of happiness see also McGill, V.J. (1967) The Idea of Happiness. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger; Sumner, L.W. (1996) Welfare, Happiness and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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prioritises any specific social and cultural pre-requisites in order to enable feelings of self-worth. It 
cannot come about through comparisons with objective standards of 'ought' (in other words by 
saying that subjects should be 'happy' or 'well' if they achieve certain specific goals, or if they 'are' 
certain things). Yet it is not entirely internal either, in that what counts as 'happiness' is often 
discursively defined in (hetero)normative terms (for example the prioritising of procreation as a part 
of the equation for happiness). This kind of 'emotional presence' is therefore not a closed list of 
what counts as aspirational.
Rather, temporality is important, whereby 'emotional presence' is an acknowledgement of present  
circumstances matched with what the subject hopes for, thereby creating a political and personal 
horizon for aspirations which do not (completely) rely on external circumstances for their  
justification or delivery1160. 
Further, this conception of 'emotional presence', however, is not one which only 
“relies on a very specific model of subjectivity, where one knows how one feels, and where the 
distinction between good and bad feeling is secure, forming the basis of subjective as well as social 
well-being”1161.
Rather, it incorporates conceptions of emotion based on a subject who is not necessarily fully  
consciously 'present' to him/herself (in other words not necessarily intelligible, but, as argued in 
Chapter 5, accessible). In this regard, 'emotional presence' cannot be about a perpetual sense of 
calm and placidity, but rather about the subjective ability to recognise and largely be at peace with  
him/herself both because of and despite feelings of ambivalence, confusion, depression and trauma 
within a broader discursive/social environment. In other words, it is about the subject being content  
to be undertaking a physico-emotional experience which sometimes has ups and sometimes downs, 
but where he/she believes he can deal with them, albeit with discomfort.
This notion of 'emotional presence' aligns with ‘positive psychology’ which both measures and 
a t tempts to maximise the extent to which posi t ive fee l ings impact on the 
individual1162.. As noted elsewhere, it is allied to 'presence' in a Buddhist sense which revolves 
around striving for a subjective sense of peace about one's being-in-the-world matched with an 
1160 See Ahmed, S. (2007–8). The Happiness Turn. In New Formations 63, no. Winter: 7–14
See also chapter 6 re arguments on temporality
1161 Ahmed, S. (2007–8). ibid
1162 See 'positive psychology', which started by critiquing how psychology takes anxiety, depression and negativity as 
object lesson. In this regard, see Argyle, M (1987) The Psychology of Happiness. London: Methuen, pp1;  Snyder, 
C.R. &  Lopez, S.J. (eds) (2002) The Handbook of Positive Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
Csíkszentmihály, M (2002) Flow: the Classic Work on How to Achieve Happiness. London: Rider & Co.. 
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acknowledgement of the ability and responsibility to make choices and decisions in a society which  
can never be utopian1163.
I suggest that this 'personal transformation/healing' encompasses a kind of pragmatic and inward-
looking or contemplative, (rather than foundationalist or determinist, personal psychical 
'functionality'), within a broader social sphere  conceived of dialogically and 
dialectically, whereby individuals engage in balanced ways with their community while at the same  
time mobilising their subjective (rather than commercial) resources to create meaning in their lives  
and behaving in ways which reflect an interdependence between themselves and the world around 
them, rather than either an independence or co-dependence.
Yet more than that, 'emotional presence' can be seen as some queer prospect of possibility, where 
identities and experiences are not bounded, but are fluid: “not that anyone might be queer, but that 
something queer might happen to anyone”1164. This possibility can be conceived by the individual as 
possibly attainable beyond him/herself and in his/her future, yet where the individual is empowered 
to look both within and beyond normativity to secure a comfortable position in the present from 
where to experience the 'hap' of 'happiness', the 'chance' of learning, and the appreciation of 
something new while acknowledging the circumstances of the present.1165 Such conceptions of 
' e m o t i o n a l p r e s e n c e ' f e e d i n t o v o i c e s a d v o c a t i n g g a y a f f i r m a t i v e 
therapy1166 and health psychology1167 in that it seeks not to essentialise experience, but rather to 
affirm the value of the individual in his/her circumstances and a broader social environment.
The Role of Psycho-Medical Practitioners
This implies that the role of psycho-medical practitioners is not to 'cure' a 'gay male fetishist'  
s u b j e c t b y m a k i n g h i s d e s i r e f o r s e x i n v o l v i n g m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s g o 
away1168. Rather, I suggest, the subject will be enabled to come to terms with his desires by being  
encouraged not to (heteronormatively) judge those desires as being either inherently 'good' or 'bad', 
1163 See Langdridge, D (2006) Ideology and Utopia: Social Psychology and the Social Imaginary of Paul Ricoeur. In 
Theory & Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 5, 641-659 (2006). 
1164 Haver, W (1997) Queer Research. In Golding, S. (ed) (1997) The Eight Technologies of Otherness. Routledge: New 
York, London, p288-291. 
1165 See chapter 2 re the role of queerness
1166 See Lebolt, J (1999) Gay Affirmative Psychotherapy: A Phenomenological Study. In Clinical Social Work 
Journal, 27(40), 355-370, Langdridge, D, in conversation with Kathleen Ritter (2006) Gay affirmative therapy: 
Perspectives from an ally. In Lesbian &Gay Psychology Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 253; Langdridge, D (2007) Gay 
Affirmative Therapy: A Theoretical Framework and Defence. In Journal of Gay & Lesbian 
Psychotherapy, Volume 11, Issue 1 & 2 June 2007 , pages 27 – 43
1167 See Yardley, L (1997) Material Discourses of Health and Illness. Routledge
1168 which such practitioner cannot do anyway, since, as discussed in Chapter 6, that will in principle conflict with the 
subject's agency: the subject enjoys his practices, albeit in a conflicted way, failing which he wouldn't do them
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but to embrace them within his own emotional capacities which are mediated by the extent and 
nature of those desires, and the social prescriptions to which he is subject.  He can thereby achieve a  
better understanding of what those desires represent, albeit not in terms of some abstract 
metaphorical representation relating to the subject's past and his desire to achieve some kind of  
missing 'wholeness' (i.e. lack), but rather in terms of what that subject seeks to achieve in a future-
oriented way. This does not, in turn, mean that the subject is only metaphorically seeking to achieve  
some kind of purely psychological sense of 'transformation', but rather that his psychical reality is 
necessarily and inherently interconnected with his sense of embodied self. This translates into 
feeling grounded both now, in the moment of sexual experience, and in the future, as though he 
belongs somewhere, both physically and emotionally and in an ongoing social way. This implies  
that the subject may not really be conflicted with his use of material objects, or with his sexuality,  
but with how his sexual choices will intersect with the normative prescriptions against them and the 
subjective associations he has with the material world and 'fetish objects'.
I suggest therefore that, if the subject is conflicted concerning his sexuality or desires (which would 
be his reason for going to a psycho-medical practitioner in the first place), on the basis of the 
arguments in Chapters 5 and 6, the practitioner should not try to 'cure' his past or present, but to 
encourage the intersection between his present and his sense of an ongoing future. Therefore, in 
order to assist the subject to attain 'personal transformation', psycho-medical practitioners cannot  
adopt some kind of (heteronormative) moralistic position such as those inherent in the ICD 
classifications and diagnostic criteria, but should rather assist the subject to come to terms with his 
life (and his sexuality) as it is, while encouraging his ability to marshal his agency to choose to 
narrow the gap between what he desires as an embodied experience and the normative pre/
proscriptions which stand in the way, thereby enabling him to choose an appropriate (middle) path. 
I suggest that the desired outcome is for the subject to neither reject nor embrace the practices 
wholesale, but to make an empowered emotional (rather than entirely rational) choice about how to 
move forward.
In other words, and simply put: I suggest that if a ('gay male fetishist') subject is uncomfortable with 
his sexual proclivities and desires to dress up as a dog and submit to the control of a Master, he 
should not be discouraged. Rather, I suggest, he should be encouraged to make an informed and  
empowered decision to choose on a deep emotional level to incorporate his desires more usefully 
into his present through looking to what he aspires to. His choice is his responsibility. However, this 
is not to suggest that this choice is merely pragmatically made. I suggest rather that he be  
encouraged to find a subjective sense of balance between his desires and his lifestyle, based on a  
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clearer understanding of how his desires may (but do not necessarily) represent a subjective sense 
of inadequacy or empowerment, or a complex combination of both which co-exist in the 
present1169. I suggest that it is important for the subject not to be compared to normative standards, 
but to be empowered to recognise how normative standards impact on his subjective sense of self. 
Clearly, given how materiality intersects with discourse, there is nothing inherently wrong with  
enjoying material objects as part of one's sexual script. The question is whether and how one is 
prepared to take responsibility for the emotional connections between desires and practices, and the 
potential social consequences of following through with those practices. I argue that this requires  
the subject to strive for a sense of balance, rather than merely buying into social opprobrium.
Implicit Arguments: A Personal Present vs A Political Future 
Historical scholarly epistemologies on 'fetishism' in both anthropological and psychiatric discourses 
created and perpetuated an ontological distinction between humans and material objects, and  
thereby perpetuated fictions that people are somehow separate to the world around them, and 
further are somehow 'better than' or 'more important' than everything else in the universe (and 
perhaps beyond). 
Through this thesis, and in particular through looking at practices which by definition explicitly  
incorporate notions of materiality, immateriality and discursive constructions of appropriateness 
(human (sexual) interactions with material objects, i.e 'fetishism'), I implicitly suggest that this  
assumption should be unpacked not only by querying how these historical discourses perpetuate or 
challenge (hetero)normativities, but by incorporating substantive arguments on the role of discourse 
in the creation of materiality (or vice-versa), and therefore in the construction of human beings,  
thereby in turn interrogating how important human beings are, ontologically-speaking.
Interrogating Materiality and Discourse
By clarifying these relationships, I implicitly question some of the notions on which scholarly 
notions of 'fetishising' and 'reifying' rely. By calling on a kind of radical constructivism, I question 
the purported distinctions between people and objects, thereby implying that people are not  
essentially created by some deific force to be superior to other creatures, nor to the world itself, as 
1169 For example, the desire to be subjected to abuse may reflect abuse in his past, or may simply be an expression of 
empowerment. This cannot be determined objectively, or as having some relation to a psychoanalytic 'lack'. Rather, 
it is, I suggest more important to look at the feelings as they relate to his life now, rather than simply, as in the case 
of psychoanalysis, to unpack the past, which is always filtered through present eyes 
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suggested by historical nature-nurture debates. I further suggest that people are perhaps not 
anthropocentrically the most important beings on the planet, contrary to simplified notions of 
discursive constructions which often imply that language ontologically creates 'being', which by 
implication is impossible without human intervention. This argument is implied in the context of the  
recognition that animals, and even perhaps plants have 'cultures' of their own, and that they are 
therefore no less important than people1170.
Locating Scholarship and Responsibility
In the last three decades, discourse analyses have become the first port of call for scholarly 
reflection in much of the humanities and the social sciences, in particular in the realm of gender and  
sexualities, based on Foucaultian assumptions that culture is discursively created. Through this 
thesis I implicitly suggest that purely discursive reasoning has, however, been a reactionary stance 
to earlier essentialist and dualist thinking, and, as the thesis explicitly argues, tends to undermine  
the role of agency in subjectivities, assuming that people are irreparably discursively constructed. 
Yet, as mentioned above, I suggest that to see human experience in this way is to imply that 
discourse is purely immaterial, which is seen as inherently more important and more powerful than 
material influences, and indeed as constructive of materiality. It is, I argue, to focus on the past, and 
to assume that discourses are their own creature and not subject to collective choices which people 
make, which in turn come out of individual (albeit often normatively prescribed) choices impacted 
on by materially-experienced circumstances.
I suggest therefore that the role of a queer scholarship is not merely, as may be implied by  
discursive analyses of participant contributions, passively to report how discursive constructs and 
normativities are reproduced, but also to reconceive metatheoretical constructs in ways which 
enable political action by avoiding inappropriate normative assumptions underlying professional  
practices (such as those of psycho-medical practitioners). This is not to assume that discursive 
analyses are inappropriate, and therefore that discourse is not immensely powerful in constructing 
reality, but rather that discourses are impacted on by material circumstances and by choices which 
individuals (which include both the participants and scholars) make in the face of dominant 
discourses. Discourse analyses are therefore powerful tools to reveal the ways of the cultural world  
as they stand now, yet not necessarily to construct frameworks for moving forward. 
1170 Which in turn feeds into debates on the role of humans in areas like ecology and global warming. I suggest that 
people are not 'placed' on earth (either by some deific force or through evolutionary change) as either the 'rulers' or  
the stewards of the planet, but rather are an integral part of it and should conceive of all parts of the planet, organic 
and inorganic, with a sense of partnership.
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From Scholarly Location to Political Action
On the face of it, this thesis may look like a mere description of how (sexual) things work and may  
appear to minimise or ignore the profound effects of (hetero)normativities. Yet this is only a surface 
reading. The re-oriented theory for which I argue can and should indeed be mobilised to  
shift heteronormative essentialism and foundationalism which still runs amok, perpetuated, for  
example, by the World Health Organisation, which has not called on queer or phenomenological 
epistemologies. This indeed indicates that these imperatives have not penetrated beyond the borders  
of the few gender studies scholars. 
On the surface this might imply that an appropriate response would be merely to call attention to  
how these discourses inappropriately reproduce heteronormativities. But, I suggest, to do so merely 
itself reproduces dualist ontologies. As I have argued in Chapter 2 and the Interjection, re-phrasing 
metatheory to be explicitly anti-normative itself merely re-sets the same old confrontational battle-
field, rather than creating a value-neutral platform from which to make political shifts through 
mobilising political activity aimed at changing daily practice.
The key to the thesis argument is not the queer and phenomenological epistemological foundations  
on which it is based, which are, after all, no longer really new thinking. I argue, though, that simply  
recognising that human consciousness entails a focus on both discourse and materiality will enable 
us to stop simply regurgitating undesirable positivist claptrap1171. This will not necessarily take 
place by constructing new frameworks for thinking sexualities, but by working with the sound 
premises at our disposal, such as a 'queer phenomenology', which foregrounds lived 
experience1172.
Without pretending that the tedious, restrictive and uninspired heteronormative and patriarchal  
assumptions about the world don't exist, scholars and those who have the power to influence policy 
1171 See Ahmed, S. (2006) Orientations: toward a Queer Phenomenology. In GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
(12:4) 543-574
1172 See chapter 2
See Ahmed, S (2006) Orientations: toward a Queer Phenomenology. In GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
(12:4) 543-574. Calling on Merleau-Ponty's conception of the re-orientation of bodies to become 'vertical', she 
explains how certain feminist philosophers of the body have engaged with phenomenology to see how social 
differences come from the ways in which bodies inhabit spaces and are intercorporeal. 
“Becoming vertical” pertains to Merleau-Ponty's points in The Phenomenology of Perception. See also the work of 
feminists such as Bartky, S (1990) Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression. New 
York: Routledge; Butler, J (1997) Performative Acts and Gender Constitutions: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory. In Conboy, K, Medina, N. & Stanbury, S. (eds) Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and 
Feminist Theory. New York: Columbia University Press; Diprose, R (2003) Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with 
Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas. Albany: State University of New York Press; Grosz, E (1995) Space, Time, 
and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies. New York: Routledge; Young, I.M. (2005) On Female Body 
Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Weiss, G. (1999) Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality. 
New York: Routledge.
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can, I suggest fight normativities on two fronts: through explicit (queer) political action, and 
through a refusal to keep heteropatriarchy alive by diverting focus away from it through adopting 
'presence' based arguments such as those advocated in this thesis. Such arguments, I suggest, 
combats normativity both explicitly, in the face of problematic discursive constructs, and by  
enabling a kind of 're-orientation' similar to that I argue applied to 'fetishists' in Chapter 6, whereby 
they support subjects' acknowledge what is 'present' in their lives, together with what subjects want 
to become, as mediated by both (heteronormative) discourses and the material. In so doing, 
personal and embodied responses to the unusual, which includes non-normative sexual proclivities, 
can inspire, energise and enable the creation of new, healthy personal habits, while still, in more  
appropriate political environments, countering dominant (heteropatriarchal) discourses. This, I  
sugges t wi l l contribute to what Sullivan calls significant, rather than monotonous 
change1173.
This thesis addresses how individuals interact with their socio-political and material environments.  
It therefore suggests approaches on how individuals should be dealt with in the 'safe spaces' of 
psycho-medical assistance. It does not focus on how normativities are perpetuated, and therefore 
how political activity should be mobilised. Yet the implication of the argument is that those in the  
caring professions can, and indeed should, contribute to the empowerment of individuals to 
undertake daily excursions into destabilising heteronormativities, which daily practices are an 
important element of political change, since such practices disrupt what is often seen as the 
impenetrable homogeneity of such discourses. By engaging in individual re-orientation, and 
implementing the appropriate epistemological shifts, everyone can shift paradigms away from 
heteronormativity. Political change can thereby not be tied to activists and politicians alone, but can  
be acknowledged to happen in the interstices of everyday life by everyone, which includes scholars,  
psycho-medical practitioners and sexual subjects. 
At the same time, I suggest that the overt politically pragmatic activism advocated in Chapter 2  
should be mobilised, in order to deal with popular politics, which still relies on majoritarianism,  
which in turn often tends to exclude and marginalise what are mainly conceived of as 'minorities' 
through media representation of unusual sexualities, popular discourses and political rhetoric.
1173 Weiss, G (2002) The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies. In Hypatia vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2002) 
pp187-200, reviewing Sullivan, S. (2001) Living across and through skins: Transactional bodies, pragmatism, and 
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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Closing Thoughts
Clearly the world is not in any essentialist, foundationalist or determinist way made up of  
'majorities' and 'minorities', 'heterosexuals' or 'homosexuals', or 'fetishists' or 'non-fetishists'. Rather, 
it contains six billion or so individuals-in-community, each of whom interacts with the material  
world to navigate his/her way and to make sense of his/her life in the face of powerful discourses.
For the privileged, this might equate to buying property, going to fancy restaurants and jet-setting, 
socially problematic though that may be. For the middle-classes this often equates to buying into 
the discourses which prioritise the (unattainable) accumulation of wealth which contemporary 
popular culture romanticises, whereby big-screen televisions and a 4x4 sports utility vehicles are 
the height of achievement. For the underprivileged this equates to subjecting themselves to 
deprecating performances to obtain and maintain basic survival. Yet to assume that all privileged 
people are not subject to discursive scrutiny and control, and are inherently 'present' in their lives is  
much the same as concomitantly to assume that the underprivileged endure lives of abject  
meaninglessness and misery. All substantive assumptions render human experience deterministic 
and deny people the wonderful singularity of their subjectivities which produce amazing cultural, 
political, social and personal contributions both despite and because of their circumstances.
Overt political activity must, in all good conscience, fight for the redress of inequality in order to  
afford all people similar opportunities. Yet psycho-medical activity (particularly, in the context of  
this thesis, the work of psychiatrists and psychologists) must not presume either that the bourgeois 
sensibilities with which most psychiatric and medical professionals come equipped are the point of  
reference/standard for 'healing', nor that underprivileged people do not take their own circumstances 
and the discourses to which they are subject and work with them in order to fashion some sense of 
meaning and self-worth.
Similarly, in the context of non-normative sexual play, medical professionals cannot assume that 
heteropatriarchal norms are appropriate gauges for life. Whereas some subjects (otherwise 
constructed as 'fetishists') explore their lives in a sexual context through the explicit and conscious  
non-normative use of material objects, others do so implicitly, for example by offering a flower to a  
loved one. Whether such individuals are privileged or underprivileged, (hetero)sexually central or  
(homo)sexually peripheral, the only foundation on which to base any psycho-medical assistance is 
surely through enabling those subjects to be 'present' as embodied beings in the face of discourses  
which continuously tell all people that they are not valuable, and calling attention to their lives as  
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they are, not as they can/should/might be. Such lives are not merely fantasies, psychically-based  
feelings or ideas, but are subjective experientially and phenomenologically based 'presence'.
As is apparent through performance art exhibitions like that of Marina Abramović, these individuals 
are better phrased and better assisted in being present in their lives and therefore in appreciating the  
experience through destabilising notions of the spectacular and the specular: by creating spaces for  
them in which to be both the viewer and the viewed, in dialogic conversation with the phenomenal  
world, rather than under either the (hetero)normative microscope of psychopathology or the 
discursive erasure of their uniqueness and complexity.
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ADDENDUM 1
FREUDIAN FETISHISM
Freud discussed Fetishism in various commentaries1174. His views were seen through the processes 
of ego splitting and disavowal, as well as defence and repression.
Ego-Splitting, Disavowal and Fetishism: a Brief Explanation 
Freud's construction of Ego-Splitting and Disavowal defines fetishism in relation to what is seen as 
an inappropriate adult response to castration anxiety. This translates into a fear of the absence/
removal of the penis, qua object, which, through psychical mechanisms, remains both lost and 
found.
Freud saw non-pathological ego-splitting as a general principle of all psychopathology, which 
principle is exemplified by ‘Fetishism’1175. As a result of their inability to conceive of someone 
similar to them without a penis, boys consistently try to see themselves, or a mirror image of  
themselves, in others in the face of their mother's penile lack, through a refusal to recognize that 
women have no penis, and a belief that they see one1176. This process is not uncommon and not 
dangerous in children, but in adults indicates psychosis1177.
The adult 'fetishist' continues with this immature reaction to perceived differences between male 
1174 See http://www.ncf.edu/hassold/FinDeSiecle/freud_fetishism.htm, compiled by Cris Hassold 
Professor of Art History, New College of Florida, from Freud, Sigmund. (1928) "Fetishism." vol. 21 in Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.: 152-157. He notes that “this is a seminal 
psychoanalytic discussion of fetishism which claims that a fetish both acknowledges and denies the maternal 
phallus. The fetish acts as a substitute for what was not there when the male child first encountered his, mother's 
body, the maternal penis. Freud goes on to say that the fetish is a substitute for the Mother's penis and wards off the 
castration that the child "saw" and feared for himself when he did not find a penis on the body of his mother who 
must have been castrated.”
See 'Fetischismus." First published Int. Z. Psychoanal., 13 (1927), 373; reprinted Ges. Schr., 11, 395; and Ges. W., 
14, 311. Translation, reprinted from Int. J. Psychoanal., 9 (1928), 161; by Joan Riviere.; Freud's paper on 
"Repression" (1915b). General Psychological Theory. Collier Books edition AS 582V.; "Neurosis and 
Psychosis" (1924a) and The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis (1924c).;  Freud reverted to the subject of 
fetishism later, in 1938. See An Outline of Psychoanalysis (London, 1949), 73 ff.
1175 Bass, Alan. (2000) Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press
1176 Note that girls, on the other hand, “disavow” their lack of penis. See Freud, S in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted 
by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, 24 vols. London: The Hogarth Press, 1953–1974. Vol XIX, 143–44; see 
Rottenberg, E (2000) A Testament to Disaster. In MLN 115 (2000): 941–973 Johns Hopkins University Press, pp951 
& 952
1177 Freud, ibid, vol XIX, 252; see Rottenberg, ibid, pp950
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and female anatomies, thereby retaining two incompatible positions. The fetish therefore substitutes  
“for a particular and quite special penis that had been extremely important . . . but had later been  
lost”, i.e. the mother’s (woman’s) missing penis, in such way that the penis remains both lost and 
found1178.
As a psychological defence, Kaplan understands disavowal as ‘having it both ways” and as “the 
sine non qua (sic) of sexual fetishism’, which allows the fetishist to disregard reality and continue 
believing in an imagined construct1179. In disavowal, the fetishist does not “scotomise”, but creates a 
blind spot where the perception continues1180.
The fetishist therefore sees and does not see at the same time, holding onto the belief that women 
have a penis and he has given it up1181. The child ‘fetishist’ is caught between the id and reality, and 
is compelled either to acknowledge a real danger, give in to it and deny an instinct satisfaction, or to  
‘disavow’ reality and choose to believe there is no reason for fear, in order to hold onto satisfaction. 
Here the ego does not choose be tween the id and rea l i ty, but holds both 
together1182.
Freud sees Fetish as an ‘oscillation’ between two contradictory reactions, both of which remain 
valid and effective. However, he maintains that this oscillation is “only possible under the 
dominance of the unconscious laws of thought—the primary process”1183. As the child grows, life 
1178 Freud, ibid, vol XXI, 152; see Rottenberg, ibid, pp 968
1179 Kaplan, LJ. (1991) Cultures of Fetishism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp27-28
1180 scotomising is a neurotic and pathological process equated with repression, where the incompatible reality is 
“entirely wiped out, so that the result is the same as when a visual impression falls on the blind spot in the retina 
[auf den blinden Fleck der Netzhaut]. Freud, ibid, vol X, 153–54; see Rottenberg, ibid, pp952.
1181 Note that throughout this section I refer to the fetishist as 'he/him', both because of Freud's construction of the fetish 
in patriarchal terms whereby the female fetishist is not conceived of, and because the current research deals  
specifically with gay men.
1182 Freud, S. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey in 
collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, 24 vols. London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1953–1974.  Vol XXIII, 275; see Rottenberg, E (2000) A Testament to Disaster. In 
MLN 115 (2000): 941–973 Johns Hopkins University Press, pp952
1183 Freud, S. ibid vol XXI, 154; see Rottenberg, ibid, pp952, (Rottenberg’s emphasis) His description of the psyche in 
terms of primary and secondary processes date from early in his work. In the 1895 Project for a Scientific 
Psychology, Freud notes the distinction between “primary psychic processes,” where “wishful cathexis tends toward 
hallucination, which in turn entails the full development of unpleasure and defense,” from “secondary processes,” 
which involve “a moderation of the foregoing . . . through the correct evaluation of reality-signs”. He noted that, in 
primary processes, wish-fulfillment and defense work together: [t]he wishful state results in a positive attraction 
towards the object wished for, or, more precisely, towards its mnemic image; the experience of pain leads to 
repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile image cathected. Here we have primary wishful attraction and 
primary defense.
The pleasure principle regulates the idea of the primary process in this context. In Chapter VII of The Interpretation 
of Dreams (1900) he uses the example of a hungry baby hallucinating the breast. Here the baby’s wishing replaces 
hunger with images of satisfaction; and at the same time prevents an ‘investment or cathexis’ in the painful 
experience. Wishing makes what Freud refers to as “a perceptual identity” (Wahrnehmungsidentität) by destroying 
the difference between memory and perception. The child repeats the perception connected to its prior sense of  
satisfaction, getting back the psychical rest state (psychische Ruhezustand).
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experiences force the psyche to create a secondary way of doing things (the 
secondary process).1184 In fetish the primary process defense does away with the ‘disagreeable’ 
reality of genital difference, and the fetish makes reality ‘agreeable’ again. Disavowal therefore uses 
primary process wish fulfilment or fantasy, in a delusional way, to correct the unpleasant 
reality1185.
Freud acknowledges that the fetish is not a neurosis, since disavowal successfully wards off the 
‘reality’ of genital difference, i.e. the mother’s missing penis, which must be there, failing which the 
castration possibility is real1186. The fetish is therefore created in order “to destroy 
the evidence for the possibility of castration”1187.
Defense and Repression
‘ D e f e n c e ’ a n d ‘ R e p r e s s i o n ’ a r e p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g  F r e u d i a n 
'Fetishism'1188.
Freud saw fetish as a defence, which describes how the ego struggles against incompatibility which 
takes place as experiences, representations, or sensations. This incompatibility distresses the ego so 
much that its only recourse is to protect itself by denying what has happened. Although Freud 
replaced 'defence' with “repression,” the former resurfaced in his later work (Inhibitions, Symptoms 
and Anxiety) as a way to restrict “repression”, where this latter form of “defense” referred to all 
defensive processes, including “repression” as a separate idea.
1184 Freud, S, ibid, vol. XII, 219; see Rottenberg, ibid, pp955 The child moves from a closed and self-contained and self–
regulated system, through being forced to recognize and confront reality which stands in the way of its pleasure (the 
reality principle). 
“[T]he non-appearance [das Ausbleiben]” of the expected satisfaction, the failure of the psyche to defend against an 
increase of tension by way of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment (primary process) forces the psychical apparatus to 
change its defensive strategy. “A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was presented in 
the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable”
1185 Freud, S, ibid, vol. XII, 219; see Rottenberg, ibid, pp955 Freud maintained that the primary processes don’t 
disappear as we grow, but rather they remain in our dreams and “our waking tendency to tear ourselves away from 
distressing impressions”, as well as in disavowal. In this respect the term ‘primary’ does not indicate that it is 
replaced by the secondary process, but rather is something that must remain in balance with the secondary process 
by means of a knowledge of the ‘fiction’ of an unbridgeable gap between an experience of satisfaction 
(i.e. a perception) and the ‘hallucination’ of the memory of satisfaction. This implies that reality has been registered 
and rejected. This further implies that almost but not quite realizing a self-sufficient psychical system is recognizing 
the dependence of the primary process on something that is equally, if not more primary 
(i.e. the secondary process).
1186 Freud, S, ibid, vol XXI, 152 Rottenberg, ibid, pp957
1187 Freud, S, ibid, vol XXIII, 203; see Rottenberg, ibid, pp957
1188 For a fuller explanation, see Rottenberg, E (2000) A Testament to Disaster. In MLN 115 (2000): 941–973 Johns 
Hopkins University Press
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Freud's idea of a defense against the incompatible reflects a reaction so extreme that the ego is in an  
impossible situation. The ego must forget the distress in order to survive, which Freud considered 
impossible, leading to various conditions defined as pathological, such as hysteria, obsession or 
hallucinatory psychosis. Yet in these instances, the ego remembers the distress, does not force away 
the incompatibility and survives through ego-splitting, which functions to separate the  
representation from its effect, and turn a strong representation into a weak one. Obsessional 
neuroses dislodge or transpose the affect from its original representation.
A third way to deal with incompatible representation by banishing it from consciousness, along with 
its affect, resulting treating the representation as if it hadn’t happened. This however results in  
psychosis, and hallucinatory confusion.
In the case of neurosis, the superego, influenced by the external world, commands the ego, which in  
turn represses the id, denying a strong instinctual impulse, thereby refusing to help the impulse find  
a motor outlet, or denying the impulse an object. The ego sides with the superego against the id, 
based on the idea that the demands of the superego are stronger than the impulses of the id. The 
superego acts as a mediator between the inside and the outside the psyche, but prioritises ‘reality’  
over the drives of the id.
In psychosis, however, the disturbance is more extreme. Here, repression is ineffective and the 
external world remains out of consciousness and perception. With amentia, the ego refuses to accept 
new perceptions and of its own accord it creates a new world as per the impulses of the id. In 
psychosis, the powers of the superego are overwhelmed, and delusion occurs
Since the present research is conducted in relation to consensual, conscious and willing participants 
in sexual fetish, at this point it is not necessary to explore ‘psychical illnesses’ such as obsessional 
neurosis.
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ADDENDUM 2
THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATIONS OF MENTAL AND 
BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS
From the World Health Organisation Website 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/?gf60.htm+f681
Chapter V 
Mental and behavioural disorders  (F00-F99)
Disorders of adult personality and behaviour  
(F60-F69)
This block includes a variety of conditions and behaviour patterns of clinical significance which tend to be 
persistent and appear to be the expression of the individual's characteristic lifestyle and mode of relating to 
himself or herself and others. Some of these conditions and patterns of behaviour emerge early in the course 
of individual development, as a result of both constitutional factors and social experience, while others are 
acquired later in life. Specific personality disorders (F60.-), mixed and other personality disorders (F61.-), 
and enduring personality changes (F62.-) are deeply ingrained and enduring behaviour patterns, manifesting 
as inflexible responses to a broad range of personal and social situations. They represent extreme or 
significant deviations from the way in which the average individual in a given culture perceives, thinks, feels 
and, particularly, relates to others. Such behaviour patterns tend to be stable and to encompass multiple 
domains of behaviour and psychological functioning. They are frequently, but not always, associated with 
various degrees of subjective distress and problems of social performance.
Disorders of sexual preference:
Includes:
paraphilias 
F65.0 Fetishism
Reliance on some non-living object as a stimulus for sexual arousal and sexual gratification. Many 
fetishes are extensions of the human body, such as articles of clothing or footwear. Other common examples 
are characterized by some particular texture such as rubber, plastic or leather. Fetish objects vary in their 
importance to the individual. In some cases they simply serve to enhance sexual excitement achieved in 
ordinary ways (e.g. having the partner wear a particular garment).
F65.1 Fetishistic transvestism
The wearing of clothes of the opposite sex principally to obtain sexual excitement and to create the 
appearance of a person of the opposite sex. Fetishistic transvestism is distinguished from transsexual 
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transvestism by its clear association with sexual arousal and the strong desire to remove the clothing once 
orgasm occurs and sexual arousal declines. It can occur as an earlier phase in the development of 
transsexualism.
Transvestic fetishism 
F65.2 Exhibitionism
A recurrent or persistent tendency to expose the genitalia to strangers (usually of the opposite sex) or 
to people in public places, without inviting or intending closer contact. There is usually, but not invariably, 
sexual excitement at the time of the exposure and the act is commonly followed by masturbation.
F65.3 Voyeurism
A recurrent or persistent tendency to look at people engaging in sexual or intimate behaviour such as 
undressing. This is carried out without the observed people being aware, and usually leads to sexual 
excitement and masturbation.
F65.4 Paedophilia
A sexual preference for children, boys or girls or both, usually of prepubertal or early pubertal age.
F65.5 Sadomasochism
A preference for sexual activity which involves the infliction of pain or humiliation, or bondage. If 
the subject prefers to be the recipient of such stimulation this is called masochism; if the provider, sadism. 
Often an individual obtains sexual excitement from both sadistic and masochistic activities.
Masochism 
Sadism
F65.6 Multiple disorders of sexual preference
Sometimes more than one abnormal sexual preference occurs in one person and there is none of first 
rank. The most common combination is fetishism, transvestism and sadomasochism.
F65.8 Other disorders of sexual preference
A variety of other patterns of sexual preference and activity, including making obscene telephone 
calls, rubbing up against people for sexual stimulation in crowded public places, sexual activity with 
animals, and use of strangulation or anoxia for intensifying sexual excitement.
Frotteurism 
Necrophilia 
F65.9 Disorder of sexual preference, unspecified
Sexual deviation not otherwise specified
311
 
 
 
 
ADDENDUM 3
PARTICIPANT RECORDS OF HOMOPHOBIA AMONGST 
MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS
Certain participants report judgmental medical responses to their sexuality, albeit in subtle ways.  
“it's hard to describe...when you say medical professional, it's a general practitioner which is my only 
contact with medical practitioners. You go there because you're sick with flu, but your partner takes you. 
And of course he can see that you're a couple, and you get that feeling that he's not as ... he has to like  
touch you, and it's like you pick up that this guy is uncomfortable with you purely because he assumes 
that you're homosexual. ... Where I know... fortunately I haven't been in a position where I have to go to a 
doctor and say “listen, check this out”, or “do this” or whatever, because I've picked up something. If I 
have to do something like that I would definitely make sure that I go to a gay doctor, for sure. Because I  
would feel that if I were to go to any other guy, that won't accept me or my lifestyle or how I got what I  
did... ja, I would feel intimidated by it...” ('Brian')
Even in the absence of overt psychopathologising of sexuality/sexual orientation on the part of  
mental health/medical professionals, participants have often felt guilt/shame pertaining to their  
fetish sexuality, and/or being gay, or at least feel the need to be discrete about their sexuality due to  
the risk of public censure:
Qu: Have you ever felt bad, guilty, shameful, about your sexuality/sexual orientation ?
“yes. When I was a lot younger, definitely, and I would ascribe that to a lot of religious guilt, because you  
know, you've been told that it's wrong to be gay, sinful, God hates you, God will punish you, etc etc. And 
you ... once you've just come down from that euphoric high from an orgasm, the guilt starts setting in, you  
start feeling “I'm so bad, I'm so bad, I shouldn't have done that, will God forgive me?” Once you can get  
over that, then... but ja, I have felt guilty...” ('Brian')
“Yes.  I grew up in an ultra-conservative Afrikaner Church-going home.  ... Acceptance of being gay ...  
took a while.  I never discussed my fetishes with the therapist, but not being ashamed came with the 
general acceptance of being gay.” ('Donald')
“well, with my religion, a good catholic boy, I would automatically feel bad about my sexual orientation, 
but I've come to grips, not... come to an understanding with that. Um, I accept myself as I am. 
Qu: and how did you change... how did that acceptance happen?
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“I think it was a case of I realised I would never ever be different to what I am. Right?  As a good Catholic  
boy I would say you're gonna have to go to confession every week. But every week you're going to  
confession, you're saying the same things. You've done the same things. And you're gonna be doing that til 
the end of your life. Um, when you come down to it, Christ came to die for sinners, not for  
saints.” ('Henry')
“I wouldn’t say I’ve ever felt bad or guilty for being gay and having certain fetishes, but what I will agree  
to is having been very discreet about it in the past – mainly to due public opinion and persecution. I used 
to feel embarrassed by the names I was called. It really hurt since I never really had the strength, of  
character and body, to withstand the attacks .... I never felt accepted anywhere and knew that I didn’t fit in 
anywhere. Today it’s a different story as I’m older now, a little bit wiser to the world and a lot more  
confident in myself. I have built up my body and have gained respect for that, even from strangers. My 
confidence levels have improved (though it can be stronger, or longer as in the case of my dick) and I 
think this is mainly due to the fact that I have accepted myself for who I am: I have been my own worst  
sexual enemy and there was a period from the age of about 27 to 32 where I thought my sexual prime was 
over and that I have lost that desire. Today, at 35, I have never had such a prolific sex life (mainly with  
established partners – being very careful) and I am very proud to say that I am an extreme gay fetishist, 
beginning to live the dream at last.” ('Jason')
“in the beginning there was (a sense of shame), ... Before I came out and I realised I was gay, there was a  
huge sense of shame when I got chatted up by gay people. And the same was with the fetish. It was a very  
much hidden away, .... You know, ... my parents were fairly elderly, they were 40 when I was born, so in  
terms of generations, there was a generation missing, so we never got sexual education... and I think that  
was it: it was always restricted, it was always hidden, and even now, I mean, even up until a few years 
ago, when I came it was instantly clean up and hide everything away and run away. And it's only now that  
I've got into exploring myself more, and realising, and seeing porn videos and seeing how it's not a 
disgusting thing to have cum all over your chest.” ('Jared')
“I think in the beginning you do. Ja, when you realise you're gay you always think somewhere something 
is wrong. And especially coming out of an Afrikaans home, and ja, very conservative... so in a way you  
do, especially the first few times I played I felt very very guilty. But after that, no. Especially once the 
family  knew about it, they accept me for who I am. So ja. I don't have a problem there now.” ('Karl')
“When I was coming to terms with who I was in my teens, I struggled to accept that I was gay, mainly  
because of what society’s point of view on it was as well as religious upbringing. In realising I couldn’t  
live my life to make others happy I accepted who I was and realised I’m just as entitled to be happy as  
everyone else.” ('Simon')
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ADDENDUM 4
NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS
4a:
Mthethwa, B (2008) “It's still not OK to be gay in SA: Survey shows 80% of population is 
prejudiced against same-sex relationships”. In The Sunday Times, 23 November 2008, Page 24
4b: 
Qwelane, J (2008) Call me names, but gay is NOT OK. In The Sunday Sun, Sunday 20 July 2008
4c: 
Evans, S (2010) Minister Slams 'Porn' Exhibition. In The Times, Monday 1 March 2010
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Date : November, 23 , 2008 Publication : Sunday Times Page Number: 24 
It s stiE not ok to be gay in SA 
Survey shows 80% of population is prejudiced against same-sex relationships 
BONGANI MTHETHWA 
SOUTH Africans may legally 
embrace same­sex marriages, 
but deep down an overwhelming 
majority are homophobic. 
The annual South African So­
cial Attitudes Survey, which was 
conducted by the Human Sci­
ences Research Council, to be 
released tomorrow, shows that a 
staggering 80% of South Africans 
are still largely prejudiced 
against rather than accepting of 
gay and lesbian relationships. 
Thm Sludj '• 'ted by Ben 
K • • NM .aiv. ■'■ 
that5: ftweenftfflg I2007moi> 
than 80% of the population con 
sistently felt that sex between 
two men or two women was 
always wrong. It also found that 
gays and lesbians were char­
acterised as "un­African" and 
that intolerance towards homo­
sexuality was prevalent. 
South Africa was ranked 
alongside countries such as 
Chile and the Philippines, where intolerance towards gays and lesbians was more than five times higher than in the Netherlands. 
The study, conducted annu­ally since 2003, with sample sizes ranging from 3164 to 5 843, used a national represen­tative sample of respondents 
among those older than 24. 
"However, it's important not 
to overstate the scope of the 
age differences, especially since 
in most instances more than 
80% of the various age groups 
over all five years held negative 
views," said Roberts. 
Views on same­sex relations 
appear to be closely related to 
The view that homosexuality is 
un-African implies that African culture 
Is somehow unique to all other cultures' 
aged 16 and older. 
The researchers found that, in 
the four years between 2003 and 
2006, 16 to 24 year olds were 
significantly less likely to voice 
their disapproval of same­sex 
relations than middle­aged and 
older groups. There were some 
indications that attitudes began 
softening after 2005, especially 
education, with highly educated 
people being more tolerant. 
Black South Africans report­
ed slightly higher levels of 
disapproval than whites and 
coloureds in most of the survey 
rounds. The most negative at­
titudes were found in rural ar­
eas, among those living on com­
mercial farms and in communal 
areas, while less negative at­titudes were observed in formal urban areas. 
Yet, given the still high level of intolerance in urban areas, com­bined with relative proximity to gay and lesbian communities, the potential for hate crimes in such areas was likely to be high. 
Reddy said labelling homo­sexuality as "un­African" was part of a culture of denial and a "hostile" response to its exis­tence. "It's an attempt to tell African gays and lesbians to 'go back into the closet' because you're a 'disgrace' to African culture," he said. 
Reddy said this attitude was also linked to the stereotyped view of homosexuality as a European and Western form of perversion, "something that colonisers brought with them to contaminate African culture". 
"This attitude still exists de­spite openly gay and lesbian Africans speaking out about 
their sexuality. The view that 
homosexuality is un­African im­
plies that African culture is 
somehow unique to all other 
cultures," said Reddy. 
Johannesburg clinical psy­
chologist Kevin Joubert said al­
though it was easy to change the 
law, it was very difficult to 
change people's attitudes. 
In one narrative in the / sto­
ries, published by Gender Links, 
Marco Ndlovu, a 39­year­old 
black lesbian from Pietermar­
itzburg, said: "As a lesbian, hate, 
violence and misogyny follow 
me wherever I go. 1 became 
pregnant as a result of being 
raped by a man I believed to be a 
friend. I've been beaten almost 
to pulp because of my sexual 
orientation, at the instigation of 
none other than my mother." 
In July last year, Sizakele 
Sigasa and her friend Salome 
Masooa were tortured, raped 
and brutally murdered in Sowe­
to. Sigasa was an outreach co­
WEDDING PLANS: Andre-B v Wyk and Wayne Scott plan to get married next year despite South Africans' 
prejudice against gay couples Picture: JACKIE CLAUSEN 
ordinator for the Positive Wom­
en's Network, a lesbian rights 
organisation. The network said 
their murders appeared to be 
hate crime. 
Pretty Makhanya, an organ­
iser at the Lesbian and Gay 
Equality Project, said: "It's a fact 
that lesbians and gays are get­
ting killed out there and nothing 
has been done about 30 cases 
of gender violence. Homophobia 
is still alive and kicking." — 
mthethwab@sundaytimes.co.za 
TELL US: Why are South 
Africans so intolerant of 
same-sex relationships? 
Write to 
tellus@sundaytimes.co.za 
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THE opening of an exhibition by
young,'black women artists at Con-
stitution Hill turned sour when
Arts and Culture Minister Lulu
Xingwana stormed out of the ex-
hibition, calling the work "im-
moral".
Xingwana, whose department
gave RIl00 000 to the Innooatiue
W@nen exhibition, which was
launched in Johannesburg to co-
incide with Women's Dav last Au-
gust, left before she wis due to
speak at the opening.
The Times understands that after
she saw a series of photographs by
prominent artist and lesbian ac-
tivist Zanele Muholi, of naked,
black women embracing each oth-
er, Xingwana slammed the work as
Minister refuses toopen exhibition after she is given preview ofphotographs
"pornographic",
spoke to her
aides, and left in a
huff. Her person-
al assistant read
out her speech.
Yesterday,
Xingwana con_-
firmed that she
had "indeed" left
the event without
addressing the
gathering.
In a statement
read by her
spokeswoman
Lisa Combrinck,
Xingwana said:
"Our mandate is
to promote social
cohesion and na-
tion building. I
left the exhibition
because it expressed the very op-
posite of this.
Combrinck
said: "Minister
Xingwana was al-
so concerned that
there were chil-
dren present at
the event and
that children
should not be ex-
posed to some of
the images on ex-
hibit."
The Times un-
derstands that
the day after the
opening, Xing-
wana complained
to staff at Consti
tution Hill about
the "pornograph-
ic" content of the
art on display.
Insiders, who
"It was immoral, offensive and spoke to The Times on condition ofgoing against nation-building." anonymity, said Xingwana did not
like the images of women posing as
couples.
However, Xingwana denied that
any such complaints were relayed
to Constitution Hill.
The Innouatiue Women exhibi
tion featured work by 10 artists
including Muholi, photographer
Nandipha Mntambo, and painter
Bongi Bengu, who also curated
the exhibition.
The exhibition was also shown in
Durban and Cape Town.
'While 
viewing the artwork, Xing-
wana appeared most upset by the
work of Muholi and Mntambo.
which deals with intimacy between
women.
Speaking to The Times from
the US where she is exhibiting
and lecturing, Muholi said she
was "very disturbed" by Xing-
wana's views.
O Continued on Page 4
SAIY EVANS
ZANELE MUHOLI LULU XINGWANA
 
 
 
 
'Immoral, offensive and against nation-building
ALL-EMBRACING: Three of Zanele Muholi's photographs, as they appeared in the catalogue for the exhibition 'Innovative Women'
O From Page I
"There is nothing pornographic.
We live in a space where rape is a
common thing, so there is nothing
we can hide from our children.
"Those pictures are based on
experience and issues. Where else
can we express ourselves if not in
our democratic country?"
"Children need to know about
these things. A lot of people who
have no understanding of sexual
orientation, people are suffering
in silence," Muholi said.
"We need to educate people
about homosexuality. We need to
have very good treatment and re-
spect from the minister."
The Times has learned that af-
ter the exhibition opening, Xing-
wana demanded to know why it
was not censored and why her
department had contributed
Ri|00 000 to it.
Although Xingwana denies this,
three insiders told The Times thal
after the department's lawyers
found nothing pornographic about
the art, she then called in lawyers
from a Pretoria law firm to "in-
spect" the work. Insiders said they
were flown to Cape Town for the
opening of the exhibition there to
decide whether the art was "suit-
able as art or not".
The exhibiting artists told The
Times many artists feel there is no
place for them in South Africa.
'It is worrisome to
artists that what we
do will be censored'
One said: "It is worrisome to
artists that everything we do is
going to be censored.
"There is no room for us in
South Africa, so we are having
to relocate overs€as, where our
work is recognised and appreci-
ated because sadly it is not in
South Africa."
Mntambo, who did not attend
the exhibition opening, said she
found Xingwana's views "irritat-
ing and sad".
"I was quite surprised by what
happened. I actually found outjust
after I had done a presentation on
censorship," she said.
Mntambo said she received
funding from international spon-
sors or from private individuals.
"I don't even apply for funding
from the department. I like being
Pictures: ZANELE MUHOLI
able to do what I want to do, it's
really important," she said.
In the exhibition's catalogue,
Muholi's artwork has been de-
scribed as being "without prece-
dent in South Africa. where there
are very few instances of black
women openly portraying female
same-sex practices."
HAVE YOUR SAY
Do you think the pictures
are pornographic?
tellus@thetimes.co.za
orsMs339n hNMs@sb
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ApoLoeY FoR Naming rapist 'clarion call for abused girls'
 
 
 
 
